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HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW-AN INTRODUCTION
VED P. NANDA*
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of human rights, a powerful idea indeed, has stirred the imagination
of people all over the world; it has revolutionized the status of individuals and
groups under international law. This is especially evident in the case of women
and children, as specific treaties-the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women ("CEDAW")' and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child ("CRC") 2-are aimed at transforming the status of women and
children respectively. These treaties have been widely ratified by states,3 and thus
states have accepted binding obligations to comply with the treaties implementing
the rights enumerated in these treaties. Notwithstanding the wider ratification and
the broad scope of the rights under these treaties, women and children still suffer
severe violations of basic human rights.
II. WOMEN AND CHILDREN HAVE LAGGED BEHIND IN THE ENJOYMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
To test the veracity of this statement, a reliable yardstick is to measure
achievements in the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals
("MDGs") concerning women and children. It may be recalled that in September
4.2000, U.N. Member States adopted the Millennium Declaration, in which they
resolved that by the year 2015 "children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be
able to complete a full course of primary schooling and that girls and boys will
* John Evans University Professor, University of Denver; Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law and
Director, Ved Nanda Center for International and Comparative Law, University of Denver Sturm
College of Law.
1. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979,
1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
2. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
3. United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Dec. 18, 1979), available at
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=1V-8&chapter-4&lang-en
(last visited Aug. 25, 2014) (there are 188 states parties to the CEDAW as of August 25, 2014); United
Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Convention on the Rights of the
Child (Nov. 20, 1989), available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsgno=IV-
I I&chapter-4&lang-en (last visited Aug. 25, 2014) (there are 194 states parties to the CRC as of
August 25, 2014).
4. United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. AIRES/55/2 (Sept. 8,
2000).
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have equal access to all levels of education."5 By the same date, they resolved, "to
have reduced maternal mortality by three quarters, and under-five child mortality
by two thirds, of their current rates." 6  Also, by then they undertook to have
"halted, and begun to reverse, the spread of HIV/AIDS, the scourge of malaria and
other major diseases that afflict humanity."7  They also resolved "[t]o promote
gender equality and the empowerment of women as effective ways to combat
poverty, hunger and disease and to stimulate development that is truly
sustainable."8
The following summer, a group of staff members from the U.N., World Bank,
International Monetary Fund, and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development drafted a set of goals highlighting key commitments in the
Millennium Declaration. The selection criteria included existing established
indicators and reasonable data for those indicators. The process resulted in a
framework. Aimed at reducing extreme poverty in its many dimensions, this
framework, which contained eight human development goals to be reached by the
end of 2015, with eighteen targets and forty-eight indicators, became the
Millennium Development Goals framework.9 Although the role of women and
children is significant in the achievement of all eight goals, the goals specifically
referring to them are:
Goal 2 - Achieve universal primary education
Goal 3 - Promote gender equality and empower women
Goal 4 - Reduce child mortality
Goal 5 - Improve maternal health
Goal 6 - Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases'o
With a year and a half to go till the end of 2015, the scorecard shows that,
while several MDGs have already been met or are within close reach, many for
women and children have not." Three recent reports and studies-by the
Commission on the Status of Women (March 2014),12 the Millennium
5. Id. 119.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. 1120.
9. What They Are, U.N. MILLENNIUM PROJECT, http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/goals (last
visited Aug. 25, 2014) [hereinafter U.N. MILLENNIUM PROJECT]; see also Official List of MDG
Indicators, UNITED NATIONS STAT. DIVISION,
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=lndicators/OfficialList.htm (last updated Jan. 15,
2008).
10. U.N. MILLENNIUM PROJECT, supra note 9.
11. See U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
REPORT 2014, at 5 (2014) [hereinafter MDGS REPORT 2014], available at
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2014%20MDG%/o20report/MDG%202014%2OEnglish%20web.pdf.
12. Challenges and Achievements in the Implementation ofthe Millennium Development Goals for
Women and Girls, Comm'n on the Status of Women, 58th Sess., Mar. 10-21, 2014, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.6/2014/L.7 (Mar. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Status of Women Report].
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Development Goals Report 2014,13 and the Human Development Report 201414_
provide ample evidence. It seems appropriate to discuss them in detail.
The Commission on the Status of Women reported at its 58th session in
March 2014 "that almost 15 years after the Millennium Development Goals were
adopted, no country has achieved equality for women and girls and significant
levels of inequality between women and men persist, although the Goals are
important in efforts to eradicate poverty and of key importance to the international
community."15 With regard to Goal 2-achieving universal primary education-
the Commission noted
the lack of progress in closing gender gaps in access to, retention in and
completion of secondary education, which has been shown to contribute
more strongly than primary school attendance to the achievement of
gender equality, the empowerment of women and the human rights of
women and girls and several positive social and economic outcomes. 16
Regarding Goal 3-promoting gender equality and empowering women-the
Commission noted that
progress has been slow, with persistent gender disparities in some
regions in secondary and tertiary education enrolment; the lack of
economic empowerment, autonomy and independence for women,
including a lack of integration into the formal economy, unequal access
to full and productive employment and decent work, . . .
overrepresentation in low-paid jobs and gender-stereotyped jobs such as
domestic and care work, and the lack of equal pay for equal work or
work of equal value ... .7
As to Goal 4-reducing child mortality-the Commission noted that "targets
are likely to be missed."' 8 It further noted
with deep concern that increasingly, child deaths are concentrated in the
poorest regions and in the first month of life, and further expresse[d]
concern that children are at greater risk of dying before the age of 5 if
they are born in rural and remote areas or to poor households.' 9
Regarding Goal 5-improving maternal health-the Commission noted that
"progress towards its two targets, reducing maternal mortality and achieving
universal access to reproductive health, has been particularly slow and uneven,
13. MDGs REPORT 2014, supra note 11.
14. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014, SUSTAINING
HUMAN PROGRESS: REDUCING VULNERABILITIES AND BUILDING RESILIENCE (2014) [HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014], available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdrl4-report-en-I.pdf.
15. Status of Women Report, supra note 12, I 12.
16. Id. 120.
17. Id. 121.
18. Id. 122.
19. Id.
1032014
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especially for the poorest and rural sectors of the population, within and across
countries." 20
With regards to Goal 6-combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases-
the Commission said "progress has been limited, with the number of women living
with HIV increasing globally since 2001."21 It also noted "the particular
vulnerability to HIV infection of adolescent girls and young women, as well as
other women and girls who are at a higher risk," and stressed "that structural
gender inequalities and violence against women and girls undermine effective HIV
responses and the need to give full attention to increasing the capacity of women
and adolescent girls to protect themselves from the risk of HIV infection." 22 it
further noted "the challenges faced by women and girls living with HIV and AIDS,
including stigma, discrimination and violence." 23 In the Commission's view,
"despite increased global and national investments in malaria control, . . . malaria
prevention and control efforts, particularly for pregnant women, must rapidly
increase in order to achieve the Goals."24
While the Commission observed "that the lack of adequate sanitation facilities
disproportionately affects women and girls, including their participation rates in
the labour force and school, and increases their vulnerability to violence," 25 it
found "the development resources . . . [supporting] gender equality and women's
empowerment . . . inadequate to the task." 26 It expressed concern that the MDGs
did not adequately address critical issues such as
violence against women and girls; child, early and forced marriage;
women's and girls' disproportionate share of unpaid work,. . . women's
access to decent work, the gender wage gap, employment in the
informal sector, low-paid and gender-stereotyped work such as domestic
and care work; women's equal access to, control and ownership of
assets and productive resources, including land, energy and fuel, and
women's inheritance rights; women's sexual and reproductive health,
and reproductive rights ... . 27
The Commission also recognized "that progress on the [MDGs] for women
and girls ha[d] been limited owing to the lack of systematic gender mainstreaming
and integration of a gender perspective in the design, implementation, monitoring
and evaluation of the Goals." 28
The Commission made several recommendations regarding the realization of
women's and girls' full enjoyment of all human rights: strengthening the enabling
environment for gender equality and the empowerment of women, maximizing
20. Id. 11 23.
21. Id. 1124.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. 1125.
26. Id. 1 26.
27. Id. 1 28.
28. Id. 1 37.
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investment in gender equality and the empowerment of women and strengthening
the evidence base for that, ensuring women's participation and leadership at all
levels, and strengthening accountability. 29
In a public statement on the Commission's recommendations, Amnesty
International especially welcomed the Commission's call "for a standalone goal on
gender equality" for inclusion in the set of development goals to follow the MDGs
in the post-2015 development agenda. 30 In its 2013 report, entitled Rights Should
Be Central to Post-2015 Development Agenda, Human Rights Watch specifically
proposed that:
The post-2015 agenda should promote gender equality and
women's rights, including through a requirement on governments to
work to end gender discrimination and promote equality in their laws,
policies, and practices. It should also require governments to prevent
and punish violence against women and ensure adequate services for
victims of abuse.3'
The Millennium Development Goals Report 2014 examined the latest progress
toward achieving the MDGs and also pointed to significant gaps and disparities.
For example, one in four children under five years of age in the world suffers from
inadequate height for her/his age.32 On the goal of achieving universal primary
education, the report concludes that although impressive strides forward were
made at the start of the decade, "progress in reducing the number of children out of
school has slackened considerably,"33 and that "[c]hildren in conflict-affected
areas, girls from poor rural households and children with disabilities are more
likely to be out of school."34
As regards the goal of promoting gender equality and empowering women,
the report found that gender disparity in the labor market still exists.35 On the goal
of reducing child mortality the report found that although substantial progress has
been made, "the world is still falling short of the MDG child mortality target,"36
and that out of every five deaths of children under age five, four continue to occur
in sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia.3 7  Regarding the goal of improving
maternal health, the report found that in 2013 almost 300,000 women died in the
29. Id. at 9-20.
30. Public Statement, Amnesty International, 58th Session of the Commission on the Status of
Women: Women and Girls Hold Key to a Successful Post-2015 Development Agenda (March 24,
2014), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IlOR41/003/2014/en/Il l88028b-bc46-4ab6-
8f43-271d5fe26e39/ior410032014en.pdf.
31. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RIGHTS SHOULD BE CENTRAL TO POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA 14 (2013) [hereinafter HRW, RIGHTS SHOULD BE CENTRAL TO POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA], available at https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related material/2013post2015dev-
goals.pdf.
32. MDGs REPORT 2014, supra note 11, at 8, 14.
33. Id. at 16.
34. Id. at 17.
35. Id. at 21.
36. Id. at 24.
37. Id.
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world due to causes related to pregnancy and childbirth. It also found that while
"[c]ontraceptive use had increased . . . gaps persisted in meeting the demand for
family planning." 39
On the goal of combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, the report
found that "still too many new cases of HIV infection" are occurring and that in
2012 almost 600 children died daily of AIDS-related causes.40 It observed that an
estimated 2.3 million cases of people of all ages were newly infected in 2012, 70
percent of them in sub-Saharan Africa, and 1.6 million people died from AIDS-
related causes.4' An estimated 35.5 million people were living with HIV
worldwide, a new record in 2012,42 while only 30 percent of people living with
HIV are covered by antiretroviral treatment. 43
The report noted that also "[i]n 2012, about 207 million cases of malaria
occurred" worldwide, with "the disease kill[ing] about 627,000 people," 80 percent
of whom were children under age five.44 It found that there were not adequate
resources to prevent, diagnose, and treat malaria globally.45  President Ellen
Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia said that Africa's progress on the MDGs remains
uneven, and although there has been remarkable progress in some areas,
there is ample room for more good news. Some areas have been
neglected when they should have been put up-front, for example
malaria, the number one killer of children in sub-Saharan Africa and
many other places in the world. Additionally, the goal for school
enrollment did not take into account the need for quality education.46
According to the report, the rate of decline in the incidence of tuberculosis
was "very slow," and "an estimated 1.3 million died from the disease" in 2012.47
The report noted that despite good progress, "much more needs to be done. One-
third of newly diagnosed tuberculosis patients may not have received proper
treatment. Only one-third of the estimated 300,000 multi-drug-resistant cases
among notified TB cases in 2012 were diagnosed and treated according to
international guidelines." 48  It found bridging the funding gap to be a great
challenge.49
The Human Development Report 2014 finds that "[v]ulnerability threatens
human development-and unless it is systematically addressed, [which can be
done] by changing policies and social norms," neither equitable nor sustainable
38. Id. at 28.
39. Id. at 32.
40. Id. at 34.
41. Id. at 35.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 36.
44. Id. at 37.
45. Id.
46. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014, supra note 14, at I1.
47. MDGs REPORT 2014, supra note 11, at 38.
48. Id. at 39.
49. Id.
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progress is possible.o In specifically addressing women's human rights, the report
states that "[w]omen everywhere experience vulnerability in personal insecurity.
Violence violates their rights, and feelings of personal insecurity restrict their
agency in both public and private life."5  The report provides a Gender Inequality
Index for 149 countries, 52 which, it says, "reveals the extent to which national
achievements in reproductive health, empowerment and labour market
participation are eroded by gender inequality."53 It states, "[g]lobally, women are
disadvantaged in national political representation. On average, they occupy 21
percent of seats in national parliaments. In Latin America and the Caribbean they
do better, with around 25 percent of seats. In Arab States parliaments they hold
less than 14 percent of seats."54
The report adds:
Poor reproductive health services are a major contributor to gender
inequality, especially in developing countries. For example, the
maternal mortality ratio is 474 deaths per 100,000 live births in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Maternal deaths naturally have serious implications for
babies and their older siblings left without maternal care, who could be
trapped in low human development throughout their life cycle.
Adolescent births could also lead to debilitating human development
outcomes for young mothers and their babies. In Sub-Saharan Africa
there are 110 births per 1,000 women ages 15-19.55
The report provides examples from rural Ethiopia and Vietnam as to how
gender inequality shapes the school experience. It found that "[i]n rural Ethiopia
15-year-old girls in the lowest wealth quintile scored on average 2.1 of 20 on a
math test, whereas 15-year-old boys averaged 7.4. In rural Viet Nam 15-year-old
girls averaged 9.4, whereas 15-year-old boys averaged 18.1."5
In discussing vulnerability of children the report states:
Too often, poverty disrupts the normal course of early childhood
development-more than one in five children in developing countries
lives in absolute income poverty and is vulnerable to malnutrition. In
developing countries (where 92 percent of children live) 7 in 100 will
not survive beyond age 5, 50 will not have their birth registered, 68 will
not receive early childhood education, 17 will never enrol in primary
school, 30 will be stunted and 25 will live in poverty. Inadequate food,
sanitation facilities and hygiene increase the risk of infections and
stunting: close to 156 million children are stunted, a result of
50. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014, supra note 14, at 10 (emphasis omitted).
51. Id. at 4.
52. Id. at 172-75 tbl.4.
53. Id. at 39.
54. Id. at 40.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 64 (citation omitted).
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undernutrition and infection. Undernutrition contributes to 35 percent
of deaths due to measles, malaria, pneumonia and diarrhoea.57
The report states further that children with disabilities and those who are
psychologically or cognitively vulnerable are at special risk of sexual abuse.58 It
adds that "[c]hildren raised in institutions may also suffer profound depravation
that damages brain development. Even schools may be sources of insecurity.
Indeed, when parents fear for the physical and sexual safety of daughters, they are
likely to keep them out of school."59
III. SELECTED PROPOSALS REGARDING WOMEN'S AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN THE
POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA
Among a host of studies on and proposals for the next set of development
goals following the target date of the end of 2015 for the completion of the MDGs,
only a selected few will be noted here. On the 20th anniversary of the 1992 U.N.
Conference on Environment and Development, heads of state and government
again met in June 2012 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and issued their final report as the
Outcome Document of the conference, The Future We Want.60 It provided a
framework for sustainable development with "the highest priority [given] to
poverty eradication within the United Nations development agenda [and to]
address[] the root causes and challenges of poverty."6' Specifically addressing
gender inequality, the participants recognized "that gender equality and the
effective participation of women are important for effective action on all aspects of
sustainable development." 62 They also recognized that, "although progress on
gender equality has been made in some areas, the potential of women to engage in,
contribute to and benefit from sustainable development as leaders, participants and
agents of change has not been fully realized, owing to, inter alia, persistent social,
economic and political inequalities." 63 They expressed their support for
prioritizing measures to promote gender equality and the empowerment
of women in all spheres of our societies, including the removal of
barriers to their full and equal participation in decision-making and
management at all levels, and we emphasize the impact of setting
specific targets and implementing temporary measures, as appropriate,
for substantially increasing the number of women in leadership
positions, with the aim of achieving gender parity.64
Following the Rio+20 conference, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon launched
several new initiatives on the post-2015 development agenda. One was in July
57. Id. at 59 (citations omitted).
58. Id. at 61.
59. Id. (citations omitted).
60. Rio+20: United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June
20-22, 2012, The Future We Want, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.216/L.1 (June 19, 2012).
61. Id. 11106.
62. Id. 1|242.
63. Id.11237.
64. Id.
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2012, the establishment of a 27-member High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons co-
chaired by the Presidents of Indonesia and Liberia and the Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom,65 which in May 2013 presented its report, A New Global
Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies Through Sustainable
Development.66  Among twelve universal goals, the report recommended two
specifically related to women and children: (1) to empower girls and women and
achieve gender equality, and (2) to provide quality education and lifelong
learnmg.67
Another of the Secretary-General's initiatives was the establishment of the
Sustainable Development Solutions Network ("SDSN"), which was aimed at
promoting sustainable development.68 In its report, last updated in May 2014, An
Action Agenda for Sustainable Development, SDSN identified ten priority
sustainable development challenges that must be addressed at the global, regional,
national, and local levels. 69  One of these challenges was to achieve gender
equality, social inclusion, and human rights for all; and another was to ensure
effective learning for all children and youth for life and livelihood.70
In September 2013 the OECD issued a report entitled Gender Equality and
Women's Rights in the Post-2015 Agenda: A Foundation for Sustainable
Development.7 1 The report recommended for the post-2015 framework to more
specifically focus on seven issues:
1) Addressing girls' completion of a quality education;
2) Women's economic empowerment;
3) Universal access to sexual and reproductive health and rights;
4) Ending violence against women and girls;
5) Women's voice, leadership, and influence;
6) Women's participation in peace and security; and,
7) Women's contributions to environmental sustainability. 72
65. The Secretary-General's High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development
Agenda, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/sg/management/hlppost2015.shtml (last visited Aug. 25,
2014).
66. HIGH-LEVEL PANEL OF EMINENT PERSONS ON THE POST-2015 DEV. AGENDA, A NEW
GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP: ERADICATE POVERTY AND TRANSFORM ECONOMIES THROUGH SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT (2013), available at http://www.un.org/sg/management/pdf/HLPP2015_Report.pdf.
67. See id. at 30-31 (listing all of the goals).
68. United Nations Secretary-General Announced New Sustainable Development Initiative,
UNITED NATIONS (Aug. 9, 2012),
www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/SDSN%20FINAL%/o20release 9Aug.pdf.
69. SUSTAINABLE DEV. SOLUTIONS NETWORK: A GLOBAL INITIATIVE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS,
AN ACTION AGENDA FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 8-26 (2014), available at http://unsdsn.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/140505-An-Action-Agenda-for-Sustainable-Development.pdf.
70. See id.
71. OECD, GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN THE POST-2015 AGENDA: A
FOUNDATION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2013), available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/Post-
2015%2OGender.pdf.
72. Id. at 1.
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In January 2013 the U.N. General Assembly established the Open Working
Group on Sustainable Development Goals,73 which, after completing 13 sessions,
issued on July 19, 2014, its proposal for a set of goals that consider economic,
social, and environmental dimensions to improve people's lives and protect the
planet.74  Introducing the proposal, the Working Group states that these goals,
accompanied by targets,
build on the foundation laid by the MDGs, seek to complete the
unfinished business of the MDGs, and respond to new challenges.
These goals constitute an integrated, indivisible set of global priorities
for sustainable development. Targets are defined as aspirational global
targets, with each government setting its own national targets . . . taking
into account national circumstances.75
Several of these goals relate specifically to women's and children's rights.
For example, Goal 2, to end hunger, states: "[B]y 2030 end all forms of
malnutrition, including achieving by 2025 the internationally agreed targets on
stunting and wasting in children under five years of age, and address the nutritional
needs of adolescent girls, pregnant and lactating women, and older persons."76
On Goal 3, to ensure healthy lives and promote wellbeing for all, the goal is
to "reduce the global maternal mortality ratio to less than 70 per 100,000 live
births" by 2030.77 It also calls for ending "preventable deaths of newborns and
under-five children," ending the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and
other neglected tropical diseases and communicable diseases by 2030, and also by
that year to "reduce by one-third pre-mature mortality from non-communicable
diseases (NCDs) through prevention and treatment, and promote mental health and
wellbeing."78
On Goal 4, to ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote
life-long learning opportunities for all, the goal is to ensure that girls and boys
complete primary education, free of charge, by 2030 and that by that date they
"have access to quality early childhood development, care and pre-primary
education," that there is "equal access for all women and men to affordable quality
technical, vocational and tertiary education" and that gender disparities in
73. U.N. President of the G.A., Draft Decision on an Open Working Group of the General
Assembly on Sustainable Development Goals, U.N. Doc. A/67/L.48/Rev.l (Jan. 15, 2013).
74. OPEN WORKING GROUP FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. GOALS, OUTCOME DOCUMENT (2014)
[hereinafter OUTCOME DOCUMENT], available at
http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/4518SDGs_FINAL Proposal%20of%/o200WG
19%20July%20at%201320hrsver3.pdf. See also Outcome Document-Open Working Group on
Sustainable Development Goals, U.N. SUSTAINABLE DEV. KNOWLEDGE PLATFORM,
http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/focussdgs.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2014).
75. OUTCOME DOCUMENT, supra note 74, at 4, 1 18.
76. Id. at 6, Goal 2.2.
77. Id. at 7, Goal 3.1.
78. Id., Goals 3.2-3.4.
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education be eliminated and "equal access to all levels of education and vocational
training for the vulnerable, including . .. children," be ensured.79
On Goal 5, to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls, the
Open Working Group calls for ending discrimination and all forms of violence to
them, and ending "all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage
and female genital mutilations."80 It also calls for recognizing and valuing unpaid
care and domestic work, ensuring women's "full and effective participation and
equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political,
economic and public life," ensuring "universal access to sexual and reproductive
health and reproductive rights," undertaking "reforms to give women equal rights
to economic resources" and access to all of "property, financial services,
inheritance, and natural resources in accordance with national laws," and adopting
and strengthening "sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of
gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels."8 1
It is worth noting that on Goal 5 there is no targeted date for achieving the
goal of gender equality. When the Open Working Group issued the "Zero Draft"
of its suggested sustainable development goals and related targets,82 Human Rights
Watch sent a letter to the Group urging the inclusion of target dates. The letter
stated: "We are troubled that Goal 5 is the only goal whose targets all lack target
dates for completion. We believe this gives the impression of a lack of urgency,
and may create an accountability gap for reaching these targets."83 It also urged
the explicit recognition of women's and girls' human rights in Goal 5, as it said
that "[e]mpowerment of women may be insufficient if their rights are not fully
respected by their own government or within society." 84
IV. SELECTED WOMEN'S AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN THIS ISSUE OF THE JOURNAL
The Denver Journal of International Law and Policy makes a valuable
contribution to the literature by publishing the four selected articles here, one
exclusively on women's rights, two exclusively on children's rights, and one that
concerns both women and children. The piece on women's rights studies an issue
of grave concern-gender violence. The focus is on migrant victims of domestic
violence and their rights. This is a comprehensive survey of the legal and social
79. Id. at 8, Goals 4.1-4.3, 4.5.
80. Id. at 9, Goals 5.1-5.3.
81. Id. at 9-10, Goals 5.4-5.6
82. OPEN WORKING GROUP FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. GOALS, INTRODUCTION AND PROPOSED
GOALS AND TARGETS ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT FOR THE POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA:
ZERO DRAFT 6-7, Goal 5 (2014), available at
http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/4523zerodraft.pdf.
83. Letter from lain Levine, Deputy Exec. Director, Human Rights Watch, to the U.N. General
Assembly Open Working Group 12 on Sustainable Development Goals ahead of the 12th Session (June
20, 2014), available at http://www.hrw.org/print/news/2014/06/20/letter-un-general-assembly-open-
working-group- 12-sustainable-development-goals-ahead.
84. Id.
2014 111
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
support systems of the European Union Member ("EU-M") States for this
vulnerable group.
The two pieces on children's rights study juvenile justice and child abduction,
respectively, and the article concerning both women's and children's rights
specifically deals with the Millennium Development Goal No. 6, which is aimed at
combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases. This article provides a human
rights analysis with its focus on Africa.
The first article, entitled Juvenile Justice in Belligerent Occupation Regimes:
Comparing the Coalition Provisional Authority Administration in Iraq with the
Israeli Military Government in the Territories Administered by Israel, discusses
the juvenile justice systems unique to occupation regimes. Dr. Hilly Moodrick-
Even Khen, a senior lecturer of public intemational law in Israel, studies first the
objectives ofjuvenile justice systems under both comparative law and international
law and then proceeds to examine how these systems operate in occupied
territories and the changes occupation regimes experience from "belligerent
occupations" to "transformative occupations" and from those lasting short-term to
long-term. She then examines how these transformations affect the legal means
for meeting the obligations of the occupying power under international
humanitarian law, especially "the duty to ensure the safety and the daily life
routine of the occupied population."8 5 She does this by comparing the system in
Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority Administration and that under the
Israeli occupation in the Administered Territories.
After identifying three central principles in juvenile justice "diminished
responsibility, proportionality and room to reform"86 -the author discusses
changes regarding "justice-based" principles of the late 20th century concerned
more with responses to the "deed" of the offense rather than the offender's "need."
She also identifies the international law norms applicable to juvenile justice,
including international conventions and other non-obligatory international
instruments regulating juvenile justice systems. The pertinent conventions, of
87
course, are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
CRC,88 and non-binding instruments include the United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, 89 the United Nations
Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty,90 the United
Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency, 9' and the United
85. See Moodrick-Even Khen, infra p. 120.
86. Id. at 121 (citing Josine Junger-Tas, Trends in International Juvenile Justice: What
Conclusions can be Drawn?, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 505, 510 (Josine
Junger-Tas & Scott. H. Decker eds., 2006)).
87. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
88. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 2.
89. G.A. Res. 40/33, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/33 (Nov. 29, 1985).
90. G.A. Res. 45/113, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/113 (Dec. 14, 1990).
91. G.A. Res. 45/112, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/112 (Dec. 14, 1990).
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Nations Children's Fund Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with
Armed Forces or Armed Groups.92
Before responding to the question of the application of the appropriate legal
regime to apply in occupied territories, the author discusses the changes over the
last few decades that, in her words, "have witnessed a proliferation of other types
of occupation regimes,"93 in addition to belligerent occupation regimes to which
international humanitarian law or the law of war applied. These include long-term
occupation regimes such as the one administered by Israel in the Territories and
transformative occupation regimes such as in the formerly occupied Iraq and in
Afghanistan. The latter are aimed at building new societies "as end goals of
intervention and to protect the occupied population as consistent with international
norms and human rights law," 94 and the U.N. typically is involved. Thus the
author argues that, "since the aim of transformative regimes is to rebuild the legal
infrastructure of the territory they occupy and create a new legal order, the
governing laws must allow changes in the existing laws in the occupied
territory."95 On the other hand, she argues that long-term occupation regimes
"may not require permission to change existing laws in the occupied area, but they
must consider the need for development of the occupied area." 96
What follows is a comparison of the obligations of occupiers in formerly
occupied Iraq and in the Administered Territories. These include both the
traditional and the new obligations. After a thorough examination of these regimes
and the application of international humanitarian law and international human
rights law, the author suggests that "the co-application of human rights law and
international humanitarian law, while taking into consideration the security needs
of both the occupying power and the protected persons, would create legal
standards that would see the application of more protections for minors in criminal
procedures."97 Specifically addressing the Israeli occupation in the Administered
Territories, acknowledging that it may not end in the near future, she considers it
"crucial to maintain that a belligerent occupying power, including a long-term one,
should avoid changes that will render it a sovereign."98  Her rationale is that
although this objective could be justified for a transformative regime, "it works
against the purposes of a long-term belligerent occupant." 99
In the second article, United Against Gender Violence: Europeans Struggle to
Provide Protection for Migrants, Mimi E. Tsankov, a U.S. immigration judge and
adjunct professor of law at both the University of Denver Sturm College of Law
92. UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN FOUND., THE PARIS PRINCIPLES: PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES
ON CHILDREN ASSOCIATED WITH ARMED FORCES OR ARMED GROUPS 4 (2007), available at
http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/publications/ParisPrinciplesEN.pdf.
93. See Moodrick-Even Khen, infra p. 127.
94. Id
95. Id. at 128.
96. Id
97. Id. at 160.
98. Id. at 161.
99. Id
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and the University of Colorado School of Law, and Nadja Helm, an Attorney
Advisor with the U.S. Department of Justice, provide a survey, both wide and
deep, of the EU-M States as they struggle to provide legal and social protections to
migrant victims of domestic violence. The authors' aim "to present a snapshot of
the European Union's journey towards compliance that may enable human rights
observers to gauge where individual EU-M States find themselves on this
particular metric in comparison to other states given a variety of contextual
factors."' 00 They provide data regarding each state to assess how it meets its treaty
obligations for these vulnerable people. However, they are cognizant of the
difficulties in gathering reliable information on monitoring treaty compliance in
the context of human rights. Measuring CEDAW compliance is especially hard
because (1) member states are required to act with "due diligence in responding to,
preventing, and eliminating all forms of violence against women",o' and (2)
appropriate indicators or benchmarks for evaluating due diligence are non-existent.
The authors are, therefore, appropriately cautious and undertake their survey
based upon the following four qualitative dimensions: (1) gender equality /
inequality; (2) human development; (3) treaty obligations; and (4) domestic legal
infrastructure. In each of these categories they have selected the most appropriate
measures as contextual tools. They present data as reported by several entities: the
EU-M States; the Special Rapporteur on the issue of violence against women
appointed by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in 1994; U.N. specialized
agencies; NGO studies; and actual case studies. They have selected a "modest
goal" for the article, which is "to summarize (1) the states' international
obligations, (2) the legal frameworks providing support to this population, (3) the
information that has been reported related to protections for this vulnerable
population, and (4) the criticisms that have been lodged." 02 They acknowledge
that "[b]ecause states have the prerogative of choosing the timetable under which
they implement protections, as well as what they choose to report, a definitive
comparison across EU-M States remains elusive."' 0 3
The authors do not discuss female genital mutilation ("FGM") as it "is not
properly considered within a domestic violence analysis, because, while the
victim's family is often involved, it is usually a community-based practice."' 04
However, the subject is important and thus it is worth noting that the U.N. General
Assembly in December 2012 adopted a Resolution entitled Intensifying Global
Efforts for the Elimination of Female Genital Mutilations.05 Subsequently, on
June 28, 2014, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon remarked at an event in Nairobi on
100. See Tsankov & Helm, infra p. 166-67.
101. Id. at 244.
102. Id. at 184.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 171.
105. Intensifying Global Efforts for the Elimination of Female Genital Mutilations, G.A. Res.
67/146, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/146 (Dec. 20, 2012). See also U.N. Secretary-General, Ending Female
Genital Mutilation: Rep. of the Secretary-General, Comm'n on the Status of Women, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.6/2012/8 (Dec. 5, 2011).
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ending maternal mortality: "Some 20 per cent of girls in Kenya are cut, and in
Somalia, the proportion is close to 98 per cent. African Governments are united in
opposing female genital mutilation, and the United Nations is giving priority to
helping all communities abandon this practice."'
06
The authors study Member States' compliance and accountability with the
European Convention on Human Rights, the CEDAW, and the Council of Europe.
They note implementation compliance concerns and evaluate the actions taken by
the various countries "to address these limitations and enhance the rights of
migrant female domestic violence victims." 07
The outcome is a very impressive study outlining the protections Member
States have provided in compliance with the ECHR, CEDAW, and Council of
Europe mandates. The authors conclude that human rights bodies both at the
international and regional levels are developing specific standards to address some
of the problems these victims face and states are responding with appropriate
changes; however, they find that "the pace of reform is uneven across states, and
the development of increasingly specific model systems may serve to bring some
states that have heretofore been lagging further into line with the more robust and
comprehensive state systems that exist today."'
08
The next article, which relates to both women's and children's rights, is
Millennium Development Goal 6 and the Trifecta of HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and
Tuberculosis in Africa: A Human Rights Analysis, by Dr. Obiajulu Nnamuchi, an
assistant professor of law at the University of Nigeria. The article provides a clear
understanding of MDG 6, which is aimed at reducing the incidence of these
diseases, and thoroughly examines the circumstances responsible for failure in
many African countries to combat them effectively. The author's suggestions for
remedial measures are designed to ensure that African countries attain this goal in
a sustainable fashion and are able to secure the human right to health of each
person within its borders. He asserts that it is a human right to have access to
necessary interventions to combat these diseases.
Professor Nnamuchi is especially critical that the second prong of the
HIV/AIDS-related targets, that is, achieving universal access to treatment for all
those in need, by 2010, was not met in the African context. He focuses on special
population groups-women, sex workers, and prisoners-who are most vulnerable
and who have higher incidence of infection than the rest of the population. He
specifically underlines the challenges that many of these countries face in getting
universal access to anti-retroviral therapy ("ART"). Giving examples from
African countries, he discusses the problem of lack of information about
HIV/AIDS and risky sexual behavior as especially responsible for the problem.
The section on discrimination against people living with HIV/AIDS is especially
106. U.N. Secretary-General, 'No Woman Should Die While Giving Life,' Secretary-General Says
at Event on Ending Maternal Mortality (June 28, 2014),
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/sgsml5984.doc.htm.
107. See Tsankov & Helm, infra p. 189.
108. Id. at 245.
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poignant as he discusses the pertinent human rights instruments and concludes that
such discrimination is an affront to human rights. Similarly, he critically analyzes
the huge impact of malaria in Africa and how special population groups, especially
children, are severely affected. Challenges pertain to all aspects-prevention,
control, and treatment.
After conducting a similar analysis on tuberculosis, Professor Nnamuchi
convincingly argues that as we analyze the challenges in the human rights context
much more is needed than simply access to medicine. He makes two points
pertaining to the obligation of governments in Africa regarding these scourges:
first, that MDG 6 does not impose substantially new obligations on these
governments. Here he refers to several statements by African governments and the
obligations imposed by African instruments such as the Africa Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights. The second point is about conceptualization of health,
according to which everyone has a right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health. Thus, a medicine-oriented response to
problems related to health without more is not enough. He makes a telling point:
To suggest that human rights should serve as a liberating or
emancipating force, freeing vulnerable and other marginalized groups
from the cold clutches of poverty, deprivation and other harmful
conditions, the consequence of which has been disproportionate burden
of HIV/AIDS, malaria, TB, and other largely preventable diseases, is
not to reconceptualize the doctrine. Rather, the suggestion merely
emphasizes practicalization, the way things ought to be. It is, in reality,
about making human rights work to the advantage of its primary
subjects, the people who need it most.109
In conclusion, the author reminds affluent countries of MDG Goal 8, under
which international cooperation is required as a means to achieving the MDGs,
asserting that the donor countries must hold poor countries accountable for the way
money is spent in those countries. This might "force political leadership in Africa
to rethink their insensitivity to massive human suffering in the region."''o Along
with such effort he emphasizes the role of the civil society as a complementary
effort which "involves the people ridding themselves of docility and demanding
good governance as a right-the key, ultimately, to real freedom from preventable
diseases-be it HIV/AIDS, malaria, TB, or anything else.""'
The final paper in this special issue is by Colin P.A. Jones, a professor at
Doshisha Law School, and entitled Will the Child Abduction Treaty Become More
"Asian"? A First Look at the Efforts of Singapore and Japan to Implement the
Hague Convention. Acknowledging that a comparison between Singapore and
Japan as two Asian countries does not suffice to ask the question whether an Asian
response to international child abduction could develop, the author suggests that
109. See Nnamuchi, infra p. 281.
I10. Id. at285.
111. Id. at 285-86 (citation omitted)
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the more likely answer now is "no," but that as more countries in the region join
the Convention, perhaps in some aspects there might develop an Asian response.
The author begins his analysis by providing an overview of the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction ("the Convention"). 112 It may
be recalled that the Convention assumes that the courts in the jurisdiction where
the children have been residing, that is, the jurisdiction of their "habitual
residence," should evaluate their interests, rather than a court in a jurisdiction to
which they have more recently moved. Thus the Convention deters unilateral
action by one parent, with the goal of protecting the children's welfare. If a child
is removed in violation of "rights of custody" in the child's jurisdiction of habitual
residence, the court must order a return if such rights were being exercised at the
time of removal. While almost every country in Europe, North and South
America, and Australia and New Zealand, are parties to the Convention, only a
handful of African and Asian countries have ratified it.
The author compares and contrasts Singapore and Japan, the former having
acceded to the Convention in 2010, while the latter joined it in 2014. He reviews
these countries' demographics, international business and finance, and the number
of marriages, divorces, and annulments typical in a year in each country. He then
reviews the rights of custody, first in Japan and then in Singapore. Japan's family
register system has several special features-only Japanese citizens have family
registries; the family register performs a function analogous to a real estate title
register insofar as it primarily facilitates transactions between a family and
government agencies or other third parties.
The author notes that marriage is at the heart of the family register system and
it primarily deals with the common consensual family transactions such as
marriage, adoption, and most divorces. He then discusses Japan's civil code, under
which minor children are under the "parental authority" of their parents, which is
jointly exercised by both parents during marriage and solely by one parent after
divorce. The civil code provides a vast scope for parental authority. Thus, under
the Japanese system, individual families have a large degree of autonomy to
manage their internal affairs.
Many Japanese laws and legal institutions are historically based upon
Continental European models, contrasted with Singapore's legal system, which is
based upon the English system of Common Law and equity. After reviewing
Singapore's various laws, which include a separate system of Islamic law and a
special court for its Muslim minority community, the author discusses how the role
of "custody" is changing and a presumption has arisen that usually joint custody
will be in the best interest of children in most cases. He discusses case law of
Singapore to conclude that Singapore's courts are interpreting the Convention in
light of its peer jurisdictions' approach. And in reviewing Japan's implementing
legislation, the author finds that among several reasons for the discrepancies
between the Convention and Japanese domestic law, the following are noteworthy:
112. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No.
11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89.
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systems of family law in Japan, especially family mediation and its consensual
nature, and the country's civil law foundation. His conclusion seems apt that
perhaps the pertinent inquiry to account for the difference between Singapore's
and Japan's approach to the Convention lies not in "Western-ness" and "Asian-
ness" but is instead between the common law and civil law traditions.
V. CONCLUSION
The main focus of three of the four papers selected here is a human rights-
centered approach to the issues they address. The absence of this approach was
indeed seen as a major flaw in the MDG framework' 13 and as the post-2015
international development agenda is being formulated it is not simply NGOs, such
as Amnesty International' 4 and Human Rights Watch'' 5 that are calling for
sustainable development goals to be based on human rights foundations, but even
the official proposals regarding the post-2015 development agenda"l 6 echo the
same spirit.
113. See generally Ved P. Nanda, Human Rights Must Be at the Core of the Post-2015
International Development Agenda, 75 MONT. L. REV. I (2014).
114. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, DELIVERING A JUST FUTURE FOR ALL-WHY HUMAN RIGHTS
MATTER TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2014), available at
http://amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT35/008/2014/en/66bf8961-23c3-495d-a7bd-
lOOb7la3bbe5/act350082014en.pdf; Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Post-2015 Agenda: Human Rights
Accountability Key to Progress Amnesty International Tells UN (June 12, 2014), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/post-2015-agenda-human-rights-accountability-
key-progress-amnesty-intemati.
115. See, e.g., HRW, RIGHTS SHOULD BE CENTRAL TO POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra
note 31; David Mepham, Putting Development to Rights: A Post-2015 Agenda, OPEN DEMOCRACY
(Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.opendemocracy.net/david-mepham/putting-development-to-rights-post-
2015-agenda (David Mepham is the U.K. director of Human Rights Watch).
116. For the various proposals urging the primary role of human rights in achieving sustainable
development, see, supra Part Ill.
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JUVENILE JUSTICE IN BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION REGIMES:
COMPARING THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
ADMINISTRATION IN IRAQ WITH THE ISRAELI MILITARY
GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL
DR. HILLY MOODRICK-EVEN KHEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Juvenile justice has become a theme of great interest, with the international
community showing a growing concern with protecting the rights of children under
international lawi-in times of peace as well as in times of war.2 This article
examines the juvenile justice systems unique to occupation regimes, basing the
analysis of this type of system on the case studies of the Israeli occupation in the
administered territories and the former Coalition Provisional Authority
Administration ("Coalition") in Iraq.3  We maintain that the changing nature of
occupation regimes has bearing on their juvenile justice systems, demanding more
protections for the rights of children within these criminal structures. These
protections can be awarded either through direct application of human rights law or
by amending the specific laws that administer territories under occupation.
In order to determine the most adequate set of international norms for
securing the interests of juveniles within the juvenile justice systems in occupied
territories, we need to assess the tenets and objectives of juvenile justice in general.
This is the object of the second section of this paper, in which we discuss the major
goals of juvenile justice both in comparative law and in international law. We
address the current trends and characteristics of juvenile justice systems worldwide
vis-i-vis the goals of the juvenile justice system as they are reflected in
international law, most notably in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
*Dr. Hilly Moodrick-Even Khen is Senior Lecturer of public international law at Sha'arei Mishpat
College Israel; LL.D, Hebrew University of Jerusalem (2007); M.A. in philosophy (Magna Cum
Laude), Tel Aviv University (2001); LL.B, The Interdisciplinary Center of Herzlyia (2000); B.A. in
humanities, Hebrew University of Jerusalem (1996).
1. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC].
Under international law, the legal definition of a "child" is embedded in the CRC, which stipulates, "a
child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the
child, majority is attained earlier." Id. art. 1. We shall adhere to this definition in the article.
2. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 14, 17,
23, 24, 38, 50, 82, 89, 94, 132, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GCIV]
(highlighting the rights of children within and during an armed conflict).
3. Several terms are used to describe the territories in the article, such as the "Occupied
Palestinian Territories," the "West Bank Territories," and "Judea and Samaria." We have chosen the
term that appears in the title, which has, to our mind, no political connotations. We also use a shortened
term: the "administered territories."
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Rights ("ICCPR"),4 the International Convention on the Rights of the Child
("CRC"), and subsequent soft law instruments.
As our interest is not simply in the juvenile justice systems that operate within
independent states and regimes but more specifically in those that are implemented
in occupied territories, we proceed, in the third section, to examine the history of
the changes experienced by occupation regimes: from belligerent occupations to
transformative occupations and from short-term to long-term ones. We then
examine how these transformations affect the legal means for realizing the
obligations of the occupying power under the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949)6
and the Hague Convention and its annexed regulations (1907) ("Hague
Regulations"), primarily the duty to ensure the safety and the daily life routine of
the occupied population.
In the fourth section, we discuss the mutual application of international
humanitarian law and international human rights law in occupied territories
through the prism of the objectives of the juvenile justice system in general, and in
occupied territories in particular.
We first suggest that the longer an occupier rules in an occupied territory, the
more likely that human rights law, rather than humanitarian law, will better serve
the interest of the occupied population, as the latter has more limited tools for
achieving this goal. Hence, in longer-term occupations, there is more room for the
application of human rights law as an interpretative and complementary law. We
then return to the conclusions of the second section with regard to the objectives of
juvenile justice systems and claim that, given the nature of juvenile justice in
general, and in occupied territories in particular, we must see a more extensive
application of human rights law in occupation regimes. We substantiate our claims
through the analysis of the case study of detention, prosecution, and adjudication
of children in formerly occupied Iraq.
In the fifth section, we turn to Israel, discussing the juvenile courts and the
legislation of the juvenile justice system in the territories administered by the
Israeli army. After addressing the legal views expressed by the Israeli government
and the Israeli Supreme Court on the question of the applicability of human rights
law in the administered territories, we address the recent developments in juvenile
justice in these territories. We propose that the long-term nature of the Israeli
occupation in the administered territories demands that Israel keep and strengthen
the reform in the juvenile justice system in these territories in order to increase the
application of human rights norms. However, in the specific case of Israel,
international law is not automatically incorporated within the national legal
4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
[hereinafter ICCPR] (the relevant articles for this paper will include article 10 and 14).
5. CRC, supra note 1.
6. GCIV, supra note 2.
7. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with Annex of
Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations] (also referred
to as the Fourth Hague Convention) (in this piece, articles will be referencing the articles in the
regulations found in its annex).
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system, and furthermore, Israel objects to the application of human rights treaties
in the administered territories. These two facts lead us to conclude that the best
way to apply human rights norms, found in both formal and soft law instruments,
in the occupation regime in the administered territories is by incorporating them
into the legislation of the military governance that regulates the administered
territories.
II. THE OBJECTIVES OF JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS
In order to determine the appropriate set of norms for governing juvenile
justice systems in general and in occupied territories in particular, we must
extrapolate a definition of such systems, clarifying their basic tenets and
objectives. The Council of Europe defines a juvenile justice system as:
[T]he formal component of a wider approach for tackling youth crime.
In addition to the youth court, it encompasses official bodies or agencies
such as the police, the prosecution service, the legal profession, the
probation service and penal institutions. It works closely with related
agencies such as health, education, social and welfare services and non-
governmental bodies, such as victim and witness support.8
The Council states that the principal aims of a juvenile justice system are to
"i. prevent offending and re-offending; ii. to (re)socialise and (re)integrate
offenders; and iii. to address the needs and interests of victims." 9
Scholars identify three central principles in juvenile justice: "diminished
responsibility, proportionality and room to reform."o
Diminished responsibility refers to the question whether children
are less culpable then adults for having offended. Children may lack
sufficient cognitive abilities to realize what they are exactly doing and
in particular what might be the consequences of their acts. Of course
the older the juvenile the more he will be responsible for his acts, but
even at age 14 and 16 he might be incapable of grasping the full
meaning of his actions.
Proportionality refers to the mitigation of punishment because of
children's lack of development of social and cognitive capacities. . . .
Room to reform indicates the importance of the kind of
punishments that is meted out, considering what we want to achieve
with punishment and what we would want to avoid."
8. Eur. Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation, 853rd Meeting, Rec(2003)20 (2003) (this
recommendation is for "new ways of dealing with juvenile delinquency and the role of juvenile
justice"), available at https://wed.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=70063.
9. Id.
10. Josine Junger-Tas, Trends in International Juvenile Justice: What Conclusions can be
Drawn?, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 505, 510 (Josine Junger-Tas & Scott. H.
Decker eds., 2006).
I1. Id. (citation omitted).
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According to this final principle, for example, preference should be given to
penal interventions that promote rehabilitation and the growth of young people into
responsible citizens. 12
The above basic principles of juvenile justice are the result of a long process
of development of the concepts of juvenile justice in 20th-century Western
thought. This ranged from the rhetoric of child protection and "meeting needs" of
the 1970s, where justice for juveniles was considered best delivered through
community-based interventions, to the series of diverse "justice-based" principles
of the late 20th century, which were "more concerned with responding to the
'deed' of the offence rather than the 'need' of the offender." 3  These changes are
reflected in the variety of policies in the juvenile justice systems implemented by
Western states, which scholars divide into three clusters:
The first cluster includes the English speaking countries, with the
exception of Scotland but including the Netherlands. It is essentially
"justice" oriented, characterized by a retributive, sometimes repressive,
approach, placing a strong emphasis on the juvenile's accountability,
"just desert" principles and parental responsibility for their child's
behaviour ....
The second cluster of countries mainly covering continental
Europe is still very much "welfare" oriented ....
A third cluster is formed by the Scandinavian countries and
Scotland [that combines approaches from "just desert" and "welfare"].' 4
In the third cluster, the "just desert" philosophy gained an important role
because of their relationships with Anglo-Saxon states.' 5 In practice, these policies
12. Id.
13. John Muncie & Barry Goldson, States of Transition: Convergence and Diversity in
International Youth Justice, in COMPARATIVE YOUTH JUSTICE: CRITICAL ISSUES 197 (John Muncie &
Barry Goldson eds., 2006).
14. Junger-Tas, supra note 10, at 526-28
It is clear that the United States represents these characteristics [of the first cluster] in its
extreme form . . . . On the other hand most of these countries-while subscribing to the
general just desert philosophy-have also introduced on a large scale alternative sanctions
(Canada, the UK, and the Netherlands), restorative justice (Northern Ireland) and preventive
and diversionary measures (Ireland, the Netherlands, and the UK).
... [The second cluster] is perhaps best represented by the German approach ofjuveniles and
young adults, but one sees a similar approach in many continental European states. Western
European states, such as France and Belgium also have a strong welfare legal tradition,
although there are pressures to change this and create a more retributive system ....
However, this approach is also characteristic for other continental countries, such as
Switzerland, Spain, and Greece, as well as the Eastern European states.
Id. at 527-28.
15. Id. at 528 (this is traced particularly in Sweden, out of the three Scandinavian states, but there
are also some "just desert" innovations in Denmark, for example).
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place more emphasis on the offence, on the responsibility of the juveniles for their
actions, and on the proportionality principle.16
In addition to state-policy rules, juvenile justice is also governed by
international law. Three fundamental international conventions and several other
non-obligatory instruments regulate juvenile justice systems under international
law. The ICCPR guarantees general rights of suspects and accused, such as the
rights to avoid arbitrary detention,17 to be treated "with humanity and with respect
for the inherent dignity of the human person,"" and to "be entitled to a fair and
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by
law."' 9 It also refers specifically to minors' rights by requiring states to provide
every child "such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor"20
and demanding specifically that "[a]ccused juvenile persons shall be separated
from adults and brought as speedily as possible for adjudication."21 In addition,
the ICCPR outlaws capital punishment for those under the age of eighteen. 22 The
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms 23 "provides for the due process of law, fairness in trial proceedings, a
right to education, a right to privacy and declares that any deprivation of liberty
(including curfews, electronic monitoring and community supervision) should not
be arbitrary or consist of any degrading treatment." 24
Yet, the most comprehensive convention regarding juvenile justice is the
CRC, which established a near global consensus that "[i]n all actions concerning
children . . . the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration." 25 In
addition, it was established that all children have a right to protection,26 to
participation,27 to personal development, 28 and to basic material provisions.2 9 The
CRC upholds the following rights for children: "[T]o life, to be protected in armed
conflicts, to be safe-guarded from degrading and cruel punishment, to receive
special treatment in justice systems," and to be granted "freedom from
discrimination, exploitation, and abuse."30 This "full-fledged Convention, which
has increasing importance for Youth protection as well as for Youth Justice ...
16. Id.
17. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 9(1).
18. Id. art. 10(1).
19. Id. art. 14(1).
20. Id. art. 24(1).
21. Id. art. 10(2)(b).
22. Id. art. 6(5).
23. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
24. Muncie & Goldson, supra note 13, at 211.
25. CRC, supra note 1, art. 3(1).
26. Id. art. 3(2).
27. Cf id. arts. 12, 14-15 (discussing a child's freedom of expression, religion, conscience,
thought, association, and peaceful assembly).
28. Id. art. 6(2).
29. Id. arts. 23-27.
30. Muncie & Goldson, supra note 13, at 211.
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was adopted in 1989 by the General Assembly and since than has been ratified by
191 countries." 3'
Articles 37, 39, and 40 of the CRC are relevant for juvenile justice. In Article
40, the CRC defines the purposes of juvenile justice to be "promoting the child's
reintegration and the child's assuming a constructive role in society." 32 Hence,
Article 40 requires that:
Whenever appropriate . . . [the state shall use] measures for dealing
with such children without resorting to judicial proceedings, providing
that human rights and legal safeguards are fully respected . . . [and shall
maintain] [a] variety of dispositions, such as care, guidance and
supervision orders; counseling; probation; foster care; education and
vocational training programmes and other alternatives to institutional
33care ....
To that end, the CRC requires that a child will be "treated in a manner
consistent with the promotion of the child's sense of dignity and worth . . . which
takes into account the child's age" and "the needs of persons of his or her age"; 34
that detention shall be "used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest
appropriate period of time";35 that state parties "shall seek to promote the
establishment of laws, procedures, authorities and institutions specifically
applicable to children";36 and that the child "shall have the right to maintain
contact with his or her family through correspondence and visits, save in
exceptional circumstances."37
The above basic tenets of juvenile justice are reinforced by several non-
binding documents regarding juvenile justice. The United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice stress the need for
special training for the authorities regulating juvenile justice and determine "a
minimum training in law, sociology, psychology, criminology and behavioural
sciences." 38 The United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of
their Liberty elaborate on the conditions of detention of minors and reiterate the
importance of rehabilitation and return to community. 39  The United Nations
Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency add that youth justice
31. Junger-Tas, supra note 10, at 526. See also Muncie & Goldson, supra note 13, at 211 ("The
only UN member states that have not ratified are Somalia and the USA (Somalia has had no
internationally recognised government since 1991, the US has claimed that ratification would
undermine parental rights."). South Sudan, since becoming a state in 2011, has also not ratified the
CRC. The Convention on the Rights of the Child: Signatory States and Parties to the Convention,
HUMANIUM, http://www.humanium.org/en/convention/signatory-states (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).
32. CRC, supra note 1, art. 40(1).
33. Id. arts. 40(3)-(4).
34. Id. arts. 37(c), 40(1).
35. Id. art. 37(b).
36. Id. art. 40(3).
37. Id. art. 37(c).
38. G.A. Res. 40/33, Annex, at 211, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/33 (Nov. 29, 1985) (commenting on
Article 22).
39. G.A. Res. 45/113, Annex, % 79-80, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/113 (Dec. 14, 1990).
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policy should avoid criminalizing children for minor misdemeanours. 40 Lastly, the
United Nations Children's Fund Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated
with Armed Forces or Armed Groups ("Paris Principles") deal specifically with
children recruited for armed forces during armed conflicts. 4 1 These principles
relate to the mechanism of juvenile justice under these special circumstances and
subject them to a "child rights approach" (including the principles of restorative
justice and reintegration) and the general principle of the best interests of the
child42 (which is also one of the foundations of the CRC).43 The Paris Principles
also introduce the concept that children who are accused of committing war crimes
should be regarded not only as perpetrators but also as victims and treated
accordingly.44
Collectively, these conventions and rules might be viewed as tantamount to a
growing legal global standardization of juvenile justice. Numerous countries
"have now used the []CRC to improve protections for children and have appointed
special commissioners or ombudspersons to champion children's rights."A "A
monitoring body-the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child-reports under
the Convention and presses governments for reform."46
However, the enforcement of children's rights under international law is
complicated by the same problems faced by other human rights protected by
international human rights law. While the discussion and analysis of these
difficulties is beyond the scope of this paper, we note here that the mechanisms of
enforcing these laws are relatively weak.47  The implementation of such rights,
40. G.A. Res. 45/112, Annex, 56, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/112 (Dec. 14, 1990).
41. UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN FOUND., THE PARIS PRINCIPLES: PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES
ON CHILDREN ASSOCIATED WITH ARMED FORCES OR ARMED GROUPS 4 (2007) [hereinafter PARIS
PRINCIPLES], available at http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/publications/ParisPrinciplesEN.pdf.
42. Id. at 8-9.
43. CRC, supra note 1, art. 3(1).
44. PARIS PRINCIPLES, supra note 41, at 9. For the claim that the special circumstances of children
in terrorist groups may turn them from perpetrators into victims, see also Hilly Moodrick-Even Khen,
Child Terrorists: Why and How Should They be Protected by International Law, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 262, 264-72 (Noalle Quenivet &
Shilan Shah-Davis eds., 2010).
45. Muncie & Goldson, supra note 13, at 211. The appointment of ombudspersons for children
has become so prevalent in Europe that in 1997 a European Network for Ombudspersons for Children
was established to connect the independent offices for children in thirty-three countries in Europe. See
European Network of Ombudspersons for Children, CHILD RIGHTS INT'L NETWORK,
http://www.crin.org/enoc (last visited Jan. 30, 2014).
46. Muncie & Goldson, supra note 13, at 211.
47. Most human rights law treaties are monitored by monitoring committees whose enforcing
authorities are rather limited. JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 8-10 (4th ed. 2013).
They are usually authorized only to make recommendations for the implementation of their respective
instruments, while their authority to resolve disputes between states or between individuals and states
with regard to the application of the instruments depends on whether the states parties have accepted
such authority. See id. See also Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ("A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a Party to
the present Protocol recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider
communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by
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therefore, relies primarily on the good will of the states formally bound by human
rights treaties and customary law.48  In addition, the CRC is not enforced by an
international tribunal, but it is rather a committee that monitors its implementation
by state parties and this committee is only authorized to "make suggestions and
general recommendations . . . [that] shall be transmitted to any State Party
concerned and reported to the General Assembly, together with comments, if any,
from States Parties." 49 Breaches attract no formal sanction, even though every five
years the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child tests the measures taken by
individual states to implement the convention.50  Moreover, non-governmental
organizations that critically review juvenile justice proceedings,5 ' such as Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch, suggest that "implementation has often
been half-hearted and piecemeal." 52 A country will give lip service to rights in
order to be "granted status as a 'modem developed state' and acceptance into
world monetary systems." 53 The pressure to ratify is both moral and economic.
While the CRC may be the most ratified of all international human rights
directives, it is also the most violated. 54 Indeed, thirty-three countries' ratification
that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant."); Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women art. 29(1), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 ("Any dispute
between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the present
Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to
arbitration. [if this is not successful] . . . any one of those parties may refer the dispute to the
International Court of Justice .... ). However, states often sign human rights treaties with reservations.
See Elena A. Baylis, General Comment 24: Confronting the Problem of Reservations to Human Rights
Treaties, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 277, 277 (1999). In addition, there is no international body that is
authorized to make mandatory decisions or to enforce human rights law instruments, except for the
U.N. Security Council, which may decide on matters pertaining to human rights law but only as far as
these issues are related to the Council's main objective, which is safeguarding international peace and
security. See DONNELLY, at 87, 162. The Security Council has taken action in response to different
human rights violations to different degrees of success. See id. at 90-91, 194-95, 198-99, 206-07
(including embargoes against South Africa in response to Apartheid, creating the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in reaction to violence in the Balkans, sending peacekeepers to
Rwanda to enforce the Arusha Accords, and ordering the International Criminal Court to indict Omar
al-Bashir for his responsibility for the humanitarian crisis in Darfur).
48. See DONNELLY, supra note 47, at 8.
49. CRC, supra note 1, art. 45(d).
50. Id. arts. 44-45.
51. Junger-Tas, supra note 10, at 526.
52. Muncie & Goldson, supra note 13, at 211.
53. Id.
54. According to "Abramson's (2000) analysis of UN observations on the implementation of
juvenile justice in 141 countries" there is a "widespread lack of 'sympathetic understanding' necessary
for compliance with the []CRC." Id. at 212. ("[Abramson] notes that a complete overhaul of juvenile
justice is required in [twenty-one] countries and that in others torture, inhumane treatment, lack of
separation from adults, police brutality, bad conditions in detention facilities, overcrowding, lack of
rehabilitation, failure to develop alternatives to incarceration, inadequate contact between minors and
their families, lack of training of judges, police, and prison authorities, lack of speedy trial, no legal
assistance, disproportionate sentences, insufficient respect for the rule of law and improper use of the
juvenile justice system to tackle other social problems, are of common occurrence.").
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is accompanied by reservations.55 "For example the Netherlands, Canada, and the
UK have issued reservations to the requirement to separate children from adults in
detention."56
Above all, like other human rights law treaties and instruments, the ICCPR
and the CRC are general in their character and lack specific detailed regulations for
the legal procedures of juvenile justice; among them, regulations of criminal
procedures, specific forms of rehabilitation, and limitation periods for offences
committed by juveniles. Hence, it is understood that the importance of the CRC
and other soft law instruments lies more in the values they represent and their
moral appeal to realize these values, and less in their actual application.
Even more complicated, however, is the question of which human rights
norms governing juvenile justice systems in independent and democratic regimes
could, and should, be applied within occupation regimes. As we shall see in the
following section, both the problem and its suggested solutions emerge from the
question of which legal regimes should apply in occupied territories.
III. THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE LAW OF OCCUPATION
Traditional, or classic, international law of occupation sets a very constrained
framework of rules to govern belligerent occupation regimes, known as belligerent
occupation law or international humanitarian law.57 However, the last decades
have witnessed a proliferation of other types of occupation regimes. These include
long-term occupation regimes (for example, in the territories administered by
Israel) and transformative occupation regimes, also called multilateral regimes (in
formerly occupied Iraq and in Afghanistan)." The aim of these latter regimes is to
build new societies as end goals of intervention and to protect the occupied
population as consistent with international norms and human rights law, and they
are characterized by the involvement of the U.N.5 9
The changing nature of occupation regimes-in terms of both the period of
the occupation and the goals of the regime-will, in our view, inevitably change
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Hans-Peter Gasser, Protection of the Civilian Population, in THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw 237, 270-73 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008).
58. See Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and
Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 580, 584, 588-89, 604-05 (2006). A recent report on occupation and
other forms of administration of foreign territory prepared by the International Committee of the Red
Cross questions the legal basis of transformative occupations and suggest that their mandate relies only
in U.N. Security Council decisions and not in international law itself. See TRISTAN FERRARO, INT'L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, OCCUPATION AND OTHER FORMS OF ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN
TERRITORY 67-71 (2012) [hereinafter ICRC REPORT], available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-4094.pdf. However, in this article we rather
accept the main existence of such forms of occupations (or administration of territory) and hence
delineate the duties incumbent on such regimes without questioning their legitimacy under international
law.
59. Grant T. Harris, The Era of Multilateral Occupation, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 7-9, 13
(2006) (see figure 1).
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the normative legal framework that regulates those regimes and the interpretation
of existing traditional laws. In order to enable them to fulfill their purposes, both
long-term occupation regimes and transformative (even if short-term) occupation
regimes demand changes in the set of rules that govern them. For example, since
the aim of transformative regimes is to rebuild the legal infrastructure of the
territory they occupy and create a new legal order, the governing laws must allow
changes in the existing laws in the occupied territory. Long-term occupation
regimes, on the other hand, may not require permission to change existing laws in
the occupied area, but they must consider the need for development of the
occupied area. In this section, we compare the traditional and the new obligations
of occupiers in the administered territories (as long-term occupiers) and in
formerly occupied Iraq (as transformative occupiers).
The foundations of the traditional law of occupation are the 1907 fourth
Hague Convention and the Fourth Geneva Convention.6 1  These instruments,
which are considered customary international law,62 establish the framework of
belligerent occupations regimes: that is, their goals, the duties of the occupant, and
the rights and privileges of the occupied population. They also seek to create a
harmonized system that secures the rights of the occupied population, on the one
hand, and the security needs of the occupant, on the other hand.
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations contains the crux of the goals of the
occupation regime and the obligations of the occupant:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the
hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power
to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country.63
Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention completes the legal framework
that enables the occupying power to ensure "public order and safety": "The penal
laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception that they
may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they
constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present
Convention."64 As one commentator noted, "[t]he main thrust of the international
law of occupation is to provide a set of interstitial rules for the administration of
territory during an interim period while the fate of the territory is decided." 65
However, questions arise with regard to the content, the purpose, and the
limits of the framework of these rules, especially, as will be discussed further, vis-
A-vis the changes that conservative forms of belligerent occupations have
60. Hague Regulations, supra note 7.
61. GCIV, supra note 2.
62. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 1 79
(July 8).
63. Hague Regulations, supra note 7, art. 43.
64. GCIV, supra note 2, art. 64.
65. Harris, supra note 59, at 8.
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undergone. A recent report prepared by legal experts on behalf of the International
Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC"), aimed at analyzing, clarifying, and
developing the laws of occupation, suggested that the obligation to "'restore and
ensure public order and safety' contained in the first part of Article 43 of [the
Hague Regulations]" would receive a much broader interpretation in terms of the
obligations of the occupying power if interpreted according to the authoritative
French text, as this version "referred to the restoration and maintenance of 'l'ordre
et la vie publics,"' that is the restoration of "public order and civil lie.",66 In this
interpretation, the occupying power's obligations according to the Hague
Regulations "to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety"
represent a role that is fraught rather than one-dimensional.67  The occupying
power, in this reading, would "no longer be regarded as . . . a disinterested invader
but rather . .. a full-fledged administrator."6 8
The above obligations to restore and maintain public order and safety in the
occupied territory are realized and performed by the military commander, the
incarnation of effective control in the occupied territory. This position has been
echoed by the Israeli Supreme Court in several cases:
As is well known, Article 43 [of the Hague Regulations is a] ...
framework maxim of the belligerent occupation laws, which sets a
general framework for the manner by which the military commander
exercises its duties and powers in the occupied territory. . . . [T]he
commander of the Area must exercise his powers under all
circumstances exclusively for the benefit of the Area, while applying
only the relevant considerations-the best interest of the protected
persons, on the one hand, and the needs of the military, on the other
hand.69
Thus, when exercising his powers, "the military commander is not allowed to
consider the national, economic and social interests of his own state, inasmuch as
such interests have no effect on his security interest in the area or the interest of the
local population." 70
However, the ICRC report on occupation suggests that prolonged occupation
"call[s] into question some of the underlying principles of occupation law, in
particular the provisional character of the occupation and the necessity of
preserving the status quo ante."71  Hence, it asserts "[s]ince neither the Hague
Regulations nor the Fourth Geneva Convention specifies any lawful deviation from
existing law in such circumstances, many have argued that prolonged occupation
necessitates specific regulations for guiding responses to the practical problems
66. ICRC REPORT, supra note 58, at 56-57 (first emphasis added).
67. Hague Regulations, supra note 7, art. 43.
68. ICRC REPORT, supra note 58, at 57.
69. HCJ 2164/09 Yesh Din-Volunteers for Human Rights v. Commander of the IDF Forces in
the West Bank } 8 [2011 ] (Isr.).
70. Id. (quoting HCJ 393/82 Askaan v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the Area 37(4) PD 785,
794-795 [1983] (Isr.)).
71. ICRC REPORT, supra note 58, at 55.
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arising from long-term occupation." 72 Indeed, the prolonged nature of the Israeli
occupation in the administered territories has generated numerous discussions over
the years on the question of how the commander should apply the relevant
considerations and exercise his duties. The main question discussed by the Israeli
Supreme Court has been how to adjust "the prolonged duration of the occupation,
to the continuity of normal life in the Area and to the sustainability of .. . relations
between the two authorities-the occupier and the occupied." 73
These discussions have mainly taken place in the context of securing the
rights and freedoms of the occupied population, such as the freedom of
movement, 74 the right to property,75 or the rights of the civilian population in times
of armed conflict.76  These discussions have persisted both when the territories
were peacefully administered and when uprisings and even armed conflicts arose.77
The Israeli Supreme Court concluded by stating the need for a dynamic view
of the duties of the military commander:
This kind of conception supports the adoption of a wide and dynamic
view of the duties of the military commander in the [administered
territories], which impose upon him, inter alia, the responsibility to
ensure the development and growth of the Area in numerous and
various fields, including the fields of economic infrastructure and its
development.78
The Supreme Court then quoted a previous ruling: "Thus, a military
administration may develop industry, commerce, agriculture, education, health,
welfare and other elements regarding good governance, which are required in order
to secure the changing needs of a population in an area held in belligerent
72. Id.
73. HCJ 2164/09 Yesh Din, 10 (citing HCJ 393/82 Askaan at 800-02; HCJ 9717/03 Naale v.
Civil Administration 58(6) PD 97, 103-04 [2004] (Isr.); HCJ 337/71 El-Jamiya v. Minister of Defense
26(1) PD 547, 582 [1972] (Isr.)).
74. HCJ 2150/07 Safiyeh et al. v. Minister of Defense 32 [2009] (Isr.), available at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files eng/07/500/021/ml9/07021500.ml9.pdf.
75. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel 48(5) PD 807, 8 [2004] (Isr.), available
at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/FilesENG/04/560/020/A28/04020560.A28.pdf; see also HCJ 7957/04
Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Israel 60(2) PD 477, T 7 [2005] (Isr.), available at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/Files ENG/04/570/079/Al4/04079570.Al4.HTM.
76. See, e.g., HCJ 9132/07 Albassioni v. Prime Minister % 4-5, 7, 10-11 [2008] (Isr.) (not
reported), available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/FilesENG/07/320/091/n25/07091320.n25.pdf; see
also HCJ 201/09 Physicians for Human Rights v. Prime Minister 1 1 [2009] (Isr.), available at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files eng/09/010/002/nO7/09002010.nO7.pdf.
77. See, e.g., HCJ 201/09 Physicians for Human Rights 1, 3-4 (discussing IDF activities in Cast
Lead operation in 2009); HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza 85(5)
PD 385, 1, 3 [2004] (Isr.), available at
http://elyon I.court.gov.il/fileseng/04/640/047/a03/04047640.a03.pdf (reviewing applications
regarding IDF activities in defense operations); HCJ 2936/02 Physicians for Human Rights v.
Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank 53(3) PD 26 [2002] (Isr.), available at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/FilesENG/02/360/029/LO2/02029360.102.pdf.
78. HCJ 2164/09 Yesh Din 10 (first emphasis added).
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occupation." 79 The Israeli Court seems to express a view that is compatible with
the authoritative French text of the Hague Regulations. According to this view, the
lengthy nature of the Israeli occupation in the administered territories requires that
the discretion of the military commander be widened to take into consideration the
needs of the restoration and maintenance of the general civil life, as it is his
responsibility "to ensure the development and growth of the Area in numerous and
various fields."80 In fact, this view supports the concept that the fundamental
conservative rules of occupation law should not be interpreted as a general
directive to freeze development in occupied territory or leading the territory into a
frozen situation."
Yet, it should be clarified that this widened authorization cannot exceed the
constraints of the international law of occupation-that is, the Hague Regulations
and the Fourth Geneva Convention-which sustain that the interests of the
protected persons (the local population living in the occupied territories) must be
secured.82 Therefore, the military commander's discretion may be widened in the
administered territories given the prolonged nature of the occupation regime so
long as this is done for the benefit of the occupied population: that is, for the
protected persons.83
The military commander's discretion is also restricted with regard to the
occupying power's ability to legislate in the occupied territory. Article 43 of the
Hague Regulations orders the occupying power to respect, "unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country." 84 Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention authorizes the occupying power (and hence the military commander)
to:
[S]ubject the population of the occupied territory to provisions which
are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfill its obligations
under the present Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the
territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of the
members and property of the occupying forces or administration, and
likewise of the establishments and lines of communication used by
them. 85
This indicates that the occupying power should not engage in attempts to
change the fundamental legal framework-that is, the legislation and institutions
of the occupied territory-as it is not the permanent sovereign of the territory. As
the ICRC report suggests, we must interpret the concept of the necessity to change
laws governing the occupied territory folded within Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations as encompassing, first, the duty of the occupant to fulfill its
79. Id. (quoting HCJ 393/82 Askaan v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the Area 37(4) PD 785,
804 [1983] (Isr.)).
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. See ICRC REPORT, supra note 58, at 72.
82. See HCJ 2164/09 Yesh Din 1 8.
83. Id. 10.
84. Hague Regulations, supra note 7, art. 43.
85. GCIV, supra note 2, art. 64.
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obligations under Fourth Geneva Convention; second, to maintain orderly
government in the occupied territory; and third, preserve its ability to ensure its
own security.86 This is the only justification for the occupying power to change the
pre-existing legal system in the occupied territory and issue its own military
legislation.
With regard to the role of the occupying power emerging from both the
Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention, then, we can conclude that,
on the one hand, it exceeds the conservative framework of a short-term belligerent
occupation regime. The occupying power may "develop industry, commerce,
agriculture, education, health, welfare and other elements regarding good
governance, which are required in order to secure the changing needs of a
population in an area held in belligerent occupation."88 On the other hand, the role
of occupying power does not evolve into that of a complete sovereign that can
legitimately and indiscriminately change the laws in the area.
In contrast, in formerly occupied Iraq, a broader mandate in terms of the
development of the physical and legal infrastructures of the occupied territory was
given to members of the Coalition (mainly the United States and the United
Kingdom).89 Following the invasion of Iraq, the United States established the
transitional government of the Coalition Provisional Authority ("CPA") on behalf
of the Coalition.98 The U.N. Security Council gave the Coalition members a
mandate to administer Iraq,91 allowing them to
advance efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for
representative governance, including by working together to facilitate a
process leading to an internationally recognized, representative
government of Iraq; . . . [to] promot[e] the protection of human rights; ..
. [and to] encourag[e] international efforts to promote legal and judicial
reform. 92
However, while the Security Council referred to the administration of the
Coalition members in Iraq as occupation,93 the CPA did not refer to the
administrative regime it created as "an occupation regime," but rather as a
86. See ICRC REPORT, supra note 58, at 56-59.
87. Id. (the experts base their interpretation of the concept of necessity in article 43 of the Hague
Regulations).
88. HCJ 2164/09 Yesh Din-Volunteers for Human Rights v. Commander of the IDF Forces in
the West Bank 10 [2011] (Isr.) (quoting HCJ 393/82 Askaan v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the
Area 37(4) PD 785, 804 [1983] (Isr.)).
89. See S.C Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).
90. Sean D. Murphy, Ed., Coalition Laws and Transition Arrangements During Occupation of
Iraq, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 601, 601-02 (2004).
91. See S.C. Res. 1546, 9-10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004); S.C. Res. 1511, 13-14,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1511 (Oct. 16, 2003); S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 89, 4.
92. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 89, 8.
93. See id. pmbl. (referring to the Coalition members as "occupying powers").
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"transitional administration"94 regime that intended to "restore conditions of
security and stability, to create conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely
determine their own political future, (including by advancing efforts to restore and
establish national and local institutions for representative governance) and
facilitating economic recovery, sustainable reconstruction and development." 95
The objectives of the powers in Iraq, accompanied by the involvement of the
U.N. Special Representative to Iraq in helping the Iraqi people and members of the
Coalition achieve these goals, suggest that "the purposes of the occupation [there] .
. . went beyond the confines of the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva
Convention," 96 even though not to such an extent that they completely disregarded
the traditional law of occupation. Hence, the mandate to reform the existing legal
framework in Iraq gained by the CPA and the U.N. Security Council was much
wider than that given to the Israeli occupying power in the administered
territories.97
The differences between the administered territories and formerly occupied
Iraq in the objectives and roles of the occupying powers suggest a difference in the
application and interpretation of the legal framework governing these occupied
territories, be it the traditional law of occupation, which forms part of international
humanitarian law,98 or international human rights law, which, as will be discussed
in the next section, contemporary legal theory of international law claims to apply
in occupied territories. We will discuss this difference in the following section.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
The co-application of international human rights law and international
humanitarian law has become a prominent topic of discussion in the last decade,
yielding controversies and disagreements over both its mere feasibility and its form
or degree. 99 In this section, we examine this co-application specifically through
94. L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
(CPA): ORIGIN, CHARACTERISTICS, AND INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITIES 8 (2004) (statement for Maj.
Frank A. March).
95. Id. at I (footnote omitted).
96. Roberts, supra note 58, at 613.
97. Yet, it is interesting to note that after the conclusion of the formal mandate of the Coalition
and since the insurgents' activities in Iraq demanded the continuing presence of Coalition forces, the
administrative regime regained its nature as a traditional form of belligerent occupation, which required
the application of traditional Hague and Geneva law. See id. 617-18.
98. International humanitarian law includes both the laws of belligerent occupation and the laws
governing the conduct of hostilities. ICRC REPORT, supra note 58, at 7.
99. There are numerous articles on this issue. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (Oma Ben-Naftali ed., 2011) (containing nine essays on the
relationship between international humanitarian law and international human rights law); Michael J.
Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and
Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 119 (2005); Cordula Droege, The Interplay Between
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations ofArmed Conflict,
40 ISR. L. REV. 310 (2007); Hans-Joachim Heintze, On the Relationship Between Human Rights Law
Protection and International Humanitarian Law, 86 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 789 (2004); Orna Ben-
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the prism of norms that apply in the juvenile justice system in occupied territories.
We then apply the discussion to the case study of the juvenile justice system in
former occupied Iraq.
A. The Mutual Application ofInternational Human Rights Law and
International Humanitarian Law
It has been long contested whether human rights law should apply in
situations where international humanitarian law traditionally applies, including
occupied territories.00 Some valuable arguments apply against such application,
the most significant being that protections provided by international human rights
treaties do not normally apply extra-territorially, outside the government-governed
relationship.o' This position is extrapolated from a narrow linguistic interpretation
of the "under its jurisdiction" clause of the ICCPR.102 Others argue that because
human rights norms were not drawn up with the circumstances of armed conflict
and occupation primarily in mind, the rules of the law of armed conflict regarding
military occupations offer more extensive, detailed, and relevant guidance on a
wide range of issues than do the general human rights conventions. 10 3 These two
regimes, therefore, are said to mutually exclude each other.104 Another argument is
that "human rights treaty bodies [are not necessarily] competent to find violations
of international humanitarian law, or even to evaluate conduct during armed
conflicts or military occupation, when the treaties that created these bodies gave
them a mandate only to review generally state implementation of obligations under
each instrument." 05
However, contemporary theories of international law and practice do support
such co-application. 06 This can be seen, on the one hand, through a direct and
Naftali & Yuval Shany, Living In Denial: The Application of Human Rights in the Occupied
Territories, 37 ISR. L. REV. 17 (2003).
100. See Dennis, supra note 99, at 119-20 (referencing the observation of Jean Pictet, editor of the
ICRC commentaries, on the 1949 Geneva Convention).
101. See id. at 122-27.
102. Id. at 122-23.
103. E.g., Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 99, at 28.
104. Id. at 29; Roberts, supra note 58, at 600.
105. Dennis, supra note 99, at 121-22.
106. For two of ICJ's core decisions on this subject, see Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 1.C.J. 226, 1 25 (July 8) and Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, IT
106-113 (July 9) (this case included examining Israel's obligations under the ICCPR in the occupied
territories). For recent European Court of Human Rights decisions that support the mutual application
of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, see Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 27021/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R., July 7, 2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-105612 (this and the next case examine the
United Kingdom's obligations under the European Convention of Human Rights in their role in the
occupation of Iraq); Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07 (Eur. Ct. H.R., July 07, 2011),
http:/ihudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1-105606; Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96
(Eur. Ct. H.R., Mar. 3, 2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-67460 (this
and the next case cases examine Turkey's obligations under the European Convention of Human Rights
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independent application of human rights law in occupied territories according to a
contemporary interpretation of the obligations entrusted with the occupying power
by traditional occupation law (such as Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and
Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention),10 7 or, on the other hand, by applying
a lex specialis concept.0  According to this latter approach, international
humanitarian law is the lex specialis in occupation regimes, and hence
international human rights law serves as a complementary set of norms that should
be applied as an interpretative source of the former, serving to solve lacunas in
international humanitarian law and validate the legitimacy of the involvement of
international supervisory mechanisms in situations of occupation.109 This co-
application of human rights law and international humanitarian law is based on a
paradigm that undermines the traditional great divide between the law of war and
the law of peace. It is vested in the idea of universality of human rights that
embraces "the interpretation of the jurisdictional clauses of the major human rights
treaties, substitut[es] the test of effective control for the concept of territory, and
revers[es] the presumption in favor of the territorial application of international
treaties, insofar as human right treaties are concerned."' to
Yet, while the above analysis of the co-application of international
humanitarian law and human rights law may seem plausible where the occupying
power executes law enforcement actions, its feasibility with regard to situations of
armed conflict in an occupied territory requires further substantiation. Indeed, this
is quite often the situation that occupying powers face even after establishing a
stable occupation regime."' As the ICRC report on occupation suggests:
[O]ccupation law is silent on the separation and interaction between law
enforcement measures and the use of military force under the 'conduct-
of-hostilities' model . . . [and hence, it] leaves unresolved a number of
in regards to Turkish soldiers in Iraq); Ergi v. Turkey, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1751; Loizidou v. Turkey,
310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995) (this case examines Turkey's obligations under the European
Convention of Human Rights in regards to its actions in the 1974 Cyprus invasion and the refugees that
resulted). For the U.N. position on the universal application of minimum humanitarian standards, see
Comm. on Human Rights, Letter Dated 5 January 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Norway
and the Charg6 d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Finland Addressed to the Commission on
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/116 (Jan. 31, 1995) (notifying that the U.N. Sub-Commission
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities decided to transmit the Declaration of
Minimum Humanitarian Standards).
107. GCIV, supra note 2, art. 64; Hague Regulations, supra note 7, art. 43. See also Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 1 178 (Dec.
19).
108. See the cases cited in note 106.
109. ICRC REPORT, supra note 58, at 61-66. See also Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 99, at 22.
110. Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 99, at 100.
111. This was the case between Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza before the disengagement, and
partially the case in the administered territories. See id. at 19. A similar situation prevailed in formerly
occupied Iraq, where continuing insurgent activities have been pitted against the Coalition forces. See,
e.g., Seumas Milne, Insurgents Form Political Front to Plan for US Pullout, GUARDIAN, July 18, 2007,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jul/I9/topstories3.usa.
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issues related to the identification of the legal regime(s) governing the
use of force in occupied territory.112
The inability to identify the legal regimes that should govern the use of force
in occupied territory pertains to a difficulty in determining whether human rights
law regimes should apply even to law enforcement missions that the occupying
power is to execute under the constraints of an armed conflict, such as detentions,
assigning of residence, or issuing of orders that limit movement in the occupied
territory.
In scenarios where hostilities arise in the occupied territory, the occupying
power may lose, at least to some degree, its effective control. Since the level of
effective control needed to apply human rights law is greater than that needed to
apply the laws governing the conduct of hostilities, the occupying power may
conclude that the latter should prevail over the former." 3 Some have suggested
that situations where armed conflict arises infrequently in occupied territories be
defined as a mixed conflict,' 14 comprising periods where "protracted armed
violence between governmental authorities and organized groups" take place and
other periods where the occupying power exercises effective control in relatively
peaceful circumstances." 5  According to a mixed conflict model, the co-
application of human rights law and international humanitarian law is also
intelligible, as the occupying power's capacity to exercise some degree of effective
control implies its capacity to enforce human rights law in the area." 6
These assertions regarding the applicability of human rights law in occupied
territories are strengthened by the nature of long-term and transformative
occupations, discussed above." 7  "[A]n occupant with a transformative project
may view human rights norms as constituting part of the beneficent political order
being introduced into the territory."" t A long-term occupant will perhaps be
112. ICRC REPORT, supra note 58, at 109.
113. See HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza 85(5) PD 385,1
20 [2004] (Isr.), available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/fileseng/04/640/047/a03/04047640.a03.pdf;
HCJ 3239/02 Mar'ab v. IDF Commander in the West Bank $ 21 [2002] (Isr.), available at
http://www.hamoked.org/files/2012/3720 eng.pdf; Yuval Shany, Israeli Counter- Terrorism Measures:
Are They "Kosher" Under International Law?, in TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 96, 105 (Int'l Inst. of Humanitarian Law ed., 2003), available at
http://www.iihl.org/iihl/Documents/Terrorism%/ 20and%/o201HL.pdf. See also Hilly Moodrick Even-
Khen, Can We Now Tell What "Direct Participation in Hostilities" Is?, 40 ISR. L. REv. 214, 219-31
(2007); see also HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel (2) IsrLR 459, 16
[2006] (lsr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/FilesENG/02/690/007/A34/02007690.A34.pdf
(citing Israeli Supreme Court's statements in cases dealing with the Israeli Army activities in the
territories during the second Intifada, that the laws of armed conflict should prevail in those territories).
I14. AMICHAI COHEN & YUVAL SHANY, 1 " , r100f nTn n-'pn :127 nK 1lMpflan2 'n
[The IDF and Alleged International Law Violations: Reforming Policies for Self-Investigations] 26-27
(2011) (Isr.), available at http://en.idi.org.il/media/230988/pp_93.pdf.
115. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, $ 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
116. COHEN & SHANY, supra note 114, at 26-27.
117. See id.
118. Roberts, supra note 58, at 594.
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pressured by "the inhabitants, or outside bodies claiming to act on their behalf," to
apply standards that secure "the human rights of inhabitants, internees, and
others."' 19
Indeed, a long-term belligerent occupant may claim conservatively that
international humanitarian law adequately ensures the rights of the occupied
population.120 However, the prototype of belligerent occupations regime that set
the model for international humanitarian law, including the laws of belligerent
occupation, was of a short-term occupation. This legal framework, most of it
intended to expire a year after the commencement of an occupation,' 2 1 was
carefully tailored for the purposes of keeping law and order in the occupied
territory by imposing limited obligations on the occupant for the rights of the
occupied population and by providing the occupant with a confined set of means
for derogating from the protected rights of the occupied population.122 Long-term
occupations, which demand the "develop[ment of] industry, commerce,
agriculture, education, health, welfare and other elements regarding good
governance" are closer in resemblance to sovereign regimes.' 23 As the period of
occupation extends, they face demands of the civilian population to be protected
"from improper exercise of governmental power."' 24  The legal framework of
human rights law-rather than international humanitarian law-is thus most
adequate for fulfilling this mission. Human rights law norms and ideology, which
seek to ensure human dignity, are designed to insist that governments provide for
the needs of individuals. Hence, as the belligerent occupant exercises most of the
powers of the sovereign government-such as "the power to legislate (jurisdiction
to prescribe), the power to resolve disputes (jurisdiction to adjudicate), and the
19. Id. See, e.g., NAAMA BAUMGARTEN-SHARON, B'TSELEM, No MINOR MATTER: VIOLATIONS
OF THE RIGHTS OF PALESTINIAN MINORS ARRESTED BY ISRAEL ON SUSPICION OF STONE-THROWING 7-
9 (Yael Stein & Maya Johnston eds., Zvi Shulman trans., 2011), available at
http://www.btselem.org/download/201107_no-minor-matter eng.pdf (demanding that the Convention
on the Rights of the Child be applied by Israel in the occupied territories). For the U.N. Human Rights
Committee and the U.N. Economic, Cultural and Social Committee's demands to apply human rights
treaties in these territories, see Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Rep. on its 22d, 23d, and
24th Sess., Apr. 25-May 12, 2000, Aug. 14-Sept. 1, 2000, Nov. 13-Dec. 1, 2000, 1 577, U.N. Doc.
E/2001/22; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 2 (2001); Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Second Periodic Report, Addendum: Israel, Human Rights
Comm., 1 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/2001/2 (Dec. 4, 2001) [hereinafter Human Rights Comm.,
Considerations of Reports].
120. See Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports, supra note 119, 8 (detailing Israel's
position objecting to the co-application of human rights law and international humanitarian law and
claiming that international humanitarian law adequately suffices for the administration of the occupied
territory).
121. GCIV, supra note 2, art. 6.
122. See, e.g., id. arts. 43, 53, 78 (allowing internment, expropriation of property, and assigned
residence respectively).
123. HCJ 393/82 Askaan v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the Area 37(4) PD 785, 804 [1983]
(Isr.). See also Roberts, supra note 58, at 601 (indicating specific situations where human rights law
should apply).
124. Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 99, at 61.
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power to implement laws and court decisions (jurisdiction to enforce)"l 25 -it
seems logical that the belligerent occupant apply, mutatis mutandis, the apparatus
of human rights law in the occupied territory.
The above conclusion connects the argument put forward in this article
(namely, that the occupying power's compliance with the obligation to restore and
maintain public order and civil life requires certain transformations) to the
argument that these transformations are best achieved by the application of human
rights law. However, the following questions arise: Does the applicability of
human rights law depend only on the occupying power's objectives and
obligations in the occupied territory? Or should it also be affected by the
willingness of the ousted sovereign's constitutional regime to absorb and apply
international human rights law or by the values and goals of the occupied
population, if these can be detected? The answer is not immediately clear. It may
be argued that the flexibility given to an occupying power "to implement human
rights law in occupied territory . . . should not be interpreted as giving it a blank
cheque to change legislation and institutions in the name of human rights to make
them accord with its own legal and institutional ideas."I 26
Yet, an alternative claim points to the dicta of the International Court of
Justice that accepts the applicability of human rights law in occupied territory both
as a complementary set of norms and as a direct interpretation and application of
belligerent occupation law,127 and the universality of human rights law and the
customary nature of most of its norms. Accordingly, proponents of this view
demand the application of human rights law in the occupied territory by the
occupying power, and even justify the use of it to make substantial changes in the
occupied territory. 128
Finally, the endorsement of the application of human rights law in occupied
territories serves perfectly the interests of securing a legitimate juvenile justice
system discussed in the second section of this article. The principal aims of a
juvenile justice system-that is "[t]o prevent offending and re-offending; [t]o
(re)socialize and (re)integrate offenders; [and] [t]o address the needs and interests
of victims" through diminished responsibility, proportionality, and room to
reform 29 -are all incorporated both in general human rights instruments and in
those specific to children's rights, as was suggested and exemplified above.
In addition, as maintained in this section, international human rights law
supplies both the long-term belligerent occupant and the transformative occupant
with an additional compatible legal framework to abide by its obligations towards
125. Id. at 60-61.
126. ICRC REPORT, supra note 58, at 69.
127. See generally the cases in note 106.
128. See, e.g., ICRC REPORT, supra note 58, at 70 (noting that "Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations and Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention require the suspension or abrogation of
oppressive local laws if they hindered the occupying power from discharging its duties under the Fourth
Geneva Convention and by extension of this principle, require the occupying power to implement any
other obligations derived from international law, in particular human rights law").
129. Junger-Tas, supra note 10, at 510-11.
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the protected persons in the occupied territory. Therefore, in order to ensure a
legitimate juvenile justice system within the occupied territory, the occupying
power should be bound both by general human rights law norms and by specific
human rights standards that regulate the treatment of children under human rights
law.
Having determined the above, we must decide which instruments of
international human rights law that substantiate those norms and standards bind the
occupying power. As states are bound by their customary and treaty international
law obligations, systems of juvenile justice that are established by sovereign states
rest, inter alia, on general human rights principles such as the prevention of such
practices as torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment
and prolonged arbitrary detention, considered as customary law,130 and, secondly,
on the rights that are specifically mentioned in the ICCPR regulating standards of
legal detention, arrest, and trial for those states that are parties to the
Convention.' 3' A system of juvenile justice is also compiled of rights and
protections specifically tailored to secure the rights of children who are detained,
arrested, or tried. These are found in the CRC and in non-binding instruments,
such as decisions of U.N. bodies and ICRC documents.
An examination of the applicability of human rights treaty law reveals that a
wide interpretation of the "under its jurisdiction" clause of the ICCPR suggests that
an occupier has jurisdiction over persons who are under its effective control, 32
which applies when it exercises public powers on the territory of another state.133
This leads to the conclusion that the ICCPR applies in occupied territories.
However, the case for application of the CRC is more complicated. This
convention contains an application clause that determines that "States Parties shall
respect and ensure the rights set forth in the . . . Convention to each child within
their jurisdiction,"l 34 and hence has been interpreted by the International Court of
Justice to impose a similar obligation on occupying powers to apply this
convention in the territory they temporarily administer.' 35 However, it may be
130. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 563 (7th ed. 2008); MALCOLM
N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 256-57 (5th ed. 2003).
131. ICCPR, supra note 4, arts. 9, 10, 14.
132. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 1.C.J. 136, if 108-11 (July 9).
133. See, e.g., AI-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, 11 107-10 (Eur. Ct. H.R., July 7,
2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-105612; Al-Skeini v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 131-42 (Eur. Ct. H.R., July 07, 2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-105606 (noting examples of recent
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, in which the court, in contrast to its former dicta that
aimed at limiting the application of the European Convention on Human Rights extraterritorially, ruled
that the Convention applied when a state-such as an occupying power-is responsible for maintaining
the security of the territory that is under its effective control or when it has the authority to employ
governmental authorities); contra infra Part V.A (explaining Israel's contrasting position on this issue).
134. CRC, supra note 1, art. 2 (emphasis added).
135. Legal Consequences ofthe Construction ofa Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004
I.C.J. 113 ("As regards the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989, that
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contended that this convention does not apply in armed conflicts. The specific
reference of Article 38 of the CRC to situations of armed conflicts specifies that
states "undertake to respect and to ensure respect for rules of international
humanitarian law applicable to them in armed conflicts which are relevant to the
child" and "[i]n accordance with their obligations under international humanitarian
law to protect the civilian population in armed conflicts." 36 This may suggest that
the CRC intended to exclude other of its articles in times of armed conflict and
occupation.' 37 Yet, other non-binding human rights standards referring to juvenile
justice can be considered as guiding the occupying power regime in the
occupied territory, as a manifestation of the general application of human rights
law in these territories.
Hence, the specific human rights law norms that apply in occupied territories
are primarily those in the ICCPR that determine the rights of suspects and accused,
guaranteeing the right to avoid arbitrary detention,' 39 to be treated "with humanity
and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person," 40 and "to a fair and
public hearing by a[n] . . . independent and impartial tribunal established by
law."' 41 As was indicated in the second section of this article, specific reference to
minors' rights is also found within the ICCPR when it requires states to provide
every child "such measures of protection as are required by his status as a
minor"l42 and demands specifically that "[a]ccused juvenile persons shall be
separated from adults and brought as speedily as possible for adjudication." l43
The CRC-whose applicability in occupied territories, while questionable, is
possible-focuses on the importance of securing juvenile justice and adds more
obligations for states parties. 144 These include seeking "to promote the
establishment of laws, procedures, authorities and institutions specifically
applicable to children [in the juvenile justice system]," 4 5 demanding that detention
"shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate
period of time," 46 and that the child "shall have the right to maintain contact with
his or her family through correspondence and visits, save in exceptional
circumstances."' 47 These goals are reinforced by the soft law instruments that refer
instrument contains an Article 2 according to which 'States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights
set forth in the . . . Convention to each child within their jurisdiction . . . .' That Convention is therefore
applicable within the Occupied Palestinian Territory.").
136. CRC, supra note 1, arts. 38(1), 38(4).
137. Dennis, supra note 99, at 129.
138. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
139. See ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 9.
140. Id. art. 10(1).
141. Id. art. 14(1).
142. Id. art. 24(1).
143. Id. art. 10(2)(b).
144. See Dennis, supra note 99, at 129.
145. CRC, supra note 1, art. 40(3).
146. Id. art. 37(b).
147. Id. art. 37(c).
140 VOL. 42:2
JUVENILE JUSTICE IN BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION REGIMES
to the detention and rehabilitation of children in juvenile justice systems, which
were discussed in the second section of this article.
In the following sub-section we discuss the co-application of the laws of
belligerent occupation and human rights law in the juvenile justice system in
formerly occupied Iraq. We examine the standards of human rights law that were
formally incorporated into the legal instruments regulating the CPA and discuss
the question of whether the administration has lived up to its own standards.
B. The Juvenile Justice System in Formerly Occupied Iraq
As explained above,148 the Coalition occupation regime in Iraq was approved
by the U.N. Security Council and implemented by the CPA memorandum.14 9
Those instruments, which approved and provided guidance to the Coalition's
occupation, based the regime's legal framework explicitly on the laws of
belligerent occupation and implicitly on human rights law. Security Council
Resolution 1483 instructed the Coalition forces to abide by and comply fully with
their obligations under the laws of belligerent occupation, "including in particular
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907.""so The
CPA revised memorandum stipulated that "the relevant and appropriate provisions
[of the Fourth Geneva Convention] constitute an appropriate framework consistent
with its mandate in continuance of measures previously adopted."151
In terms of the application of human rights law, the CPA noted "the
deficiencies of the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code with regard to fundamental
standards of human rights," 52 and intended to "establish[] procedures for applying
criminal law in Iraq, recognizing that the effective administration of justice must
consider . . . the need to modify aspects of Iraqi law that violate fundamental
standards of human rights."' 53
The Security Council addressed the application of human rights law only
indirectly by calling upon the Coalition members to act
consistent[ly] with the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant
international law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the
effective administration of the territory, including in particular working
towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability and the
creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine
their own political future.154
148. See supra Part III.
149. Memorandum of L. Paul Bremer, Adm'r, Multinational Provisional Auth., Coalition
Provisional Auth. Memorandum Number 3 (Revised) (June 27, 2004), available at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/469cdlb32.html [CPA Memo (Revised)].
150. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 89, 5.
151. CPA Memo (Revised), supra note 149, pmbl.
152. Id.
153. Id. § 1.
154. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 89, $ 4 (emphasis added).
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Following the termination of the U.N. mandate for the occupation in Iraq
given to the Coalition in 2005, the occupation regime ended,'55 and since the
departure of the multinational force from Iraq, the prevailing legal framework has
been a subject of debate.156 According to the United States, after the end of the
U.N. mandate, the occupation re-acquired its definition as a belligerent occupation
regime in which insurgent activities take place.'57 Under such circumstances, the
lex specialis is humanitarian law, which is regulated by the Hague and Geneva
laws, which generally do not contain specific guarantees for the rights of children
detained by the occupying power. However, according to another legal analysis,
the completion of the U.N. mandate rendered the lex specialis in Iraq human rights
law, notwithstanding the armed conflict between dissident forces and the Coalition
powers that remained there.iss In this interpretation, belligerent occupation law
lost its relevancy.159
However, according to the analysis of this article, both international
humanitarian law and human rights law should have applied. International
humanitarian law, which includes both the laws of belligerent occupation and the
laws of armed conflict, is the lex specialis, and human rights law supplies
complementary standards of interpretation and resolves situations not satisfactorily
regulated by the laws of belligerent occupation or the laws of armed conflict.160
Juvenile justice seems to be such a situation, requiring co-application of these
laws.
The detention and prosecution of children both before the end of the U.N.
mandate and afterwards was governed by a legal framework that incorporated
general human rights standards only to a very limited extent. "The United States-
Iraq status of forces agreement require[d] that juveniles detained by [United States
Forces in Iraq] be released, or, if sufficient evidence exist[ed], that they be
transferred to the Iraqi justice system for processing."' 6' The CPA referred to the
detention of children under the age of eighteen only, determining that any person
under the age of eighteen interned at any time shall in all cases be released not later
than twelve months after the initial date of internment.162 The CPA formally
related only to the basic ICCPR guarantees of the right to freedom 63 and due
155. S.C. Res. 1546, supra note 91, 4(c).
156. See Roberts, supra note 58, at 617-18; cf US: Respect Rights of Child Detainees in Iraq:
Children in US Custody Held Without Due Process, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 20, 2008),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/05/19/us-respect-rights-child-detainees-iraq [hereinafter HRW Report].
157. See Roberts, supra note 58, at 608.
158. See id. at 594.
159. HRW Report, supra note 156.
160. See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 1.C.J. 136, 106-113 (July 9); Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, T 25 (July 8).
161. U.N Secretary-General, Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Children and
Armed Conflict, 100, U.N. Doc. A/65/820-S/2011/250 (Apr. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Report of SG on
Children in Armed Conflicts].
162. CPA Memo (Revised), supra note 149, § 6(5).
163. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 9.
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process of law,164 and completely disregarded specific juvenile justice norms under
international human rights law, such as taking into consideration the interest of
rehabilitation or emphasizing the best interest of the child. 6 1
Even more so in practice, not only have the juvenile justice standards been
ignored, but the general standards of human rights law have also been abused.
According to the report of the U.N. Secretary General to the Security Council in
April 2011, the detention of children by United States Forces in Iraq ("USF-l")
already ceased before the report was prepared: "As of June 2010, no juveniles
remained in USF-I custody."' 66
To date, the United States has not released statistics on the number of children
under the age of 18 it has transferred to Iraqi custody for trial. According to the
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq by December 2007
89 children transferred from US to Iraqi custody had been convicted of
offenses . . . . Between December 2007 and March 2008, there was a
drop of 450 children in U.S. custody, but the United States has not made
known whether they were released or transferred to Iraqi custody.167
According to unofficial data collected by Human Rights Watch, "[s]ince
2003, the US has detained some 2,400 children in Iraq, including children as young
as 10. Detention rates rose drastically in 2007 to an average of 100 children a
month from 25 a month in 2006."I68 In early 2008, "US military authorities,
operating as the Multinational Forces in Iraq, were . . . holding 513 Iraqi children
as 'imperative threats to security,' and have transferred an unknown number of
other children to Iraqi custody."' 69
Many of the practices of detention and interrogation were in breach of the
ICCPR and the CRC. In violation of the ICCPR, 70 young children were not
separated from older ones;' 7' and in contradiction to the ICCPR, which demand
that suspects be treated "with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of
the human person," 72 children were interrogated "over the course of days or weeks
by military units in the field before being sent to the main detention centers."'7 In
spite of the ICCPR's guarantee of the right of due process and the right to be
"entitled to a fair and public hearing by a[n] . . . independent and impartial tribunal
established by law,"' 74 the children had "no real opportunity to challenge their
164. Id. art. 14.
165. CPA Memo (Revised), supra note 149 (failing to mention child-specific protections).
166. Report of SG on Children in Armed Conflicts, supra note 161, 1 100.
167. HRW Report, supra note 156.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 10(2)(b).
171. HRW Report, supra note 156 ("US officials earlier this year told Human Rights Watch that
they separate children from adults at these facilities but do not separate very young or particularly
vulnerable children from other child detainees.").
172. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 10(1).
173. HRW Report, supra note 156.
174. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 14.
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detention."' 75 They were "not provided with lawyers and [did] not attend the one-
week or one-month detention reviews after their transfer to [the detention facility
at] Camp Cropper."' 76 The conditions under which these children were detained
entailed physical abuse. 77 In contrast to the CRC's demand that the best interest
of the child be preferred, children had very limited contact with their families and
no efforts were made to ensure, as both the CRC and the ICCPR instruct, that
every child will be entitled to "such measures of protection as are required by his
status as a minor." 78
While the US [did] assign each child a military "advocate" at the
mandatory six-month detention review, [the] advocate[s] ha[d] no
training in juvenile justice or child development.
As of February 2008, the reported average length of detention for
children was more than 130 days, and some children [were] detained for
more than a year without charge or trial, in violation of the Coalition
Provisional Authority memorandum on criminal procedures....
In August 2007, the United States opened Dar al-Hikmah (House
of Wisdom) at Camp Cropper with the stated intention to provide 600
detainees, ranging in age from 11 to 17, with educational services
pending release or transfer to Iraqi custody. However, in May 2008, US
military officials in Baghdad told Human Rights Watch that only "200
to 300" of the 513 child detainees were enrolled in classes at Dar al-
Hikmah.' 79
Under "justice for children" in 2009:
Four mobile legal teams continued to provide assistance to boys in pre-
and post-trial detention in Baghdad and Basra in 2010. Many of these
boys were accused of being involved in terrorist activities, which carries
a 15-year jail sentence if convicted. Others had been in detention
without a formal charge for more than 12 months. 80
Having discussed the co-application of human rights law with international
humanitarian law in occupied territories with regard to juvenile justice and having
critically examined the juvenile justice system applied by the United States in
formerly occupied Iraq, we now turn to an appraisal of juvenile justice in the
administered territories. We will first refer to the general legal framework applied
in these territories, and then discuss specifically the juvenile justice system.
175. HRW Report, supra note 156.
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 24; CRC, supra note 1, art. 2.
179. HRW Report, supra note 156. See also CPA Memo (Revised), supra note 149, § 6(5)
(requiring anyone under the age of 18 to be released no later than 12 months after initial date of
detention).
180. Report of SG on Children in Armed Conflicts, supra note 161, T 100.
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V. JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE ISRAELI CASE
Israel has consistently claimed that international humanitarian law, including
both the laws of belligerent occupation and the laws of armed conflict, is the sole
legitimate legal regime in the occupied territories.' However, this system that
was set up under security legislation and operated under military rule is beginning
to change. In the last several year, the military administered courts have started to
question the strict application of international humanitarian law, and have issued
rulings with dicta that have led to the adoption of some human rights principles in
regards to the rights of child prisoners. While this has been a positive step, there
are still concerns that these principles are not being adequately applied to match
the norms of international human rights law.
A. Legal Regimes in the Administered Territories: International
Humanitarian Law or International Human Rights Law?
Since Israel has claimed that international humanitarian law applies in the
occupied territories, it has objected to the application of human rights treaties in
the administered territories.182  In the most current report submitted to the
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 2011, and taking into
consideration the political changes that took place in the area, such as the Israeli
disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005 and the establishment of Hamas
regime there in 2007, Israel maintained the following:
The applicability of the [International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights] to the West Bank or to the Gaza Strip has
been the subject of considerable debate in recent years....
. . . In these circumstances Israel can clearly not be said to have
effective control in the Gaza Strip, in the sense envisaged by the Hague
Regulations.
It is against this background that Israel is called-on to consider the
relationship between different legal spheres, primarily the Law of
Armed Conflict and Warfare and Human Rights Law.... For its part,
Israel recognizes that there is a profound connection between Human
Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict . . . . However, in the
current state of international law and state-practice worldwide, it is
181. See STATE OF ISRAEL, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL: ISRAEL'S REPLIES TO LIST OF ISSUES TO BE TAKEN UP IN
CONNECTION WITH THE CONSIDERATION OF ISRAEL'S THIRD PERIODIC REPORT CONCERNING ARTICLES
I TO 15 OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
(E/C. 12/ISR/3) 3-5 (2011) [hereinafter Israel's Replies]. For previous expressions of the Israeli position,
see Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Additional
Information Submitted by States Parties to the Covenant Following the Consideration of Their Reports
by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Addendum: Israel, Econ. & Soc. Council,
2-3, U.N. Doc. E/1989/5/Add.14 (May 14, 2001) (containing additional information submitted by
Israel to the Council following the consideration of their reports by the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights); Human Rights Comm., Considerations of Reports, supra note 119,T 8.
182. We will explain below that the Israeli Supreme Court has taken a nuanced view in Part VB.
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Israel's view that these two systems-of-law, which are codified in
separate instruments, nevertheless remain distinct and apply in different
circumstances.
Furthermore, Israel has never made a specific declaration in which
it reserved the right to extend the applicability of the Convention with
respect to the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. Clearly . . . in the absence
of such a voluntarily-made declaration, the Convention, which is a
territorially bound Convention, does not apply, nor was it intended to
apply, to areas outside its national territory.1
Hence, Israel's position can be summarized as a rejection of the application of
treaties in territories that are, according to Israel's interpretation of the "under its
jurisdiction" clause, outside its sovereign territory and jurisdiction. 184  Israel's
refusal to enact human rights treaties in the administered territories and the lack of
effective control in Gaza are used as explanations for its claim that these territories
are not under its jurisdiction.'8 5  Israel also supports its position through its
interpretation that human rights law and international humanitarian law are
possibly mutually exclusive.
In contrast to the Israeli government position, the Israeli Supreme Court has
recently expressed the view that even though human rights law treaties do not
directly apply in the occupied territories, human rights law serves as a source for
filling in lacunas in the lex specialis-that is, international humanitarian law-
governing the administered territories. 8 7  This assertion is compatible with the
doctrine of mutual application of human rights law and international humanitarian
183. Israel's Replies, supra note 181, at 4-5 (emphasis added). While the ICESCR and ICCPR have
different jurisdictional standards, Israel has made similar statements in reference to the applicability of
the ICCPR. Compare ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 2(1) ("Each State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present Covenant . . . ."), with International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights art. 2(l), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 ("Each State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes to take steps . . . to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate
means....").
184. Human Rights Comm., Considerations of Reports, supra note 119, 1 8 ("Israel has
consistently maintained that the [ICCPR] does not apply to areas that are not subject to its sovereign
territory and jurisdiction. This position is based on the well-established distinction between human
rights and humanitarian law under international law. Accordingly, in Israel's view, the Committee's
mandate cannot relate to events in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, inasmuch as they are part and
parcel of the context of armed conflict as distinct from a relationship of human rights."). See also Ben-
Naftali & Shany, supra note 99, at 33-38 (explaining the treaty interpretation argument).
185. Israel's Replies, supra note 181, at 3-5. See also Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 99, at 38-40
(explaining the effective control argument).
186. Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 99, at 27-33.
187. See HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel (2) IsrLR 459, J 18-21
[2006] (Isr.), available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/FilesENG/02/690/007/A34/02007690.A34.pdf;
HCJ 2150/07 Abu Safiyeh v. Minister of Defense 16 [20091 (Isr.), available at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files eng/07/500/021/ml9/07021500.ml9.pdf; CrimA (TA) 6659/06 A v.
State of Israel T 9 (2008) (lsr.), available at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/FilesENG/06/590/066/nO4/06066590.nO4.htm.
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law that we discussed above and claimed to reflect contemporary international law
doctrine on this issue. Moreover, it strengthens the other claim this article
maintains: that is, that a long-term belligerent occupying power that is required to
increasingly take on the powers of a sovereign government in its relations with the
population it controls can best fulfill this role by applying human rights law in
addition to belligerent occupation law.
The following subsection examines the current juvenile justice system applied
in the administered territories, revealing how a co-application of the laws of
belligerent occupation and human rights law solves certain deficiencies in the
system and best serves the objectives of a long-term occupation in the territories.
B. The Juvenile Justice System in the Administered Territories
The juvenile justice system in the administered territories is applied under the
general legal framework of these territories by the belligerent occupant."s This
system is composed of security legislationl89 and the laws of belligerent occupation
of international law-primarily, the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Hague
Regulationsl 90-and a judicial system of military courts. 191
A juvenile justice system in general, and in the administered territories in
particular, requires actions such as detention and interrogation to be undertaken by
several authorities. The first of these is the enforcing authority, which in the
administered territories includes "a network of military bases, interrogation and
detention centers and police stations in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and in
Israel."l 92 "Palestinians, predominantly from the West Bank, are initially taken to
one of these facilities for questioning and temporary detention."1 93 Later, the
system requires the involvement of the judicial authority in the adjudication
process.1 94
In this section, we will focus on the current developments in the judicial
authority system in terms of legislation governing its conduct and in terms of its
actual practice. We will consider first the significant improvements in the
absorption and application of norms that forward the best interest of the child
concept prompted by human rights law instruments discussed above. Then we will
examine criticism aimed both at the judicial procedures and at the procedures of
interrogation and detention.
188. See Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), 5770-2008, No. 1651, §§ 8, 10
(Isr.), available at http://nolegalfrontiers.org/en/military-orders/mil01.
189. Zvi Hadar, The Military Courts, in I MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES
ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967-1980: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 171, 177 (Meir Shamgar ed., 1982).
190. David Kretzmer, The Law of Belligerent Occupation in the Supreme Court of Israel, 94 INT'L
REV. RED CROSS 207, 209-10 (2012).
191. Order Regarding Security Provisions No. 1651, §§ 8-20.
192. DEF. FOR CHILDREN INT'L: PALESTINE, BOUND, BLINDFOLDED AND CONVICTED: CHILDREN
HELD IN MILITARY DETENTION 15 (2012) [hereinafter BOUND, BLINDFOLDED AND CONVICTED],
available at http://www.dci-palestine.org/sites/default/files/report_0.pdf.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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However, before turning to discuss the juvenile justice system applied by the
military legislation and courts, we will make a short reference to the Palestinian
Authority's legal perception of minors under criminal law.195 The relevance of
such a detour lies in the fact that, as we suggest in Section IV(A) above, the local
perception of human rights norms may affect the application of human rights law
in occupied territories that is promulgated by this article.
The Palestinian Child Law defines a juvenile as a person who has not yet
attained the age of eighteen.' 96 The law's objectives are to raise the prestige of the
children of Palestine; to promote children's national pride and religious identity; to
foster loyalty to Palestine, its land, its history, and its people; to encourage both
children's freedom and their responsibility to civil society solidarity; and to create
a balance between rights and obligations.' 97 Emphasizing the values of justice,
equality, tolerance, and democracy, the law aims at protecting children's rights to
survive, grow, and enjoy a free, secure, and advanced life.'98 It also aims to raise
public awareness of children's rights and to use appropriate measures for achieving
this purpose.' 99 Finally, the law encourages social involvement of children in their
environment according to their age, abilities, and degree of maturity, and aims at
fostering their creativity and independence while ensuring they preserve respect for
parents and family. 200
In addition, a draft of Youth Protection Law has been pending since 201 1,201
which the Legislative Council of the Palestinian Authority has not yet signed and
ratified. The purpose of the draft law is to expand the legal treatment of juvenile
cases in several areas.202 The guiding principle is respect for children's rights,
rehabilitation, and integration in society.203 This draft forbids the prosecution of
any person younger than twelve at the time of committing the criminal offense,204
and it regulates the methods of punishment of minors under the age of fifteen,205
195. See Israel-Palestinian Liberation Organization: Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip, Annex IV, art. 1, Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 551, 635 (stipulating that the Palestinian
Authority is authorized to conduct criminal procedures and trials in cases that are not related to the
security of the area in which the victim is not Israeli); see, e.g., Agreement on the Gaza Strip and
Jericho Area, Isr.-Palestine Liberation Organization, Annex 1, arts. 5-7, May 4, 1994, U.N. Doc
A/49/180 [hereinafter The Cairo Agreement].
196. Palestinian Child Law No. 7, art. 1 (2004), available at
http://www.crin.org/Law/instrument.asp?lnstlD=1476.
197. Id. arts. 2(l)-(3).
198. Id. art. 2(4).
199. Id. art. 2(5).
200. Id. art. 2(6).
201. Draft Youth Protection Act 2011 (Palestine). See also DEF. FOR CHILDREN INT'L: PALESTINE
SECTION, ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 28 (2013), available at
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/annualreport2012.pdf (mentioning the Palestinian
Juvenile Protection Law Draft approved by the Ministerial Council in October 2011).
202. See generally Draft Youth Protection Act 2011 (Palestine).
203. Id. art. 1.
204. Id. art. 6.
205. Id. arts. 38-47.
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and the methods of treatment of minors over the age fifteen. 206 It also orders the
establishment of juvenile courts and discusses the legal procedures that apply
there,207 such as the manners of processing and control of convicted minors.208
This law also relates to the establishment of the Center for Child Protection by the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Services. 2 09
What becomes clear from the review of the Palestinian Authority's legal
perception of minors in criminal procedures is that their treatment in criminal
systems should be guided by specific human rights values that refer to children
under the CRC. This concept is consistent with that of the juvenile justice system
applied by the military administration discussed below.
As mentioned above, the juvenile justice system in the administered territories
is based on the security legislation in the administrated territories and the dicta of
the military courts.210 On "June 7, 1967, the first day of operation of the military
government in the West Bank, three proclamations and several orders were
published throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip." 211 These orders set forth
legal procedures in the military courts and defined the offenses and penalties to be
imposed upon offenders. 212 "Since then, the [Security Provisions Order ("SPO")]
has been the basic enactment regarding military jurisdiction in these Regions." 2 13
The SPO was amended numerous times up until 2011, when it was issued as a
consolidated version containing all the preceding amendments and unifying all
remaining valid military orders into one instrument.214
The military courts system established by the SPO consists of two courts of
first instance, one for the region of Judea and the second for the region of Samaria,
as well as an appeals court.215 The substantive law applied in these courts consists
of local statutes and orders issued by the military commander, in his capacity as
the sovereign power in the occupied territory under international humanitarian
law.216 The rules of evidence and procedure are similar to those applied in Israel,
including legal representation for defendants and the right for a due process of
law.217 The prosecution is conducted by the military prosecutor and the trial is
206. Id. art. 48.
207. Id. arts. 26-36.
208. Id. arts. 49-57.
209. Id. art. 65.
210. Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), 5770-2008, No. 1651, §§ 8-20
(Isr.), available at http://nolegalfrontiers.org/en/military-orders/milOl.
211. YESH DIN: VOLUNTEERS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BACKYARD PROCEEDINGS: THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IN THE MILITARY COURTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
36 (2007), available at http://www.yesh-din.org/site/images/BackyardProceedingsEng.pdf.
212. Id. at 45-46.
213. Hadar, supra note 189, at 177.
214. Since that time, the Order has been amended repeatedly, and constitutes up to 31 amendments
at the time of this writing.
215. Order Regarding Security Provisions No. 1651, §§ 9, 10(D).
216. See Hague Regulations, supra note 7, art. 43.
217. Order Regarding Security Provisions No. 1651, §§ 77, 86, 88.
149
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
conducted solely by judges possessing particular legal experience.218 According to
decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court dating from the early days of the military
administration, all of the procedures in these courts may be subject to review by
the Supreme Court of Israel, in cases when defendants apply to the Supreme Court
claiming violation of their rights.219
In the past few years, and officially since 2009,220 the juvenile justice system,
governed by the legislative and judicial system described above, has undergone
remarkable changes and improvements led by the military courts' dicta. 22 1 Before
2009, there were no significant differences between criminal procedures for adults
and those for minors in the administered territories.222 If any special attention was
given to minors in procedures at the military courts, it was mainly in authorizing
the court to close hearings to the public 22 3 and forbidding the publication of the
defendants' names.224
However, without a formal legislative foundation and relying on common law
judicial legislation, the military courts' dicta have enabled an on-going process of
changes aimed at applying higher standards, more in line with human rights law
norms, in the juvenile justice system in the administered territories.225  This
venture eventually led to formal changes in the security provisions order.226
Seeking creative solutions that would focus on rehabilitation instead of retribution
at sentencing, the military courts gave considerable weight to the age of the
juvenile, stating:
When sentencing a minor, especially one who just reached the age of
criminal liability, a minor without previous convictions, a minor who
was lucky enough that his offense did not cause substantial damage to
property or to human lives, it is proper to avoid severe punishment and
218. Id. §§ I I(A)(1), I l(A)(4), 123(B).
219. See Kretzmer, supra note 190, at 234.
220. Order Regarding Security Provisions No. 1644 came into force on July 29, 2009. New Military
Order on Juveniles Issued in the West Bank, DEF. FOR CHILDREN INT'L: PALESTINE (Aug. 25, 2009),
http://www.dci-pal.org/english/display.cfm?Docld=1223&Categoryld=l. As it is a temporary order, it
has to be annually renewed. Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), No. 1644
(Amend. No. 109) (Isr.).
221. See infra notes 227-33 and accompanying text.
222. STEPHEN SEDLEY ET AL., CHILDREN IN MILITARY CUSTODY 4 (2012), available at
http://www.childreninmilitarycustody.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/Children inMilitaryCustody FullReport.pdf. However, younger offenders
were able to receive custodial sentences in "an institute of social care." See NOAM HOFFSTADTER,
PUBLIC COMM. AGAINST TORTURE IN ISR., PERIODIC REPORT: JUNE 2008-No DEFENSE: SOLDIER
VIOLENCE AGAINST PALESTINIAN DETAINEES 14 n.39 (2008), available at
http://www.stoptorture.org.il/files/No Defense Eng.pdf.
223. See Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), 5730-1970, No. 378, § 11
(lsr.), available at http://www.israellawresourcecenter.org/israelmilitaryorders/fulltext/mo0378.htm.
224. See id.
225. See infra notes 227-33 and accompanying text.
226. See Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), No. 1644 (Amend. No. 109)
(Isr.); contra SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 4 (mentioning that even with the new procedures in
2009, there were still incidences of those under eighteen that were treated as adults).
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give the minor hope and a chance to mend one's ways while he is in his
natural environment and surrounded by his family.227
The minor's age is also a crucial factor in remand hearings, where minors'
228
age is a strong consideration for release. In addition, the military courts ordered
the release of suspects and defendants when they discovered that some of their
rights were impaired during the penal procedures, even when these rights were not
included in formal legislation but were rather an outcome of judge-made
legislation.229
All of these defacto changes have resulted in dejure changes in the military
legislation in the administered territories. In 2009, the security order was amended
to establish the Military Youth Court.230 Professional qualification training was
given to the judges who were appointed as youth judges and special legislative
regulations were made to put more emphasis on the rehabilitation of convicted
minors in the area.231 The main changes in the regulations of the security order
were as follows: only youths were to be tried in the Military Youth Court and the
indictment against a minor must state the minor's date of birth; the Military Youth
Court was authorized to appoint an advocate for the minor if justified by the
minor's best interest; the court was enabled to make use of a report prepared by the
welfare officer in the civil administration before sentencing; the separation of
minors (up to the age of sixteen) and adults in detention facilities was legally
determingd; the court was authorized to order that the minor's parents be present at
all hearings of the case and that they could act in certain instances in their child's
name (such as by handling petitions to court or examining witnesses).232
227. Mil. Appeal 58/00 Military Court of Appeals (Judea & Samaria), 0. K. v. Military Prosecutor
(May 30, 2000), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.) (translated by author).
228. See Military Court Decisions, MIL. COURT WATCH,
http://militarycourtwatch.org/print.php?id=706zUIAHaTa31383A58dQYNef4o (last visited July 17,
2014).
229. For example, the courts ruled that night-time investigation may lead to release on bail,
although at that point such a limitation was not yet mandated to the Security Legislation. See Mil.
Appeal 2763/09 Military Court of Appeals (Judea & Samaria), A. A. v. Military Prosecutor (Aug. 2,
2009), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.); Mil. Appeal 2912/09 Military Court of Appeals
(Judea & Samaria), Military Prosecutor v. A. R. (Aug. 27, 2009), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription) (Isr.) (translated by author). The same was ruled regarding investigation by a person
unqualified to investigate minors. Mil. Appeal 2763/09; ef Mil. Appeal 1781/11 Military Court of
Appeals (Judea & Samaria), Military Prosecutor v. M. (June 15, 2011), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription) (Isr.) (translated by author) (where the court emphasized that the investigators should
allow the detainee reasonable time to sleep and rest; however, the court did not find that a complaint for
lack of sleep justified the detainee's release from custody). The courts had also given weight in remand
hearings to the infringement of the right of representation. See Mil. Appeal 2912/09. Most significantly,
there are explicit court rulings determining that prolonged procedures may lead to the release of
defendants (and particularly minors) from remand. See Mil. Appeal 1411/11 Military Court of Appeals
(Judea & Samaria), Military Prosecutor v. D. A. S. (Mar. 22, 2011), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription) (Isr.).
230. Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), No. 1644 (Amend. No. 109) (Isr.).
231. See id.; see also BAUMGARTEN-SHARON, supra note 119, at I1.
232. Order Regarding Security Provisions, No. 1644. Although the amendment does not refer to
remand hearings, the courts are strict about holding public hearings in general and about the presence of
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Furthermore, it was determined that in criminal offences a minor would not be
indicted for a crime committed one year before the indictment was filed, and in
security offences, a minor will not be prosecuted for offences committed more than
two years before the indictment without permission from the Chief Military
Prosecutor.233
In 2011, further amendments were issued by the new consolidated military
order that introduced a line of substantial amendments regarding the treatment of
minors in the penal procedure.234  Amendment number ten raised the age of
majority from sixteen to eighteen, so that from the date of its entering into force
forward all the newly and previously instituted special procedures defined for
235minors were officially valid for youths under the age of eighteen. In this
amendment, all the developments of the 2009 security order regarding juvenile
justice were adopted, but this time referring to minors up to the age of eighteen. 236
It established the duty of the police to inform the minors of their right to a legal
counsel before interrogation, and to inform parents or other legal guardians about a
minor's arrest and interrogation. 237 Finally, the limitation period for indictments of
regular criminal offences was shortened to one year, while the limitation period for
indictments of national security related offences remained the same (two years).238
Amendment number sixteen determined the shortening of the period of
detention before judicial review for all detainees. 239  The maximum period of
detention before being brought before a judge was set at forty-eight hours for
ordinary crimes and ninety-six hours for security offences (with the option of
limited extension in special circumstances).240 If no warrant is issued within these
parents in particular at remand hearings. See ADDAMEER PRISONER SUPPORT & HUMAN RIGHTS ASS'N,
EYES ON ISRAELI MILITARY COURT: A COLLECTION OF IMPRESSIONS 5 (2012), available at
http://www.addameer.org/files/Reports/Eyes%20on%20Israeli%2OMilitary%2OCourt-
%20impressions.pdf (demonstrating that hearings were public as NGOs were able to attend and view
them); SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 4 (highlighting that "parents are allowed to participate"). In
certain cases, defendants were released because their family members were prevented from being
present at the hearings. See Mil. Appeal 2912/09 Military Court of Appeals.
233. Order Regarding Security Provisions, No. 1644, art. 46(J).
234. Compare Order Regarding Security Provisions, No. 1644, with Order Regarding Security
Provisions (Judea and Samaria), 5771-2011, No. 1676 (Amend. No. 10) (lsr.), available at
http://www.dci-palestine.org/sites/default/files/militaryorder 1676.pdf (unofficial translation).
235. Order Regarding Security Provisions, No. 1676, § 3.
236. See id.
237. Id. § 4.
238. Compare id. § 5, with Order Regarding Security Provisions No. 1644, art. 46(J).
239. See Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), No. 1685 (Amend. No. 16)
(Isr.) (translated by author). This was established in August 2012. UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S
FUND., CHILDREN IN ISRAELI MILITARY DETENTION: OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9
(2013) [hereinafter CHILDREN IN ISRAELI MILITARY DETENTION], available at
http://www.unicef.org/oPt/UNICEFoPtChildren-inIsraeliMilitaryDetention Observations and R
ecommendations_-_6_March_2013.pdf. See also DCI-Pal: Children Prosecuted in Israeli Military
Courts-Update, SAMIDOUN (Oct. 2, 2012), http://samidoun.ca/2012/10/dci-pal-children-prosecuted-in-
israeli-military-courts-update.
240. See Order Regarding Security Provisions, No. 1685.
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periods, the suspect is released. 24 1 The court may not order the detention of a
suspect for longer than twenty days, but it may extend a period of detention several
times for periods of up to fifteen days each upon further review.242 A suspect may
not be detained for an overall period that exceeds forty days without being
indicted.243
In amendments twenty five and twenty six, issued a few months later, a
reduction of initial detention periods was set specifically for minors so that minors
under the age of fourteen are to be brought before a judge within a maximum
period of twenty-four hours after their detention with regard to all types of
offences (with the option of an extra twenty four hours extension in special
circumstances).244 Minors between the age of fourteen and eighteen are to be
brought before a judge within a maximum period of forty-eight hours from their
detention, with regard to all types of offences (with the option of an extra forty-
eight hours extension in special circumstances).245 In addition, minors are to be
brought before the Military Court of Appeals in cases where they were maintained
in custody longer than one year, after filling an indictment without reaching a
verdict.246 Any extension in this concern must be determined by the court every
three months. 247
Amendment number twenty-four refers to the translation of procedures in the
military courts from Hebrew to Arabic. 248 The proceedings in the military courts
241. See id. Contra SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 29.
242. See Order Regarding Security Provisions, No. 1685.
243. See Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), No. 1726 (Amend. No. 40)
(translated by author); see also DEF. FOR CHILDREN INT'L: PALESTINE, DETENTION BULLETIN:
OVERVIEW SEPTEMBER 2013, at 1 (2013), available at http://www.dci-
palestine.org/sites/default/files/september_2013_detention bulletin final 4nov2013.pdf. But see,
ADDAMER PRISONER SUPPORT & HUM. RTS. Ass'N, DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND LIBERTY OF A
PERSON AS A CRIME OF APARTHEID: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE RUSSELL TRIBUNAL ON PALESTINE 2
(2011), available at
http://www.addameer.org/userfiles/Addameer%/20Testimony%20for%/ 20Russell%20Tribunal%20on%2
OPalestine%20-%205%20November%20201 1%5B20111108155735%5D.pdf (stating detention of
Palestinians can be renewed up to 180 days).
244. See Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), No. 1711 (Amend. No. 25)
(Isr.) (translated by author). See also CHILDREN IN ISRAELI MILITARY DETENTION, supra note 239, at 9.
245. See Order Regarding Security Provisions, No. 1711. See also CHILDREN IN ISRAELI MILITARY
DETENTION, supra note 239, at 9.
246. Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), No. 1712 (Amend. No. 26) (Isr.)
(translated by author).
247. Id.
248. See Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), No. 1710 (Amend. No. 24)
(lsr.) (translated by author). See also High Court of Justice Calls Attention to the Obligation to
Translate Indictments to Arabic in Cases Before Military Courts (HCJ 2775/11), NEWSLETTER
(Embassy of Isr., Den Haag, Neth.), Apr. 18, 2013, at 2 [hereinafter Embassy of Isr., NEWSLETTER],
available at http://embassies.gov.il/hague-
en/Departments/Documents/20130418 Newsletterl I ILD.pdf (providing unofficial English translation)
("The general question regarding whether there exists an obligation to translate all military courts
decisions [and not just indictments] in order to facilitate the possibility of utilizing them as precedents,
has not been sufficiently argued and is not the subject-matter of this petition.").
1532014
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
in the administered territories are conducted mainly in Hebrew and translated to
Arabic during the course of the proceedings by court interpreters. 249 Amendment
number twenty-four determines that all the indictments must be translated to
Arabic. 250
The above notwithstanding, it is worth considering several critical
observations with regard to the procedures undertaken by the judicial authority,
including the interrogation and arrest process, and a comparison with the Israeli
juvenile justice system. We will first briefly address the criticism of methods of
interrogation and detention undertaken by the enforcing authorities-even though
these issues venture beyond the scope of this paper.
Several non-governmental organizations have harshly criticized the process of
detention and interrogation of Palestinian minors by the Israeli Defense Forces.25'
According to the Defence for Children (Palestine) report of April 2012, over the
past eleven years around 7,500 children are estimated to have been detained by the
Israeli forces in the administered territories.252 According to the B'Tselem report
of July 2011, between the years 2005 and 2010, more than 800 minors were
prosecuted for stone throwing. 253 Some NGO's-basing their findings on
interviews with detainees and others who escorted them through detention,
interrogation, and imprisonment-report severe violations of the rights of
254
minors. According to Defence for Children International (Palestine),
testimonies reveal that most children undergo a coercive interrogation that mixes
verbal abuse, threats, and physical violence; approaches torture or inhumane
treatment; and usually results in a confession. 2 55 "The Report also finds that in 29
percent of cases, the children are either shown, or made to sign, documentation
written in Hebrew, a language they do not understand."256
According to a report of a delegation of British lawyers on the treatment of
Palestinian children under Israeli military law, most of the interrogations of
children are executed without the presence of a lawyer representing the child-
reflecting, according to this delegation, a violation of Military Order 1676.257 The
249. Embassy of Isr., NEWSLETTER, supra note 248, at 2.
250. See Order Regarding Security Provisions, No. 1710.
251. See, e.g., BOUND, BLINDFOLDED AND CONVICTED, supra note 192, at 22-29, 34-38.
252. Id. at 7.
253. BAUMGARTEN-SHARON, supra note 119, at 5.
254. See, e.g., BOUND, BLINDFOLDED AND CONVICTED, supra note 192, at 22-50; SEDLEY ET AL.,
supra note 222, at 30-31.
255. See BOUND, BLINDFOLDED AND CONVICTED, supra note 192, at 7.
256. Id.
257. See SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 18. However, Order No. 1676 provides that children be
notified of their right to consult with a lawyer and it does not order the lawyer's presence at the
investigation. Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), 5771-2011, No. 1676, § 4
(Amend. No. 10) (Isr.), available at http://www.dci-
palestine.org/sites/default/files/military order 1676.pdf (unofficial translation) ("Prior to the
investigation of an arrested minor suspect, the investigator will inform a defense attorney named by the
minor, detailsregarding [sic] the investigation; without prejudice to the instructions of any law,
informing of the defense attorney named by the minor as detailed above, will not delay the
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British lawyers' report continues to claim that parents are not present at
interrogations, 25 and that the children are generally not informed of their right to
remain silent during the interrogation. 259 Children are arrested during night hours
with no parental accompaniment and are violently treated by the arresting
soldiers.2 60  In addition, some children report having been detained in solitary
confinement,261 a practice that according to the United Nations Special Rapporteur
262on Torture amounts to torture when used against juveniles. Finally, the report
points out that periods of detention before and during trial are equal for adults and
263
minors.
Criticism has also been aimed at the procedures in the judicial system.264 It is
important to note that the Military Youth Court functions only in trials and not in
interim hearings, bail hearings included,265 and hence the implications of the
reform described above are quite limited. Furthermore, because the practices of
the court deviate somewhat from the law, the significant amendments in the
military legislation are not always scrupulously followed. Legal practice is full of
investigation.") (amending article 136(c)). It should be nevertheless mentioned that despite the criticism
expressed by the British lawyers delegation of the means of law enforcement and application by law
enforcement authorities, the delegation did not criticize the work of the military courts or the military
youth courts. See SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 30 ("As we have explained, we have been given
two radically different accounts of Israeli practice. It is not our role to adjudicate between them. But
within them are certain undisputed facts which compel us to conclude that Israel is in breach . . . of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.").
258. SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 18. However, "Military Order 1676 requires 'notification'
of a parent but does not make provision for the parent's attendance at the interrogation." Id.
259. See id. at 16.
260. BAUMGARTEN-SHARON, supra note 119, at 26-27; SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 17. The
criticism of the law enforcement means in the juvenile justice system in the administered territories
presented above demands serious consideration and response. However, given that this article focuses
on the military youth courts and not on the enforcement means and authorities, we must leave this
discussion to another study. Nevertheless, we will mention briefly that the military courts have not
disregarded the criticism and many of the changes in formal legislation were perhaps motivated by
NGO claims. The B'Tselem report even maintains that the Military Courts are leaders and initiators in
bringing about change and protection of minors' rights. See BAUMGARTEN-SHARON, supra note 119, at
71 ("[O]ne can establish beyond doubt that the Military Courts have initiated and led for changes in the
behavioral norms of the enforcement officials in all that concerns the rights of the Minors.").
261. SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 27; see also Harriet Sherwood, The Palestinian Children-
Alone and Bewildered-in Israel's Al Jalame Jail, GUARDIAN, Jan. 22, 2012,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/22/palestinian-children-detained-jail-israel.
262. See Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Interim Rep. of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights
Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 77,
transmitted by Note of Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/66/268 (Aug. 5, 2011) (by Juan E. Mindez); see
also SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 27.
263. SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 27. This was changed by Amendments 16, 25, and 26 of the
Order regarding Security Provisions. See supra notes 239-47 and accompanying text.
264. See No LEGAL FRONTIERS, ALL GUlLTY!: OBSERVATIONS IN THE MILITARY JUVENILE COURT
APRIL 2010-MARCH 2011, at 10 (2011), available at
http://nolegalfrontiers.org/images/stories/report 2011/report en.pdf.
265. SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 23 (determining, inter alia, the jurisdiction of the youth
courts).
2014 155
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
examples of these failures, as is demonstrated by a survey of seventy-one cases in
the Youth Court conducted by the NGO, No Legal Frontiers. 266 In this survey, it
was found that numerous indictments are based on the defendants' confessions or
on incriminations of co-partners given to the police during the interrogation;267
most of the cases conclude with a plea bargain;2 68 and, most importantly, actual
imprisonment is usually the default sentence and is imposed as a first rather than a
last resort, especially in cases where the accused was detained during the whole or
part of the legal procedure. 269 This is due to the fact that there are no substantial
Palestinian welfare services, and even the military judges expressed frustration at
the lack of alternatives to imprisonment:
The Supreme Court has recently ruled that when punishing minors the
following factors should be taken into consideration: the lesser
responsibility that should be attributed to a minor whose personality is
not yet fully formed, the damage caused to the minor by actual
imprisonment, damage that is ultimately against the public interest, and
on the other hand the severity of the crime.
The situation in the Region is even worse than in Israel in such
cases, because the juvenile court does not have any rehabilitation
instruments such as: ordered stays in locked facilities, parole officers
and so on. . . . It is clear that creating rehabilitation instruments in the
Region is not easy, especially when the crimes in question are often
committed for ideological reasons and supported by the community
surrounding the minor. In any case, I believe that the legislator in the
Region cannot avoid addressing this issue and finding creative ways to
allow minors to be treated outside of the framework of actual prison. 270
Other practices in the juvenile court also attest to the failure of the military
legislation regulating the administered territories' juvenile justice system to fully
meet the legal standards of juvenile justice vested in human rights law, in spite of
266. No LEGAL FRONTIERS, supra note 264, at 8. It should be noted that this report has been
strongly rejected by the IDF Spokesman. See Letter from IDF Spokesperson, to Organization Law
Without Borders, Response to Report on Military Jurisdiction (Aug. 30, 2011). In a response to the No
Legal Frontiers report, the IDF Spokesman raises claims against both its factual determinations and the
scientific validity of its statistical methods. Id. 1 4. With regard to the factual claims, the Spokesman
states that contrary to the report, most Palestinian minors are not held in custody until the end of their
trials. Id. The Spokesman adds that the report disregards major developments in both the security
legislation and the military courts dicta, which improved the protections for minors in the criminal
procedure in the administered territories. Id. 5. Regarding the report's scientific statistical methods,
the Spokesman claims that the report's findings are not based on the basic principles of the science of
statistics. Id. 4. In its response, the No Legal Frontiers stated that this report is not a scientific
representative sample but rather a representation of the impression of reviewers who observed the
procedures. See Letter from No Legal Frontiers, answer to the response of the IDF Spokesman to the
No Legal Frontiers Report (translated by author).
267. No LEGAL FRONTIERS, supra note 264, at 28.
268. Id. at 37-38; SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 22.
269. See No LEGAL FRONTIERS, supra note 264, at 44.
270. Id. at 44-45 (emphasis and quotations omitted).
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the changes that have been made. 271 These standards are motivated primarily to
preserve the best interests of the child and promote "the child's sense of dignity
and worth . . . and the desirability of promoting the child's reintegration and the
child's assuming a constructive role in society." 272 The British lawyers' report
states that children are brought into the court in iron shackles, which, while
removed on their entering the courtroom, are replaced when they leave. 273 The
report mentions that this practice stands in contrast to the United Nations standard
minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners:
Which provide that chains and irons shall not be used as restraints; that
any other restraints should only be used as a protection against escape
during transfer provided they are removed when the prisoner appears
before a judicial authority (or on medical grounds or to prevent injury);
and that they should not be applied for any longer period than
274necessary.
Finally, criticism of the juvenile justice system in the administered territories
has been made through a comparison between this system and the juvenile justice
system within Israel's borders.275  Some major examples are the discrepancies
between the minimum age for custodial sentences,276 the right of parents to be
present during interrogations,277 and the maximum periods of detention without
271. See The Youth (Trial, Punishment and Modes of Treatment) Law, 5731-1971, 25 LSI 128
(1970-1971) (Isr.) (demonstrating that Israel has passed a specific law for treatment of its juveniles
within its domestic system).
272. CRC, supra note 1, art. 40(1).
273. SEDLEY ET AL., supra note 222, at 23.
274. Id. See also UNITED NATIONS, STANDARD MINIMUM RULES FOR THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS 5 (1955), available at
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminaljustice/UN StandardMinimum Rules-for-theTreatment-of Pris
oners.pdf.
275. The issues relating to days of detention have been brought before the Israeli Supreme Court.
Because a new amendment to the security order was to be applied with regard to the case of juveniles,
the Court has decided to leave the applications pending until 1/12/2012, when the respondents (i.e., the
Minister of Defence and the IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria) were to report to the Court on the
application of the order. The applications are still pending until the time of this writing. See HCJ
3368/10 Office of the Palestinian Prisoners v. Minister of Defense (Isr.); HCJ 4057/10 The Association
of Civil Rights in Israel v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria (1sr.). See also HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: ISRAEL'S DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT OF PALESTINIANS IN THE
OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 34 (2010), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ioptl21 0webwcover.pdf.
276. The minimum age for custodial sentencing is fourteen for Israeli youth in Israel and twelve in
the administered territories. Compare The Youth (Trial, Punishment and Modes of Treatment) Law
(Isr.), § 10(c)(2), with Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), 5771-2011, No. 1676,
(Amend. No. 10) (Isr.), available at http://www.dci-
palestine.org/sites/default/files/militaryorder 1676.pdf (unofficial translation); see also BOUND,
BLINDFOLDED AND CONVICTED, supra note 192, at 19.
277. According to the Israeli Youth Law, a parent is allowed to be present at all times in
circumstances where the child has not been formally arrested, but may not intervene in the interrogation
process. The Youth (Trial, Punishment and Modes of Treatment) Law (1sr.), § 9(H). Exceptions are
made upon written authorization of an officer and in cases in which the well-being of the child requires
that the parent is not present. Id. §§ 9(I)-(J). No such right formally exists for Palestinian youth even
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having a right to consult a lawyer.278 An application before the Israeli Supreme
Court to make the legal protections of minors in the administered territories equal
to those of Israeli minors is now pending. 279
Any comparison between the Israeli juvenile justice system and that in the
administered territories remains untenable unless we take into consideration the
differences between the crimes committed by minors in Israel and those committed
by juveniles in the administered territories. Many of the latter crimes are
perpetrated for ideological reasons with the encouragement of the minor's friends
and family and even the support of recruiters for terrorist organizations. 280
Another difference is the absence of welfare services for minors in the
administered territories,28 1 a situation that is partially the result of transferring the
welfare services in the area to the Palestinian Authority according to the Oslo
Accords.282
All of the above criticism reflects the need to apply a normative framework
for the practical application of human rights law in the juvenile justice system in
the administered territories. Indeed, security considerations of the occupying
power should not be excluded, however analysis of the particular circumstances
calls for a co-application of international humanitarian law and human rights law,
and not only a reliance upon the latter as the source of international law in
occupied territories. The effects of such a normative framework on military
legislation and its application by the judicial system will be to promote concepts
such as the best interests of the child and the preference of rehabilitation over
retribution. It will also strengthen trends in the military legislation and the military
courts, discussed earlier in this article. In the words of the Military Court:
Amendment number fourteen to the Israeli Youth Law . . . has
provided the police with special obligations pertaining to the
interrogation of minors. The essence of this amendment was a new
conception, in the spirit of the International Convention on the Rights of
the Child and in accordance with the Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty. . . . Th[is] amendment has not been incorporated into the
military legislation in the area, yet . . . the Military Appeals Court has
opined that "it is impossible to ignore the . . . principles at the
though efforts are made to notify parents of their child being interrogated, there is only a right to be
notified if there is an arrest. Order Regarding Security Provisions, No. 1676 (Isr.); see also BOUND,
BLINDFOLDED AND CONVICTED, supra note 192, at 18. See also Order Regarding Security Provisions
(Judea and Samaria), No. 1644, art. 46(L)(b) (Amend. No. 109) (Isr.) (giving parents the right to attend
sessions of the military court).
278. See BAUMGARTEN-SHARON, supra note 119, at 14.
279. See id.
280. Moodrick-Even Khen, supra note 44, at 269-70 (describing the motivations for children in
occupied territories to join armed groups and perpetrate crimes).
281. See File No. 3905/10 Military Court (Judea), Military Prosecutor v. Mohammed Omar (Jan.
17, 2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (1sr.).
282. See The Cairo Agreement, supra note 195, art. 3.
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foundation of the protection of the minor's rights . . . and the need to
emphasize the supra principle of the minor's best interests.283
Promoting the best interest of the child and developing an improved welfare
system reflect the obligations of a long-term occupying force to promote the
interests of the protected persons and to ensure public life and not only public
order. However, as long as the Israeli government objects to a direct application of
human rights law in the administered territories, the standards and norms of human
rights law, including soft law, should be applied in the administered territories
through their incorporation within the security legislation in the territories. This
solution lacks the advantage of enabling the supervising mechanisms of
international bodies, such as the Human Rights Committee or other U.N. treaty and
Charter bodies, to monitor Israel's compliance with international human rights
treaty standards in the administered territories; nor would it allow these bodies to
influence public opinion in Israel and outside.284 Nevertheless, this solution does
demand that human rights standards that are relevant to the juvenile justice system
in the administered territories are obligatory upon the governing authorities in
these areas, ensuring that their role and function as temporary holders of the
territory are adequately fulfilled.
VI. SUMMARY
Long-term belligerent occupations and transformative occupations face new
challenges in terms of the occupying forces' relations with the occupied population
and their obligations towards the protected persons. Applying a compatible and
just juvenile justice system in occupied territories is one such challenge.
We rely on contemporary theory and practice in international law that
supports a mutual application of human rights law and international humanitarian
law, where one of these branches of international law is the lex specialis and the
other may serve as a complementary or interpretative legal framework. We
suggest that this model is most appropriate for the long-term belligerent occupying
force and for the transformative occupying force to fulfill their legal obligations in
general, in particular in establishing a juvenile justice system. We applied this
claim to the case studies of the juvenile justice system in formerly occupied Iraq
and in Israel's administered territories.
In Iraq, the legal framework of the occupation regime was based both on U.N.
Security Council resolutions and in the CPA Memorandum, situating it explicitly
on the laws of belligerent occupation and implicitly on human rights law.2 85 The
283. File No. 1367/11 Military Court (Judea & Samaria), Military Prosecutor v. D. A. (Jan. 9,
2012), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (1sr.) (translated by author); see also Mil. Youth Court
3905-10, Military Prosecution v. M. A. (Jan. 17, 2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.)
(translated by author) ("The military courts have often opined that every effort should be made, subject
to the special circumstances in the Region, to equalize as much as possible the situation concerning
minors in the Region with the situation in Israel.").
284. Ben-Naftali & Shany, supra note 99, at 106.
285. See S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 89, pmbl., 8(g); CPA Memo (Revised), supra note 149,
pmbl.
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CPA incorporated only the general standards of human rights law, 286 and with
regard to human rights law norms that relate to minors' protection, it established
only the demand that children be separated from adults while in custody. 287 In
practice, even these limited demands have continuously been violated, and this
violation persisted after the U.N. mandate for the occupation ended. 288
In the administered territories, significant progress in both the military
legislation and its application by the military courts has taken place since 2009,
when the Military Youth Courts were established. Before 2009, there were no
significant differences between criminal procedures for adults and those for minors
in the administered territories. 289 However, with the support of the military courts'
dicta, an on-going process of changes aimed at applying standards more applicable
with norms that protect minors in the criminal procedure resulted in the emergence
of important changes in the military legislation. Among these was raising the
290majority age from sixteen to eighteen, separating minors and adults in detention
facilities,29 1 reducing periods of detention before being brought before a judge,292
and relying on welfare reports in criminal trials. 293 Nevertheless, criticism of the
application of these changes in practice point out that the changes do not
encompass remand procedures and that the punishments meted out by the military
courts reflect more a consideration of retribution than of rehabilitation.
Finally, we suggest that the co-application of human rights law and
international humanitarian law, while taking into consideration the security needs
of both the occupying power and the protected persons, would create legal
standards that would see the application of more protections for minors in criminal
procedures. This proposal is also supported by the local Palestinian Authority
Child Law, which promotes a concept of childhood under criminal law adhering to
the values and norms of human rights law that are anchored in human rights law
treaties, and especially in the CRC.294  Yet, since Israel objects to a formal
application of human rights treaties in the administered territories, the practical
application of human rights law in these territories is rather through military
legislation that absorbs human rights norms than through the application of human
rights treaties.
286. See CPA Memo (Revised), supra note 149, § 1(1)(c).
287. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 10(2)(b).
288. HRW Report, supra note 156.
289. As opposed to special arrangements regarding sentencing that allow the serving of custodial
sentences in an institute of social care. Order Regarding the Judgment of Young Offenders (No.132)
(Isr.) (translated by author).
290. Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), 5771-2011, No. 1676, § 3 (Amend.
No. 10) (Isr.), available at http://www.dci-palestine.org/sites/default/files/militaryorder 1676.pdf
(unofficial translation) (amending article 136 of Order Regarding Security No. 1651).
291. Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), No. 1644, art. 46(L)(d) (Amend.
No. 109) (Isr.) (adding to Order Regarding Security No. 1651).
292. See Order Regarding Security Provisions (Judea and Samaria), No. 1685 (Amend. No. 16)
(lsr.) (translated by author).
293. Order Regarding Security Provisions, No. 1644 (lsr.), art. 46(L)(c).
294. See Draft Youth Protection Act 2011, art. 2 (Palestine); CRC, supra note 1, arts. 37, 39, 40.
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Nevertheless, and even though it does not seem that the Israeli belligerent
occupation in the administered territories will end in the near future, it is crucial to
maintain that a belligerent occupying power, including a long-term one, should
avoid changes that will render it a sovereign. While this objective is justified for a
transformative regime, such as that in Iraq, it works against the purposes of a long-
term belligerent occupant. Hence, any changes of legislation made by the
occupying power, such as those suggested in this article, must pertain to the basic
tenet of belligerent occupation regime, wherein the roles of the occupying power
should be limited to maintain the order and safety and the civil life routine of the
occupied territory and population.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence is a worldwide phenomenon, and since the mid-1990's,
there has been a coordinated international effort to reduce its pervasiveness.' In
Europe, statistics suggest that up to one quarter of women will experience
domestic violence and up to 10 percent of women will suffer an incident in any
given year.2 Within the domestic violence victim population, there is a subgroup
of victims that is uniquely vulnerable. 3 It is comprised of victims that lack legal
immigration status. With language and cultural barriers, as well as a lack of
knowledge about domestic legal systems, some of these victims may fear that in
seeking law enforcement protection they could be removed from their host
country.4
European Union Member ("EU-M") States are bound by a host of regional
and international human rights obligations to strengthen laws and construct
networks of resources to combat this problem.5  This article provides background
1. COUNCIL OF EUR., COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONVENTION ON PREVENTING AND COMBATING
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EXPLANATORY REPORT J|l 1, 5-6, 8
[hereinafter ISTANBUL CONVENTION EXPLANATORY REPORT], available at
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/equality/03themes/violence-against-
women/Exp memo Cony VAW en.pdf.
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination [A]gainst Women . . . of the United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination [a]gainst Women . . .
in its general recommendation on violence against women No. 19 (1992) helped to ensure
the recognition of gender-based violence against women as a form of discrimination against
women. The United Nations General Assembly, in 1993, adopted a Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence against Women that laid the foundation for international action on
violence against women. In 1995, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action identified
the eradication of violence against women as a strategic objective among other gender
equality requirements. In 2006, the UN Secretary-General published his [i]n depth study on
all forms of violence against women, in which he identified the manifestations and
international legal frameworks relating to violence against women, and also compiled details
of 'promising practices' which have shown some success in addressing this issue.
Id. 1 5.
2. EUROPEAN COMM'N, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN REPORT 5 (Special
Eurobarometer No. 344, 2010), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs 344_en.pdf.
3. ISTANBUL CONVENTION EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 1, 1 87 ("For the purpose of this
Convention, persons made vulnerable by particular circumstances include: pregnant women and women
with young children, persons with disabilities, including those with mental or cognitive impairments,
persons living in rural or remote areas, substance abusers, prostitutes, persons of national or ethnic
minority background, migrants-including undocumented migrants and refugees, gay men, lesbian
women, bi-sexual and transgender persons as well as HIV-positive persons, homeless persons, children
and the elderly.").
4. Id.11187,306.
5. See Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women
and Domestic Violence art. 61, Apr. 7, 2011, C.E.T.S. No. 210 [hereinafter Istanbul Convention]. See
also ISTANBUL CONVENTION EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 1, 11 319-22.
Paragraph 2 [of Article 611 confirms that the obligation to respect the non-refoulement
principle applies equally to victims of violence against women who are in need of protection
complementing in this way the first paragraph. More specifically, paragraph 2 reiterates the
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information on the sources of regional and international law mandating these
protections.6  It defines the legal obligations inherent in European Union
Membership, the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR"), the United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
("CEDAW"), 9 and the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and
Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence ("Istanbul
Convention"),' 0 focusing primarily on the CEDAW's specific obligations related
to migrant domestic violence victims.
The general consensus has been that although many EU-M States have
devised complex internal legal frameworks to support migrant domestic violence
victims, success has been elusive in some instances." Thus, this article provides
country-specific data to better understand the environments in which these deficits
are believed to occur.12  To be sure, providing adequate legal relief to migrant
domestic violence victims is a challenging proposition.' 3  Contextual factors can
serve to either diminish or heighten the extent to which individual EU-M States are
able to meet this human rights obligation.14 The purpose of this article is to present
a snapshot of the European Union's journey towards compliance that may enable
human rights observers to gauge where individual EU-M States find themselves on
this particular metric in comparison to other states given a variety of contextual
obligation for Parties to take the necessary legal or other measures to ensure that victims of
violence against women and in need of protection, shall not be returned under any
circumstances if there were a real risk, as a result, of arbitrary deprivation of life or torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It is important to ensure that these
obligations are complied with irrespective of the status or residence of the women concerned.
This means that this protection against return applies to all victims of violence against
women that have not yet had their asylum claim determined as refugees under the 1951
Convention [relating to the Status of Refugees] regardless of their country of origin or
residence status, and who would face gender-based violence amounting to the ill-treatment
described above if expelled/deported. Even if their claim for asylum is refused, states should
ensure that these persons will not be expelled/deported to a country where there is a real risk
to that they will be subject to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This
paragraph is not to be read, however, as contradicting the relevant provisions of the 1951
Convention, and in particular does not preclude the application of Article 33, paragraph 2, of
that Convention.
Id. 1 322.
6. See infra Part II.
7. Conditions for Membership, EUR. COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index en.htm (last visited Jan. 22,
2014).
8. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHRI. See infra Part II.A.
9. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979,
1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]. See infra Part II.B.
10. Istanbul Convention, supra note 5. See infra Part II.F.
11. See infra Part V.
12. See infra Part V.
13. See ISTANBUL CONVENTION EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 1, 111 53, 87, 298-300, 302.
14. See infra Parts 111, IV.
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factors. The article concludes that while each of the EU-M States has made
significant strides in supporting domestic violence victims generally, some
deficiencies and concerns remain as relates to migrant victims.' 5
II. INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL SOURCES OF LAW
A. The European Convention ofHuman Rights
The foundational legal instrument that provides protection for migrant
domestic violence victims in EU-M States is the ECHR.16  Through the
development of that treaty and the articulation of its inherent obligations, the
European Union, as a regional body, has voiced support for establishing a variety
of explicit and implied protections for migrant domestic violence victims.' For
example, parties to the ECHR are explicitly bound to uphold Article 3, which
guarantees freedom from torture and inhuman treatment.' 8 However, parties have
the less explicit and more general obligation to perform functions in a manner that
is deemed compatible with the states' obligations under the provisions of the
ECHR.19 Thus, many humanitarian and human rights-related requests of EU-M
States necessarily implicate standards articulated in the ECHR articles.
B. The United Nations Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of
Discrimination Against Women ("CEDA W")
A key U.N. human rights objective is the global elimination of discrimination
against women.20 Over the years, this worldwide body has given meaning to this
specific objective through the creation of the CEDAW, a legal instrument that
codifies obligations ranging from development of greater equality in state laws as
they impact men and women, to targeting "culture and tradition as influential
forces shaping gender roles and family relations." 21 Pursuant to Articles 3 and 5,
the CEDAW enshrines the right of women to enjoy their human rights free of
discrimination, and enables the attainment of that right through the modification of
social and cultural patterns. 22
15. See infra Part VI.
16. See ECHR, supra note 8, art. 14.
17. E.g., id. pmbl.
18. Id. art. 3.
19. See ISTANBUL CONVENTION EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 1, 1 87.
20. FAREDA BANDA, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS-
WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND GENDER UNIT, PROJECT ON A MECHANISM TO ADDRESS LAWS THAT
DISCRIMINATE AGAINST WOMEN 18 (2008), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/laws-that-discriminate against women.pdf.
21. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: Overview of
the Convention, UN WOMEN, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
22. CEDAW, supra note 9, art. 3 ("States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the
political, social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure
the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise
and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men."). Id. art.
5(a) ("To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to
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Article 2 of the CEDAW explicitly condemns discrimination against women
in all its forms, and parties to the treaty are required to undertake measures to end
all forms of discrimination against women. 23 The CEDAW mandates that the pace
of policy change be pursued diligently, "by all appropriate means and without
delay." 24  This treaty envisions the development and/or modification of state
constitutions and laws that further this goal and mandates the establishment of
legal protections when necessary to ensure the rights of women.25 The CEDAW
requires that state parties submit reports on the legislative, judicial, administrative,
and other measures that they have adopted with respect to their obligations under
the treaty.26 Article 22 permits "specialized agencies" ("CEDAW Specialized
Agencies") to submit reports ("Shadow Reports") discussing states'
implementation efforts. 27 In order to assess progress made in meeting the CEDAW
objectives, Article 17 envisioned the establishment of a treaty body in the form of
a committee ("CEDAW Committee"), which would articulate interpretative
guidance and recommendations, monitor state progress, and release substantive
28
reports. CEDAW Specialized Agencies submit Shadow Reports to the CEDAW
Committee to supplemental state provided information about compliance with
CEDAW obligations. 29  These are independent reports that examine particular
aspects of the state human rights reporting.30
Under the CEDAW, states are responsible for their own acts, as well as for
private acts if the state fails to act with due diligence to prevent violations of
rights.3 ' The CEDAW has further clarified that it is the state's responsibility to
"respect, protect and fulfil women's right to non-discrimination and to the
achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary [sic] and all other practices which are based on
the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and
women.").
23. Id. art. 2.
24. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women, its Causes and Consequences, Human Rights Council, 11 24, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/49
(May 14, 2013) (by Rashida Manjoo) [hereinafter Manjoo Report]. The CEDAW Committee has
described the due diligence standard in its consideration of complaints that allege a failure on the part of
states to investigate and prosecute acts of violence against women. Id. 111 1-13.
25. CEDAW, supra note 9, arts. 2-3.
26. Id. art. 18.
27. Id. art. 22.
28. Id. arts. 17, 21.
29. Id. art. 22 ("The specialized agencies shall be entitled to be represented at the consideration of
the implementation of such provisions of the present Convention as fall within the scope of their
activities. The Committee may invite the specialized agencies to submit reports on the implementation
of the Convention in areas falling within the scope of their activities.").
30. See id.
31. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No.
19: Violence against Women, 11 9, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992), reprinted in United Nations, Compilation
of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 246,
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (May 12, 2004) [hereinafter CEDAW Committee, General
Recommendation No. 19].
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enjoyment of equality." 32 Furthermore, states are responsible for investigating and
punishing acts of violence and for providing compensation for violations of the
CEDAW. Through acquiescence or indifference, inaction provides a "form of
encouragement and/or de facto permission," and CEDAW "has applied this
principle to States parties' failure to prevent and protect victims from gender-based
violence, such as . .. domestic violence." 34
C. Violence Against Women in the Human Rights Context
In 1994, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution
appointing a Special Rapporteur on the issue of violence against women
("SRVAW") in order to better understand its causes and consequences.3 ' That
human rights body has called for, among others, the elimination of all forms of
gender-based violence in the family.36 It defines gender-based violence as any act
"that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or
suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life."
Incorporating this general U.N. definition, in part, the CEDAW definition of
gender-based violence focuses specially on women who are victims of "physical,
mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other
deprivations of liberty."38
The U.N. has further elaborated the various forms of violence, dividing them
into three categories: (a) family violence; (b) community violence; and (c) violence
perpetrated or condoned by the state. 39 Migrant domestic violence victims have
fallen within all three categories because migrant women can suffer family
violence in the form of domestic violence and honor violence; community violence
in the form of female genital mutilation and trafficking; and violence perpetrated
or condoned by the state in the form of violence during armed conflict and
violence motivated by xenophobia.40 In 2002, the U.N. High Commissioner for
32. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No.
28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties Under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 119, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/28 (Dec. 16, 2010).
33. Id. 11119, 32.
34. Manjoo Report, supra note 24, 1 27.
35. Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 1994/45, Rep. of Comm'n on Human Rights, 15th Sess., Jan.
31-Mar. I1, 1994, U.N. ESCOR, 1994 Sess., Supp. No. 4, E/1994/24, at 143 (Mar. 4, 1994).
36. Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2003/45, Rep. of Comm'n on Human Rights, 59th Sess., Mar.
17-Apr. 24, 2003, U.N. ESCOR, 2003 Sess., Supp. No. 3, E/2003/23, at 174-75 (Apr. 23, 2003).
37. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993) (referencing Article I of the Declaration).
38. CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 19, supra note 31,116.
39. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, 15 Years of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences (1994-2009)-A Critical Review, Human
Rights Council, 11 12, 21, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/ 11/6/Add.5 (May 27, 2009) (by Yakin Ertark) [hereinafter
Erturk Report].
40. Seeid.165.
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Refugees ("UNHCR") issued guidelines on gender-related protection claims.41
The UNHCR Gender-Related Guidelines acknowledge a particular social group is
comprised of individuals that share a common characteristic that is "innate,
unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the
exercise of one's human rights."42  Further, the guidelines posit that "sex can
properly be within the ambit of the social group category, with women being a
clear example of a social subset defined by innate and immutable characteristics,
and who are frequently treated differently than men." 43
This article addresses so-called "honor violence" periodically. So-called
honor violence exists solely in the realm of the family and is thus properly
considered in a domestic violence analysis." Honor violence comes from the
belief that family members, particularly male family members, have a duty to
control the female family members' sexuality and reputation in order to preserve
the family's honor. "According to this belief, if women transgress, or are seen to
transgress, societal gender norms, blemishing their family's 'honour', they should
be disciplined, have their movements and life choices constrained, or be harmed or
killed."45 Any family member may perpetrate honor crimes. Honor killing has
been described "as the killing of a female, typically by a male perpetrator, because
of perceived or actual misconduct of the victim who has dishonored or shamed her
family and clan by actually or allegedly committing an indiscretion." 46
The act of killing another to restore honor falls under a category of
offenses collectively known as "honor crimes." Honor crimes are not
limited to murder, but may include other vicious crimes against woman,
such as punitive rape or deliberate disfigurement by acid or
dismemberment. Victims of honor crimes are almost exclusively
female.
41. United Nations High Comm'r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-
Related Persecution within the Context of Article IA(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter
UNHCR Gender-Related Guidelines], available at http://www.unhcr.org/3d58ddef4.html.
42. Id. 1|29.
43. Id. 1130.
44. UNITED NATIONS DIV. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN & UNITED NATIONS EcON.
COMM'N FOR AFR., GOOD PRACTICES IN LEGISLATION ON "HARMFUL PRACTICES" AGAINST WOMEN
17-18 (2009) [hereinafter GOOD PRACTICES IN LEGISLATION ON "HARMFUL PRACTICES"], available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw legislation 2009/Final%20report%20EGMGPLVAW.p
df. The U.N. uses the term "so-called 'honour' violence ... to emphasize that this violence, while
excused in the name of 'honour', in not honourable and should be condemned as a human rights
violation." Id. at 10.
45. Id. at 18.
46. Lindsey N. Devers & Sarah Bacon, Interpreting Honor Crimes: The Institutional Disregard
Towards Female Victims of Family Violence in the Middle East, 3 INT'L J. CRIMINOLOGY & SOC.
THEORY 359, 360 (2010).
47. Susanne J. Prochazka, Note, There is No Honor in Honor Killings: Why Women at Risk for
Defying Sociosexual Norms Must be Considered a "Particular Social Group" Under Asylum Law, 34
T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 445, 474-75 (2012) (citations omitted).
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Honor violence is often used as a defense or partial defense to crimes committed
against women, which has prompted the United Nations to advocate for legislation
ensuring that these crimes are punished as severely as other crimes.48
Female genital mutilation ("FGM") is not discussed in this article, as it is not
traditionally considered domestic violence. 49  The World Health Organization
defines FGM as "all procedures involving partial or total removal of the external
female genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs for non-medical
reasons."5 FGM is not properly considered within a domestic violence analysis,
because, while the victim's family is often involved, it is usually a community-
based practice. While domestic violence is confined to the family, FGM most
often involves entire communities. As highlighted by the World Health
Organization, "local structures of power and authority such as [community]
leaders, religious leaders, circumcisers, elders, and even some medical personnel"
can contribute to upholding the practice. 5 ' FGM "is a social norm, buttressed by
underlying gender structures and power relations and deeply rooted in tradition.
The decision to stop FGM/C must come from within a community; it must be
made by women, men and community leaders who together can affect and sustain
this profound social change."52 Accordingly, FGM is better discussed within a
broader communal or societal context, rather than the narrow, family-based context
of domestic violence.
In furtherance of its mandate, the SRVAW issues annual reports to the U.N.
Human Rights Council (previously the U.N. Commission on Human Rights) and
the U.N. General Assembly.5 3 It has affirmed the duty of states to not only refrain
from engaging in violence against women, but to "exercise due diligence to
prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish the perpetrators of violence against
women."54  Moreover, it has affirmed the responsibility of states "to take
appropriate and effective action concerning acts of violence against women,
whether those acts are perpetrated by the State, by private persons or by armed
48. GOOD PRACTICES IN LEGISLATION ON "HARMFUL PRACTICES," supra note 44, at 4-5, 17-18.
"Experience has shown that without a specific offence for so-called 'honour' crimes, judges will often
employ defences such as provocation in order to reduce the sentence of those who have committed such
crimes, or perpetrators will not be charged at all." Id. at 18.
49. See John Gordon Simister, Domestic Violence and Female Genital Mutilation in Kenya:
Effects of Ethnicity and Education, 25 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 247, 247 (2010).
50. WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO] ET AL., ELIMINATING FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: AN
INTERAGENCY STATEMENT 4 (2008), available at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/pubIications/2008/9789241596442 eng.pdf?ua=l.
51. Id. at 6.
52. UNFPA & UNICEF, UNFPA-UNICEF JOINT PROGRAMME ON FEMALE GENITAL
MUTILATION/CUTTING: ACCELERATING CHANGE: ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 18 (2012), available at
http://www.unfpa.org/webdav/site/global/shared/documents/publications/2013/UNICEF-
UNFPA%20Joint%20Programme%20AR final_vl4.pdf (emphasis added).
53. G.A. Res. 65/187, 1 25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/187 (Dec. 21, 2010); Human Rights Council
Res. 16/7, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 16th Sess., Jan. 25-Mar. 25, 2011, 1 5, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/16/2 (Mar. 24, 2011); Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2003/45, supra note 36,133.
54. G.A. Res. 65/187, supra note 53,119.
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groups or warring factions, and to provide access to just and effective remedies and
specialized, including medical, assistance to victims."55
D. CEDA W, Domestic Violence, and Migrants
While the basic CEDAW treaty does not reference domestic violence as a
means of discrimination per se, the CEDAW Committee has issued interpretative
guidance recommendations that address this issue. 56 General Recommendation
No. 12 highlights the obligation of parties to the CEDAW to protect women from
"violence of any kind occurring within the family, at the workplace or in any other
area of social life" under Articles 2, 5, 11, 12, and 16 of the Convention.5
Moreover, General Recommendation No. 19 incorporates gender-based violence as
a specific form of discrimination.58
The CEDAW Committee has further clarified that the protection against
gender-based violence extends to migrants in General Recommendation No. 26.
That recommendation sets forth, in pertinent part, that:
a) "States parties should ensure that linguistically and culturally
appropriate gender-sensitive services for women migrant workers are
available, including language and skills training programmes,
emergency shelters, . . . [and] police services."6 o
b) State services should be "designed especially for isolated women
migrant workers, such as domestic workers and others secluded in
the home, in addition to victims of domestic violence." 61
c) "Victims of abuse must be provided with relevant emergency and
social services, regardless of their immigration status."62
d) "[T]he situation of undocumented women needs specific attention.
Regardless of the lack of immigration status of undocumented
women migrant workers, States parties have an obligation to protect
their basic human rights. Undocumented women migrant workers
must have access to legal remedies and justice in cases of risk to life
55. Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2003/45, supra note 36,115.
56. CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 19, supra note 31, 1 1.
57. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No.
12: Violence against Women, U.N. Doc. A/44/38 (1989), reprinted in United Nations, Compilation of
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 240,
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.7 (May 12, 2004) [hereinafter CEDAW Committee, General
Recommendation No. 12] (emphasis added).
58. CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 19, supra note 31, 1 1.
59. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No.
26 on Women and Migrant Workers, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/2009/WP.1/R (Dec. 5, 2008) [hereinafter
CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 26], available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/GR_26 onwomenmigrant workers en.pdf.
60. Id. 11 26(i).
61. Id.
62. Id.
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and of cruel and degrading treatment . . . if they are abused
physically or sexually by employers or others."63
e) "If they are arrested or detained, the States parties must ensure that
undocumented women migrant workers receive humane treatment
and have access to due process of the law, including through free
legal aid. In that regard, States parties should repeal or amend laws
and practices that prevent undocumented women migrant workers
from using the courts and other systems of redress. If deportation
cannot be avoided, States parties need to treat each case individually,
with due consideration to the gender-related circumstances and risks
of human rights violations in the country of origin (articles 2 (c), (e)
and (f))."6
E. The U.N. Model Framework
The CEDAW Committee participated in drafting the U.N. Handbook for
Legislation on Violence Against Women ("U.N Handbook"), which provides
guidance about the types of provisions that should be included in any domestic
violence legal framework.65 These components range from suggesting how
violence may be defined and proposing means of prevention and protection, to
proposing model structures for investigation, prosecution, and sentencing of
perpetrators of domestic violence. A review of the U.N. Handbook recommends
the following practices that affect migrant domestic violence victims directly:
a) Equal protection without regard to migration status;66
b) Specialized services for particular groups of women, including
migrant victims;6
c) Employing gender-sensitive language acknowledging the historical
imbalance in power between men and women with respect to
violence; 68
d) Providing relief for female survivors of violence such that they are
not deported or "subjected to other punitive actions related to their
immigration status when they report such violence to police or other
authorities";6 9
e) Permitting "immigrants who are survivors of violence to
confidentially apply for legal immigration status independently of
the perpetrator."70
63. Id. 11 26(o).
64. Id.
65. U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, HANDBOOK FOR LEGISLATION ON VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN, at iv, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/329, U.N. Sales No. E.10.IV.2 (2009) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
66. Id. §3.1.3.
67. Id. § 3.6.1.
68. Id. § 3.1.4.
69. Id. § 3.7.1.
70. Id.
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Many states have adopted criminal and civil laws relating to gender equality
where violence against women is one aspect of the violence equation, or specific
laws on violence described as family, domestic, sexual, or intimate partner laws.7
The U.N. Handbook stresses the importance of developing laws that deal
specifically with migrant victims. Specifically, it calls for states to acknowledge
that "violence against women may constitute persecution and that
complainants/survivors of such violence should constitute 'a particular social
group' for the purposes of asylum law." 72
The U.N. surveys of CEDAW parties in Europe reflect that, in general, many
of the countries have taken positive steps to sensitize the public about domestic
violence and to develop legal protections and institutional mechanisms that support
domestic violence victims.7 3  These efforts include the creation of civil society
organizations to protect victims of family violence through safe houses and other
support mechanisms, the development of criminal provisions on domestic
violence, protection orders in cases of domestic violence, the delineation of
domestic violence as a ground for divorce, the promulgation of specific provisions
on marital rape, efforts to improve the social status of the victim, efforts to ensure
employment for victims, and the implementation of procedural protections for
domestic violence victims. 74
Occasionally, individuals or groups within a country will consider that a state
party has failed to abide by their obligations under the CEDAW." In 1999, the
General Assembly adopted the so-called "Optional Protocol" whereby the
CEDAW Committee may receive and consider complaints from individuals or
groups about violations of CEDAW obligations in states that have ratified the
Protocol.76 Upon review of a complaint, the CEDAW Committee can issue
recommendations to the state party.77 All but three of the EU-M States examined
in this article are party to the Optional Protocol.
71. See Ertfirk Report, supra note 39, 1 34.
72. HANDBOOK, supra note 65, § 3.14, at 56.
73. Erttirk Report, supra note 39, 11 34. See also infra Part V.
74. See id. 1 129.
75. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women art. 2, Oct. 6, 1999, 2131 U.N.T.S. 83 [hereinafter Optional Protocol to CEDAW].
76. G.A. Res. 54/4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/4 (Oct. 6, 1999).
77. Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 75, art. 5.
78. United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Optional Protocol
to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Oct. 6, 1999),
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg no=IV-8-b&chapter-4&lang=en
(last visited Apr. 22, 2014). Estonia, Latvia, and Malta have not signed nor ratified the Optional
Protocol. Id.
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F. Council ofEurope and the Istanbul Convention
Regional European bodies have also been focused on eliminating violence
against women.7 9 In 2002, the leading human rights body in Europe, the Council
of Europe, adopted Recommendation No. 5 mandating that its member states,
among other obligations, "introduce, develop and/or improve where necessary,
national policies against violence."80 It mandated that member states "ensure that
all services and legal remedies available for victims of domestic violence are
provided to immigrant women upon their request."8' That body has put in place an
intricate system of regional legal responsibilities that EU-M States owe to each
other, which include compliance with the European Council directives seeking to
harmonize protections and deter asylum applications in multiple EU-M States. 82
The Council of Europe has ordered that member states "consider, where needed,
granting immigrant women who have been/are victims of domestic violence an
independent right to residence in order to enable them to leave their violent
husbands without having to leave the host country."83
The Council of Europe has monitored implementation of its directives
through studies that examine the prevalence of domestic violence in member states
and the apparent wide variability of protections offered from country to country.84
In 2011, the Council of Europe concluded that more needed to be done to
harmonize these divergent systems in its member states in a number of areas,
including the treatment of migrant domestic violence victims.s This body
concluded that:
[I] Migrant women, including undocumented migrant women, and
women asylum-seekers form two subcategories of women that are
particularly vulnerable to gender-based violence. [2] Despite their
difference in legal status, reasons for leaving their home country and
living conditions, both groups are, on the one hand, at increased risk of
79. Council of Eur., Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation Rec(2002)5 of the Comm. of
Ministers to Member States on the Protection of Women Against Violence [hereinafter Rec(2002)5].
80. Id. app. 113.
81. Id. app.1124.
82. Council Regulation 343/2003, Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the
Member State Responsible for Examining an Asylum Application Lodged in One of the Member States
by a Third-country National, 2003 O.J. (L 50) 1. See generally UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'N FOR
REFUGEES, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION IN NATIONAL ASYLUM
LEGISLATION AND PRACTICE IN EUROPE (2004), available at http://www.unhcr.org/40cO7l354.html.
83. Rec(2002)5, supra note 79, app. 11 59; see also Ursula Fraser, The Asylum Procedure, in
SANCTUARY IN IRELAND, PERSPECTIVES ON ASYLUM LAW AND POLICY 81, 88-90 (Ursula Fraser &
Colin Harvey eds., 2003) (discussing the Council of Europe's efforts to harmonize criteria for
application of international human rights laws and standards, as well as asylum procedures, and the
criteria for granting of refugee status).
84. ISTANBUL CONVENTION EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 1, 112.
85. See id. 111 4, 298.
2014 175
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
experiencing violence against women and, on the other hand, face
similar difficulties and structural barriers in overcoming violence.
... [3] [Among other suggestions, the Council of Europe] introduces the
possibility of granting migrant women who are victims of gender-based
violence an independent residence status. [4] Furthermore, it establishes
the obligation to recognize gender-based violence against women as a
form of persecution and contains the obligation to ensure that a gender-
sensitive interpretation be given when establishing refugee status. . . .
[5] Finally, it contains provisions pertaining to the respect of the non-
refoulement principle with regard to victims of violence against
women.
Articulating this need for consistent legal standards, the Council of Europe
adopted, during an April 2011 meeting in Istanbul, Turkey, the Convention on
Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence
("Istanbul Convention")." As of the date of publication, eight EU-M States had
ratified this treaty: Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain, and
Sweden. The Istanbul Convention discusses minimum standards related to
migration and asylum at Chapter VII and requires that states develop legislative
and other measures required to meet these standards."
First, Article 59 requires that victims whose residence status depends on that
of the spouse or partner as recognized by internal law have the right, upon
dissolution of the marriage or the relationship, to an autonomous residence permit
irrespective of the duration of the marriage or relationship. 90 Second, domestic
violence victims should be able to have their expulsion proceedings suspended if
their migration status is dependent upon their spouse and apply for an autonomous
residence permit. 91
Third, residence permits shall be renewable when "necessary," considering
the migrant's personal situation and/or where their stay is deemed necessary to
further an investigation or criminal proceedings.92 Fourth, victims of forced
marriage should be permitted to regain any lost status.93  Fifth, gender-based
violence against women is to be considered both persecution for purposes of an
asylum application and a type of serious harm, such that a domestic violence
victim is eligible for subsidiary protection.94
86. Id. Jill 298-99.
87. Istanbul Convention, supra note 5, art. 62.
88. Council of Europe Treaty Office, Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and
Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Apr. 7, 2011),
http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=21 0&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG
(last visited June 4, 2014) [istanbul Convention Treaty Status].
89. Istanbul Convention, supra note 5, arts. 59-61.
90. Id. art. 59(1).
91. Id. art. 59(2).
92. Id. art. 59(3).
93. Id. art. 59(4).
94. Id. art. 60(1).
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Sixth, that adjudicators apply gender-sensitive interpretations in evaluating
asylum applications.95  Seventh, that gender-sensitive procedures be employed
with respect to reception, support, refugee determination, and consideration of
international protection.96  Eighth, that states offer non-refoulement protection
when legally appropriate. 97 Finally, that domestic violence victims not be returned
to their home country where their life would be at risk, or they might be subject to
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.98
Ill. CONCEPTUAL METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL DIMENSIONS
This study offers data regarding each EU-M State to indicate how it is
meeting its treaty obligations as relates to migrant domestic violence victims.
Additionally, the data provides a basis for comparison of the EU-M States legal
frameworks since it describes their specific domestic environments in terms of
several key indicators.
Human rights leaders and scholars have long valued comprehensive
assessments of treaty obligation compliance. 99 In fact, the U.N.'s mandate often
requires the collection of evidence to monitor compliance. oo However, in the
context of human rights treaty compliance monitoring, the means by which one
assesses the data has been subject to decades of debate. 01  Since the 1970's,
human rights scholars have developed a host of conceptual and methodological
tools to compare the extent to which states meet their human rights obligations.' 02
Some of these tools aggregate data, develop a composite index, and argue that
doing so presents a useful comparison.' 0 3
A majority of U.N. officials, as well as leading human rights scholars and
advocates, have eschewed this effort in the human rights context as both too
simplistic given the lack of reliable state-to-state data gathering abilities and
95. Id. art. 60(2).
96. Id. art. 60(3).
97. Id. art. 61(1).
98. Id. art. 61(2).
99. See Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Concept Paper on the High
Commissioner's Proposal for a Unified Standing Treaty Body, 4, U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/2006/2 (Mar.
22, 2006) [hereinaflter Concept Paper].
100. See id. 1136.
101. See id.114.
102. E.g., OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, TRAINING MANUAL ON HUMAN
RIGHTS MONITORING, U.N. Doc. HR/P/PT/7, U.N. Sales No. E.01.XIV.2 (Professional Training Ser.
No. 7, 2001); David L. Cingranelli & David L. Richards, The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human
Rights Data Project, 32 HUM. RTS. Q. 401 (2010); Datasets, HUM. RTS. DATA ANALYSIS GROUP,
http://hrdag.org/resources/software projects.shtml (last visited Feb. 12, 2014). See also JENNIFER
PRESTHOLDT, FAMILIAR TOOLS, EMERGING ISSUES: ADAPTING TRADITIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
MONITORING TO EMERGING ISSUES (Rachel Tschida ed., 2004), available at
http://www.mnadvocates.org/sites/608a3887-dd534796-8904-
997a0131ca54/uploads/FamiliarToolsEmerging_1ssues.pdf.
103. See, e.g., Cingranelli & Richards, supra note 102, at 403.
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fundamentally dangerous from a political standpoint.104  Compounding this
difficulty is the fact that measurement of CEDAW compliance is even more
problematic since parties are required "to act with due diligence to prevent
violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence"',0 5 and formal
agreements as to appropriate indicators or benchmarks for assessing due diligence
have not been developed.'0o
Understanding those limitations, this article, nevertheless, embarks cautiously
into such a survey. It proposes four qualitative dimensions through which one can
methodologically explore human rights compliance and establish a baseline for
support being provided to this population. To the extent that data is not available,
the survey identifies how such data would be useful to a better understanding of
the dimensions of this issue. The data is focused on four qualitative dimensions:
(a) gender equality/inequality; (b) human development; (c) treaty obligations; and
(d) domestic legal infrastructure.
A. Gender Equality/Inequality Dimension
In recent years, a number of international organizations have developed
gender equality/inequality indices. 0 7  The United Nations measures gender
inequality across states as defined by the loss of achievement due to reproductive
health, empowerment, and labor market participation, referred to as the Gender
Inequality Index ("GII").i0 However, the United Nations does not have adequate
datasets to track gender violence.' 09 In June 2013, the European Institute for
Gender Equality ("EIGE") released an index that includes gender violence as a
factor. 0 However, the EIGE provides no data on gender violence, citing a lack of
data at the European Union level." ' Thus, since this study is focused on
compliance with CEDAW, a U.N. treaty, and since these authors are not aware of
104. See The Conference-Measuring Impact in Human Rights: How Far Have We Come, and
How Far to Go?, in MEASUREMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING PROGRESS, ASSESSING IMPACT
25, 37-39 (Carr Ctr. for Human Rights Policy ed., 2005) [hereinafter CARR REPORT], available at
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/mhr/publications/documents/Measurement%20and%2OHuman%/ 020R
ights%20Tracking%2OProgress,%2OAsessing%201mpac%20Report%202005.pdf.
105. CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 19, supra note 31,119.
106. Michael Ignatieff & Kate Desormeau, Measurement and Human Rights: Introduction, in
CARR REPORT, supra note 104, at 1, 4; Kristen Timothy & Marsha Freeman, The CEDA W Convention
and the Beifing Platform for Action: Reinforcing the Promise of the Rights Framework, INT'L
WOMEN'S RTS. ACTION WATCH (Feb. 2000), http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iwraw/Freeman-
Timothy.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2014).
107. For a list of organizations that have developed gender inequality/equality indexes, see LAURA
DE BONFILS ET AL., EUR. INST. FOR GEND. EQUAL., GENDER EQUALITY INDEX REPORT II tbl.1.1
(2013) [hereinafter EIGE REPORT], available at http://eige.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Gender-
Equality-Index-Report.pdf.
108. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, THE RISE OF THE
SOUTH: HUMAN PROGRESS IN A DIVERSE WORLD 31 (2013) [HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013],
available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/14/hdr2013 en complete.pdf.
109. See Ignatieff & Desormeau, supra note 106, at 1-2.
110. EIGE REPORT, supra note 107, at 31.
111. See id. at 107.
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another equality/inequality index that provides a measure incorporating violence as
a dimension, this survey employs the GII measure as a contextual tool.
Furthermore, the state survey is organized in descending order, beginning with the
EU-M State that has the score reflecting the lowest rate of gender inequality
measured thus arguably a reflection of gender inequity.
B. Human Development Dimension
The United Nations measures human development by combining indicators of
life expectancy, educational attainment, and income levels into a raw score called
the Human Development Index ("HDI").11 2 This index can provide a frame of
reference for constructive comparisons between states.' 3 However, leaders in the
human rights community and multidisciplinary scholars have struggled about how
to understand and possibly measure the correlation between human development
and human rights obligation fulfillment.114 Leading figures in the human rights
community have recommended against using data sets to make these comparisons,
arguing that meaningful results would not be possible because data gathering
possibilities vary from country to country."' In addition, they have argued that the
development of country rankings would be politically untenable and would
ultimately oversimplify human rights challenges." 6
In a multi-disciplinary study employing economic principles to study human
rights obligation fulfillment, the findings suggest that the human development
index varies across countries of similar income levels, which further suggests that
human development factors such as life expectancy and education, for example,
are not directly correlated to state resource capacity.' 7 The study also reveals that
human development is an unreliable predictor of human rights obligation
fulfillment, since some states fall short of accomplishing what they arguably could
achieve given their resource capacities." In fact, there is a wide variance in
human development achievement among countries with similar income levels." 9
Finally, given that human development achievement can differ among
countries with similar income levels, this survey provides data on one indicator of
resource allocation. It examines the extent to which domestic-violence-shelter
112. Id. at 1.
113. Human Development Index (HDI), UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME,
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi (last visited Feb. 6, 2014).
114. See Sakiko Fukuda-Parr et al., An Index of Economic and Social Rights Fulfillment: Concept
and Methodology, 8 J. HuM. RTS. 195, 197 (2009).
115. Id. at 200 ("[I]t is quite difficult to credibly aggregate and to compare state conduct across
countries. Assessing conduct would require far more than merely examining official policies or levels
of resource expenditures in specific sectors, since paper commitments can mask corruption and other
political-economic failures that often prevent policies from being implemented effectively.").
116. Id. at 218 n.6.
117. See id. at 216-17; see also Human Development Index (HDI), supra note 113.
118. See Sakiko Fukuda-Parr et al., supra note 114, at 216.
119. Id. at 216-17.
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demand was met in a given year.120 Admittedly an inadequate representation of
total resource allocation, it, nevertheless, provides a barometer of sorts for the
purposes of this study.
C. Treaty Obligations Dimension
In this article, the Treaty Obligation Dimension is a function of four
qualitative criteria: (i) recency of EU membership; (ii) human rights treaty
obligations; (iii) recency of treaty ascension; and (iv) U.N. CEDAW reporting
compliance.
1. Recency of EU Membership
EU Membership is conferred only when a candidate country can demonstrate,
among other criteria, that its institutions respect the rule of law, respect human
rights, and protect minorities.121 However, the European Commission has admitted
that the accession process has become more rigorous and comprehensive over
time, specifically with respect to meeting rule of law reforms. 122 The EU
recognizes that although some states are EU members, they need to do more to
improve the position of women and ensure gender equality and to provide greater
protections to minority groups.123 Thus, this article assumes that countries that
were admitted to the EU more recently may have institutions that are not as
capable in respecting the rule of law, respecting human rights, and protecting
minorities. As such, the article provides EU membership ascension dates as a
frame of reference.
2. Human Rights Treaty Obligations
Each EU-M State has a variety of human rights treaty obligations and is thus
obligated to create legal environments that support the specific principles
embodied in each treaty and to refrain from certain acts that violate the principles
120. See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women: Germany, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 43d Sess.,
Jan. 19-Feb. 6, 2009, 1 43, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/DEU/CO/6 (Feb. 12, 2009); see also BARBARA
STELMASZEK & HILARY FISHER, WOMEN AGAINST VIOLENCE EUR., COUNTRY REPORT 2012: REALITY
CHECK ON DATA COLLECTION AND EUROPEAN SERVICES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN SURVIVORS OF
VIOLENCE, A RIGHT FOR PROTECTION AND SUPPORT? 116 (2013) [hereinafter WAVE REPORT],
available at http://www.wave-
network.org/sites/default/files/WAVE%20COUNTRY%/ 20REPORT%/ 202012.pdf (displaying a survey
Germany prepared with details on the number of women's shelters in Germany).
121. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council:
Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013-2014, at 1, COM (2013) 700 final (Oct. 16, 2013)
[hereinafter Enlargement Strategy], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key documents/2013/package/strategypaper 2013_en.pdf; see
also Presidency Conclusions, European Council in Copenhagen, at 13 (June 21-22, 1993), available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf.
122. Enlargement Strategy, supra note 121, at 2.
123. Id. at 9.
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of each treaty. 124 Thus, this article identifies the actual legal obligations that each
EU-M State bears.
3. Recency of Treaty Ascension
Treaty ascension reflects a recognition that an individual state must meet its
treaty obligations. EU-M States are required to enact legal frameworks to support
their international obligations with "due diligence."1 25  Specifically, CEDAW
obligations require that states act with due diligence.126
While treaties confer legal obligations, some EU-M States are deficient in
creating the legal frameworks that meet these obligations along a timeline that
conforms to treaty expectations. 127 Alternatively, some states create broad
guarantees in their legal frameworks but fail to implement them in practice.12 8
Thus, this article provides treaty ascension dates under the assumption that states
that have ascended to a treaty earlier could reasonably be expected to have made
greater progress toward meeting their treaty obligations.
4. U.N. CEDAW Reporting Compliance
The CEDAW requires regular reporting on how a state is meeting its treaty
obligations.129 These reports are required to be submitted at regular intervals.130
Some EU-M States comply with these requirements, while others do not.' 31
Reporting data is provided as an indication of both substantive compliance with
CEDAW requirements, as well as the willingness and capacity of the EU-M State
to report.132 The survey provides reporting data for contextual purposes.
D. Domestic Legal Infrastructure
Each EU-M State is required to develop a domestic legal infrastructure that
meets its treaty obligations. 33  The CEDAW Committee provides
recommendations as to what protections each state should provide. These include:
124. See Thomas Hammarberg, Comm'r for Human Rights of the Council of Eur., Progress in
Meeting Human Rights Obligations is Too Slow, Speech at the Eur. Movement UK Conference "Are
Member States and the EU Meeting Their Human Rights Obligations" (Dec. 12, 2011) [hereinafter
London Speech], available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1884007.
125. Istanbul Convention, supra note 5, art. 5. See also Lee Hasselbacher, Note & Comment, State
Obligations Regarding Domestic Violence: The European Court of Human Rights, Due Diligence, and
International Legal Minimums of Protection, 8 NW. J. INT'L HUM. RTs. 190, 200 (2010) (tracing the
emergence of a "due diligence" standard to assess a state's response to domestic violence).
126. CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 19, supra note 31, 1] 9. See also
Hasselbacher, supra note 125, at 193.
127. London Speech, supra note 124.
128. Ertirk Report, supra note 39, 1 62.
129. CEDAW, supra note 9, art. 18.
130. Id.
131. Concept Paper, supra note 99, 1 24.
132. Id. 110.
133. CEDAW, supra note 9, art. 2.
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(1) equal protection under the law without regard to migration status;134 (2)
specialized services for migrant victims; 135 (3) the use of gender-sensitive
language;' 36 (4) migration relief for domestic violence victims who report such
victimization;' 3 7 and (5) asylum for victims of domestic violence.13 8
Under the Istanbul Convention, EU-M States should further aspire as follows:
(1) provide an autonomous residence permit irrespective of the duration of the
marriage or relationship, that is renewable depending upon the specific
circumstances in the case, and/or whether the victim's presence is deemed
necessary to further an investigation or criminal proceedings;139 (2) provide
victims of forced marriage the ability to regain any lost status; 140 and (3) provide
subsidiary protection to migrant victims of domestic violence.141
This survey provides data about the features of each EU-M State's domestic
legal infrastructure in each of the key points identified here.
IV. COMPLIANCE, IMPLEMENTATION, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
State obligations to protect migrant domestic violence victims are defined
through their individual treaty responsibilities. Under current European
international law, there are three separate layers of protection for migrant domestic
violence victims: asylum, non-refoulement, and subsidiary protection. Asylum
protection stems from a number of international treaties, including Article 1 of the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees ("1951 Refugee
Convention").142 Non-refoulement protection is derived from Article 33(1) of the
1951 Refugee Convention. 143 Subsidiary protection is defined under the
Qualification Directive 2004/83 to provide protection to those facing "a real risk of
suffering serious harm," 44 which is defined as "torture or inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin." 45 It is notable
that the protections against torture as outlined in Article 3 of the ECHR are very
wide in scope, encompassing everything from torture to degrading treatment.146
134. HANDBOOK, supra note 65, at 14-15.
135. CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 26, supra note 59, i 26(i).
136. HANDBOOK, supra note 65, at 15; CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 26,
supra note 59,11 26(i).
137. HANDBOOK, supra note 65, at 34.
138. Id. at 56.
139. Istanbul Convention, supra note 5, arts. 59(1), 59(3).
140. Id. art. 59(4).
141. Id. art. 60.
142. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
143. Id. art. 33(1).
144. Council Directive 2004/83, arts. 2(e), 15, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12, 14 (EC).
145. Id. art. 15(b). For a discussion of the evolution of the concepts of non-refoulement and
subsidiary protection, see Francesco Messineo, Non-Refoulement Obligations in Public International
Law: Towards a New Protection Status?, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO MIGRATION
LAW, THEORY AND POLICY 129-155 (Satvinder S. Juss ed., 2013).
146. ECHR, supra note 8, art. 3.
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In this section, the article defines the specific treaty obligations governing the
protection of migrant domestic violence victims in EU-M States. It discusses the
various systems of protection that have been developed within each country,
including legislation addressing violence against women. Using the comparative
methodology outlined above, the article presents data as it is reported by the EU-M
States, the SRVAW, Specialized Agencies, independent NGO studies, and actual
case reviews. The article maps similarities and differences in the various legal
regimes, and provides contextual data to better account for variations.147
As the individual EU-M State surveys reveal, reform efforts vary from
country to country.148  A complex host of factors likely contribute to these
variations. 149 However, a definitive accounting of the precise causes for each of
these variations is beyond the scope of this study. In fact, the SRVAW has
expressed concern over the inherent limitations on conducting a sufficient
interrogation of the information presented by reporting states given the breadth of
the mandate and resource limitations in evaluating the efficacy of compliance with
existing standards.150 In spite of the increasing prevalence of domestic violence
increasing, the SRVAW reports that this has not "led to the adoption of necessary
solutions that are coherent and sustainable, and which would lead to elimination of
all forms of violence against all women."' 5 ' Moreover, the SRVAW states:
"[I]mpunity for both perpetrators and State officials who fail to protect and prevent
violence against women continues to be the norm."'
52
In furtherance of her mandate, the SRVAW recently requested information
regarding protections for migrant domestic violence victims, in order to prepare the
yearly report to the General Assembly.'53  Only fourteen of the EU-M States
responded to the request for information, representing over just 50 percent of
them.15 4 Moreover, of the responses received, the SRVAW determined that they
were not comprehensive in addressing the questions posed.' 55  The SRVAW
concluded, based on the information provided, that all states, including EU-M
States, are deficient in meeting their obligations under the CEDAW.' 56
147. See generally David Kennedy, The Methods and Politics of Comparative Law, in THE
COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 131-207 (M. Bussani & U. Mattei eds., 2003) (discussing
comparative legal methodologies).
148. See infra Part V.
149. See supra Part Ill.
150. Manjoo Report, supra note 24, 1| 43.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See id. 1I41.
154. Id. 1 44, n.25 (reflecting that Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and the United Kingdom responded to
the SRVAW questionnaire).
155. See id. 1144.
156. See id. ("Less than 10 per cent of States articulate their responsibility to act with due diligence
as emanating from legally binding intemational human rights law, despite the widespread ratification of
treaties such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.").
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Given these inherent challenges, the article's more modest goal is to
summarize (1) the states' international obligations, (2) the legal frameworks
providing support to this population, (3) the information that has been reported
related to protections for this vulnerable population, and (4) the criticisms that
have been lodged. Because states have the prerogative of choosing the timetable
under which they implement protections, as well as what they choose to report, a
definitive comparison across EU-M States remains elusive.
A. European Convention ofHuman Rights Compliance and Accountability
All EU-M States are parties to the ECHR.' 5 7 Article 3 indicates that "[n]o one
shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment."' 5 8  Thus, parties must ensure that they provide, in pertinent part,
freedom from torture and inhuman treatment, a standard that can be applied to
migrant domestic violence victims that fall within their territory. Pursuant to
Article 14, states must not engage in discrimination.159 ECHR violations are
enforced through the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR").' 60 Specific
ECtHR cases involving this particular population are discussed within the country
reports below.
B. CEDA W Compliance and Accountability
The CEDAW Committee has articulated that parties provide the following
protections to migrants within their borders:
a) Equal protection under the law without regard to migration status;'s6
b) Relief that is sensitive to the historical gender-component in
domestic violence;162
c) Relief from deportation or other punitive immigration action for
female survivors of domestic violence "when a worker files a
complaint of exploitation or abuse [to the authorities]";163
d) The right to confidentially apply for legal immigration status
independently of the abuser;'6 and,
e) The right to asylum for individuals that qualify for refugee status. 65
CEDAW compliance is evaluated through the state reporting system. 166 As
parties, all EU-M States 67 are obliged to submit detailed reports to the CEDAW
157. European Convention on Human Rights: Accession of the European Union, COUNCIL OF EUR.,
http://hub.coe.int/what-we-do/human-rights/eu-accession-to-the-convention (last visited May 29, 2014).
158. ECHR, supra note 8, art. 3.
159. Id. art. 14.
160. Id. art. 19.
161. CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 26, supra note 59,117.
162. Id.1123(a).
163. Id. 11 26(c)(ii).
164. Id.1126(f).
165. See id. 1 26(1).
166. CEDAW, supra note 9, art. 18.
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Committee documenting their efforts to eliminate discrimination against women.
General compliance with the CEDAW can be accessed through a review of these
reports.168 In addition, with respect to countries that are parties to the CEDAW
Optional Protocol, individual complaints of state deficiencies in meeting CEDAW
obligations are reviewable.16 9
Finally, the SRVAW receives individual complaints regarding violence
against women and communicates with host countries to seek clarification
regarding their decision-making and/or appeals processes.170 The SRVAW can
also try to secure protection for a victim. 171
C. Council ofEurope Compliance and Accountability
All EU-M States are members of the Council of Europe.172 In April 2004, the
Council of Europe issued Qualification Directive 2004/83/EC on "minimum
standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless
persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and
the content of the protection granted" 7 1 ("Qualification Directive 2004/83"). That
document applies to all EU-M States, except Denmark,174 and attempts to
standardize the criteria for international and subsidiary protection for refugees. 75
In addition to setting forth minimum standards for refugees and subsidiary
protection meant to harmonize the rules across countries, Qualification Directive
2004/83 seeks to limit the movement of asylum applicants between member states,
where they are motivated purely by differences in state legal frameworks.' 76
Qualification Directive 2004/83 articulates the need for a common policy
across the European Union.'7 7 While this Qualification Directive does not set forth
167. The European Commission reports the 28 European Union Member States and their year of
initial membership: Austria (1995); Belgium (1952); Bulgaria (2007); Croatia (2013); Cyprus (2004);
Czech Republic (2004); Denmark (1973); Estonia (2004); Finland (1995); France (1952); Germany
(1952); Greece (1981); Hungary (2004); Ireland (1973); Italy (1952); Latvia (2004); Lithuania (2004);
Luxembourg (1952); Malta (2004); the Netherlands (1952); Poland (2004); Portugal (1986); Romania
(2007); Slovakia (2004); Slovenia (2004); Spain (1986); Sweden (1995); and the United Kingdom
(1973). Countries, EUR. UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eulcountries/indexen.htm (last visited Feb. 10,
2014).
168. CEDAW, supra note 9, art. 18.
169. Optional Protocol to CEDAW, supra note 75, art. 7.
170. Ertilrk Report, supra note 39, 11 24.
171. Id.
172. See COUNCIL OF EUR., http://hub.coe.int (last visited Jan. 22, 2014) (follow "47 Countries"
hyperlink) (demonstrating that all of the EU-M States are also members of the Council of Europe).
173. Council Directive 2004/83, supra note 144; see also UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR
REFUGEES, ASYLUM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A STUDY OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
QUALIFICATION DIRECTIVE (2007) [hereinafter ASYLUM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION], available at
http://www.unhcr.org/47302b6c2.html.
174. Council Directive 2004/83, supra note 144,1 140.
175. Id. Ji 1, 6, 24.
176. Id. 17.
177. Id. 11 pmbl. ("A common policy on asylum, including a Common European Asylum System,
is a constituent part of the European Union's objective of progressively establishing an area of freedom,
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mandates with regard to humanitarian relief,'7 8 it does provide specific and
detailed standards for international and subsidiary protections.' 79 Paragraph 21 of
the preamble establishes the necessity of introducing a common understanding "of
the persecution ground 'membership of a particular social group."'"80 It mandates
that acts of gender-related violence are to be considered persecutory.i 8 Paragraph
27 states that family members of a refugee "will normally be vulnerable to acts of
persecution in such a manner that could be the basis for refugee status." 82 Actors
of persecution are deemed to include state governments, parties controlling a state
or territory, and non-state actors in the absence of protection by states or
controlling parties.'8 3  "Protection is generally provided when [states, or parties
controlling those states] take reasonable steps to prevent the persecution or
suffering of serious harm . . . by operating an effective legal system for the
detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious
harm." 84
With regard to subsidiary protection, Qualification Directive 2004/83 sets
forth standards for protection. It defines serious harm, in pertinent part, as "(a)
death penalty or execution; or (b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment of an applicant in the country of origin." 8 6 It mandates that "Member
States shall grant subsidiary protection status to a third country national" who
qualifies pursuant to the standards set forth in Qualification Directive 2004/83.18
Paragraph 29 states that the "family members of beneficiaries of subsidiary
protection status . . . [should] be fair in comparison to those enjoyed by
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status." 8 8
Qualification Directive 2004/83 addresses the concept of non-refoulement,
mandating that international obligations be followed in this regard.' 9 Principles of
non-refoulement are set forth in several treaties, including the 1951 Refugee
Convention 90 and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ("1967
Refugee Protocol").' 9' Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention mandates that,
security and justice open to those who, forced by circumstances, legitimately seek protection in the
Community.").
178. Id. 119 pmbl.
179. Id. chs. 11, V.
180. Id. 1121 pmbl.
181. Id. art. 9(2)(f).
182. Id. 1|27 pmbl.
183. Id. art. 6.
184. Id. art. 7.
185. Id. ch. V.
186. Id. art. 15.
187. Id. art. 18.
188. Id. 1129 pmbl.
189. Id. art. 21.
190. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 142, art. 33.
191. Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
"The States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to apply articles 2 to 34 inclusive of the
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"[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion."1 92
Article 23 of Qualification Directive 2004/83 addresses family unity
principles and mandates that family unity "be maintained" for refugees and
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection permitting family members to apply for
residence permits and state benefits to ensure an adequate standard of living. 193
D. Implementation and Compliance Concerns
Over the past twenty years, the SRVAW has issued a variety of reports on the
extent of worldwide progress in eliminating violence against women.' 94 In spite of
the progress made in strengthening protections for domestic violence victims, the
SRVAW has called for more to be done.' 95 The SRVAW points out that all of the
EU-M States are faced with increasing numbers of migrants, but only some of
these states provide gender-specific immigration benefits, such as asylum for
victims of gender-based and domestic violence. 196
Having consistently acknowledged the higher risk of violence faced by
migrant domestic violence victims, as well as the barriers to justice due to their
illegal status, the SRVAW notes the urgent need to support this vulnerable
population.197  Pointing to the Netherlands, by way of example, the SRVAW
recognizes that the state has adopted legislation that permits women to migrate in
their individual capacities on humanitarian grounds, where domestic violence is
presumably a humanitarian basis.' 98 The SRVAW also charges that the real nature
of the protection has been aimed at social and cultural integration, which has had
the result of further marginalizing this population, and that few of these
Convention to refugees as hereinafter defined." Id. art. 1(1) (reaffirming the obligations from the 1951
Convention including the provisions on non-refoulement).
192. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 142, art. 33(1).
193. Council Directive 2004/83, supra note 144, art. 23.
194. See, e.g., Manjoo Report, supra note 24; Ertilrk Report, supra note 39; Special Rapporteur on
Violence Against Women, Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective,
Comm'n on Human Rights, 11 1514, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/75/Add.l (Feb. 27, 2003) (by Radhika
Coomaraswamy) [hereinafter Coomaraswamy Report] (these three represent the types of reports that
the SRVAW produces). See also Annual Reports, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS.,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Women/SRWomen/Pages/AnnualReports.aspx (last visited Jan. 22,
2014) (listing the annual reports released by the SRVAW).
195. Manjoo Report, supra note 24, Jill 69-70. The SRVAW states that the impact of restrictive
immigration policies is especially burdensome on women whose immigration residency may be
dependent upon that of their husbands. Erttirk Report, supra note 39,1 41.
196. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 194, 11 1514.
197. Ertilrk Report, supra note 39, 1 65.
198. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Implementation of General Assembly
Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled "Human Rights Council," Mission to the Netherlands,
Human Rights Council, 111[ 56-58, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/34/Add.4 (Feb. 7, 2007) (by Yakin Ertitrk)
[hereinafter Netherlands Report].
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humanitarian-based visas have actually been issued.' 99 There has been a call for
the Netherlands government to release data on the number of humanitarian-based
200visas that have, in fact, been issued to migrant victims of domestic violence.
Another factor that influences a migrant domestic violence victim's decision
to seek assistance is the host country's family reunification policy. When a
domestic violence victim's migration status is tied to the principal residence permit
holder, the victim may be subject to increased vulnerability to exploitation of her
human rights. 20' CEDAW Specialized Agencies in the European Union have
criticized family unification policies in many of the EU-M countries.202 Moreover,
the Istanbul Convention provides that migrant domestic violence victims whose
residence status is dependent on that of their spouse or partner are able to apply for
autonomous legal status "irrespective of the duration of the marriage or the
relationship."203 In 2009, the Council of Europe issued an official recommendation
calling upon EU-M States to adopt a variety of protections for migrant domestic
violence victims, including "the granting of individual legal status to migrant
women who have joined their spouse through family reunion, if possible within
one year of the date of arrival." 204
To the extent that existing policies tie migration status to another family
member, dependencies are created. In the case of domestic violence, when there is
migration-related dependence between family members, this can impact the extent
to which a domestic violence victim will seek support. 205  Before a migrant
domestic violence victim has achieved a long-term residence status, her residency
security is tied to the family sponsor.206 Therefore, decisions about whether to
seek support from the state government may be influenced according to the power
the victim has over her right to remain in the country given her family ties to the
abuser.207
In sum, while many states have acknowledged that domestic violence against
women is the most prevalent human rights violation facing countries,
199. Ertfirk Report, supra note 39, 1193 (citing Netherlands Report, supra note 198, 111 6-17).
200. See Netherlands Report, supra note 198, 111 58-65 (stating that the Netherlands government
has not provided all asylum and residence permit data).
201. See CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 26, supra note 59,111 8, 26(0.
202. See INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, GREEN PAPER ON THE RIGHT TO FAMILY REUNIFICATION OF
THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS LIVING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (DIRECTIVE 2003/86/EC): RESPONSE
BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS 6 (2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-is-new/public-
consultation/2012/pdf/0023/famreun/intemationalorganisationssocialpartnersngos/intemational commi
ssionofjurists - icj.pdf.
203. Istanbul Convention, supra note 5, art. 59(1).
204. EUR. PARL. ASS., Migrant Women: at Particular Risk from Domestic Violence, Res. 1697, art.
4.1.1 (Nov. 20, 2009), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewPDF.asp?FilelD=17797&Language=EN.
205. Id. art. 1.
206. Netherlands Report, supra note 198, fIM 56-58.
207. See id.
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this acknowledgement has not led to the adoption of necessary solutions
that are coherent and sustainable, and which would lead to elimination
of all forms of violence against all women. In fact, the view from civil
society is that the prevalence rates are increasing and also manifesting in
new forms in many parts of the world. Also, that impunity for both
perpetrators and State officials who fail to protect and prevent violence
against women continues to be the norm.208
In the example above, where the Netherlands is progressive, by comparison,
in the creation of special protections, the SRVAW points out that most of the
countries are lagging in the development of specific immigration protections for
209
migrants.
These limitations have prompted the United Nations to express serious
concern that in some countries: (1) the policies are gender-neutral and fail to
adequately protect the rights of female migrants; 210 (2) the legal frameworks place
migrant females at high risk of refoulement;211 (3) female migrant victims have
uneven access to humanitarian relief in the form of asylum; 212 and (4) there is
generally lack of awareness about the availability of social services and legal
remedies that ensure protection against migrant domestic violence victimization.2 1 3
This article will conclude by evaluating the steps the various countries are taking
to address these limitations and enhance the rights of migrant female domestic
violence victims.214
For years, CEDAW Specialized Agency organizations have been advancing
gender-related relief in the immigration context. The European Council on
Refugees and Exiles ("ECRE"), a pan-European alliance of 82 non-governmental
organizations advancing the rights of refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced
persons, has been advocating since as early as 1997 that:
Gender-specific violence should not be evaluated differently from other
forms of violence that are held to amount to persecution, and the
appearance of sexual violence in a claim should never lead the decision-
maker to conclude that the alleged harm is an instance of purely
personal harm. In particular, where rape has occurred this should be
regarded as other forms of serious harm and thus repeated occurrence
should not need to be demonstrated in order to prove a well-founded
fear of persecution. The fact that violence against women is universal is
208. Manjoo Report, supra note 24, 143.
209. Id. Jil 69-77.
210. CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 26, supra note 59,1 123(a).
211. See id.1126(f).
212. See id. 1111 24(j), 26(a).
213. Id. Jl 26(c)(iii), 26(g), 26(i).
214. See infra Part V.
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irrelevant when determining whether gender-specific violence amounts
to persecution in a particular case.215
In response, there have been concerted worldwide and regional programs
aimed at harmonizing efforts as relates to asylum and gender-based claims
specifically. In 2000, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly passed a
recommendation that member states eliminate all gender-related discrimination
among refugees. 216 Nevertheless, as of 2008, the Council of Europe was reporting
that "[c]urrent legal measures need to be improved in almost all Council of Europe
member states and new measures need to be introduced to combat violence and
sustain progress."217 Eurostat statistics reflect that there remains a wide
discrepancy in protection rates for the similar groups of asylum-seekers across EU-
M States, a claim acknowledged by the Council of Europe. 218  Moreover, the
extent to which states have acted with due diligence in implementing these
protections is subject to debate.219
E. Asylum Claims Generally
In 2012, there were 335,365 requests for asylum made to EU-M States.220
This represents approximately 44 percent of the total number of requests for
215. EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES & EXILES, POSITION ON ASYLUM SEEKING AND REFUGEE
WOMEN, 1 8 (1997), available at http://www.ecre.org/component/downloads/downloads/1 56.html.
216. EUR. PARL. Ass., Violence Against Women in Europe, Res. 1450 (Apr. 3, 2000), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http%3A%2F%2Fassembly.coe.int%2FDocuments%2FAdopted
Text%2FtaOO%2FEREC 1450.htm.
217. COUNCIL OF EUR., FINAL ACTIVITY REPORT: TASK FORCE TO COMBAT VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN, INCLUDING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 82 (2008), available at
http://www.coe.int/t/dg2/equality/domesticviolencecampaign/Source/FinalActivityReport.pdf
218. See ADVISORY COMM. ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN AND MEN, OPINION ON THE
GENDER DIMENSION OF INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS 3 (2011), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-
equality/files/opinions advisory committee/opinion integrationmigrants en.pdf; Respect for the
Rights and Dignity of Migrants, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://hub.coe.int/what-we-do/society/migration
(last visited May 29, 2013) ("The issues connected with migratory movements and migrants require a
comprehensive approach involving all the Council of Europe's bodies: Parliamentary Assembly,
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe and Conference of International Non-
Governmental Organisations, as well as the representatives of governments, who meet to prepare and
co-ordinate their work.").
219. See Hasselbacher, supra note 125, at 191 (highlighting that the ECtHR has found that states
have not met the "due diligence" standard). Article 29 of the Istanbul Convention requires that states
ensure that civil law remedies permit victims to seek justice and compensation against state authorities,
if they have failed in their duty to diligently take preventive and protective measures. Istanbul
Convention, supra note 5, art. 29.
220. EUROPEAN ASYLUM SUPPORT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF ASYLUM IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION 2012, at 13 (2013) (asylum requests increased 11 percent from 2011), available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201310/20131028ATT73533/20131028ATT73
533EN.pdf.
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asylum worldwide. 22 1 By way of comparison, the United States received
approximately 11 percent of the total worldwide requests. 222 Germany, France,
and Sweden received the greatest percentage of total requests, at approximately 23,
18, and 13 percent, respectively. 223 Belgium and the United Kingdom received
significant requests as well, at approximately 8 percent each.224 The remaining
EU-M States received, collectively, approximately 28 percent of the applications-
representing almost 96,000 requests. 225 Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland
all received between 10,000 and 18,000 requests. 226
Asylum flows vary across years and across states, with shifting geopolitical
conflicts influencing the flows. In 2012, the majority of the asylum requests across
the EU were from Afghani, Russian, and Syrian refugees. 227  By way of
comparison, in 2010, most asylum-seekers in the EU were from Afghanistan,
Russia, Serbia, Iraq, and Somalia.228 With the advent of the civil war in Syria
beginning in March 2011, for example, neighboring Bulgaria has witnessed a
three-fold increase in the number of refugee requests it received in 2013.229
Presumably some percentage of these individuals seeking asylum are fleeing
persecution based on their gender. Asylum claims, including gender-based asylum
claims, are evaluated under individual state systems that enshrine international
principles articulated in the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Refugee
Protocol. 230 The states' definitions of the term refugee are all modeled on the 1951
Refugee Convention, which defines a refugee as one, who, "owing to well-founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country." 231
221. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, 2012 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK: TOP
POPULATION OUTFLOWS BY ORIGINS, REFUGEES vs. ASYLUM-SEEKERS 7 (2013) (highlighting that
there were 752,700 initial applications filed worldwide during 2012).
222. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, ASYLUM TRENDS 2012: LEVELS AND
TRENDS IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 3 (2013), available at
http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/unhcrlO8.pdf (stating that the United States received an estimated
83,400 applications).
223. EUROPEAN ASYLUM SUPPORT OFFICE, supra note 220, at 13.
224. Id.
225. See id.
226. Id. at 18 fig.3.
227. See id. at 29 fig.13.
228. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Annual
Report on Immigration and Asylum (2010), at 5, COM (2011) 291 final (May 24, 2011) [hereinafter
2010 Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum], available at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0291:FIN:EN:PDF.
229. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, BULGARIA AS A COUNTRY OF ASYLUM:
UNHCR OBSERVATIONS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION OF ASYLUM IN BULGARIA 4 (2014).
230. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 142; Protocol relating to the Status
of Refugees, supra note 191.
231. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 142, art. I (A)(2).
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One aspect of this definition that is significant in the context of gender-based
violence is the meaning of "particular social group." It is within this part of the
definition that claims to asylum based on domestic violence are typically
considered.232
Some individuals claim that they have been persecuted by their family or
community on account of their gender and that, due to social and cultural
conditions, they are unable to seek support from their state governments. 233 Under
international principles, harm related to domestic violence is held to be gender-
specific, and when states fail to provide adequate support, in some instances, a
claim to asylum based on membership in a particular social group may prevail.234
V. EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATE PROTECTION SURVEY
The degree to which a state meets its treaty obligations in practice is
sometimes a matter of dispute between worldwide and regional human rights
bodies, CEDAW Specialized Agencies, individual state governments, and
individuals who seek to avail themselves of human rights protections.235 Some
states have developed robust systems of protection that include a range of legal
protections and safety structures, including asylum, non-refoulement, subsidiary
protections, humanitarian relief, family unity provisions, migration-related
protections for victims that are not tied to an abusive spouse, shelters, hotlines,
legal assistance, interpretation assistance, work permits, and injunctive relief in the
form of protection orders. 236 Other states are in various stages of the process of
developing these structures.23 7 Below, we will provide a general overview of the_
legal protection and related frameworks currently in place to protect migrant
domestic violence victims, recognizing that many states are in mid-stream in
developing these structures.
A. The Netherlands
The Netherlands ratified the ECHR in August 1954.238 It ratified the
CEDAW in July 1991,239 as well as the CEDAW Optional Protocol in May
232. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Judicial Reasoning and 'Social Group' After Islam and Shah, II J.
INT'L REFUGEE L. 537, 537 (1999); Sue Kirvan, Women and Asylum: A Particular Social Group, 7
FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 333, 335 (1999) (these two articles reviewed Islam v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department; R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another ex parte Shah, [1999] 2 W.L.R.
1015 (H.L.) (appeals taken together)).
233. See infra Part IV.
234. See supra Part II.
235. See supra Part 11.
236. See infra Part V.
237. See infra Part V.
238. Council of Eur. Treaty Office, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (Nov. 4, 1950),
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG (last
visited Jan. 22, 2014) [hereinafter ECHR Treaty Status].
239. United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Dec. 18, 1979),
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2002.240 The Netherlands signed the Istanbul Convention in November 2012, but
has not yet ratified it. 241 It has submitted five party reports to the CEDAW
Committee, with a sixth report expected in February 2014.242
Since 2002, the Netherlands has been implementing a country-wide policy on
combating domestic violence, with a 2010 evaluation showing significant progress
on this front. 243 Working with local and professional partners, the government is
developing an approach for violence, with a specific focus on women and girls of
non-Dutch heritage.244 The Dutch CEDAW Network, however, highlighted the
problem of formulating policies to combat and prevent domestic violence that
exclude women of minority backgrounds from the process because "[t]his results
in solutions that are offered to them, but not developed with them." 24 5
Asylum is available for immigrants who claim to be victims of domestic
violence, when they can prove that their own government is unable or unwilling to
provide them with protection. 246 Furthermore, "[t]he Aliens Act Implementation
Guidelines specifically mention domestic violence as a ground of asylum for
immigrants from certain countries where there is a link between domestic violence
and honour-related violence, discrimination against women or the absence of
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=iV-8&chapter-4&lang-en
(last visited Feb. 18, 2014) [hereinafter CEDAW Treaty Status].
240. United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Optional Protocol
to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Oct.. 6, 1999),
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=1V-8-b&chapter-4&lang-en
(last visited Feb. 18, 2014) [hereinafter CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status].
241. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
242. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Fifth Periodic Reports of States
Parties: The Netherlands, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 45th Sess.,
Jan. 18-Feb. 5, 2010, at 2, 8 n.1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/NLD/5 (Nov. 24, 2008) [hereinafter
Netherland's Fifth Periodic Report] (the initial report was submitted in 1992 (U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/NET/1), the second in 1998 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/NET/2), the third in 2000 (U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/NET/3), and the fourth in 2005 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/NET/4)). See also Human Rights
Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/_1ayouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "The Netherlands" from
drop-box, select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
243. Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women: The Netherlands, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 45th Sess.,
Jan. 18-Feb. 5, 2010, 115, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/NLD/CO/5 (Feb. 5, 2010).
244. Netherland's Fifth Periodic Report, supra note 242, at 25-26.
245. LEONTINE BULEVELD & LINDA MANS, NETWERK VN-VROUWENVERDRAG (DUTCH CEDAW
NETWORK), WOMEN'S RIGHTS SOME PROGRESS, MANY GAPS: SHADOW REPORT BY DUTCH NGOs; AN
EXAMINATION OF THE FIFTH REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN (CEDAW), 2005-2008, at 19 (2009) [hereinafter Dutch CEDAW Network], available
at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/ngos/DutchNetworkNetherlands45.pdf.
246. Responses to the List of Issues and Questions with Regard to the Consideration of the Fifth
Periodic Report: The Netherlands, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 45th
Sess., Jan. 18-Feb. 5, 2010, at 15, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/NLD/Q/5/Add.l (Oct. 19, 2009) [hereinafter
Netherlands: Response to List of Issues].
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protection by the local authorities."247 As noted above, however, the Dutch
CEDAW Network reported that the government has failed to provide statistics on
the number of women granted refugee status on grounds of domestic violence. 248
In 2007, the Regulation on provisions for certain categories of foreign
nationals became available to victims of domestic violence without a residence
permit.249 This change means, essentially, that victims of domestic violence "may
be eligible for financial support and health insurance, on the condition that they
submit an application for a residence permit (which gives them lawful residence)
and reside in a women's shelter." 250 The Netherlands affords essentially the same
rights to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection as it does to beneficiaries of refugee
status, including family reunification benefits. 251
The CEDAW Committee expressed concern about the Netherland's asylum
policy and how it might exclude victims of domestic violence. 252 Specifically, the
Committee Against Torture and the SRVAW note the need for "adopting gender-
sensitive asylum procedures and recognizing gender-related persecution as a
ground for asylum." 253  The Committee noted that the so-called "accelerated
[asylum] procedure" could lead to refoulement of women who cannot relate
traumatic incidents of sexual or domestic violence.254 In response to this concern,
the government stated that the accelerated forty-eight hour procedure was going to
be replaced by an eight-day procedure, providing more time for them to seek legal
assistance.255 The government also assured the CEDAW Committee that the
Dutch asylum process is gender-sensitive, and that asylum status may be granted to
victims of domestic violence if their country of origin is unable or unwilling to
protect them.256
While the government repeatedly highlighted humanitarian-based resident
status for victims of domestic violence, honor-related violence, and trafficking, 257
the CEDAW Committee noted, however, that "the humanitarian grounds
mechanism had rarely been used: fewer than 10 residence permits had been
247. Id.
248. BlILEVELD & MANS, supra note 245, at 59.
249. Netherland's Fifth Periodic Report, supra note 242, at 24.
250. Id.
251. EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES & EXILES, THE IMPACT OF THE EU QUALIFICATION
DIRECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 33 (2008) [hereinafter THE IMPACT OF THE EU
QUALIFICATION DIRECTIVE], available at http://cmr.jur.ru.nl/cmr/docs/ECREQD-study full.pdf.
252. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 45th Sess., 916th mtg. 1 53,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.916 (Jan. 27, 2010) [hereinafter 916th mtg. Summary Record].
253. List of Issues and Questions with Regard to the Consideration of Periodic Reports: The
Netherlands, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 45th Sess., Jan. 18-Feb. 5,
2010,1122, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/NLD/Q/5 (Mar. 13, 2009).
254. Id.
255. Netherlands: Response to List of Issues, supra note 246, at 25.
256. Id. at 15, 25.
257. Id. at 15 ("Victims who are resident illegally can apply for legal residence either by invoking
specific arrangements for victims or on humanitarian grounds, and those resident legally can apply for
continued residence, if necessary also on humanitarian grounds.").
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granted." 258 The SRVAW noted that the humanitarian residence permit only
applies to victims who were granted temporary residence due to their cooperation
with the police.259 The Committee thus considered the recommendation that the
government provide protection to trafficking victims regardless of their level of
cooperation in legal proceedings as "partially implemented."260
Throughout the asylum procedure, the asylum-seeker may have legal
representation by a lawyer, which is provided by the Legal Aid Board.26' The
asylum-seeker is to be heard in a language that it may reasonably be assumed she
is able to understand.262 This means that in all cases, an interpreter has to be
present during the interviews.
The Netherlands's 2012 HDI worldwide ranking is fourth.2 63  Its 2012 GIl
worldwide ranking is first.264 While the state did not have in place a national
women's hotline as of 2012,265 its vast shelter system served nearly 100 percent of
the reported need.266
B. Sweden
Sweden ratified the ECHR in February 1952.267 It ratified the CEDAW in
July 1980,268 and the CEDAW Optional Protocol in April 2003.269 It ratified the
Istanbul Convention in July 2014.270 Sweden issued its initial report pursuant to its
obligations under CEDAW in October 1982,27 1 and submitted five periodic reports
thereafter, with the latest in September 2006.272 Its next report is due September 3,
2014.273
258. 916th mtg. Summary Record, supra note 252, 1 60. The low number is especially significant
when compared to residence permits and permanent residence permits issued to "cooperating" victims
of violence and trafficking. Id. ("In 2008 and 2009, residence permits had been issued to 230 and 200
cooperating victims respectively, with permanent residence permits granted to 100 and 40 victims
respectively.").
259. Letter from Barbara Bailey, Rapporteur on Follow-up, Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, to the Netherlands, at 3-4 (Nov. 26, 2012), available at
http://www.vrouwenverdrag.nl/ documenten/vv/doc/2012/CEDAWfollow-up Netherlands.pdf.
260. Id. (emphasis removed).
261. Id. at 2.
262. Id. at 3 (NGOs assist individuals from different cultures).
263. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
264. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
265. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 13.
266. Id. at 14-15.
267. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
268. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
269. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
270. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
271. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention,
Initial Reports of State Parties: Sweden, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
2d Sess., Aug. 1-12, 1983, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/5/Add.8 (Dec. 15, 1982).
272. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Combined Sixth and Seventh Periodic
Report of States Parties: Sweden, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, at 1,
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Swedish law governing migrants is set forth in the Aliens Act.2 74 According
to Chapter 4, Section 1, of the Aliens Act, the term "refugee" includes a gender-
related particular social group. 275 Protection is available irrespective of whether
the persecution is at the hands of the authorities of the country, or against whom
276the authorities cannot be expected to offer protection. In 2005, the Aliens Act
was amended to permit asylum on the basis of gender-based persecution. 277 The
State Migration Board has issued review guidelines on refugee women.278 Sweden
also provides subsidiary relief when there are substantial grounds for assuming that
the alien would run a risk of "suffering the death penalty or being subjected to
corporal punishment, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment." 279 Swedish law also permits the granting of residence permits to
persons who face "exceptionally distressing circumstances" as stated in Chapter 5,
Section 6 of the Aliens Act. 280
If a residence permit cannot be awarded on other grounds, a permit may be
granted to an alien if, based upon an overall assessment of the alien's situation,
there are found to be such exceptionally distressing circumstances that he or she
should be allowed to stay in Sweden.281 Sweden affords "essentially the same
rights to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection" as it does to beneficiaries of
refugee status, including family reunification benefits.282
In recent years, Sweden has experienced a series of highly publicized
honor killings.283 As a consequence, in February 2002, the Swedish Minister for
Integration adopted a strategy on how to protect girls living in vulnerable
28
situations.284 Since then, the ECtHR has issued decisions granting threatened
honor killing victims relief under ECHR Article 3, prohibiting return of individuals
to their home country where they risk torture as defined therein. 285 One such case
involved an Afghani women, and the ECtHR determined that "women are at
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SWE/7 (Sept. 14, 2006) (the second report was submitted in 1987 (U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/13/Add.6), the third in 1990 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/18/Add.1), the fourth in 1996 (U.N.
Doc. CEDAW/C/SWE/4), and the fifth in 2000 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SWE/5)).
273. See Human Rights Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/_1ayouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "Sweden" from drop-
box, select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
274. 1 ch. I § Utlinningslag (Svensk forfattningssamling [SFS] 2005:716) (Swed.) (Aliens Act).
275. 4 ch. I § Utlinningslag (SFS 2005:716) (Swed.) (Aliens Act).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See SWEDISH MIGRATION BD., GENDER-BASED PERSECUTION: GUIDELINES FOR
INVESTIGATION AND EVALUATION OF THE NEEDS OF WOMEN FOR PROTECTION (2001).
279. 4 ch. 2 § Utliinningslag (SFS 2005:716) (Swed.) (Aliens Act).
280. 5 ch. 6 § Utldinningslag (SFS 2005:716) (Swed.) (Aliens Act).
281. Id.
282. THE IMPACT OF THE EU QUALIFICATION DIRECTIVE, supra note 251, at 33.
283. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 194,11 1797.
284. Id.Jil 1797, 1802.
285. N. v. Sweden, App. No. 23505/09, 11 62 (Eur. Ct. H.R., July 10, 2010), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001 -99992.
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particular risk of ill-treatment in Afghanistan if perceived as not conforming to the
gender roles ascribed to them by society, tradition and even the legal system." 286
Individuals who are granted refugee status or are deemed to be "in need of
protection" based on an overall assessment of the victim's situation, are entitled to
a residence permit in Sweden. 287 The CEDAW Committee has commended
Sweden for its gender-related protection. 288  Sweden created guides on various
aspects of gender-related persecution that are binding on decision-makers at the
289Migration Board and the migration courts.
Sweden's 2012 HDI worldwide ranking is seventh.290 Its 2012 GII worldwide
ranking is second.29' Sweden has in place a national women's hotline that is
staffed twenty-four hours a day, offers free long distance calling, and provides
translation services.292 As of 2012, Sweden had in place 184 shelters, addressing
about 66 percent of the reported need.293
C. Denmark
Denmark ratified the ECHR in April 1953,294 the CEDAW in April 1983,295
and the CEDAW Optional Protocol in May 2000.296 It signed the Istanbul
Convention in October 2013, and ratified it in April 2014.297 Denmark reported on
its obligations under the CEDAW through an initial report in 1984,298 and seven
periodic reports thereafter, with the most recent report submitted in 2008.299
286. Id. 1155.
287. 5 ch. 2 § Utlinningslag (Svensk fdrfattningssamling [SFS] 2005:716) (Swed.) (Aliens Act)
(finding, based on Chapter 12, Section 18, of the Aliens Act, where new circumstances have emerged
that mean there are reasonable grounds for believing, inter alia, that an enforcement would put the alien
in danger of being subjected to capital or corporal punishment, torture or other inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment or there are medical or other special reasons why the order should not be
enforced).
288. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 24th & 25th Sess.,
Jan. 15-Feb. 2, 2001, July 2-20, 2001, at 78, U.N. Doc. A/56/38; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 38
(2001).
289. See SWEDISH MIGRATION BD., supra note 278, at 1.
290. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
291. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
292. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 13.
293. Id. at 14-15.
294. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
295. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
296. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
297. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
298. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 5th Sess., Mar. 10-
21, 1986, at 6-10, U.N. Doc. A/41/45; GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 45 (1986).
299. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention,
Eighth Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 2013: Denmark, Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, 60th Session, Feb. 9-27, 2015, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/DNK/8
(Sept. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Denmark's Eighth Periodic Report] (the second report was submitted in
1988 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/13/Add.14), the third in 1993 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/DEN/3), the fourth
in 1997 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/DEN/4), the fifth in 2000 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/DEN/5), the sixth in
2004 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/DEN/6), and the seventh in 2008 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/DEN/7)). See
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The country implemented comprehensive immigration and asylum rules in
mid-2002, including increasing the required number of years of residence from
three to seven before a permanent residence permit may be obtained.300
Humanitarian residence permits may also be issued when significant humanitarian
considerations warrant it, "for example if the said person suffers from a serious
physical or psychological illness. [A] [r]esidence permit can also be granted, if
exceptional reasons make it appropriate. ,301
Denmark reports that asylum applications alleging gender-related abuse or
violence are considered in the same manner as all other applications for protection,
and that these assessments are made on a case by case basis after examining the
individual circumstances in the case at hand.302 In spite of these protections, the
SRVAW has expressed concern "about the situation of migrant, refugee, and
minority women in Denmark, [specifically as it relates to] gender-based
discrimination and violence that they experience." 303
Denmark's 2012 HDI worldwide ranking is fifteenth.304  Its 2012 GII
worldwide ranking is third.305 It is one of only a few countries that has in place a
national program to provide safety to domestic violence victims, including
permitting all women access to shelters and "psychological, social and judicial
services, health treatment and labour market support."306  There is a nationally
organized women's hotline that provides services twenty-four hours a day, with
language interpretation.307 Women in shelters who are caring for children are
provided with additional support including rehabilitation, schooling, and
housing. 308 The judicial system provides support in connection with protection
order enforcement.309
There is some indication, however, that demand exceeds resource supply. By
2005, 32 percent of women staying in the shelters were migrant domestic violence
victims. As a consequence, between 2005 and 2008, Denmark focused on a
also Human Rights Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/_1ayouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "Denmark" from drop-
box, select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
300. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Sixth Periodic Reports of States
Parties: Denmark, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 36th Sess., Aug. 7-25,
2006, at 58, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/DNK/6 (Oct. 4, 2004).
301. Denmark's Eighth Periodic Report, supra note 299, at 12.
302. Id. at 12-13.
303. Coomaraswamy, supra note 194, 1 1597.
304. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
305. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
306. Denmark's Eighth Periodic Report, supra note 299, at 28.
307. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 13, 91.
308. See id. at 91.
309. See id. at 90.
310. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Seventh Periodic Report of States
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national action plan to combat domestic violence against women and children.3 1 1
Following the institution of the national action plan, the number of migrant
domestic violence victims in shelters in 2006 had declined to 27 percent. 312 By
2012, the number of shelters had climbed to forty-five,3 13 meeting 78 percent of the
need.314
D. Finland
Finland ratified the ECHR in May 1990.315 It ratified the CEDAW in
September 1986,316 and the CEDAW Optional Protocol in December 2000.3 1 It
signed the Istanbul Convention in May 2011, but has not yet ratified it. 31  Finland
reported on its obligations under the CEDAW through an initial report in February
1988,319 and five periodic reports thereafter, with the latest report in May 2012.
Finland's history of developing systems to protect not only domestic violence
victims, but migrants who suffer from this abuse, began in 1995.321 Prior to that
time, Finland reported that not only was violence against women considered a
"taboo" subject, 322 but that "the legislation in force contain[ed] rules that [were] de
facto discriminatory against women."323 However, as of 1995, Finland reported
Parties: Denmark, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 44th Sess., July 20-
Aug. 7, 2009, at 73, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/Den/7 (July 21, 2008).
311. Id. at 71-72.
312. Id. at 73.
313. See WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 91.
314. Id. at 14-15.
315. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
316. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
317. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
318. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
319. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 8th Sess., Feb. 20-
Mar. 3, 1989,1111 213-65, U.N. Doc. A/44/38; GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1990).
320. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention,
Seventh Periodic Reports of States Parties: Finland, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, 57th Sess., Feb. 10-28, 2014, at 3, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/FIN/7 (Feb. 18, 2013) (the
second report was submitted in 1993 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/FIN/2), the third in 1997 (U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/FIN/3), the fourth in 1999 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/FIN/4), the fifth in 2004 (U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/FIN/5), and the sixth in 2007 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/FIN/6)). See also Human Rights
Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "Finland" from drop-
box, select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
321. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Third Periodic Report of States Parties:
Finland, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 24th Sess., Jan. 15-Feb. 2,
2001, at 7, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/FIN/3 (Feb. 11, 1997) [hereinafter Finland's Third Periodic Report].
322. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention,
Second Periodic Reports of States Parties: Finland, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, 14th Sess., Jan. 17-Feb. 4, 1994, at 13, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/FIN/2 (Apr. 8, 1993).
323. Id. at 16.
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that assault, battery, and rape were criminalized in the Penal Code even when they
occurred within the confines of a domestic relationship. 324
By 2001, Finland reported that it had amplified its domestic legislation to
include restraining order protections, 325 was providing free legal assistance to
victims,326 and had developed an integrated asylum system to better meet the needs
of the growing immigrant population through the enactment of the 1999 Act on the
Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers. 327 Seven years later,
Finland reported that despite its efforts, violence against women had remained
constant.328 As a result, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health enhanced its
victim support services, and was working to reduce violence in intimate
relationships. 329 While some gender-based immigration relief was available in the
context of "honor crimes" and female genital mutilation,330 the Finnish
jurisprudence still did not recognize immigration relief based on domestic
violence. In July 2010, the Finnish NGO's Parallel Report to CEDAW Committee
called for Finland to recognize gender-based asylum in the context of domestic
violence. 3 ' As of 2013, Finland was not reporting that it had granted asylum in
this context.332
The European Network of Migrant Women and the European Women's
Lobby have argued that the Finnish system does not offer access to autonomous
residence permits in the case of domestic violence, which "puts many migrant
women experiencing domestic violence in a precarious situation. The migrant
women in question are inclined to endure domestic abuse longer, as they are
threatened with the possibility of becoming undocumented, homeless and without
means of support." 333
324. Finland's Third Periodic Report, supra note 321, at 12-13.
325. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Fourth Periodic Report of States
Parties: Finland, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 24th Sess., Jan. 15-
Feb. 2,2001, at 10, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/Fin/4 (Feb. 11, 2000).
326. Id. at 10-Il.
327. Id. at 13-14.
328. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Sixth Periodic Report of States Parties:
Finland, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 41st Sess., June 30-July 18,
2008, 159, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/Fin/6 (Nov. 8, 2007).
329. Id. 1178.
330. Id. 1186.
331. FINNISH NGOs, PARALLEL REPORT TO U.N.'s COMMITTEE MONITORING THE CONVENTION
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 15-16 (2010), available at
http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/FIN/INTCEDAWNGSFIN1 1
942 E.pdf.
332. See List of Issues and Questions in Relation to the Seventh Periodic Report of Finland, Comm.
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 57th Sess., Feb. 10-28, 2014, 11 6, 8, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/FlN/Q/7 (Aug. 2,2013).
333. Thomas Huddleston, Finland Studies Neighbours' Policies to Limit Family Reunions,
MIGRANT INTEGRATION POL'Y INDEX (Oct. 28, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://www.mipex.eu/blog/finland-
studies-neighbours-policies-to-limit-family-reunions.
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If asylum is not warranted, the Finnish Immigration Service considers
whether there are any other grounds for granting residence in Finland related to
family ties, work, residence considerations, or other humanitarian grounds.3 34
Finland's 2012 HDI worldwide ranking is twenty-first. 335 Its 2012 GII worldwide
ranking is sixth. 36 Finland provides some services to victims in the form of a
national women's hotline that offers translation services. 337 However, as of 2012,
Finland had only two shelters, and was therefore able to meet only about 3 percent
of the reported need.
E. Germany
The Federal Republic of Germany ratified the ECHR in December 1952.339 It
ratified the CEDAW in July 1985.340 It ratified the CEDAW Optional Protocol on
January 15, 2002.341 It signed the Istanbul Convention in May 2011, but has not
ratified it.342
The government submitted its initial CEDAW report in September 1988.343
In October 2007, Germany issued its sixth periodic report to the Committee,344
with a follow-up report issued in September 201 1.34 It is important to note,
however, that the follow-up report from September 2011 did not contain any
information relating to domestic violence in the migrant community.346 The most
334. Residence Permit on Other Grounds, MAAHANMUUTroVIRASTO: THE FINNISH IMMIGRATION
SERVICE,
http://www.migri.fi/asylumin finlandlapplying for asylum/decision/residencepermit on other grou
nds (last visited Apr. 28. 2014).
335. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
336. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
337. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 13, 100.
338. Id. at 14-15.
339. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
340. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
341. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
342. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
343. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 9th Sess., Jan. 22-
Feb. 2 1990, 11 51-92, U.N. Doc. A/45/38; GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1990).
344. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Sixth Periodic Report of States Parties:
Germany, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 43d Sess., Jan. 19-Feb. 6,
2009, at 6, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/DEU/6 (Oct. 22, 2007) [hereinafter Germany's Sixth Periodic
Report] (the combined second and third report was submitted in 1996 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/DEU/2-
3), the fourth in 1998 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/DEU/4), and the fifth in 2003 (U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/DEU/5)). See also Human Rights Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/ layouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "Germany" from drop-
box, select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
345. Response to Follow-up Recommendations Contained in the Concluding Observations of the
Comm. Pursuant to the Examination of the Sixth Periodic Report of the State Party on 2 February 2009:
Germany, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 50th Sess., Oct. 3-21, 2011,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/DEU/CO/6/Add.l (Sept. 9, 2011) [hereinafter CEDAW, Germany's Follow-Up
Report].
346. See id.
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recent information provided by Germany on domestic violence in general, and
within the migrant community in particular, is from 2007.347
In December 1999, the German government passed a plan of action for
combating violence against women.34 8  As part of the plan, the government
conducted a study of 10,000 women in Germany between ages sixteen and eighty-
five, about their experiences with violence. 349  Findings in the study were
published in 2004, reflecting that German women had a "median to high level of
experience with violence" in an international context. 350 The government then
interviewed an additional 250 Turkish women and 250 women from countries in
the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, representing the two largest
immigrant populations in Germany. 3 5  Significantly, the migrant women suffered
a higher rate of violence, with more incidents connected to injury than other
women in Germany. 352 Refugee women experienced violence with even higher
frequency.353
Specifically addressing domestic violence, the Government noted:
With regard to violence among couples, the high incidence experienced
by Turkish women is most noticeable; it far exceeded the average for
the female population in Germany. . . . It also became obvious that
female Turkish migrants were not only more often affected by physical
violence, but also by more serious forms and manifestations of physical
violence. 354
The Committee expressed great concerns about the heightened figures among
immigrant groups. 55 It urged the government to make immigrants, refugees, and
asylum-seekers aware of their rights, and the social services and legal remedies
available to them. 3 5 6 The Committee asked the German government whether it has
researched the reasons for the high level of violence in these particular
communities, and if so, whether the government has undertaken any measures to
combat domestic violence within the migrant community.3 5 7  The government
failed to respond to the Committee's specific inquiry regarding efforts to
347. Germany's Sixth Periodic Report, supra note 344, at 9, 11, 20, 27-28, 56, 62, 65-66, 68, 77-
79.
348. Id. at 19.
349. Id. at 19-20.
350. Id. at 20.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 20, 78.
353. Id. at 78.
354. Id. at 20.
355. Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women: Germany, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 43d Sess., Jan. 19-
Feb. 6,2009, 41, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/DEU/CO/6 (Feb. 12, 2009).
356. Id.| 60.
357. List of Issues and Questions with Regard to the Consideration of the Periodic Reports:
Germany, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 43d Sess., Jan. 19-Feb. 6,
2009, 1 17, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/DEU/Q/6 (Aug. 12, 2008).
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understand or combat the high levels of violence within migrant communities.
Rather, it noted that "a secondary analysis. of the representative study . . . is
available," which focused on "the relationship between health, violence and
migration." 359
The Committee was pleased with "Germany's efforts to compile
disaggregated data on asylum-seeking and refugee women and girls[,] its adoption
of the Second Action Plan to Combat Violence against Women[,] . . . [and] the
German Residence Act [provision] making it possible for women threatened by
gender-related discrimination to be granted refugee status." 360
Germany's 2012 HDI worldwide ranking is fifth.361 Its 2012 GIl worldwide
ranking is sixth.362 Female victims of violence are accepted into shelters
"regardless of their residence status." 363 The woman's status is determined later,
and the Asylum-Seekers' Benefits Act will cover her stay at the shelter if the
shelter "had been chosen for security reasons.",3M Under the Asylum-Seekers'
Benefits Act, asylum-seekers, refugees, and other "tolerated" foreign nationals
receive basic benefits, including food, accommodation, heating, clothing,
healthcare, and toiletries. 3 There have been, however, some limits on admission
or long-term residence for some migrant women because of the "difficulty in
determining which authorities are responsible for the reimbursement of the costs
for their housing and care." 366  The law also restricts asylum-seekers' area of
residence to distribute them among the communities and not overburden specific
local administrations. These asylum-seekers, however, can receive "permission
to leave the assigned residence area if they would otherwise suffer undue hardship,
as in the case of women threatened with violence."
358. Responses to the List of Issues and Questions with Regard to the Consideration of the Sixth
Periodic Report: Germany, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 43d Sess.,
Jan. 19-Feb. 6, 2009, 1| 17, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/DEU/Q/6/Add.l (Nov. 25, 2008) [hereinafter
Germany's Response to List of Issues and Questions].
359. Id.
360. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 43d Sess., 880th mtg. 11 22,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.880 (Feb. 2, 2009) [hereinafter 880th mtg. Summary Record].
361. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
362. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
363. 880th mig. Summary Record, supra note 360, 11 44. See also Germany's Response to List of
Issues and Questions, supra note 358, 1 23 ("[W]omen's shelters grant admission to the shelter without
making it contingent upon a clarification of residence permit status . . . instead the clarification of
individual claims is undertaken ... only after admission to the women's shelter.").
364. 880th mtg. Summary Record, supra note 360,1144.
365. Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz [AsylbLG] [Asylum Seekers Benefits Act], June 30, 1993,
BGBL. I at 2022 (Ger.), as amended by Gesetz [g], Nov. 22, 2011, BGBL. I at 2258, art. 3 (Ger.).
366. Germany's Response to List of Issues and Questions, supra note 358, 11 23.
367. 880th mtg. Summary Record, supra note 360, 1143.
368. Id.
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Germany offers other forms of protection to migrant domestic violence
victims. In the form of "Prohibition of Deportation" 369 the state offers subsidiary
protection pursuant to Article 15 of the Qualification Directive. 370 The state also
offers protection to individuals that can establish that they would be subject to
"substantial concrete danger [to] life and limb or liberty."37'
In a 2010 case, a German administrative court considered the case of a single
woman from Nigeria. 372 Her case involved severe domestic violence, as well as
FGM and forced marriage. 373 She had applied for asylum and protection from
deportation due to a threat of FGM and forced marriage under Section 60(7)
sentence (1) of the Residence Act.374 The asylum claim was denied under German
law on the grounds that her claims under FGM and forced marriage were not
sufficient to be considered political persecution.375  The court did not base its
decision on her social group in any context. 376 The applicant was found eligible
for protection from deportation under Section 60(7) sentence (1) of the Residence
Act.377  The German court reasoned that there was "a high likelihood that she
would be in extreme danger, due to her personal circumstances" and "the risk of
falling victim to violent attacks and threats by her father, who is willing to return
the applicant by use of force to the man to whom she is committed to by marriage.
Furthermore, the applicant is at risk of falling victim to circumcision."378
Similarly, in a 2008 case, the administrative courts considered the case of an
Iraqi woman who feared that she would be the victim of an "honor" killing by
members of her clan. 379 During the proceedings, the asylum-seeker stated that she
was subject to violence and threats by her family members living in Kirkuk. 380
The court affirmed the denial of the asylum application for failure to establish a
nexus to a protected ground, and provided no relief to this individual.'
369. Aufenthaltsgesetz [AufenthG] [Residence Act], July 30, 2004, BGBL. I at 1950, as amended
BGBL. I at 1970 (amended by the Act on Implementation of Residence and Asylum-Related Directives
of the European Union of 19 August 2007) (Ger.).
370. Council Directive 2004/83, supra note 144, art. 15.
371. AufenthG [Residence Act] (Ger.).
372. Verwaltungsgericht Monster [VG] [Administrative Court Monster] Mar. 15, 2010, 11 K
413/09.A, 2010 (Ger.), available at http://openjur.de/u/456682.html.
373. Germany-Administrative Court Miinster, 11 K 413/09.A, 15 March 2010, EUR. DATABASE
ASYLUM L., http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/case-law/germany-administratvive-court-mflnster-
I 1-k-41309a-15-march-2010#content (last visited May 30, 2014).
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Verwaltungsgericht Minchen [VG] [Administrative Court Minchen] Dec. 10, 2008, M 8 K
07.51028 (Ger.).
380. Germany-Administrative Court Minchen, 10 December 2008, M 8 K 07.51028, EUR.
DATABASE ASYLUM L., http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/case-law/germany-administrative-court-
m%C3%BCnchen-1 0-december-2008-m-8-k-0751028 (last visited May 30, 2014).
381. Id.
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On the other hand, a similar case decided in 2009, had a different outcome.3 82
Case 3 A 2966/09 involved an Algerian asylum-seeker who had applied for relief
claiming severe ill-treatment by her uncles with whom she lived, and who were
attempting to force her into an arranged marriage.3 8 3 She had defied them under
threat of death.384 The German appellate court found that "[t]he risk of persecution
by her uncles also constitutes relevant persecution by non-state actors since the
state, parties or organisations which control the state or a substantial part of the
state's territory, are not able to protect her from persecution." 385
F. Slovenia
Slovenia ratified the ECHR in June 1994.56 It ratified the CEDAW in July
1992, " and the CEDAW Optional Protocol in September 2004.88 It signed the
Istanbul Convention in September 2011, but has not yet ratified it. 3 89  Slovenia
issued its first CEDAW report in November 1993,390 and three periodic reports
thereafter, the latest being in May 2007.391 It was obliged to issue a report on May
1, 2013, but has not yet done so. 392
Slovenia's asylum law is found in two pieces of legislation 393: the 2000
Asylum Act394 and the 2007 Aliens Act. 395 Article 48 of Slovenia's Constitution
382. Verwaltungsgericht Oldenburg [VG] [Administrative Court Oldenburg] Apr. 13, 2011, 3 A
2966/09 (Ger.), available at http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/case-law/germany-administrative-
court-oldenburg-13-april-2011-3-296609.
383. Germany-Administrative Court of Oldenburg Miinchen, 13 April 2011, 3 A 2966, EUR.
DATABASE ASYLUM L., http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/case-law/germany-administrative-court-
oldenburg-13-april-2011-3-296609 (last visited May 31, 2014).
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
387. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
388. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
389. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
390. See Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention,
Initial Reports of States Parties: Slovenia, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, 16th Sess., Jan. 13-Jan. 31, 1997, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SVN/I (Sept. 26, 1995).
391. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Fourth Periodic Report of States
Parties: Slovenia, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 42d Sess., Oct. 20-
Nov. 7, 2008, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SVN/4 (May 8, 2007) (the second report was submitted in
1999 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SVN/2) and the third in 2002 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SVN/3)).
392. See Human Rights Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "Slovenia" from drop-
box, select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
393. UNHCR REPRESENTATION IN SLOvN., BACKGROUND NOTE ON THE PROTECTION OF ASYLUM
SEEKERS AND REFUGEES IN SLOVENIA 1 (2004), available at
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4326f9534.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR, BACKGROUND NOTE ON
SLOVENIA].
394. Law on Asylum (LoA), 2003, Official Gazette of RS, No. 61/1999, available at
http://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/3/topic/1 0.
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guarantees "the right to asylum shall be recognised to foreign nationals and
stateless persons who are subject to persecution for their commitment to human
rights and fundamental freedoms." 396 Slovenia only gained its independence in
1991. 3 As such, the UNHCR has provided greater oversight and assistance in the
form of commenting on its legislation.398  The UNHCR has thus had a direct
impact on the lives of refugees and asylum-seekers within Slovenia.399
While Slovenia affords essentially the same rights to beneficiaries of
subsidiary protection as it does to beneficiaries of refugee status, including family
reunification benefits,400 the safety infrastructure is evolving.40' Slovenia's 2012
HDI worldwide ranking is twenty-first.402 Its 2012 GII worldwide ranking is
eighth.403 It has in place a national women's hotline, but it is not staffed twenty-
four hours a day, nor are translation services provided. 4 04 As of 2012, Slovenia
had in place eighteen shelters, addressing almost 100 percent of the reported
need.405
G. France
France ratified the ECHR in May 1974.406 It ratified the CEDAW in
December 1983407 and the CEDAW Optional Protocol in June 2000.408 It signed
the Istanbul Convention in May 2011, and ratified it July 2014.409 France reported
on its obligations under CEDAW through an initial report in February 1986,410 and
four periodic reports thereafter, with the latest report in April 2006.411 France was
395. Aliens Act, Sept. 7, 2007, Official Gazette of RS, No. 79/2006, available at
http://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/3/topic/10.
396. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA, June 25, 1991, available at
http://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/constitutions/country/3.
397. Id.
398. See UNHCR, BACKGROUND NOTE ON SLOVENIA, supra note 393.
399. Slovenia, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, http://www.unhcr-
centraleurope.org/en/where-we-work/operations-in-central-europe/slovenia.html (last visited Jan. 22,
2014).
400. THE IMPACT OF THE EU QUALIFICATION DIRECTIVE, supra note 251, at 231.
401. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 244-49.
402. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
403. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
404. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 13, 248.
405. Id. at 14-15.
406. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
407. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
408. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
409. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
410. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention,
Initial Reports of States Parties: France, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
6th Sess., Mar. 30-Apr. 10, 1987, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/5/Add.33 (May 7, 1986).
411. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Sixth Periodic Report of States Parties:
France, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 40th Sess., Jan. 14-Feb. 1, 2008,
at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/FRA/6 (Apr. 6, 2006) (the second report was submitted in 1990 (U.N. Doc.
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obliged to submit another periodic report on January 13, 2013, which was
submitted in February 2014.412
The right of asylum in France has been subject to many changes in recent
years. 413 Since July 25, 1952, it has been amended several times.4 14 Significant
amendments were introduced by the Asylum Act adopted on December 10, 2003,
which entered into force on January 1, 2004.415 France recognizes relief based on
membership in a "particular social group."416 In a recent study of nine EU-M
States, and the protection that they provide in migrant gender-based protection
claims, France was identified as a country that despite its assertions to the contrary
neither employed the UNHCR Gender-Based Guidelines in its asylum
adjudications, nor developed gender-based guidelines of its own.4 17 France's 2012
HDI worldwide ranking is twentieth. Its 2012 GII worldwide ranking is ninth.4 19
In general, domestic violence claims in France often lead to a grant of
subsidiary protection, especially in the context of "forced marriage or opposition to
social mores."420 Subsidiary protection is available for a single year, to those "who
can prove that they would be exposed in their country of origin to serious threats of
capital punishment, torture or inhuman treatment or punishment, or a serious threat
to life as a result of indiscriminate violence due to internal or international armed
conflict." 421 The protection must be renewed annually to determine whether the
conditions that necessitated protection continue to exist. 422  France affords
CEDAW/C/FRA/2), the third and fourth in 1999 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/FRA/3-4), and the fifth in
2002 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/FRA/5)).
412. See Human Rights Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/_1ayouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "France" from drop-
box, select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
413. EDAL Country Overview-France, EUR. DATABASE OF ASYLUM L. (Jan. 1, 2012),
http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/edal-country-overview-france.
414. See Loi 2003-1176 du 10 d6cembre 2003 modifiant la loi 52-89 du 25 juillet 1952 relative au
droit d'asile [Law 2003-1176 of December 10th, 2003 amending the law 52-893 of July 25th, 1952
relating to the right of asylum], Joumal Officiel de la Rdpublique Frangaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of
France], Dec. 11, 2003, p. 21080.
415. Id.
416. Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on Persecution Due to the
Membership ofa Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 505, 510 (1993) ("In France, national
legislation defines refugees using the precise terms of the [1951 Refugee] Convention definition.").
417. HANA CHEIKH ALl ET AL., GENDER-RELATED ASYLUM CLAIMS IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF LAW, POLICIES AND PRACTICE FOCUSING ON WOMEN IN NINE EU MEMBER STATES 32
(2012).
418. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
419. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
420. CHEIKH ALl ET AL., supra note 417, at 46.
421. HUMAN RIGHTS RESEARCH & EDUC. CTR., UNIV. OF OTTAWA, FRANCE'S ASYLUM SYSTEM 2
(2014), available at http://www.cdp-hrc.uottawa.ca/projects/refugee-
forum/projects/systems/documents/FranceAsylumSystem.pdf
422. Id.
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essentially the same rights to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection as it does to
beneficiaries of refugee status, including family reunification benefits. 423
H. Italy
Italy ratified the ECHR in October 1955.424 It ratified the CEDAW in June
1985,425 as well as the CEDAW Optional Protocol in September 2000.426 It
ratified the Istanbul Convention in September 2013.427 It reported on its
obligations under CEDAW through an initial report in October 1989,428 and
submitted four periodic reports thereafter, with its most recent in December
2009.429 It is obliged to issue its next report on July 1, 2015.430
First, Italy offers refugee status for victims of acts of persecution as
understood by Article 1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 431 The nature of the
harm must be sufficiently serious to constitute a severe violation of basic human
rights, "in particular rights from which derogation cannot be made under the
[ECHR]."432 Acts of persecution can include "acts of physical or mental violence,
including sexual violence," as well as "acts directed specifically against one
gender." 433  Italian jurisprudence recognizes claims based on particular social
group as "defined by an innate and unchanging characteristic or by the perception
of the surrounding society or sexual orientation," including gender.434 Italy does
not require an asylum applicant to seek home-country protection before fleeing
persecution from non-state actors.435
Under Italian legislation, subsidiary protection is available to a foreign citizen
who does not qualify as a refugee but who demonstrates a real risk of suffering
423. Id.
424. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
425. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
426. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
427. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
428. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 10th Sess., Jan. 10-
Feb. 1, 1991, fI[43-83, U.N. Doc. A/46/38; GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1992).
429. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Sixth Periodic Report of States Parties:
Italy, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 49th Sess., July 11-29, 2011, at 1,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/ITA/6 (May 19, 2010) (the second report was submitted in 1994 (U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/ITA/2), the third in 1997 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/ITA/3), and the fourth and fifth in 2003
(U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/ITA/4-5)).
430. See Human Rights Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/ layouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "Italy" from drop-box,
select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
431. Hakan G. Sicakkan, The Rights of Refugees, in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS 359, 361
(Thomas Cushman ed., 2012). See also EDAL Country Overview-Italy, EUR. DATABASE OF ASYLUM
L. (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/edal-country-overview-
italy#Refugee%20status%202 [hereinafter EDAL Country Overview-Italy].
432. EDAL Country Overview-Italy, supra note 431.
433. Id.
434. CHEIKH ALI ET AL., supra note 417, at 61.
435. Id. at 53.
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serious harm and who is unable or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself
or herself of the protection of that country.436 Serious harm is defined as ranging
from being subject to the death penalty to degrading treatment in the country of
origin.437 Italy also recognizes humanitarian relief when there are serious
humanitarian concerns relating to the asylum applicant that make it necessary for
them to stay in the country. 438
Italy's 2012 HDI worldwide ranking is twenty-fifth.439 Its 2012 GII
worldwide ranking is eleventh. 440 Asylum-seekers may request state-funded legal
aid. 44 1 France also administers a national women's hotline that is available twenty-
four hours a day, offers free long distance service, and provides translation
services.442 However, as of 2012, shelters were scarce with only 25 percent of the
need met.443
I. Belgium
Belgium ratified the ECHR in June 1955.444 It ratified the CEDAW in July
1985445 and the CEDAW Optional Protocol in June 2004.446 Belgium signed the
Istanbul Convention on September 11, 2012, but has not yet ratified it.447  it
reported on its obligations under the CEDAW through an initial report in July
1987,448 and four periodic reports thereafter, with the most recent report in October
2012.449
436. Decreto Legislativo 25 luglio 1998, n. 286, in G.U. 18 agosto 1998, n. 191 (It). See also
CHEIKH ALI ET AL., supra note 417, at 46, 78.
437. EDAL Country Overview-Italy. EUR. DATABASE ASYLUM L. (Nov. 19, 2013),
http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/contentledal-country-overview-italy.
438. Decreto Legislativo 25 luglio 1998, n. 286, in G.U. 18 agosto 1998, n. 191 (It). See also
CHEIKH ALI ET AL., supra note 417, at 78.
439. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
440. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
441. EUROPEAN COMM'N & EUR. MIGRATION NETWORK, AD-Hoc QUERY ON EARLY LEGAL
ADVICE FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS 8-9 (2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/european migrationnetwork/reports/docs/ad-hoc-queries/protection/419_emn ad-
hoc queryearlylegal advice for asylumseekers_24aug2012 (wider dissemination).pdf.
442. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 13, 148.
443. Id. at 14-15.
444. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
445. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
446. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
447. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
448. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 8th Sess., Feb. 20-
Mar. 3, 1989, 11[ 266-312, U.N. Doc. A/44/38; GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1990).
449. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Seventh Periodic Report of States
Parties due in 2012: Belgium, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 59th Sess.,
Oct. 20-Nov. 7, 2014, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/BEJ7 (Feb. 19, 2013) (the second report was
submitted in 1993 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/BEL2), the third and fourth in 1998 (U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/BEL/3-4), and the 5th and 6th in 2007 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/BEU6)). See also Human
Rights Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
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The evolution of Belgian human rights jurisprudence on asylum for migrant
domestic violence victims is reflected in a case involving a Russian national of
Tatar origin who was a victim of sustained domestic violence in Russia. 45 0 In this
case, the applicant had been subject to repeated domestic violence at the hands of
her spouse while in Russia, and was unable to either relocate or seek assistance
from authorities. 451 When the Belgian trial court examined the case in 2007, in
spite of the evidence of severe physical abuse, and police inaction, the Belgian
Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons rejected
the applicant's claim on the grounds that the violence had been private in nature
and that there was a lack of evidence that the authorities would not provide
protection. 452
In 2008, however, on appellate review before the Belgian Council for Alien
Law Litigation, it was determined that domestic violence was considered
persecution under the both the 1951 Refugee Convention and Belgian law since it
involved "acts of physical or mental violence" and "acts of a gender specific
nature." 453 Additionally, the appellate body invoked the protections afforded under
Article 3 of the ECHR to find that the applicant was eligible for relief, and
determined that gender-related persecution claims could be supported as a
membership in a particular social group claim, when the harm was deemed
"serious." 454  As the jurisprudence in this area has further developed, Belgian
courts have made clear that there is no requirement that an applicant seek state
protection in the home country prior to making the claim in Belgium. 455  The
CEDAW Committee has acknowledged the new and "simplified procedure for the
consideration of asylum requests provided for specific treatment of cases involving
sexual violence, gender-based persecution and violence against children." 456 As a
http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/ layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Countries.aspx (select "Belgium" from drop-
box, select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
450. Conseil du Contentieux des Etrangers [Council for Alien Law Litigation] July 9, 2008, 149 E-
RGDC 351 (2008), No. 13.874 (BeIg.), available at
http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/sites/www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/files/aldfiles/Belgium_008%20dec
ision.pdf. For a case summary in English, see Belgium-Council for Alien Law Litigation, 9 July 2008,
Nr. 13.874, EUR. DATABASE ASYLUM L., http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/case-law/belgium-
council-alien-law-litigation-9-july-2008-nr-13874 (last visited Apr. 30, 2014) [hereinafter Belgium-
Council for Alien Law Litigation, 9 July 2008, Nr. 13.874].
451. Council for Alien Law Litigation (Belg.), 11 1.1.
452. Id.
453. Id. 11 6.1.5. See also Loi sur I'acc~s au territoire, le sdjour, I'6tablissement et I'dloignement des
6trangers [Alien Act] of Dec. 15, 1980, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Dec.
31, 1980, 14584, art. 48/3 §2 (Belg.).
454. Council for Alien Law Litigation (Belg.), 111 6.1.5, 6.1.6 (highlighting that the Standing
Committee of Appeal of Refugees has found that domestic violence is persecution under the ECHR);
see also Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 194, 1 1573.
455. See Belgium-Council for Alien Law Litigation, 9 July 2008, Nr. 13.874, supra note 450.
456. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 42d Sess., 852d mtg. 11 5, U.N.
Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.852 (Oct. 21, 2008).
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practical matter, authorities distribute copies of the UNHCR Gender-Based
Guidelines to adjudicating officials. 457
Belgium provides subsidiary protection status to foreign nationals who are not
able to establish eligibility for refugee status, but who the state finds "would face a
real risk of suffering serious harm" in their home country, and who are therefore
unable to seek protection from the home country.458 Subsidiary protection status
affords the migrant a residence permit that can be either temporary or permanent,
and offers work permit authorization and family reunification benefits. 459
The Belgian legal structure permits non-refoulement relief to migrant
domestic violence victims such that they will not be removed forcibly but rather
permitted to remain legally, but devoid of many rights.460 In the alternative,
Belgium may decide that for humanitarian reasons, it will provide a residence
permit.461
Belgium's 2012 HDI worldwide ranking is seventeenth.462  Its 2012 GIl
worldwide ranking is twelfth.463  It offers a variety of safety protections to
domestic violence victims. In 2012, Belgium met 43 percent of the reported
shelter demand.464 That year, it reported having ten women's centers for migrant
domestic violence victims. 465 However, as of 2012, Belgium did not maintain a
national women's helpline.466
J. Austria
Austria ratified the ECHR in September 1958.467 It signed the CEDAW in
July 1980, and later ratified it in March 1982.468 It ratified the CEDAW Optional
Protocol in September 2000,469 as well as the Istanbul Convention in November
2013.470 Austria reported on its obligations under the CEDAW through an initial
report in October 1983,471 and five periodic reports thereafter, with the most recent
report issued in May 2011.472
457. CHEIKH ALI ET AL., supra note 417, at 32.
458. Alien Act (BeIg.), art. 48/4.
459. Id. arts. 61/18, 61/23, 61/29.
460. Id. art. 74/17.
461. Id. art. 74/12.
462. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
463. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
464. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 14-15.
465. Id.
466. Id. at 13.
467. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
468. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
469. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
470. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
471. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention,
Initial Reports of States Parties: Austria, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
4th Sess., Jan. 21-Feb. 1, 1985, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/5/Add.17 (submitted Oct. 21, 1983).
472. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Combined Seventh and Eighth
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Asylum protection in Austria is governed by Article 3 of the Federal Law
Concerning the Granting of Asylum, and tracks the refugee definition articulated in
the 1951 Refugee Convention. 473  However, with regard to relief under asylum
law, particular social group claims based on domestic violence and gender do not
yet appear to have been recognized under current legal jurisprudence, although it
has been reported that such claims may be possible. 474 State reporting under the
CEDAW reflects that Austria believes that the law enables migrant female
domestic violence victims to receive work permits so that they can gain more
independence and earn a living;475 and permits the review of asylum claims in an
environment sensitized to the "special needs of women refugees." 476
The Aliens' Police Act governs deferral of deportation protections if a
deportation would violate non-refoulement obligations.477 Subsidiary protections
are governed by Article 8 of the Federal Law Concerning the Granting of Asylum,
which supports a limited right of residence valid for one year that can be extended
upon application.478 Humanitarian relief is available pursuant to the Residence Act
of 2005.479 Austria reports that it has in place a system for granting migrant
women who have come to the country through family reunification an independent
residence permit to protect them from domestic violence. 480 Under current law, if
Periodic Reports of States Parties: Austria, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, 54th Sess., Feb. 1l-Mar. 1, 2013, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/AUT/7-8 (June 9, 2011) (the
second report was submitted in 1989 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/13/Add.27), the third and fourth in 1997
(U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/AUT/3-4), the fifth in 1999 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/AUT/5), and the sixth in
2004 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/AUT/6)). See also Human Rights Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER
HUM. RTS., http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_1ayouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "Austria"
from drop-box, select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
473. Bundesgesetz Oiber die Gewthrung von Asyl [Asylgesetz 2005] [Federal Act Conceming the
Granting of Asylum] BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL 1] No. 100/2005, as amended by BGBL I No.
75/2007, BGBL I No. 2/2008 and BGBL I No. 4/2008, § 3 (Austria).
474. Report by Nils Muiinieks Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe
Following His Visit to Austria from 4 to 6 June 2012, CommDH (2012) 28 1 41 (Sept. 11, 2012)
[hereinafter Report by Nils Muiinieks] ("Austrian legislation provides for the possibility of granting
migrant women who have come to the country because of family reunification a separate residence
permit to protect them from violence. The residence in Austria of victims of domestic violence or
forced marriages has also been eased through the possibility of waiving the burden of proof regarding
residence criteria, and granting a residence permit irrespective of them not yet being legally resident in
Austria. Measures have been taken to address harmful practices, such as forced marriage and female
genital mutilation.").
475. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 194, 11 1559.
476. Id. 1 1565.
477. Bundesgesetz Ober die Austibung der Fremdenpolizei, die Ausstellung von Dokumenten flir
Fremde und die Erteilung von Einreisetitel 2005 [Fremdenpolizeigesetz 2005] [Aliens' Police Act]
BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL 1] No. 100/2005, as amended by BGBL I No. 157/2005,§ 50 (Austria).
478. Asylgesetz 2005, § 8 (Austria).
479. Bundesgesetz uber die Niederlassung und den Aufenthalt in Osterreich [Niederlassungs-und
Aufenthaltsgesetz] [Settlement and Residence Act] BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL 1] No. 100/2005, as
amended by BGBL I No. 157/2005, §§ 72-74 (Austria).
480. See ALEXANDRA KONIG & ALBERT KRALER, EUR. COMM'N, FAMILY REUNIFICATION
REQUIREMENTS: A BARRIER OR FACILITATOR TO INTEGRATION?, AUSTRIA COUNTRY REPORT
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the family member of a person with subsidiary status is outside Austria, that person
is granted entry only following the first extension of the limited right of residence
of the family member who enjoys subsidiary protection. 481 Thus, the legal status
of the family member depends on the legal status of the sponsor.482 Austria reports
that the legal system includes a procedure to reduce the burden of proof regarding
criteria for migrant applicants who are victims of domestic violence.483
Austria's 2012 HDI worldwide ranking is eighteenth.484 Its 2012 GIl
worldwide ranking is fourteenth.485  Austria reports that it strives to provide
effective and timely safety protections to victims of domestic violence. 486  it
maintains a national helpline with multi-lingual support.487  There were thirty
women's shelters in place in 2012, meeting approximately 90 percent of the
reported need.488 Stakeholders have called for improved public safety measures
such as the enforcement of injunctive relief48 9 and the creation of geographically
dispersed shelters. 490
In February 2013, the CEDAW Committee requested that Austria provide
further information about measures being taken to address "violence against
women in migrant communities," and "the negative impact of increasing
xenophobia in the media on women from migrant communities, particularly
Muslim women."49 1 With regard to residence permits issued to victims of
violence, the CEDAW Committee "expressed concern that they were issued for
one year only," and that they were "subject to strict criteria," requesting
information about the process for extension.492
K. Spain
Spain ratified the ECHR in October 1979.493 It ratified the CEDAW in
January 1984,494 as well as the Optional Protocol in June 2001.495 It signed the
SUMMARY 2 (2013), available at http://familyreunification.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/Summary Austria_29-01-2013_final- 3_.pdf. See also Report by Nils
Muiinieks, supra note 474,1137 (highlighting that Austria still has progress to make).
481. Asylgesetz 2005, § 35(2) (Austria).
482. KONIG & KRALER, supra note 480, at 2.
483. Id. at 3.
484. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
485. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
486. ALBIN DEARING, FED. MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, AUSTRIA, THE AUSTRIAN ACT ON THE
PROTECTION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CORE ELEMENT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE REFORM
REGARDING THE RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE ROLE OF THE
LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICE 21 (2002), available at http://www.weisser-ring.at/GeSCHG2002_eng.pdf.
487. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 13, 47.
488. Id. at 14-15.
489. See id. at 47.
490. See id. at 48.
491. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 54th Sess., 11 03d mtg. 1 30,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SR. 1103 (Feb. 13, 2013).
492. Id.
493. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
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Istanbul Convention in May 2011, and ratified it in April 2014.496 Spain issued its
first CEDAW report in August 1985,497 and six periodic reports thereafter, with the
latest in September 2013 .4
During the most recent reporting period, Spain's policies "focused almost
exclusively on combating violence against women committed by men who are or
have been their spouse or partner." 499 With a view to enabling victims to pursue
both civil and criminal law avenues of redress and settling all related legal matters
such as divorce, custody, and property questions, the Spanish Integrated Protection
Measures against Gender Violence Act set up specific "gender violence" courts.500
These courts, a special branch of the criminal courts with investigating judges, are
granted the power to rule on criminal cases involving violence against women as
well as any related civil law cases.50' Consequently, both are dealt with in the first
instance by the same bench. This relieves women going to court and costly
bureaucratic hurdles.
Similar to many other EU-M States, foreign women suffer more abuse than
Spanish women of the same age in Spain.502 Specifically, "7 [percent] of foreign
women declared that they had been victims of abuse during the last year, double
the figure for Spanish women (3.5 [percent]). In the case of 'technical abuse',
these differences again appear (17.3 [percent] versus 9.3 [percent])."' 03 Royal
Decree 2393/2004 attempts to address these figures by allowing victims who have
protection orders to request temporary residence. 50 Between the third quarter of
494. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
495. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
496. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
497. See Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 6th Sess., Mar.
30-Apr. 10, 1987,1|1 238-304, U.N. Doc. A/42/38; GAOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1987).
498. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention,
Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic Reports of States Parties to be Presented in 2013: Spain,
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 61st Sess., June 29-July 17, 2015, at 1,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/ESP/7-8 (Dec. 17, 2013) (the second report was submitted in 1989 (U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/13/Add.19), the third in 1996 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/ESP/3), the fourth in 1998 (U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/ESP/4), the fifth in 2003 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/ESP/5), and the sixth in 2008 (U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/ESP/6)). See also Human Rights Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTs.,
http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/ layouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "Spain" from drop-box,
select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
499. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Art. 18 of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Sixth Periodic Report of State Parties:
Spain, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 44th Sess., July 20-Aug. 7, 2009,
11 355, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/ESP/6 (Apr. 23, 2008) [hereinafter Spain's Sixth Periodic Report].
500. Organic Act 1/2004 of 28 December on Integrated Protection Measures against Gender
Violence art. 44 (B.O.E. 2004, 313) (Spain). See also Spain's Sixth Periodic Report, supra note 499, Ji|
369-73.
501. Integrated Protection Measures against Gender Violence Act, art. 44(1)-(3) (Spain).
502. Spain's Sixth Periodic Report, supra note 499, 11 359.
503. Id. Technical abuse is where a woman responds to survey questions in a way that suggests she
is a victim of abuse, regardless of whether she considers herself to be a victim. Id. 11358.
504. Id. 11 368.
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2005 and the second quarter of 2008, between 29.4 percent and 36.9 percent of
foreign women were granted protection orders.5 0 5 These women have the ability to
apply for a residence permit on account of exceptional circumstances. 506  The
CEDAW Committee noted that, while this statistic indicates victims' greater
access to justice, it also indicates that there has not been a reduction in gender-
based violence. 07
The general rights of asylum seekers and migrants are guaranteed by the
Spanish Constitution, and are further guaranteed through supplemental
legislation.5 0 8  The Spanish Asylum Law provides for subsidiary protection and
expands gender-based refugee relief.509 Asylum-seekers, like all arriving migrants,
have a right to free legal assistance.510 "The Spanish Asylum Act stipulates that
legal aid is mandatory when claims for asylum are made at the border."51' Spanish
law also guarantees the right to an interpreter. 512
Spain's asylum legislation includes, as part of their particular social group
definition, "people that flee from their country of origin, due to the prevailing
circumstances in those countries, because of a well-founded fear of persecution or
for reasons of gender and/or age."5 13  The interpretation of this article has
developed to include sexual assault victims as a particular social group. 514 The
legislation further declares that either state actors or non-state actors under certain
circumstances, may carry out such persecution.5 1 5  As a practical matter,
authorities cite to the UNHCR Gender-Based Guidelines in adjudicating cases.5 1 6
Spain's highest appellate body affirmed this through case 1528/2007, involving an
Algerian applicant who claimed relief based on domestic violence.5 1 7 The claim
involved gender-based persecution in the form of physical and mental abuse
505. Responses to the List of Issues and Questions with Regard to the Consideration of the Sixth
Periodic Report: Spain, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 44th Sess., Jul.
20-Aug. 7,2009, at 17, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/ESP/Q/6/Add.l (Mar. 23, 2009).
506. Id.
507. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 44th Sess., 888th mtg. 1 39,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.888 (A) (July 22, 2009).
508. CONsTITucl6N ESPAfOLA, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (asylum is included in Part 1,
Ch. 1, Sec. 13). Organic Law 2/2009 of II December, amending the Organic Law 4/2000 of January on
the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and their Social Integration (B.O.E. 2009, 299); Law
12/2009 of 30 October, Regulating the Right of Asylum and Subsidiary Protection (B.O.E. 2009, 263)
(Spain) [hereinafter Spanish Asylum Law].
509. Spanish Asylum Law, supra note 508, arts. 7(1)(e), 36.
510. Id. arts. 16(2), 18(l)(b).
511. EDAL Country Overview-Spain, EUR. DATABASE OF ASYLUM L. n.l (Jan. 1, 2012),
http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/contentledal-country-overview-spain.
512. Spanish Asylum Law, supra note 508, art. 18(1)(b).
513. Id. art. 7(1) (translated by authors).
514. Id. art. 46(1).
515. Id. art. 13.
516. CHEIKH ALI ET AL., supra note 417, at 33.
517. S.A.N, Jan. 13, 2009 (vLex, No. 1528/2007) (Spain).
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inflicted on the asylum-seeker, and her children, by her husband.5 1 8  When the
claim was initially examined, refugee status was denied, but a residence permit
was granted on humanitarian grounds. 519 The National High Court issued its ruling
in January 2009, concluding that, "[s]exually violent acts, domestic and family
violence, that cause deep physical and mental harm constitute grounds upon which
persecution can be claimed." 520 The decision affirmed that when non-state actors
commit serious acts of discrimination and other offences, which "are deliberately
tolerated by State authorities" who fail to provide effective protection, asylum can
be granted.521
The Special Rapporteur on the rights of non-citizens has expressed concern
about the situation of foreign women workers in domestic service, asylum-seekers,
and women who may otherwise be living clandestinely in Spain. 522 These women
may lack adequate protection from violence and abuse. Spain's 2012 HDI
worldwide ranking is twenty-third.523 Its 2012 GII worldwide ranking is
fifteenth.524 Spain does, however, have a national women's hotline, that is staffed
twenty-four hours a day, offers free long distance calling, and provides translation
522services.52 As of 2012, Spain had in place 148 shelters, addressing about 98
percent of the reported need.526
L. Portugal
Portugal ratified the ECHR on November 1978.527 It ratified the CEDAW on
July 30, 1980,528 as well as the Optional Protocol to the Convention on April 26,
2002.529 It ratified the Istanbul Convention in February 2013.530 Portugal issued
its first report under its CEDAW obligations in July 1983," ' and submitted seven
periodic reports therbafter. 532 In its most recent submission, Portugal reports that
518. Spain-High National Court, 13 January 2009, 1528/2007, EUR. DATABASE OF ASYLUM L.,
http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/case-law/spain-high-national-court-13-january-2009-15282007
(last visited May 20, 2014) (translated summary of case).
519. Id.
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. Comm'n on Human Rights, Subcomm'n on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Indigenous Peoples and Minorities, 53d Sess., 1 72,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/20 (June 6, 2001).
523. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
524. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
525. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 13, 253.
526. Id. at 14.
527. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
528. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
529. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
530. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
531. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 5th Sess., Mar. 10-
21, 1986,1 1111-48, U.N. Doc. A/41/45; GAOR, 41th Sess., Supp. No. 45 (1986).
532. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Seventh Periodic Report of States
Parties: Portugal, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 42d Sess., Oct. 20-
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pursuant to Law 29/2012, an exception now exists "for granting an autonomous
residence permit to family members of a holder of a residence permit before the
expiration of the normal time limit [] if the individual is 'indicted by prosecutors
for committing the crime of domestic violence.' 533 Previously, the law required
that the individual be convicted of a crime of domestic violence.534
Portugal's 2012 HDI worldwide ranking is forty-third. 3s Its 2012 GII
worldwide ranking is sixteenth.536 As of 2012, Portugal did not have in place a
national women's hotline,5 37 and, it had thirty-seven shelters that met 59 percent of
the reported need.
M. Ireland
Ireland ratified the ECHR in February 1953."' It ratified the CEDAW in
December 1985,540 as well as the Optional Protocol in September 2000.541 It has
neither signed nor ratified the Istanbul Convention. 542  Ireland reported on its
obligations under the CEDAW through an initial report in February 1987,543 and
submitted two reports thereafter with the latest in June 2 0 0 3 .' Ireland was
obliged to submit a periodic report on January 22, 2007, but has not yet done so.54 5
Nov. 7, 2008, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/PRT/7 (Jan. 29, 2008) (the second report was submitted in
1989 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/13/Add.22), the third in 1990 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/18/Add.3), the
fourth in 1999 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/PRT/4), the fifth in 2001 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/PRT/5), and the
sixth in 2006 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/PRT/6)). See also Human Rights Bodies, OFF. HIGH
COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS., http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/_1ayouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx
(select "Portugal" from drop-box, select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
533. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention,
Eighth and Ninth Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 2013: Portugal, Comm. on the Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women, 1155, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/PRT/8-9 (Dec. 17, 2013).
534. Id.
535. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
536. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
537. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 13.
538. Id. at 14-15.
539. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
540. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
541. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
542. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
543. Rep. on the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 8th Sess., Feb. 20-
Mar. 3, 1989,1|1163-131, U.N. Doc. A/44/38; GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1990).
544. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic
Reports of States Parties: Ireland, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 33d
Sess., July 5-22, 2005, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/IRL/4-5 (June 10, 2003) (the second and third report
was submitted in 1997 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/IRL/2-3)).
545. See Human Rights Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/_1ayouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "Ireland" from drop-
box, select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
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Ireland confers refugee status on successful asylum seekers. 546 If an asylum-
seeker is unsuccessful, following any appeals, she may pursue voluntary departure,
subsidiary protection, or humanitarian leave to remain. 547 Subsidiary protection is
provided when an individual can demonstrate by "substantial grounds" that she
would face a real risk of suffering serious harm. 548 This protection comports with
principles of non-refoulement. Furthermore, the individual must be "unable or,
owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that
country." 549 Serious harm is defined as ranging from being subject to the death
penalty to degrading treatment in the country of origin.550  Those granted
subsidiary protection receive temporary residence permits, employment access,
health care, and sponsored housing.55 1
In 2012, Ireland considered the case of a Nigerian woman who had applied
for asylum and subsequently for subsidiary protection.552 She demonstrated
credibly that she suffered "serious ill-treatment, rape, and . . . torture at the hands
of her husband and his associates," and continued to suffer the ill-effects of such
treatment. 553 She was refused asylum because internal host-country protection was
found to be available to her. 554  She applied for subsidiary protection in the
alternative, and was found not to have suffered serious harm on the grounds that
non-state actors can only meet this definition when the state is deemed to be unable
or unwilling to offer protection.555
Ireland provides access to employment and education benefits to recipients of
refugee and subsidiary protection at the same level as Irish citizens.55 Its 2012
HDI worldwide ranking is seventh. 5 Its 2012 GII worldwide ranking is
nineteenth.58 While Ireland offers a national women's hotline, it does not provide
546. Refugee Act 1996, § 2 (Act. No. 17/1996) (Ir.), available at
http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/RefugeeAmended.pdf/Files/RefugeeAmended.pdf. The definition is
taken directly from the 1951 Refugee Convention. See Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,
supra note 142, art. I (defining the term refugee).
547. European Union (Subsidiary Protections) Regulations 2013 (S.I. No. 426/2013) (Ir.), available
at http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/S%20426%2%Oo/ 20201 3.pdf/Files/Sl%20426%20of/ 20201l3.pdf.
548. Id.
549. Id. at 3.
550. Id. at 3-4.
551. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, IRELAND 2013 HUMAN RIGHTs REPORT 8 (2014), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220501.pdf.
552. J.T.M. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2012] I.E.H.C. 99, Jl| 2, 5 (H. Ct.) (Ir.), available
at
http://courts.ie/Judgments.nsf/09859e7a3f34669680256ef3004a27de/73115215189e255680257a0f004e
31 c4?Open Document.
553. Id.1|12-3.
554. See id.115.
555. See id.111.
556. European Union (Subsidiary Protections) Regulations 2013, at 22 (S.I. No. 426/2013) (Ir.).
557. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
558. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
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service at all times.559 During 2012, it met only about 31 percent of its shelter
demand. 6 o
N. Czech Republic
The Czech Republic ratified the ECHR in March 19 9 2 ,56t the CEDAW in
February 1993,562 and the Optional Protocol in February 2001.6 It has neither
signed nor ratified the Istanbul Convention. It reported on its obligations under
the CEDAW through an initial report in October 1995, and three periodic reports
thereafter, with the final report submitted in April 2009.566
The Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms set forth that
the state "shall grant asylum to aliens who are being persecuted for the assertion of
their political rights and freedoms. Asylum may be denied to a person who has
acted contrary to fundamental human rights and freedoms." 67  Asylum
applications are governed by the Residence of Foreign Aliens in the Territory of
the Czech Republic. 568 The Asylum Act, in Section 12, envisions particular social
group claims.569
The Czech Republic can grant humanitarian asylum in accordance with
Section 14 of the Asylum Act when circumstances permit.570 In addition, the Act
559. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 13.
560. Id. at 14-15.
561. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
562. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
563. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
564. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
565. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Initial Report of States Parties: Czech
Republic, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 18th Sess., Jan. 19-Feb. 6,
1998, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CZE/1 (Oct. 15, 1996).
566. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic
Report of States Parties: Czech Republic, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, 47th Sess., Oct. 4-22, 2010, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CZE/5 (May 22, 2009) (the second
report was submitted in 2000 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CZE/2) and the third in 2004 (U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/CZE/3)). See also Human Rights Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_1ayouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "Czech Republic" from
drop-box, select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
567. Ustavni zhkon § 3, 6 1/1993 Sb., Ustava Cesk6 Republiky [Constitution of the Czech
Republic], Listiny Zhkladnich Prav a Svobod, art. 43 [Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms],
Dec. 16, 1992, available at
http://www.usoud.cz/fileadmin/user upload/ustavni soud www/prilohy/Listina Englishversion.pdf
(English translation).
568. Zdkon 6. 326/1999 Sb. (Czech) (translated as Act No. 326/1999 Coll., on the Residence of
Foreign Nationals in the Territory of the Czech Republic), available at http://www.mvcr.cz/soubor/act-
on-the-residence-of-foreign-nationals-pdf.aspx.
569. ZAkon 6. 325/1999, § 12, Sb. (Czech) (translated as Act No. 325/1999 Coll., of 1999 on
Asylum and Amendment to Act No. 283/1991 Coll., on the Police of the Czech Republic, as amended
(the Asylum Act)), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a7a97bfc33.htmi.
570. Id. § 14.
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permits a grant of subsidiary protection in accordance with Sections 14(a) and (b)
to an applicant, and her qualifying family members, who has established that there
is an actual risk of serious harm upon return to the state of origin.5 7 ' Serious harm
is defined in the act as follows: "a) imposition or enforcement of capital
punishment, b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an
applicant for international protection, [or] c) serious threat to life or human dignity
by reason of malicious violence in situations of international or internal armed
conflict." 572  Subsidiary protection is issued for a specific duration, and is
renewable, as long as the actual risk of serious harm still persists. 5 7 3 In the Czech
Republic, refugees are afforded essentially the same rights as beneficiaries of
subsidiary protection, including family reunification benefits.574
In 2011, the Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech Republic575
considered a case involving an Uzbeki national from Kyrgystan that had been
forced into a polygamous marriage, and feared that if she tried to change her
religion, which was her will, that she would be subject to domestic violence.576
The trial court denied her claim to relief, and the appellate reviewing body
dismissed the appeal. On further appeal, the Czech Republic Supreme
Administrative Court held that forced marriage or being forced to remain in a
marriage could be considered "persecution in concurrence with other violations of
human rights (for example domestic violence) and according to the situation in the
country of origin."57 8 The court focused its inquiry on whether the home country
authorities could or should offer protection in assessing eligibility. 579
The Czech Republic's 2012 HDI worldwide ranking is twenty-eighth.5 10 Its
2012 GII worldwide ranking is twentieth.5 1' As of 2012, there were twenty-six
women's centers in the Czech Republic, most of which provided "counseling,
information and advice, intervention safety support, legal advice and court
accompaniment, among other services and activities." 582
571. Id. §§ 14a-b.
572. Id. § 14a(2).
573. Id. § 53a(1).
574. THE IMPACT OF THE EU QUALIFICATION DIRECTIVE, supra note 251, at 31.
575. Rozsudek Nejvygtiho sprivniho soudu ze dne 25.01.2011 (NSS) [Decision of the Supreme
Administrative Court of Jan. 25, 2011], j. 6 Azs 36/2010-274 (Czech).
576. Czech Republic-Supreme Administrative Court, 25 January 2011, R.S. v Ministry of Interior,
6 Azs 36/2010-274, EUR. DATABASE OF ASYLUM L., http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/case-
law/czech-republic-supreme-administrative-court-25-january-201 1-rs-v-ministry-interior-6-azs (last
visited May, 21, 2014) (case summary in English).
577. See id.
578. Id.
579. Id.
580. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
581. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
582. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 85.
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0. Cyprus
Cyprus ratified the ECHR in October 1962.583 It ratified the CEDAW in
1985584 and the Optional Protocol in April 2002.85 It has not signed the Istanbul
Convention.586  Cyprus has submitted three state reports to the CEDAW
committee, beginning with the first report issued in February 1994,58 the second
report on March 2004,'58 and the third report in May 2011.519
As of 2006, Cyprus reported to the CEDAW Committee that it did not yet
have in place a system of protections for migrant domestic violence victims.5 90
Going forward, Cyprus indicated that it planned to implement a comprehensive
action plan on gender mainstreaming including providing support for the special
needs of vulnerable groups, such as migrants.591  The CEDAW Committee
acknowledged that Cyprus was working on the issue, 592 but noted that it could
improve its data collection methods to document the frequency of domestic
violence abuses, the level of reporting, the extent to which prosecutions and
convictions followed incidents of domestic violence, and whether police training
was being implemented.593  The CEDAW Committee "further requested
information on the number of female immigrants entering Cyprus, either illegally
or as asylum-seekers, and . . . whether national law contained gender-specific
asylum provisions."594 Cyprus reported "that national law contained gender-
583. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
584. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
585. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
586. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
587. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention,
Initial and Second Periodic Reports of States Parties: Cyprus, Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, 15th Sess., Jan. 15-Feb. 2, 1996, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CYP/1-2
(May 4, 1995).
588. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Combined Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Periodic Reports of States Parties: Cyprus, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, 35th Sess., May 15-June 2, 2006, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CYP/3-5 (Aug. 6, 2004).
589. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Combined Sixth and Seventh Periodic
Reports of States Parties: Cyprus, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 54th
Sess., Feb. I1-Mar. 1, 2013, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CYP/6-7 (Sept. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Cyprus'
Sixth and Seventh Periodic Report]. See also Human Rights Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM.
RTS., http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/_1ayouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "Cyprus" from
drop-box, select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
590. See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 35th Sess., 733d mtg. 1| 7,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.733 (May 25, 2006).
591. Id.
592. Id. 11 12.
593. Id. 1127.
594. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 35th Sess., 734th mtg. 1 26,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.734 (May 25, 2006).
2014 221
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
specific asylum provisions and that women could be granted asylum in their own
right."s9 s
Cyprus modified its refugee law in 2007 and 2009,596 and in 2011, it reported
to the CEDAW Committee that in its present form, its refugee law expressly
prohibited discrimination and provided refugee protection to persons persecuted
because they belong to a particular social group, in other words, women.59 7
Cyprus provides subsidiary protection, if the applicant does not qualify as a
refugee, as long as substantial grounds have been shown for believing that, the
migrant victim would suffer serious harm if sent back to their country of origin. 598
Cyprus further reports that it affords asylum-seekers who are single women, or
who have been subject to degrading treatment or punishment to have priority
access to shelter, medical care, and psychological, social, and other types of
support. 599
Cyprus' 2012 HDI worldwide ranking is thirty-first.oo Its 2012 GII
worldwide ranking is twenty-second.o' While Cyprus has in place a national
women's helpline, it does not provide twenty-four hour assistance. 602 In 2012,
Cyprus reported that it had one shelter in the country, which was able to meet
approximately 15 percent of the demand for shelter services. 603 Recipients of
asylum and subsidiary relief have access to employment in restricted areas. 60
Cyprus also provides residency on humanitarian grounds. 60 5 Cyprus provides
family unification protections to recipients of asylum and subsidiary relief.606
In a 2013 NGO Shadow Report issued to the CEDAW Committee regarding
Cyprus' 2011 report to the CEDAW Committee, a group of organizations charged
that Cyprus had provided no research or data on the issue of gender-based violence
within migrant communities.607 Moreover, despite the protections articulated by
Cyprus, the United States has reported that Cyprus has a poor record with respect
595. Id.1127.
596. See Refugee Law (Law No. 112(1)/2007) (Cyprus); Refugee Law (Law No. 112(1)/2009)
(Cyprus).
597. Cyprus' Sixth and Seventh Periodic Report, supra note 589, 1 142.
598. Id. 11144.
599. Id. Jl 118, 146.
600. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
601. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
602. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 13.
603. Id. at 14-15.
604. Refugee Law of 2000 § 9 (Law No. 6(1)/2000) (Cyprus).
605. Id. § 19a.
606. Id. § 201.
607. Ass'N FOR THE PREVENTION & HANDLING OF VIOLENCE IN THE FAMILY ET AL., CONVENTION
FOR THE ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 54" SESSION-CYPRUS: SHADOW
REPORT 10 (2013), available at
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/CYP/INTCEDAWNGOCYP_1
3225 E.pdf.
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to its treatment of migrants .608 The U.S. Department of State reports that, with few
exceptions, "'authorities' generally treated asylum seekers as illegal immigrants
and either deported or denied them entry. Since no 'law' or mechanism . . .
protects the right of asylum seekers, no identification or protection is available."
609
Amnesty International has condemned Cyprus' practice of detaining all illegal
migrants seeking asylum.610 Cypriot law criminalizes irregular entry or stay in
Cyprus, but no longer imposes a punishment of imprisonment.,61
In February 2013, the CEDAW Committee asked for information on current
provisions governing the right of asylum, particularly with regard to female
asylum-seekers, citing a charge from Amnesty International that "female asylum
seekers were [not] treated . . . in accordance with international standards." 6 12
CEDAW Committee member, Ms. Neubauer, acknowledged the progress that
Cyprus had made during the previous twenty-seven years, but found the "party's
efforts with regard to its obligations under the Convention . . . had been
insufficient. The CEDAW Committee expressed concern
about the lack of information on the implementation of the National
Action Plan on Prevention and Handling of Family Violence (2010-
2013), the insufficient gender perspective and lack of inclusion of
migrant women and ethnic minorities in [Cyprus' programs] and
policies regarding domestic violence, as well as the limited assistance
provided by the only shelter run by a non-governmental organization in
the [country].614
The CEDAW Committee has requested that future reports provide enhanced
"data collection systems to include all forms of violence against women, protection
measures, prosecutions and sentences imposed on perpetrators, [as well as] surveys
to assess the prevalence of violence experienced by women, including migrant
women and women belonging to ethnic minorities." 615
608. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CYPRUS 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 39-41 (2014), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220477.pdf.
609. Id. at 39.
610. AMNESTY INT'L, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT A CRIME: DETENTION OF MIGRANTS AND AsYLUM-
SEEKERS IN CYPRUS 25 (2012), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/EURI 7/001/2012/en/36f06387-9ce6-43df-9734-
a4550fa413d6/eurl 70012012en.pdf.
611. Until November 2011, these offences were punishable by imprisonment or a fine or both.
Aliens and Immigration Law Chapter 105 of the Law § 19(2) (Cap. 105/1959) (Cyprus). The current
law that reversed this is codified in Law No. 153(1)/2011. M.A. v. Cyprus, App. No. 41872/10, 1 65
(Eur. Ct. H.R., Oct. 23, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-122889.
612. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 54th Sess., 1 107th mtg. 1147,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SR. 1107 (Feb. 15, 2013).
613. Id. 1I 48.
614. Concluding Observations on the Combined Sixth and Seventh Periodic Reports of Cyprus,
Adopted by the Committee, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 54th Sess.,
Feb. I1-Mar. 1, 2013,1[ 17 UN Doc. CEDAW/C/CYP/CO/6-7 (Mar. 25, 2013).
615. Id. 1118.
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P. Poland
Poland ratified the ECHR in January 1993."' It ratified the CEDAW in July
1980,617 and the CEDAW Optional Protocol in December 2003.1 It signed the
Istanbul Convention in December 2012, but has not yet ratified it.6 19 Poland issued
its first report to the CEDAW Committee in October 1985620 and five reports
thereafter, with the latest in November 2012.621
Polish law provides for the granting of asylum or refugee status pursuant to
the Aliens Act of June 13, 2003,622 and the Act of July 14, 2006 on the Entry into,
Residence in and Exit from the Republic of Poland of Nationals of the European
Union Member States and Their Family Members. 623 Poland complies with its
ECHR responsibilities by offering refugee status to successful asylum-seekers, 624
and subsidiary protection to meet its ECHR non-refoulement obligations.625
Additionally, Poland offers a tolerated stay permit where a return to the country of
origin "would constitute a threat to his/her life, freedom and personal safety, when
in the country of origin he/she could be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment." 626
Access to employment, education, social welfare, healthcare, and integration
programs are provided to both refugee and subsidiary beneficiaries under the same
616. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
617. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
618. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
619. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
620. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Rep. on its 6th Sess., Mar. 30-
Apr. 10, 1987, at 6-10, U.N. Doc. A/42/38; GAOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1987).
621. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention,
Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 2010: Poland, Comm. on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 59th Sess., Oct. 20-Nov. 7, 2014, at 1, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/POUJ7-8 (Mar. I1, 2013) (the second report was submitted in 1988 (U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/13/Add.16), the third in 1990 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/18/Add.2), the fourth and fifth in
2004 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/POU4-5), and the sixth also in 2004 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/POU6)). See
also Human Rights Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/_1ayouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "Poland" from drop-
box, select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
622. Act on Aliens of 13 June 2003, 128 JOURNAL OF LAWS, item 1175 (Pol.), available at
http://www.udsc.gov.pl/files/old file/44e9bdd07dlb8 1-44043372d9359_cudzoziemcy.pdf.
623. Act of 14 July 2006 on the Entry into, Residence in and Exit from the Republic of Poland of
Nationals of the European Union Member States and Their Family Members, 144 JOURNAL OF LAWS
item 1043 (Pol.), available at http://www.udsc.gov.pl/files/old-file/44e9bddO7di b8_3-
UdSRiC_74_2006_plenen%5Bl%5D.doc.
624. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, POLAND 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 12 (2014), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220529.pdf
625. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, POLAND 2012 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 13-14 (2013) [hereinafter
POLAND 2012 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT], available at
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/poland/788/pdfs/204536.pdf.
626. HELSINKI FOUND. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, DUBLIN II: NATIONAL ASYLUM PROCEDURE IN
POLAND 1 (2010).
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conditions.627 Poland's 2012 HDI worldwide ranking is thirty-ninth.628 Its 2012
GII worldwide ranking is twenty-fourth. 62 9 As of 2012, Poland did not have a
national women's helpline, 630 and it had in place a single shelter that was unable to
meet even 1 percent of the reported need.'
Q. Luxembourg
632
Luxembourg is a founding member of the EU, and ratified the ECHR in
1989.633 It ratified the CEDAW in January 1989634 and the Optional Protocol to
the Convention in July 2003.635 It signed the Istanbul Convention in May 2011,
but has not yet ratified it. 636 It issued its first report pursuant to the CEDAW in
November 1996,637 and has issued four periodic reports thereafter, with the latest
in May 2006.638
Luxembourg law provides for equal protection based on gender in the
application of its criminal code,639 but in the domestic violence context it does so
in a gender-neutral format. 640  Its CEDAW state reporting does not reference
migration status as a pre-condition for invoking such rights.64' As of January
627. See POLAND 2012 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 625, at 13-14 (while basic services
were provided, there are improvements that could be made).
628. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
629. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
630. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 13.
631. Id. at 14-15.
632. Bernard Cook, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, in II EUROPE SINCE 1945: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA
800, 801(Bernard A. Cook ed., 2001)
633. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
634. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
635. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
636. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
637. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Initial Reports of States Parties:
Luxembourg, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 17th Sess., July 7-25,
1997, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/LUX/1 (Dec. 18, 1996).
638. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Fifth Periodic Reports of States
Parties: Luxembourg, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 40th Sess., Jan.
14-Feb. 1, 2008, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/LUX/5 (May 8, 2006) [hereinafter Luxembourg's Fifth
Periodic Report] (the second report was submitted in 1997 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/LUX/2), the third in
1998 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/LUX/3), and the fourth in 2002 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/LUX/4)). See also
Human Rights Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/_1ayouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "Luxembourg" from
drop-box, select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
639. See Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 28th and 29th
Sess., Jan. 13-31, June 30-July 18, 2003, at 48, U.N. Doc. A/58/38; GAOR, 58th Sess., Supp. No. 38
(2003).
640. See id. See also CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 19, supra note 31 ("The
definition of discrimination includes gender-based violence, that is, violence that is directed against a
woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately.").
641. See Luxembourg's Fifth Periodic Report, supra note 638.
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2000, the CEDAW Committee was concerned that Luxembourg had not yet issued
national legislation addressing domestic violence.642 However, in September 2003,
Luxembourg enacted legislation on domestic violence that authorized "the removal
of a perpetrator of domestic violence from the family home." 643  Luxembourg
offers assistance to domestic violence victims, which includes providing
information about bringing charges against the perpetrator or requesting a
protection order.644 However, as of 2008, "[n]o population-based survey on
violence against women [had] been conducted.",64
Luxembourg's 2012 HDI worldwide ranking is twenty-sixth. 6  Its 2012 GII
worldwide ranking is also twenty-sixth.6 7  Luxembourg has in place a national
women's hotline,64 and as of 2012, it had nine shelters that were able to meet all
the reported need.649
R. Lithuania
Lithuania ratified the ECHR in June 1995.5o It ratified the CEDAW in
January 1994,651 and the Optional Protocol to the Convention in August 2004.652 it
signed the Istanbul Convention in June 2013, but has not ratified it.653 Lithuania
issued its first report pursuant to the CEDAW in June 1998,654 and has issued three
periodic reports thereafter, with the latest in June 201 1.655
642. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 22d Sess., 447th mtg. 1 39,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.447 (Jan. 19, 2000).
643. Luxembourg's Fifth Periodic Report, supra note 638,11 19.
644. Id. 1153.
645. Responses to the List of Issues and Questions with Regard to the Consideration of the Fifth
Periodic Report: Luxembourg, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 14th
Sess., Jan. 14-Feb. 1, 2008, at 14, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/LUX/Q/5/Add.l (Oct. 15, 2007).
646. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013,supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
647. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
648. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 13.
649. Id. at 14-15.
650. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
651. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
652. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
653. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
654. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Initial Reports of States Parties:
Lithuania, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 23d Sess., June 12-30, 2000,
at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/LTU/I (Aug. 27, 1998).
655. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Foris of Discrimination against Women, Fifth Periodic Reports of States
Parties: Lithuania, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 58th Sess., at 1, U.N.
Doc. CEDAW/C/LTU/5 (Dec. 21, 2011) (the second report was submitted in 1998 (U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/LTU/2) and the third in 2004 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/LTU/3) with an addendum (U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/LTU/4)). See Human Rights Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_1ayouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "Lithuania" from drop-
box, select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
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In May 2011, Lithuania adopted the Law on Protection Against Domestic
Violence, which defines all forms of domestic violence more clearly and makes it
easier to prosecute perpetrators as well as provide support to victims and institute
preventative measures.656 The U.S. Department of State reports that Lithuania
continues to fail to "permit asylum seekers coming from 'safe' countries of transit
to enter the country." 657 The Lithuanian government returns these "asylum seekers
to the country of transit without reviewing the substantive merits of their
applications." The Lithuanian Migration Department reported that it "did not
have a list of safe countries" but, rather, defined them as countries where "the
person's life or liberty would not be threatened on account of membership in one
of the categories specified in the 1951 [R]efugee [C]onvention and associated
instruments and from which the individual would not be sent to another country in
contravention of his or her rights under these agreements." 659
Lithuania also offers protection in the form of "'temporary protection' to
groups of persons in . .. mass influx," but individuals are not permitted this type of
relief.660 Lithuania offers "'subsidiary protection' to individuals who do not
qualify as refugees but who cannot return to their countries of origin because of
fear of torture or because . . . systematic violations of human rights in that country
would endanger their basic rights or fundamental freedoms." 661 Lithuania's 2012
HDI worldwide ranking is forty-first.662 Its 2012 GIl worldwide ranking is twenty-
eighth.6  While Lithuania has in place a national women's hotline, 664 as of 2012,
it had no shelters to serve victims of violence. 665
S. Greece
Greece ratified the ECHR in November 1974,6 the CEDAW in June 1983,667
and the Optional Protocol in January 2002.668 It signed the Istanbul Convention in
May 2011, but has not ratified it.669  It reported on its obligations under the
656. Law on Protection Against Domestic Violence (No. XI-1425) (May 26, 2011) (Lith.),
available at http://www3.1rs.It/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_1?pid=410975. See also REPLY OF
LITHUANIA ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND DISABILITY 2 (2011), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/women/docs/VAWHRC20/Governments/Lithuania.doc.
657. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, LITHUANIA 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 10 (2014), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220511.pdf.
658. Id.
659. Id.
660. Id.
661. Id.
662. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
663. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
664. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 13.
665. Id. at 14-15.
666. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
667. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
668. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
669. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
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CEDAW through an initial report in April 1985,670 and four periodic reports
thereafter, with the most recent report in December 2010.671
Greek law provides for two types of protections: refugee status and subsidiary
protection. 6 72  Until June 7, 2013, Greece offered humanitarian-based relief, as
well.6 73  Applications that were filed before that date were eligible for
humanitarian-based consideration, where a grantee may remain in Greece "for up
to two years, with the option to apply for renewal."674 In 2011, a new legal
framework reforming the asylum system was adopted in 201 1.675 Under that
system, any person not meeting the criteria for refugee status, may be granted
subsidiary protection if she substantiates that, if returned to the country of origin,
she runs the risk of being subjected to serious harm, as defined in Article 15 of
Presidential Decree 96.676 Under the current system, when an asylum claim is
rejected, but authorities believe that humanitarian relief should be forthcoming, the
case is referred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and is examined according to
immigration procedures under the provisions of Law 3386/2005, on Entry,
Residence and Social Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the Hellenic
677Territory. Greece has in place a procedure for prioritizing case reviews of
matters involving persons belonging to vulnerable groups.67
Greece's 2012 HDI worldwide ranking is twenty-ninth.679 Its 2012 GII
worldwide ranking is twenty-third.6 80  Greece offers a twenty-four hour national
670. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Rep. on its 6th
Sess., Mar. 30-Apr. 10 1987, 111 65-129, U.N. Doc. A/42/38; GAOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1987).
671. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Seventh Periodic Reports of States
Parties: Greece, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 54th Sess., Feb. I1-Mar.
1, 2013, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GRC/7 (Mar. 14, 20111) (the second and third report was
submitted in 1996 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GRC/2-3), the fourth and fifth in 2001 (U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/GRC/4-5), and the sixth in 2005 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CRC/6)). See also Human Rights
Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/ _ayouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "Greece" from drop-
box, select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
672. EDAL Country Overview-Greece, EUR. DATABASE OF ASYLUM L. (Nov. 19, 2013),
http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/contentledal-country-overview-greece.
673. Id.
674. Id.
675. Id.
676. Diatagma (2013:113) Demiourgia Mias Eniaias Diadikasias gia te Choregise tou Prosfyga e
tes Epikourikes Dikaioucho Prostasia Stous Allodapous e Anithageneis Atoma, Symfona me to
Symvoullio Odegia 2005/85/EK [Establishment of a Single Procedure for Granting the Status of
Refugee or of Subsidiary Protection Beneficiary to Aliens or to Stateless Individuals in Conformity
with Council Directive 2005/85/EC "on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for
granting and withdrawing refugee status" (L326/13.12.2005) and Other Provisions], EPHEMERIS TES
KYVERNESEOS TES HELLENIKES DEMOKRATIAS [E.K.E.D.] 2013, art. 35(l)(b) (Greece).
677. Id. art. 33.
678. Id. art. 35(l)(g).
679. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
680. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
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women's hotline.68' However, shelter services are vastly under supported with
only about 9 percent of the need met in 2012.682 Greece offers no right to free
legal representation, but will provide it to eligible low-income individuals. 683 The
SRVAW has recommended that all law enforcement personnel be given
appropriate gender-sensitive training in order to effectively respond to cases of
rape and other forms of sexual violence against women, including violence
occurring within the family. 684 Moreover, she suggests that the law be revised in
such a manner that victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence cannot be
put under pressure to stop the prosecution of the case.685
T. Estonia
Estonia ratified the ECHR in April 1996.686 It ratified the CEDAW in
October 1991,617 but has not signed the Optional Protocol.688 It has neither signed
nor ratified the Istanbul Convention.689 Estonia reported on its obligations under
the CEDAW through an initial report in June 200 1,690 and a second periodic report
in October 2005.9 Its latest reported was due on November 20, 2012, but has not
yet been submitted.692
Estonia has developed a number of systems to address domestic violence,
including the creation of governmental organizations and training of police
officials and medical workers in the victim support services. 693  In 2002, the
681. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 13.
682. Id. at 14-15.
683. Nomos (2004:3226) Paroche Nomikes Voetheias se Polites Chamelou Eisodematos kai alles
Diatakseis [Legal Aid to Citizens of Low Income and Other Provisions], EPHEMERIS TES
KYVERNESEOS TES HELLENIKES DEMOKRATIAS [E.K.E.D.] 2004, A:24 (Greece).
684. See Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Further Promotion and Encouragement
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Question of the Programme and Methods
of Work of the Commission: Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means Within the United Nations
System for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, Comm'n
on Human Rights, 11122, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/53 (Feb. 5, 1996) (by Radhika Coomaraswamy).
685. Id.1123.
686. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
687. CEDAW Ratification Treat Status, supra note 239.
688. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
689. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
690. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Combined Initial, Second and Third
Periodic Reports of States Parties: Estonia, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, 26th Sess., Jan. 14-Feb. 1, 2002, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/EST/1-3 (Aug. 21, 2001).
691. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Fourth Periodic Report of States
Parties: Estonia, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 39th Sess., July 23-
Aug. 10, 2007, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/EST/4 (Oct. 6, 2005).
692. See Human Rights Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/_1ayouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "Estonia" from drop-
box, select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
693. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Rep. on its 26th
Sess., Jan. 14-Feb. 1, 2002, 197, U.N. Doc. A/57/38; GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (2002).
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CEDAW Committee urged Estonia to meet its obligations under international law
and to place a high priority on establishing comprehensive measures to address
domestic violence. 694 In response, Estonia created such a system that provides
asylum protection to refugees.695 Authorities have reported that they have granted
interviews to all individual asylum seekers. 696  The UNHCR, however, has
expressed concern about the low numbers of registered asylum seekers at the
border, which indicates that individuals might be turned away at the border without
being afforded an opportunity to claim asylum or other fear-based relief.697
Estonia's 2012 HDI worldwide ranking is thirty-third.698 Its 2012 GII
worldwide ranking is twenty-ninth.699 While Estonia has in place some resources
to provide safety to women, the demand for shelters is almost twice what is
available.700  Estonia has in place a national women's hotline that provides
language services, but it does not provide twenty-four hour service or free long
distance calls.70' In 2012, the ten nationwide shelters were able to serve 51 percent
of the need.702 Some limited free legal aid is available.703 However, reforms in the
criminal justice system to hold perpetrators accountable are criticized as providing
weak enforcement.
U. Slovakia
Slovakia ratified the ECHR in March 1992.70s It ratified the CEDAW in May
1993,706 and signed the CEDAW Optional Protocol in November 2000.707 It
signed the Istanbul Convention in May 2011, but has not yet ratified it.708 Slovakia
694. Id.1 98.
695. See Act on Granting International Protection to Aliens, RT 1 2006, 2, 3 (2005) (Est.).
696. EUROPEAN MIGRATION NETWORK, THE PRACTICES IN ESTONIA CONCERNING THE GRANTING
OF NON-EU HARMONISED PROTECTION STATUSES 12 (2009), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/europeanmigration network/reports/docs/emn-studies/non-eu-harmonised-protection-
status/07._estonia nationalreport non eu harmonised protection statuses final version_28sept09_e
n.pdf.
697. See Estonia. 2014 UNHCR Regional Operations Profile: Northern, Western, Central and
Southern Europe, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48ded6&submit=GO (last visited June 1, 2014).
698. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
699. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
700. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 14-15.
701. Id. at 13, 96.
702. Id. at 14-15.
703. Id. at 95.
704. Id.
705. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
706. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
707. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
708. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
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issued its first report in April 1996709 and a second periodic report in May 2007.710
It is due to issue its next report June 27, 2014.'
In 2007, the European Court of Human Rights considered Kontrovi v.
Slovakia, a case involving egregious domestic violence in the form -of
psychological and physical abuse by a male Slovak against his female spouse
within Slovakia.712 The abusive conduct included the murder of the couple's two
children.713  The court held unanimously that there had been violations of the
ECHR involving Article 2, the right to life, and Article 13, the right to an effective
remedy. 714  The ECtHR notes that "[t]he situation in the applicant's family was
known to the local police department [given among other things] . ... the criminal
complaint of 2 November 2002 and the emergency phone calls of the night of 26 to
27 December 2002. "7s The ECtHR agreed with the domestic courts, finding that
the tragedy was a direct consequence of the police officers' failure to act to help
the victims.716 While this case does not involve domestic violence in the migrant
context, it may be illustrative of the current state of limited protections for victims
in Slovakia.
Slovakia's 2012 HDI worldwide ranking is thirty-fifth.1 Its 2012 GII
worldwide ranking is thirty-second. t While Slovakia has in place a national
women's hotline, it is not staffed twenty-four hours a day, and there is no
information available on translation services.719 As of 2012, Slovakia had in place
two shelters, addressing about 5 percent of the reported need.720
V. Croatia
Croatia ratified the ECHR on November 1997,721 the CEDAW in September
1992,722 and the CEDAW Optional Protocol in March 2001.723 It signed the
709. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Initial Report Periodic Report of States
Parties: Slovakia, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 19th Sess., June 22-
July 10, 1998, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SVK/I (July 20, 1996).
710. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Combined Second, Third and Fourth
Periodic Reports of States Parties: Slovakia, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, 41st Sess., June 30-July 18, 2008, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SVK/4 (May 11, 2007).
711. See Human Rights Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/ layouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "Slovakia" from drop-
box, select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
712. KontrovA v. Slovakia, App. No. 7510/04, Jil[ 7-8 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 24, 2007),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-80696.
713. Id. 1114.
714. Id. at 16.
715. Id. 1152.
716. Id. 111154-55.
717. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
718. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
719. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 13.
720. Id. at 14-15, 240.
721. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
2312014
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Istanbul Convention in January 2013, but has not yet ratified it. 724 It reported on
its obligations under the CEDAW through an initial report in January 1995,2 and
two periodic reports thereafter, with the latest in September 2013.726 Croatia's
legislation provides for asylum and subsidiary protections.727 The domestic legal
structure provides for a system of safety measures such as shelters, legal
assistance, interpretation assistance, work permits, and support in connection with
injunctive relief.728 However, as of 2012, Croatia did not offer a national women's
helpline, 729 but its nineteen shelters provided shelter for 77 percent of the needed
population.730 Croatia's 2012 HDI worldwide ranking is forty-seventh.' Its 2012
GII worldwide ranking is thirty-third.732
At the time that Croatia ratified the CEDAW (September 1992), the country
was in the midst of a civil war, during which widespread human rights abuses
against women were recorded in a variety of contexts.73 3 While its first report to
the CEDAW Committee in 1994 recounted the widespread nature of the human
rights abuses during the previous years, 734 by 2003, its second report reflected
marked changes in the protections available to female victims of violence in
general.7 3 5 Croatia adopted a Law on Gender Equality in 2008,736 as well as a Law
on Protection from Domestic Violence in 2003. "
722. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
723. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
724. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
725. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Initial Reports of States Parties:
Croatia, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 18th Sess., Jan. 19-Feb. 6, 1998,
at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CRO/1 (Feb. 15, 1995). Prior to its initial report, Croatia issued a "[r]eport
on an exceptional basis." Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the
Convention, Reports of States Parties: Croatia, Report on an Exception Basis, Comm. on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 14th Sess., Jan. 16-Feb. 3 1995, at 1, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/CRO/SP. 1 (Dec. 6, 1994) [hereinafter Croatia's Report on Exceptional Basis].
726. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention,
Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 2009: Croatia, Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, 61st Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/HRV/4-5 (Dec. 13, 2013)
[Croatia's Fourth and Fifth Periodic Report] (the second and third report was submitted in 2003 (U.N.
Doc. CEDAW/C/CRO/2-3)). See also Human Rights Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/_1ayouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "Croatia" from drop-
box, select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
727. Asylum Act, art. I (O.G. No. 79/07 and 88/10) (Croat.), available at
http://www.mup.hr/UserDocslmages/engleska%20verzija/2013/asylumact.pdf.
728. See WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 75-77.
729. Id. at 11.
730. Id. at 14-15.
731. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
732. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
733. Croatia's Report on Exceptional Basis, supra note 725, at 5-7.
734. Id.
735. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Combined Second and Third Periodic
Reports of States Parties: Croatia, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 32d
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During the period from 2008 through 2010, Croatia implemented an official
national strategy, 738 which helped it harmonize its legislation with its
responsibilities under international law. Croatia's efforts have been aimed at
creating a social and legal structure to provide support to domestic violence
victims. 739  While the governing law envisions particular social group claims to
protection,740 the authors are not aware of a published case to date in which a
gender-related claim to asylum in Croatia has been accepted. There is no right to
free legal aid or interpreters in connection with the initial filing of an asylum
application, 74 1 but some victims may receive some assistance in appeals. 742 Under
the law, agents of persecution may be state bodies, parties, or non-state actors
where the state is unable or unwilling to provide protection from persecution or
serious harm. 743
In 2012, Croatia created an Administrative Court with responsibility for
appeals of asylum claims. 744 During 2013, the UNHCR anticipated working with
Croatia to support the growth in asylum-seekers and improve the quality of the
asylum system. 74 5  It planned to work with Croatia to improve programs for
vulnerable groups. 746 Overall, only sixty-four individuals have been granted either
asylum or subsidiary protection since 2004 in Croatia, despite the vast growth in
the number of asylum claims made beginning in 2012.747 Subsidiary protection is
available when, in pertinent part, there is a "real risk of suffering serious harm"
such as the "death penalty or execution, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment." 748  The protections include the right of non-refoulement where a
Sess., Jan. 10-28, 2005, at 6-16, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CRO/2-3 (Oct. 27, 2003) [hereinafter Croatia's
Second and Third Periodic Report] (highlighting the numerous laws that have been passed in regards to
discrimination against women).
736. Croatia's Fourth and Fifth Periodic Report, supra note 726, at 4.
737. Croatia's Second and Third Periodic Report, supra note 735, at 14.
738. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 74.
739. Croatia's Second and Third Periodic Report, supra note 735, at 4-5.
740. Id. at 18-21.
741. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2013: EVENTS OF 2012, at 421 (2013) [hereinafter
HRW, WORLD REPORT 2013], available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/wr20l3 web.pdf
742. Id.
743. See Asylum Act, art. 5(2) (O.G. No. 79/07 and 88/10) (Croat.), available at
http://www.mup.hr/UserDocslmages/engleska%20verzija/2013/asylum act.pdf.
744. EUR. COMM'N AGAINST RACISM & INTOLERANCE, ECRI REPORT ON CROATIA: FOURTH
MONITORING CYCLE 7 (2012), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-
country/Croatia/HRV-CbC-IV-2012-045-ENG.pdf.
745. 2014 UNHCR Regional Operations Profile: South-Eastern Europe, UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e48d7d6 (last
visited Jan. 22, 2014).
746. Id.
747. HRW, WORLD REPORT 2013, supra note 741, at 421.
748. Asylum Act, arts. 2, 7 (O.G. No. 79/07 and 88/10) (Croat.), available at
http://www.mup.hr/UserDocslmages/engleska%/ 20verzija/2013/asylum act.pdf.
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victim "could be exposed to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment."749
W. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The United Kingdom ratified the ECHR in March 195 1.750 It ratified the
CEDAW in April 198651 and ratified the Optional Protocol in December 2004.752
It signed the Istanbul Convention in June 2012, but has not yet ratified it. 753 The
United Kingdom issued its initial report under the CEDAW in June 1987, and
six reports thereafter, with the latest in June 2011.755
The United Kingdom offers several types of protection to victims of domestic
violence. First, a domestic violence victim who is the spouse or partner of a
British citizen or person settled in the United Kingdom is able to apply for an
indefinite leave to remain, a permanent status.756 For those who are victims
pursuant to non-British, or non-U.K.-settled perpetrators, the United Kingdom
offers asylum protection through a particular social group-based claim,7 5 7 as well
as humanitarian protection when there are "substantial grounds ... for believing
that the person concerned, if he returned to the country of return, would face a real
risk of suffering serious harm and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country."75 8 Some have argued that in
practice, domestic violence is often interpreted as a form of serious harm leading to
the grant of subsidiary protection, rather than asylum.75 9 Without a comprehensive
749. Id. art. 3.
750. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
751. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
752. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
753. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
754. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Rep. on its 9th Sess., Jan. 22-
Feb. 2, 1990, j[ 167-213, U.N. Doc. A/45/38; GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1990).
755. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Seventh Periodic Reports of States
Parties: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, 55th Sess., July 8-26, 2013, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GBR/7 (Aug.
11, 2011) (the second report was submitted in 1991 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/UK/2), the third in 1995
(U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/UK/3), the fourth in 1999 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/UK/4), the fifth in 2003 (U.N.
Doc. CEDAW/C/UK/5), and the sixth in 2007 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/UK/6)). See also Human Rights
Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/ layouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland" from drop-box, select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28,
2014).
756. Immigration Rules, 2014, pt. 8, f1l 289A-D (U.K.), available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/immigration-rules (follow "Immigration Rules part
8: family members" hyperlink].
757. Id. pt. 11, 1[334(v).
758. Id. 339C(iii).
759. SiobhAn Mullally, Gender Asylum Law: Providing Transformative Remedies, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN REFUGEE LAW 196, 202-04 (Satvinder Singh Juss & Colin Harvey eds.,
2013).
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accounting of government adjudications, this is difficult to verify. Moreover, as a
practical matter, some authorities rely on and cite to the UNHCR Gender-Based
Guidelines in adjudicating cases, while others assert that they are of little
assistance.760
The SRVAW expressed concern "about the absence of a national strategy on
the prevention and elimination of violence against women." 761 In particular the
SRVAW was concerned about "[d]ifferent regimes ... being established in Wales,
Scotland, and Northern Ireland with responsibility for women's equality issues,
including legislative and administrative provisions and mechanisms." 762
The United Kingdom's 2012 HDI worldwide ranking is twenty-sixth.7 6 3 Its
2012 GIl worldwide ranking is thirty-fourth.764 The United Kingdom has in place
a national women's hotline that is staffed twenty-four hours a day, offers free long
distance calling, and provides translation services.7' As of 2012, the United
Kingdom had in place 1,105 shelters, addressing about 87 percent of the reported
need.766
X Latvia
Latvia ratified the ECHR in June 1997.6 It ratified the CEDAW in April
1992.768 It has not signed nor ratified the Optional Protocol. 769 Additionally, it has
neither signed nor ratified the Istanbul Convention.7 7 0 Latvia issued its first report
to the CEDAW Committee in June 2003.n' While it was obliged to issue a
periodic report on May 14, 2005, it has not yet done so.772
Latvia provides asylum relief and a subsequent permanent residence
permit, 7 as well as subsidiary relief in the form of an annually renewable
temporary residence permit, which embodies the principles of non-refoulement to
760. CHEIKH ALl ET AL., supra note 417, at 33-34.
761. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 194,1 1849.
762. Id.
763. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
764. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
765. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 13, 284.
766. Id. at 14-15.
767. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
768. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
769. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
770. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
771. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Combined Initial, Second and Third
Periodic Report of States Parties: Latvia, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
31st Sess., July 6-23, 2004, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/LVA/1-3 (June 16, 2003) [hereinafter Latvia's
Initial, Second and Third Periodic Report].
772. See Human Rights Bodies, OFF. HiGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/_1ayouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "Latvia" from drop-box,
select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
773. Asylum Law § 27 (Jan. 20, 2005) (Lat.), available at
http://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/3815.
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migrants seeking the state's protection. 774 Subsidiary relief is offered when, in
pertinent part, an individual "is under threat of the death penalty, corporal
punishment, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, or degrading punishment in
the country of his or her citizenship."775 In some circumstances, Latvia provides
humanitarian relief.776 The protection offers employment eligibility7" and family
unity protections.
Latvia's 2012 HDI worldwide ranking is forty-fourth.7 Its 2012 GII
worldwide ranking is thirty-sixth.779  Latvia provides free legal assistance for
asylum appeals only.780 However, it does provide translation for all interviews.78 1
Family unity protection is afforded to successful asylum-seekers. 782 As of 2012,
Latvia had neither a national women's hotline, nor any shelters.783  The Latvian
National Human Rights office reported in 2003, that although the law provides for
criminal liability for physical violence, "law enforcement institutions do not pay
sufficient attention to manifestations of physical violence in families if bodily
injury sustained by the woman cannot be regarded as serious or at least
moderate." 784 "Moreover, the laws did not recognize psychological violence" for
purposes of criminal liability. 7 s
Y. Bulgaria
Bulgaria ratified the ECHR in September 1992.86 It ratified the CEDAW in
February 1982 and the Optional Protocol in September 2006.8 It has neither
signed nor ratified the Istanbul Convention. 789 It reported on its obligations under
the CEDAW through an initial report in June 1983,790 and two periodic reports
774. Id. § 2.
775. Id. § 35(1)(1).
776. Id. § 35(l)(2). See also LATVIAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, SEEKING ASYLUM IN LATVIA: GUIDE FOR ASYLUM-SEEKERS 10, available at
http://www.rs.gov.lv/docupl/SeekingAsylum-inLatvia.pdf.
777. Asylum Law, §§ 37, 40 (Lat.).
778. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
779. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
780. EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, COUNTRY FACTSHEET: LATVIA 5
(2010), available at http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/frauploads/I 035-
asylumfactsheet_Latvia en.pdf.
781. Asylum Law, § 9 (Lat.).
782. Id.
783. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 13-15.
784. Latvia's Initial, Second and Third Periodic Report, supra note 771, 1133.
785. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 31st Sess., 657th mtg. 11 11,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.657 (July 14, 2004).
786. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
787. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
788. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
789. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
790. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Rep. on its 4th
Sess., Jan. 21-Feb. 1, 1985, 11 74-126, U.N. Doc. A/40/45; GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 45 (1985).
236 VOL. 42:2
AGAINST GENDER VIOLENCE IN EUROPE
thereafter, with the latest report in September 2010.791 It is obliged to issue its next
report on July 30, 2016.792
Bulgarian asylum law is governed by the Law for Asylum and Refugees, and
its subsequent amendments. 7 9 3  It enacted protections for victims of domestic
violence with the passage of the Protection from Domestic Violence Act
("DVA").794 These protections include the right to seek police protection; to
obtain a protection order; to prosecute criminal protection order violations in
criminal court; to obtain legal aid in the form of services of a lawyer free of charge
during proceedings; to have an interpreter during proceedings; to submit
applications for custody or for divorce to the courts; and to undertake all other
relevant actions relating to family issues and protection from domestic violence. 795
The statutory framework that flowed from the passage of the DVA contains no
reference to migration status as a pre-condition for invoking rights thereunder.796
Shelter services were provided to less than 8 percent of the reported demand, in
2012.797 Bulgaria's 2012 HDI worldwide ranking is fifty-seventh.9  Its 2012 GII
worldwide ranking is thirty-eighth.799
Article 2 of the DVA recognizes an expansive definition of domestic
violence, which include physical, sexual, mental, emotional, psychological, and
economic forms of violence, in the context of heterosexual relationships. 00
However, domestic violence in Bulgaria is still regarded as a private matter with
actions being brought by victims against their aggressors in a private
prosecution. 0' Domestic violence is prosecuted as a criminal matter only in
791. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Combined Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and
Seventh Periodic Reports of States Parties: Bulgaria, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, 52d Sess., July 9-27, 2012, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/BGR/4-7 (Jan. 7, 2011) (the
second and third report was submitted in 1994 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/BGR/2-3)).
792. See Human Rights Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/ layouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "Bulgaria" from drop-
box, select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
793. Law for the Asylum and the Refugees, Prom. SG. 54/31 May 2002, amend. SG. 31/8 Apr.
2005, amend. SG. 30/11 Apr. 2006, amend. SG. 52/29 Jun 2007, amend. SG. 109/20 Dec. 2007, amend.
SG. 82/16 Oct. 2009, amend. SG. 39/20 May 2011, amend. SG. 15/15 Feb. 2013 (BuIg.), available at
http://www.aref govemment.bg/ebf/docs/Law/20for/o2Othe%2OAsylum%2Oand%20the%20Refugees
EN.pdf.
794. Protection Against Domestic Violence Act, Prom. SG. 27/29 Mar. 2005, amend. SG. 82/10
Oct. 2006, amend. SG. 102/22 Dec. 2009, art. I (BuIg.), available at
http://www.stopvaw.org/uploads/lpfdv.pdf.
795. See id. arts. 6(7)(2), 20, 21.
796. See id.
797. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 14-15.
798. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013,supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
799. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
800. Protection Against Domestic Violence Act, arts. 2-3 (BuIg.).
801. ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BULGARIA: CHALLENGES WITH ADDRESSING DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 102ND
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exceptional circumstances and where substantial injury is involved, and the victim
is unable to bring a private prosecution by him or herself. 802
Migrant domestic violence victims do not have the right to seek financial
compensation from their abusers under the Crime Victim Assistance and Financial
Compensation Act as this right flows only to foreign nationals legally residing in
the territory of Bulgaria.8 0 3 A recent study of thirty cases reviewed by the State
Agency for Refugees reflects that this adjudicatory body does not recognize
gender-based relief or gender-based asylum claims.8 04 Of the cases reviewed in
this study, most of the asylum applications filed by women contained claims to
membership in a gender-based social group and to domestic violence
persecution.8 05 Relief was not forthcoming in any of these cases.
In November 2010, the CEDAW Committee considered a claim in which a
migrant claimed she had been subjected to domestic violence and that the
procedures in place in Bulgaria failed to provide support as required under the
CEDAW.806 Brought by two domestic violence victims, Gambian national Isatou
Jallow and her Bulgarian minor daughter, they claimed that Bulgaria had breached
its responsibilities under the CEDAW. 0 7 Over the next two years, the CEDAW
Committee reviewed the claim, and issued its finding in July 2012.08 The
CEDAW Committee found that in September 2008, Ms. Jallow and her minor
daughter arrived in Bulgaria and began living with Ms. Jallow's husband, who was
also the father of her minor daughter. 809 Specifically, he repeatedly abused both
Ms. Jallow and her daughter, sexually, physically, and emotionally, and used Ms.
Jallow's migrant status as a tool to further abuse her in that, "[h]e constantly told
her that her stay in Bulgaria depended on him and threatened that, if she resisted,
he could have her imprisoned, confined to a mental institution or deported to the
Gambia, without her daughter."o10 She sought assistance from local authorities in
November 2008, who recommended that she "stay away from her husband" and
initiated an investigation into the claimed domestic violence.8 1  During a
SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 1 10 (2011), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngo/AHRBulgaria HRC102.doc.
802. CODE CRIMINAL [C. CRIM.] art. 161 ("[For bodily injury ... inflicted on a relative . .. [such
as] a spouse . .. the penal prosecution shall be instituted on the basis of complaint by the victim.").
803. Crime Victim Assistance and Financial Compensation Act, SG. 105/22 Dec. 2006, art. 27(l)
(Bulg.), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice home/judicialatlascivil/html/pdf/nationallaw cvbulen.pdf.
804. Memorandum from Maria Nikolova, Bulgarian Human Rights Advocate (November 26, 2013)
(on file with the authors).
805. Id.
806. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Isatou Jallow v. Bulgaria,
Comm. No. 32/2011, 1[ 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/52/D/32/2011 (2011), available at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=CEDAW/C/52/D/32/2011.
807. Id.
808. Id.
809. Id. 112.1.
810. Id.112.2.
811. Id. J|l 2.3-2.4.
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protracted period in which she lived alternately in a women's shelter, and in the
family apartment, the Bulgarian judicial system considered the case, and ultimately
dropped it without interviewing Ms. Jallow. 812 In July 2009, she received a
Bulgarian residence permit.8 13 With the escalating domestic violence, however,
she contemplated pursuing a divorce. 814
Soon thereafter, Ms. Jallow's husband sought assistance from the state
authorities claiming that, in fact, it was him and his daughter that had been subject
to psychological and physical violence as well as death threats at the hands of Ms.
Jallow.8 1 5 The Bulgarian authorities issued a restraining order against Ms. Jallow,
and placed the child under the care and custody of her husband.8 16 Soon thereafter,
he instituted divorce proceedings against Ms. Jallow, and sought custody of their
daughter.817
Ms. Jallow brought a claim under the CEDAW Optional Protocol claiming
that Bulgarian state officials had violated a number of the CEDAW provisions
ranging from discriminatory treatment of women to a complete failure to both
recognize and protect against domestic gender-based violence and to sanction the
perpetrator.8'8 She argued that due to language barriers she had extremely limited
access to the institutions that are charged with addressing gender-based violence. 819
Furthermore, she asserted that the authorities separated her from her daughter and
failed to provide her with information during the separation, in spite of a history of
sexual abuse by the father of the daughter.820 As a legal remedy, she sought:
a) Fair compensation;
b) Child support and legal assistance;
c) Reparations for the physical and mental harm caused to her and her
daughter; and,
d) Effective measures to provide for her future security.821
From a systemic viewpoint, she requested that Bulgaria institute legal
measures to provide for effective protection for women victims of gender-based
violence, including training of judges and free translation and legal services. 822
The CEDAW Committee agreed that Ms. Jallow and her daughter had
suffered damage given Ms. Jallow's vulnerable situation and that the Bulgarian
government did not provide adequate protection as required under the CEDAW.823
812. Id. Ji 2.4-2.5.
813. Id.12.6.
814. Id.
815. Id.1|2.7.
816. Id. 112.8.
817. Id. 2.12.
818. Id. 3.1.
819. Id. 13.4.
820. Id. Jil 3.4, 3.6.
821. Id.113.7.
822. Id. 13.8.
823. Id. 118.2.
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The CEDAW Committee ordered that Bulgaria take measures, including
legislative and policy steps
to ensure that women victims of domestic violence, in particular migrant
women, have effective access to services related to protection against
domestic violence and to justice, including interpretation or translation
of documents, and that the manner in which domestic courts apply the
law is consistent with the State party's obligations under the
Convention.824
The CEDAW Committee's most recent state report was issued in 2012, and
fails to discuss relief specific for migrant domestic violence victims.825
Z. Malta
Malta ratified the ECHR in January 1967.826 It ratified the CEDAW in March
1991,827 but has not signed the CEDAW Optional Protocol.82 8 It signed the
Istanbul Convention in May 2012, and ratified it in July 2014.829 Malta issued its
first report to the CEDAW Committee in August 2002830 and a second periodic
report in May 2009.831 It is not scheduled to issue another report until October 31,
2014.832
Malta provides relief in the form of asylum for, among others, members of a
particular social group.8 3 3 To be considered a particular social group, there must
be both an immutable characteristic and the group must be perceived as being
different from the rest of society. 834 "[T]here is no requirement per se to seek state
protection in the country of origin before fleeing persecution from non-State
actors.",3 The government consistently provided non-refoulement protections
824. Id. 118.8.
825. Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women: Bulgaria, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 52d Sess., July 9-27,
2012, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/BGR/CO/4-7 (Aug. 7,2012).
826. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
827. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
828. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
829. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
830. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Combined Initial, Second and Third
Periodic Report of States Parties: Malta, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
31st Sess., July 6-23, 2004, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/MLT/1-3 (Dec. 18, 2002).
831. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Fourth Periodic Report of States
Parties: Malta, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 47th Sess., Oct. 4-22,
2010, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/MLT/4 (June 4,2009).
832. See Human Rights Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/ layouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "Malta" from drop-box,
select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
833. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, MALTA 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 9 (2014) [hereinafter MALTA
2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220518.pdf.
834. CHEIKH ALI ET AL., supra note 417, at 50.
835. Id. at 43.
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where migrants who did not qualify as refugees could be granted subsidiary
protection, which permits them to remain in the country on a year-to-year,
renewable basis.836
Beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, and their dependents, were entitled to
remain in the country, and received a variety of benefits including
accommodations, integration programs, public education and training, and
essential medical care.' 37  Malta also provides for temporary protection to
individuals who have a real risk of serious harm if they were to return to their
home countries.
Malta's 2012 HDI worldwide ranking is thirty-second.8 39  Its 2012 GII
worldwide ranking is thirty-ninth.8 40 While Malta does not have in place a national
women's hotline, 841 as of 2012, it had in place three shelters, addressing all of the
reported need.8 42
AA. Hungary
Hungary ratified the ECHR in November 1992,843 the CEDAW in December
1980,844 and signed the Optional Protocol in December 2000.845 It signed the
Istanbul Convention in March 2014, but has not ratified it. 846 Hungary reported on
its obligations under the CEDAW through an initial report in September 1982,847
and submitted five periodic reports culminating with its most recent in June
2011.848 It was obliged to submit a periodic report on March 30, 2013, but that
report has not yet been submitted. 849
Hungary recognizes three types of protection: (1) refugee protection; (2)
subsidiary protection; and (3) "tolerated stay" protection encompassing the concept
836. MALTA 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 833, at 9.
837. Id. at 8-9.
838. See id at 7-8.
839. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
840. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
841. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 13.
842. Id. at 14-15, 181.
843. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
844. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
845. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
846. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
847. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 12th Sess., Jan. 18-
Feb. 5, 1993,1|1[ 144-98, U.N. Doc. A/48/38; GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1993).
848. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Combined Seventh and Eighth
Periodic Reports of States Parties: Hungary, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, 54th Sess., Feb. 1l-Mar. 1, 2013, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/HUN/7-8 (Sept. 22, 2011) (the
second report was submitted in 1986 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/13/Add.1), the third in 1991 (U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/HUN/3), the fourth and fifth in 2000 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/HUN/4-5), and the sixth in
2006 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/HUN/6)).
849. See Human Rights Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/_1ayouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "Hungary" from drop-
box, select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
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of non-refoulement.o50 Refugee protection is indefinite.' Subsidiary protection is
offered to "[a] person who is at a real risk of suffering" the death penalty, torture,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or serious threat to her life or
person because of indiscriminate violence in an armed conflict.852 Tolerated stay
status can be granted to individuals who have a "well-founded fear of persecution,
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or [the] death penalty, but who cannot
benefit from refugee status or subsidiary protection." 853 Tolerated stay status is
valid for one year, but can be withdrawn at any time or renewed upon
expiration.8 54
Hungary's 2012 HDI worldwide ranking is thirty-seventh.1 5  Its 2012 GII
worldwide ranking is forty-second.856  In 2012, Hungary provided no shelter
services, and was unable to provide support to the more than 1,000 individuals that
857 858needed assistance. All asylum seekers are eligible for free legal aid. Hungary
affords essentially the same rights to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection as it
does to beneficiaries of refugee status, including family reunification benefits. 859
Hungary recognizes in law and practice that gender-related claims may
warrant specific considerations. 860  Despite these protections, the SRVAW has
expressed concern about the "prevalence of violence against women and girls,
including domestic violence," and the lack of work that has been "done to raise
awareness of the subject in the public opinion, in the media and in education."86'
"The Special Rapporteur is particularly concerned that no specific legislation has
been enacted to combat domestic violence and sexual harassment and that no
protection or exclusion orders or shelters exist for the immediate protection of
women victims of domestic violence." 862
850. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HUNGARY AS A COUNTRY OF ASYLUM:
OBSERVATIONS ON THE SITUATION OF ASYLUM-SEEKERS AND REFUGEES IN HUNGARY 11 7 (2012),
available at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4f9167db2.pdf
851. The Refugee Situation in Hungary, HUNGARIAN RED CROSS,
http://www.voroskereszt.hu/menekueltuegy/english/ 1144-the-refugee-situation-in-hungary.html (last
visited May 29, 2014).
852. EDAL Country Overview-Hungary, EUR. DATABASE OF ASYLUM L. (Feb. 14, 2014),
http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/edal-country-overview-hungary.
853. Id.
854. Id.
855. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
856. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
857. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 13, 131.
858. 2003. 6vi LXXX. torvdny a Jogi Segitsigny6jtasr61 (Act LXXX of 2003 on Legal
Aid) (Hung.), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/UDRW/images/items/docI 15650_294267511 .pdf.
See also EDAL Country Overview-Hungary, supra note 852.
859. THE IMPACT OF THE EU QUALIFICATION DIRECTIVE, supra note 251, at 31.
860. See CHEIKH ALI ET AL., supra note 417, at 42.
861. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 194, 2005.
862. Id. 112006.
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BB. Romania
Romania ratified the ECHR in June 1994.6 It ratified the CEDAW in
January 1982,86 and ratified the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW in August
2003 .8 It has neither signed nor ratified the Istanbul Convention.866  Romania
issued its first report in January 1987867 and three periodic reports thereafter with
861the latest in December 2003. It was obliged to issue a report on February 1,
2011, but that report has not yet been submitted.8 69
Romania offers asylum or refugee status pursuant to comprehensive asylum
legislation passed in 2006.17' Romania complies with its ECHR responsibilities by
offering refugee status to successful asylum-seekers, pursuant to Article 14 of the
Law of Asylum in Romania. Romania offers subsidiary protection to meet its
ECHR non-refoulement obligations, pursuant to Article 6.872 Relief under either
asylum or subsidiary protection affords essentially the same rights including family
reunification benefits. 1
Romania's 2012 HDI worldwide ranking is fifty-sixth.8 74  Its 2012 GII
worldwide ranking is fifty-fifth.87' As of 2012, Romania did not have a national
women's hotline.87 6  As of 2012, Romania had in place thirty-five shelters,
addressing about 37 percent of the reported need. 7
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Despite years of international focus on eradicating domestic violence, the
problem has not abated. Migrant domestic violence victims that lack legal
immigration status are extremely vulnerable in this climate. Recognizing that
863. ECHR Treaty Status, supra note 238.
864. CEDAW Treaty Status, supra note 239.
865. CEDAW Optional Protocol Treaty Status, supra note 240.
866. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
867. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 12th Sess., Jan. 18-
Feb. 5, 1993,111 144-98, U.N. Doc. A/48/38; GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1993).
868. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Sixth Periodic Report of States Parties:
Romania, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 35th Sess., May 15-June 2,
2006, at 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/ROM/6 (Dec. 15, 2003) (the second and third report was submitted in
1992 (U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/ROM/2-3) and the fourth and fifth in 1998 (U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/ROM/4-5)).
869. See Human Rights Bodies, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.,
http://tbintemet.ohchr.org/_Iayouts/TreatyBodyExtemal/Countries.aspx (select "Romania" from drop-
box, select "CEDAW" hyperlink) (last visited May 28, 2014).
870. Law No. 122/2006 on Asylum in Romania, OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 428/18.05.2006.
871. Id. art. 14.
872. Id. art. 6.
873. Id. arts. 20, 24, 27.
874. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013, supra note 108, at 151 tbl.3.
875. Id. at 156 tbl.4.
876. WAVE REPORT, supra note 120, at 13.
877. Id. at 14-15.
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vulnerability, one state, the United Kingdom, developed a sophisticated protection
system that includes offering permanent legal immigration status when the
perpetrator of the domestic violence is the victim's spouse or partner, and is also a
British citizen or U.K.-settled resident.8 7 8  This type of relief, however, is an
anomaly. The majority of domestic violence victims who have no legal
immigration status suffer at the hands of perpetrators, and in most cases, pursue
asylum, subsidiary protection, or humanitarian relief. In practice, the application
of asylum law has met with incongruities across states, especially in the context of
particular social group gender-based claims.
Many states have in place protections that are ECHR and CEDAW compliant.
Moreover, many states are enacting systems that comply with Council of Europe
mandates. Nevertheless, the U.N. system that monitors and evaluates compliance
of state implementation efforts is somewhat ineffective.8 7 9  In May 2013, the
United Nations stated that some states do not provide requested information, and
when information is provided it is, occasionally, lacking in quality.8 80
Additionally, while most states have in place legal frameworks that strive for
compliance, a strong argument can be made that implementation and enforcement
efforts are lacking.
The SRVAW points to the lack of a legally binding instrument to monitor
state responsibility to act with due diligence in responding to, preventing, and
eliminating all forms of violence against women.m Realizing the implications that
such disparities have in an interconnected system, the regional human rights bodies
have sought to develop model systems that would create effective protections for
this population, and which not only harmonize relief across this legally and
geographically interconnected set of states, but mandate compliance. Based on the
above survey, it seems that many states have been successful in strengthening their
laws and constructing networks of resources to combat this problem as it relates to
domestic violence generally. However, treaty obligations under the CEDAW
require that states go further if they are to achieve the mandate, which includes
eliminating violence against women, including protection for migrant domestic
violence victims.
The development of the Istanbul Convention seems a positive corollary step
toward harmonizing somewhat discordant systems, specifically as it relates to
gender-based asylum claims. Article 60 obligates parties to implement gender-
based asylum protection to further eradicate violence against women and domestic
violence. 882 Article 61 reiterates non-refoulement principles for this purpose, as
well. However, to date, only eight EU-M States have ratified the Convention,884
878. See supra note 756 and accompanying text.
879. See Manjoo Report, supra note 24, Jill 42, 69-70.
880. Id.1142.
881. Id.
882. Istanbul Convention, supra note 5, art. 60.
883. Id. art. 61.
884. Istanbul Convention Treaty Status, supra note 88.
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and like the CEDAW, the Istanbul Convention monitors compliance through a
reporting and review mechanism that is premised on the due diligence of states in
meeting their international obligations.8 8 5
There is strong evidence to suggest that worldwide and regional human rights
bodies are becoming more adept at developing specific standards that address
some of the problems migrant domestic violence victims encounter. States have
responded, and the changes are evident. However, the pace of reform is uneven
across states, and the development of increasingly specific model systems may
serve to bring some states that have heretofore been lagging further into line with
the more robust and comprehensive state systems that exist today.
885. Istanbul Convention, supra note 5, art. 68.
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MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL 6 AND THE TRIFECTA OF
HIV/AIDS, MALARIA, AND TUBERCULOSIS IN AFRICA: A HUMAN
RIGHTS ANALYSIS
DR. OBIAJULU NNAMUCHI*
I. INTRODUCTION AND PRELIMINARY BACKGROUND
At the Millennium Summit, convened as a key part of the Millennium
Assembly of the United Nations,' in September 2000, participating world leaders
unanimously ratified the Millennium Declaration-a set of objectives grounding
the Millennium Development Goals ("MDGs" or "Goals"). 2 The MDGs consist of
the commitment by the global community to pursue a number of objectively and
quantitatively verifiable Targets, with the deadline for reaching most of these
Targets set at 2015. Strikingly, of the eight Goals to which each country aspires
to attain within the specified time frame, one-MDG 6-is devoted to combating
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases.4 Considering the devastation these
diseases have inflicted, and continue to inflict, upon the lives and wellbeing of
Africans, it is clear that this Goal holds special significance for people in the
region. But whether the benchmarks of MDG 6 would actually be attained, come
2015, is mired in controversy as pessimism remains rife about Africa's capability
to achieve this or any of the other Goals.
* LL.B. (Awka), LL.M. (Notre Dame), LL.M. (Toronto), LL.M. (Lund), M.A. (Louisville), S.J.D.
(Loyola, Chicago), Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nigeria; President cum Chief Health
System/Policy & Bioethics Consultant, Centre for Health, Bioethics and Human Rights (CHBHR)
Enugu, Nigeria. Many thanks to campaigners for the prevention, cure, and management of HIV/AIDS,
malaria, and tuberculosis (TB) whose work inspired this paper and, of course, AdaObi Nnamuchi, my
able assistant. All errors and omissions remain my sole responsibility.
1. G.A. Res. 53/202,1 2, U.N Doc. A/RES/53/202 (Dec. 17, 1998).
2. United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 8,
2000) (stating the objectives as being values and principles; peace, security, and disarmament;
development and poverty eradication; protecting the environment; human rights, democracy, and good
governance; protecting the vulnerable; meeting the special needs of Africa; and, strengthening the
U.N.).
3. Id.; 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005);
see also Official List of MDG Indicators, UNITED NATIONS STAT. DIvISION,
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content-indicators/OfficialList.htm (last updated Jan. 15,
2008) [hereinafter MDG Indicators].
4. The remaining MDGs are to: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary
education, promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal
health, ensure environmental sustainability, and develop a global partnership for development. MDG
Indicators, supra note 3.
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The African Union Conference of Health Ministers was quite categorical,
"Africa is still not on track to meet the health Millennium Declaration Targets and
the prevailing population trends could undermine progress made."5 More recently,
New York University professor of economics William Easterly documents other
6instances including, inter alia, a statement by the U.N. Department of Public
Information, "[a]t the midway point between their adoption in 2000 and the 2015
target date for achieving the [MDGs], sub-Saharan Africa is not on track to achieve
any of the Goals."7  But Professor Easterly vehemently disagrees with the
conclusion, blaming the bleak picture on "poorly and arbitrarily" designed MDGs,
the effect of which, in his view, has been widespread and misguided portrayal of
Africa in a worse light than the true circumstances warrant.8 Other scholars
identify the "overly-ambitious" nature of the Goals themselves as the culprit. 9
But regardless of design flaws or the overly-ambitious nature of the MDGs,
evidence is beginning to percolate indicating that whilst challenges abound, there
are bright spots in several countries in the region. Even in nations seriously
lagging behind, new initiatives continue to be rolled out, aimed at bridging the gap
between current realities and the MDGs. The political leadership is adamant about
its commitment to achieving the Goals. Speaking at the 2008 World Economic
Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Umaru Yar'Adua, the late president of Nigeria,
echoed the regional attitude, "[fjor us in Africa, the achievement of the MDGs is
our sacred duty."'o This is quite an encouraging proclamation; nonetheless,
whether this rhetoric is being or will be acted upon by authorities in the region, and
if the strategies would be sufficient to pull the region out of its present doldrums,
will begin to unfold as the various benchmarks specified in Goal 6, the focus of
this discourse, are examined and will become even clearer as the 2015 deadline
draws nigh. A critical aspect of this paper is its identification of what it calls
"special population groups" (the most vulnerable groups in relation to the diseases)
as worthy of being put "in front of the line," so to speak, in terms of receiving
necessary interventions. Prioritizing the interest of vulnerable groups in the overall
scheme of attending to population-wide challenges is a key requirement of human
rights. It is a catechism forcefully advanced in this discourse.
This paper consists of six sections. Following the introduction, Part II
examines global attempts to get a handle on the scourge of HIV/AIDS as well as
5. African Union Conference of Ministers of Health, African Health Strategy: 2007-2015, at 2,
AU Doc. CAMH/MIN/5(lll) (Apr. 13, 2007), available at
http://www.nepad.org/system/files/AFRICAHEALTHSTRATEGY(health).pdf.
6. William Easterly, How the Millennium Development Goals are Unfair to Africa, 37 WORLD
DEv. 26,26 (2009).
7. UNITED NATIONS, AFRICA AND THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: 2007 UPDATE I
(2007), available at http://www.unicnairobi.org/Africa-andMDGs_07 final.pdf.
8. Easterly, supra note 6, at 26.
9. See MICHAEL CLEMENS & TODD MOSS, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEv., CGD BRIEF: WHAT'S
WRONG WITH THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS? 1-2 (2005), available at
www.cgdev.org/files/3940_fileWWMGD.pdf.
10. World Leaders Issue Call to Action on MDGs, PAMBAZUKA NEWS (Jan. 28, 2008),
http://pambazuka.org/en/category/development/45713.
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factors standing in the path to success in Africa. It also identifies measures that
hold prospect for reversing the status quo. Part III continues this theme, albeit
with a different focus, by interrogating efforts to control malaria in the region. The
section analyzes the wide disparities between countries in the region in terms of
incidence and resulting mortalities and proffers suggestions on how to bridge the
divide-a necessity for attaining Goal 6. In Part IV, the paper zeroes in on the
prevalence of TB in Africa and the adoption of the World Health Organization's
("WHO") directly observed treatment short course ("DOTS") as part of the Stop
TB Strategy, which was recommended by the WHO as the cornerstone of national
anti-TB strategies. The section argues that although this approach has resulted in
significant improvement in the control and management of TB, a lot more still
needs to be done, including scaling up a range of critical interventions via
increases in budgetary allocation to TB. Part V seeks a human rights solution to
the tragedy resulting from the trifecta of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and TB. Its central
argument is that while health care-based interventions are certainly critical to
making inroads into the situation, it must be strengthened with deploying resources
to the conditions that combined to subject people to these diseases and conditions
in the first place. The section projects underlying or social determinants of health
as holding the key to freedom from the stranglehold that these diseases hold on
human lives and, borrowing from liberation theology, calls for prioritizing the
needs of vulnerable groups. The conclusion-Part VI-is that operationalizing the
human rights-based recommendation of the paper is fundamental not only to
consigning HIV/AIDS, malaria, and TB in Africa to the abyss of history, but also
to positioning the region on a sustainable path toward attaining Goal 6.
II. HIV/AIDS
A. Impact and Relevant Benchmarks
There are two HIV/AIDS-related Targets: (i) to "[h]ave halted by 2015 and
begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS;" and (ii) "[a]chieve, by 2010, universal
access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it.""I Definitionally, at
least, the first arm of the Target appears to have been met in most regions of the
world, including Africa.12 The most recent data shows a decline in the number of
new infections globally. A total number of 2.5 million people (including adults
and children) were infected in 2011, 20 percent less than 2001.13 There have been
dramatic changes in infection pattern and incidence in the last decade. The
incidence of HIV infection declined amongst adults by more than 25 percent in
11. MDG Indicators, supra note 3 (referencing Goal 6).
12. JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, GLOBAL REPORT: UNAIDS REPORT ON
THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC 2010, at 7 (2010), available at
http://www.unaids.org/globalreport/documents/20101123_GlobalReport fullen.pdf.
13. JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, GLOBAL REPORT: UNAIDS REPORT ON
THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC 2012, at 8 (2012) [hereinafter UNAIDS REPORT 2012], available at
http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/epidemiology/2012/gr2O12/20121120
UNAIDSGlobalReport 2012_with annexes en.pdf.
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thirty-nine countries, twenty-three of them in sub-Sahara Africa.14 In fact, sub-
Sahara Africa ranks second only to the Caribbean in reduction level, at 25
percent.' 5 Despite these improvements, however, the region, comprising just 12
percent of the global population, bears the worst brunt of the pandemic,' 6
accounting for nearly 70 percent of the global population of people living with
HIV/AIDS ("PLWHA"), nearly one in every twenty adults (4.9 percent of people
in the region).' 7
In 2011, deaths resulting from AIDS-related causes totaled 1.7 million
globally, representing a 24 percent decline in AIDS-related mortality in
comparison to 2005 when the number was 2.3 million.' 8 Although the number of
people dying from AIDS-related causes in sub-Sahara Africa declined by 32
percent from 2005 to 2011, the region was still responsible for 70 percent of such
deaths in 2011.19 Of the 17.1 million children around the world who were
estimated to have lost one or both parents to AIDS in 2009, 15 million of them
lived in sub-Saharan Africa. 20 Although the number of PLWHA is growing, the
growth represents an increase in longevity due to improved access to treatment and
other support services.2'
The second arm of the Target, obligating countries to provide universal access
to treatment for all those who need it by the year 2010,22 appears to be more
problematic as the deadline has passed and yet, except for Western countries, no
other region met the Target. 23  Nevertheless, recent data indicate significant
progress even in some of the worst affected countries. In fact, some dramatic
result could have been recorded had it not been for the WHO's new
recommendation on when antiretroviral therapy ("ART") should be initiated (CD4
count of or below 350 cells/mm3 in contrast to the previous criterion of CD4 count
of or below 200 cells/mm3). 24 This change and its result notwithstanding, 2011
represents huge advances in scaling up access to ART. For the first time ever, a
majority (54 percent) of those in need of treatment in low and middle-income
14. Id. at 11.
15. Id. at 8.
16. U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT
2012, at 39, U.N. Sales No. E.12.1.4 (2012) [hereinafter MDGS REPORT 2012], available at
http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/Progress20l2/English2Ol2.pdf.
17. UNAIDS REPORT 2012, supra note 13, at 8.
18. Id. at 12.
19. Id.
20. MDGS REPORT 2012, supra note 16, at 41.
21. UNAIDS REPORT 2012, supra note 13, at 12.
22. See id. at 51-55.
23. See U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT
2010, at 45, U.N. Sales No. E.10.1.7 (2010) [hereinafter MDGs REPORT 2010], available at
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/MDG%20Report%202010%/ 20En%/ 20rl5%20-
low%20res%2020100615%20-.pdf.
24. WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO] ET AL., TOWARDS UNIVERSAL ACCESS: SCALING UP PRIORITY
HIV/AIDS INTERVENTIONS IN THE HEALTH SECTOR: PROGRESS REPORT 2010, at 6 (2010), available at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2010/9789241500395 eng.pdfua=1.
250 VOt. 42:2
2014 MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL 6: A HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS
countries actually received it.25 Even sub-Sahara Africa was not left behind. The
region attained 56 percent coverage within the same period. 26 To grasp the real
impact of this growth in the number of eligible people receiving ART, one has to
see it in economic terms, in the sense of the effect on economic productivity (as
mentioned in the abstract) in affected countries. At the end of 2011, 8 million
people were receiving ART, representing "a 20-fold increase since 2003.",27 The
availability of this life-saving intervention in low and middle-income countries has
had dramatic impact, adding 14 million lived-years in these countries, including 9
million in sub-Sahara Africa. 28
The WHO defines "universal access" as the existence of "an environment in
which HIV prevention, treatment, care and support interventions are available,
accessible and affordable to all who need them."29 A critical element of this
definition is that achieving universal access does not necessarily mean that
everyone in need receives ART, for even if treatment is available, accessible and
affordable, there is no guarantee that some people would not, for whatever reason,
decide against treatment. Given this consideration, one could surmise that the
obligation incumbent on countries is to create conditions that are conducive for the
"participation" of affected individuals in the "planning and implementation of their
health care," including ensuring that cost does not constitute an obstacle to
treatment.30 What constitutes "participation," in terms of health care
implementation would vary according to the socioeconomic circumstances of those
seeking treatment-meaning that for some individuals, free or subsidized coverage
would be provided but not for others. Therefore, it is possible to achieve universal
access in the sense indicated above, by removing obstacles to accessing treatment,
even though 100 percent coverage is not reached. In fact, the WHO's specific
parameter for achieving universal access to ART is achieving at least 80 percent
coverage of those in need.3 ' So, how does Africa fare? At the end of 2010 three
countries, namely, Botswana, Namibia, and Rwanda achieved universal access to
ART, whereas Swaziland and Zambia are not far off, having achieved an estimated
coverage of 70-79 percent. 32
25. UNAIDS REPORT 2012, supra note 13, at 51.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 50.
28. Id.
29. WHO, PRIORITY INTERVENTIONS: HIV/AIDS PREVENTION, TREATMENT AND CARE IN THE
HEALTH SECTOR 1 (2009), available at http://www.who.int/hiv/pub/priority interventionsweb.pdf.
30. International Conference on Primary Health Care, Alma-Ata, USSR, Sept. 6-12 1978, The
Declaration of Alma-Ata, art. IV, available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/9241800011.pdf.
31. WHO ET AL., GLOBAL HIV/AIDS RESPONSE: EPIDEMIC UPDATE AND HEALTH SECTOR
PROGRESS TOWARDS UNIVERSAL ACCESS: PROGRESS REPORT 2011, at 89 (2011) [hereinafter
HIV/AIDS RESPONSE PROGRESS REPORT 2011], available at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2011/9789241502986_eng.pdf.
32. Id. at 90.
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B. Special Population Groups
Although HIV/AIDS is no respecter of persons or territories, affecting every
demography throughout Africa, the impact is disproportionately felt by certain
population groups, namely, women, sex workers, and prisoners. True, illness
produces vulnerability, but even amongst the sick, some are more vulnerable than
others. For this reason, arresting the spread of HIV/AIDS must start with
identifying and attending to the special needs of these especially at-risk vulnerable
groups.
There is a higher incidence of infection amongst women in Africa than men.34
Over the last few years, HIV infection has stabilized everywhere else in the world,
affecting both genders equally, except in sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean,
where the rate of infection amongst women stand at 59 and 53 percent respectively
of all people living with HIV. 35 This is a major problem; it not only touches on
MDG 6, it also affects meeting the obligation of countries in sub-Sahara Africa
regarding MDG 5 (reducing maternal mortality) and MDG 4 (reducing child
mortality).36 This is especially critical given that latest figures indicate that not
only did the region record the largest proportion of maternal deaths attributable to
HIV (10 percent), it was also responsible for 17,000, or 91 percent, of the 19,000
worldwide deaths formally known as "AIDS related indirect maternal deaths."37
Failure to stem the tide of HIV amongst women in Africa has a domino-like impact
on children and negatively impacts the ability of countries in the region to reduce
child mortality as required under MDG 4. This is because pregnancy for women
living with HIV poses a real risk to their unborn children. Intrapartum
transmission of HIV is common in most countries in the region due to massive
drug unavailability and even where availability is not a problem, high cost
33. E.g., MDGs REPORT 2012, supra note 16, at 39; UNAIDS REPORT 2012, supra note 13, at 70;
WHO, INTEGRATING GENDER INTO HIV/AIDS PROGRAMMES IN THE HEALTH SECTOR, at xi-xii (2009)
[hereinafter INTEGRATING GENDER], available at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2009/9789241597197 eng.pdf?ua=1 (reporting that although 50
percent of global HIV population are women, in Africa, the percentage is 60 percent); Stefan Baral et
al., Burden of HIV Among Female Sex Workers in Low-Income and Middle-Income Countries: A
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 12 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 538 (2012); Tuberculosis in
Prisons, WHO, http://www.who.int/tb/challenges/prisons/storyI/en/index.html (last visited Feb. 17,
2014) (reporting that HIV and TB are more common amongst prisoners).
34. INTEGRATING GENDER, supra note 33, at xi.
35. MDGs REPORT 2012, supra note 16, at 39; UNAIDS REPORT 2012, supra note 13, at 70
(putting the figure for sub-Sahara Africa at 58 percent).
36. See UNITED NATIONS DEV. GROUP, THEMATIC PAPER ON MDG 4: REDUCE CHILD
MORTALITY, THEMATIC PAPER ON MDG 5: IMPROVE MATERNAL HEALTH, THEMATIC PAPER ON MDG
6: COMBAT HIV/AIDS, MALARIA AND OTHER DISEASES 4 (2010), available at
http://www.undg.org/docs/1 1421/MDG4-6_1954-UNDG-MDG456-LR.pdf.
37. MDGs REPORT 2012, supra note 16, at 31.
38. United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, 1 19, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept.
8, 2000) (MDG 4: reduction of child mortality).
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effectively keeps the door shut for most women in those countries.3 9 The
complexity and interconnectedness of these problems threaten the ability of Africa
to meet the Targets of the health-MDGs. It is essential, therefore, in order to make
meaningful headway, that policy makers pay special attention to women,
particularly maternal health, in formulation of strategies to deal with HIV
pandemic in their respective jurisdictions.
The second vulnerable group in need of special protection is female sex
workers. There are two reasons why taking concrete steps to deal with this group
of HIV-infected women is very important to the entire MDGs project. First, akin
to the multidimensional nature of the problems implicated in the case of pregnant
women who are HIV positive (in terms of being a source of infection to the child
and, therefore, touching on MDGs 4 and 5), paying particular attention to the
special needs of female sex workers living with HIV/AIDS also impacts MDG 1
(poverty eradication). As more fully argued in Part V, prostitution is not a choice.
Trading oneself for money is not a vocation one chooses upon careful reflection on
its suitability or otherwise to the individual's aptitude and future wellbeing. It is
not a source of individual fulfillment; instead, it is the direct result of a
combination of circumstances in respect to which the individual lacks any real
control. HIV/AIDS is symptomatic of the gruesome conditions under which these
women must survive; it is not the root cause. Therefore, HIV/AIDS-related
therapeutic interventions in isolation of sustainable strategies capable of
expurgating the circumstances that makes sex work attractive in the first place is a
move in the wrong direction.40
Countries seriously committed to solving HIV/AIDS problems amongst
female sex workers must also be prepared to meet their obligation to efface
poverty amongst its population, prostitute or otherwise.41 Poverty breeds
prostitution and vice versa, as evidenced by the high incidence of deprivation and
want amongst this population.42 Both set their victims on a path to HIV/AIDS. A
resolution adopted by the U.N. captures this nexus and the need for synergistic
response: "Recognizing that poverty, underdevelopment and illiteracy are among
the principal contributing factors to the spread of HIV/AIDS, and noting with
grave concern that HIV/AIDS is compounding poverty and is now reversing or
39. See JAMES MCINTYRE, UNAIDS, HIV IN PREGNANCY: A REVIEW 9-10 (1998), available at
http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/dataimport/publications/irc-pub0l/jcl51-hiv-in-
pregnancyen.pdf.
40. See G.A. Res 65/277,1125, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/277 (June 10, 2011).
41. See MDG Indicators, supra note 3 (describing the message of MDG I as demonstrating the
linkages amongst the various MDGs and inviting countries to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger in
their territories).
42. See JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, UNAIDS GUIDANCE NOTE ON HIV
AND SEX WORK 18 (2012), available at
http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/unaidspublication/2009/JC2306_UNA
IDS-guidance-note-HIV-sex-work en.pdf.
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impeding development in many countries and should therefore be addressed in an
integrated manner." 43
Another undergirding rationale for taking seriously the uniquely different
circumstances of this vulnerable population is the consequence of inaction on
others. More than any other demography, female sex workers constitute the most
formidable source of HIV infection." The rate of infection amongst them is
staggering, up to 76.6 percent in some studies, 45 although a more recent large
cohort study (involving the review of 102 articles and surveillance reports and
covering nearly 100,000 female sex workers in fifty countries) found the overall
prevalence rate to be near 12 percent; or, to put it differently, this population group
is 13.5 times more likely to contract HIV than other women.46 Direct cause of high
infection rate amongst this population is the very low rate of condom use. A study
of sexual behavior of female sex workers conducted in Guangzhou province,
China, found consistent condom use-100 percent-with clients only amongst 30
percent of the women.47 Of those who reported having a steady partner in the last
twelve months, 41 percent of them, of which only 8 percent reported always using
condom, and more than half, 53 percent, never did.48 Worse still, their reported
knowledge of prevention of sexually transmitted diseases/HIV and self-efficacy for
condoms use was abysmally low.49 A study describes male clients of these female
sex workers as forming "a 'bridging population' for HIV/STD transmission" in
that upon infection, they become a risk not only to female sex workers but also to
the general population of females, particularly their regular partners.5 0  Apparent
from these studies is the high risk female sex workers pose to the general public,
making their situation a case of utmost importance. 5 1
43. Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, G.A. Res S-26/2, 1 11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-26/2
(June 27, 2001).
44. Baral et al., supra note 33, at 543.
45. Genevieve Deceuninck et al., Improvement of Clinical Algorithms for the Diagnosis of
Neisseria Gonorrhoeae and Chlamydia Trachomatis by the Use of Gram-Stained Smears Among
Female Sex Workers in Accra, Ghana, 27 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 401, 401 (2000).
46. Barel et al., supra note 33, at 538.
47. Anneke van den Hoek et al., High Prevalence of Syphilis and Other Sexually Transmitted
Diseases Among Sex Workers in China: Potentialfor Fast Spread of HIlV, 15 AIDS 753, 755 (2001).
48. Id. at 756.
49. Id. Note that although the rate of HIV infection in this study was very low (1.4 percent), and
although other sexually transmitted diseases such as chlamydia (32 percent) were high, this is
explicable on the basis that most of the women are new entrants to the sex work labor force. See id. at
756, 758.
50. Catherine M. Lowndes et al., Management of Sexually Transmitted Diseases and HIV
Prevention in Men at High Risk: Targeting Clients and Non-Paying Sexual Partners of Female Sex
Workers in Benin, 14 AIDS 2523, 2523 (2000).
51. Id. at 2524. Countries are beginning to scale up coverage of HIV prevention programs among
sex workers within their territories. See UNAIDS REPORT 2012, supra note 13, at 21-22. Amongst the
sub-Saharan African countries reporting in 2012, only Nigeria recorded less than 25 percent coverage.
Id. at 24. Seven countries in the region recorded 75-100 percent coverage. Id. Nevertheless, the fact that
African's largest country (Nigeria) performed poorly is worrisome given the high number of its HIV
population. HIV & AIDS in Nigeria, AVERT, http://www.avert.org/hiv-aids-
nigeria.htm#footnote3_pxmplgn (last visited Feb. 18, 2014).
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Related to female sex workers, although a distinct category in itself, are men
who have sex with other men. Amongst this group, akin to female sex workers,
condom use is quite low. Of ninety-six countries that reported on the use of
condoms amongst men who have sex with men during their last episode of sex,
only in thirteen was more than 75 percent compliance rate achieved. 52 Even more
alarming is the low number of this population that gets tested for HIV infection.
Current data indicates that amongst men who have sex with men, the median
proportion of those who underwent test for HIV virus in the last twelve months is
38 percent.53 This is problematic. Knowing one's status is a necessary first step in
the prevention of the disease, especially among high risk groups such as men who
have sex with men, an opportunity that is missed by refusal or neglect to submit to
necessary screening.
On a positive note, countries in sub-Sahara Africa have shown considerable
policy shift in the way it deals with this vulnerable group.54 Rather than pretend
that these people do not exist, sort of wish them away, their presence has gradually
been publicly acknowledged in various countries in the region.55 In 2012, twenty-
two African nations reported on men who have sex with men in their territories, up
from eleven in 2010.56 This is significant because acknowledging their existence is
a crucial preliminary step in recognizing the challenge, a necessary condition for
dealing with the special needs of this marginalized population. Nonetheless,
national expenditures on preventive strategies do not reflect this importance.
Although funding levels for HIV programs for men who have sex with men has
increased, the funds are mostly provided from foreign donors.57 Of all the funds
available for HIV programs for men who have sex with men in 2010-2011, 92
percent was provided by foreign donors.s5 This is a worrisome development not
only on sustainability concerns but also on ownership of the programs.
Although prisoners "comprise one of the least represented populations in
national HIV strategies,"5 they are a significant vulnerable group in respect to
which special intervention is urgently needed in order to meet the obligations
imposed by MDG 6.60 This is because infection rate amongst prisoners in most
countries in sub-Sahara Africa far exceeds that of the general population. Consider
these alarming statistics: in South Africa, an estimated 40 percent of its prison
population is HIV-positive compared to 25 percent amongst the general
population;6' infection in Cameroonian and Ivorian prisons is 12 and 28 percent
52. UNAIDS REPORT 2012, supra note 13, at 28.
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIMES ET AL., HIV AND PRISONS IN SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION 5 (2007), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/hiv-
aids/Africa%20HIV_PrisonPaper Oct-23-07-en.pdf [hereinafter HIV AND PRISONS].
60. See id. at 21.
61. Id.
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respectively, double or triple the HIV prevalence outside the prisons in these
countries; 62 and at 5 percent, Mauritius' prisoner HIV prevalence is almost 50
times more than that of the adult general population. 63 This is worrisome on two
levels. First, homosexual activity-a major transmission mode-is not uncommon
in prisons in the region,6 the implication being that the level of infection is likely
to worsen overtime. Second, reintegration into the community upon release from
prison would result in transmission to unsuspecting members of the public, causing
a rise in the number of PLWHA65 and making the task of meeting the obligations
of MDG 6 even more daunting.
C. Challenges and Key Interventions
Treatment is difficult to come by in most parts of the region, even in countries
with large HIV-positive population. 66 The reason nearly half of those in need of
ART are not receiving it is, simply, cost.67 Not many people in Africa can afford
the cost of treatment, neither are the respective governments in the region in a
68position to provide gratis coverage. With very few exceptions, resources
allocated to HIV/AIDS interventions in most African countries, even those that are
relatively well-off, are generally low. Take Nigeria, as an example. The
proportion of its HIV population receiving ART is only 21 percent, leaving out
more than three-quarters without any form of access. 69  The country's total
allocation to HIV/AIDS in 2008 was $395 million, out of which 7.6 percent was
contributed by the government, with the rest coming from external sources. 70 This
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 16.
65. Rucker C. Johnson & Steven Raphael, The Effects of Male Incarceration Dynamics on
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Infection Rates Among African American Women and Men, 52
J.L. & Econ. 251, 251-52 (2009) (finding a link between the exponential rise in the 1980s in African-
American AIDS patients, particularly amongst African-American women-19 times at greater risk of
being diagnosed with the virus than white women-with the surge in number of incarnated African-
American men within the same period).
66. See WHO ET AL., GLOBAL UPDATE ON HIV TREATMENT 2013: RESULTS, IMPACT AND
OPPORTUNITY 97 (2013) [hereinafter GLOBAL UPDATE ON HIV TREATMENT 2013], available at
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/85326/1/9789241505734 eng.pdf.
67. The cost of ART treatments in South Africa are estimated to be between $500 and $900 per
person per year. Brandon Bryn, Science: Antiretroviral Therapy for HIV Worth the Price, ADVANCING
SCI., SERVING SOC'Y (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.aaas.org/news/science-antiretroviral-therapy-hiv-
worth-price.
68. GLOBAL UPDATE ON HIV TREATMENT 2013, supra note 66, at 96-97.
69. WHO, WORLD HEALTH STATISTICS 2011, at 96-97 (2011) [WORLD HEALTH STATISTICS
2011], available at http://www.who.int/whosis/whostat/EN WHS2011_Full.pdf?ua=1; see also
UNAIDS REPORT 2012, supra note 13, at 57 (putting the figure between 20 and 39 percent at the end of
2011).
70. NATIONAL AGENCY FOR THE CONTROL OF AIDS ET AL., FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA,
NATIONAL AIDS SPENDING ASSESSMENT (NASA) FOR THE PERIOD 2007-2008: LEVEL AND FLOW OF
RESOURCES AND EXPENDITURES OF THE NATIONAL HIV AND AIDS RESPONSE 20 (2010), available at
http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/dataimport/pub/report/2008/NASA Nigeria 2007
-2008 en.pdf.
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level of dependence on foreign funds raises questions about the sustainability of
the advances, albeit minimal, that have been made.
The unpredictability of donor funding ought to be a source of concern to
policy makers in the region, especially, given-as is the case in several countries
such as Nigeria-low internal budgetary allocation to HIV/AIDS programs.7 1
There is no guarantee of continued availability of external resources to take the
place of deficits in internally generated resources of affected countries. Still,
whether universal access to ART becomes a reality in sub-Sahara Africa anytime
soon will hinge on the ability of each country to drastically narrow the gap
between ART availability and need for treatment-and this, in turn, is dependent
on monumental scaling up of HIV/AIDS budgets. The fact that only three
countries (Botswana, Namibia, and Rwanda) in the region have been able to
achieve universal access to ART is worrisome. 72 Halting the spread of HIV is
indubitably a great achievement but it represents just one side of the equation that
would need to be crunched in order to gain an upper hand against a disease that has
cut short millions of productive lives in the region and created millions of widows
and orphans. Sub-Sahara Africa alone is responsible for 70 percent of AIDS-
related deaths globally.73 Scaling up access to ART is urgently needed to reverse
this atrocity.
The aphorism "prevention is better than cure" is one with which public health
experts are quite familiar. The notion is that preventing the onset of illness is
vastly more beneficial than having to subsequently expend scare resources upon
falling ill-a notion that is defensible on the ground that adopting the former
approach spares the individual the agony and suffering that could result from pain,
discomfort, and even death as well as the financial resources involved in physician
and hospital services. 74 Nowhere is this principle truer than in cases of illnesses
for which there is no known cure such as HIV/AIDS. For the vast majority of
people in Africa, the onset of HIV signals doom ahead since, as indicated
previously, ART is in very limited supply in virtually all the countries in the
region. This makes knowledge of ways to shield oneself from contracting the
disease very critical. Yet, on this count, the region lags seriously behind others.
Gender-desegregated data shows the number of males aged 15-24 years with
comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS in Africa to be 33 percent, with
some countries such as Niger and Madagascar recording as low as 16 percent.7 5
71. Id. at xvi.
72. HIV/AIDS RESPONSE PROGRESS REPORT 2011, supra note 31, at 90.
73. UNAIDS REPORT 2012, supra note 13, at 12.
74. Note that although for ages preventive health services have generally been considered more
cost effective than curative care, a recent study disputes whether the difference is really significant. See
Joshua T. Cohen et al., Does Preventive Care Save Money? Health Economics and the Presidential
Candidates, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 661, 661 (2008).
75. WORLD HEALTH STATISTICS 2011, supra note 69, at 33 ("This [data refers to] the percentage
of males who correctly identify the two major ways of preventing the sexual transmission of HIV, who
reject the two most-common local misconceptions about HIV transmission and who know that a
healthy-looking person can transmit HIV."). See also MDGS REPORT 2012, supra note 16, at 40.
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Females fare even worse. Just 25 percent of females between the ages of 15 and
24 in Africa have comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS. This huge
knowledge deficit portends trouble for policy makers in affected countries, an issue
that will be discussed shortly.
Related to the problem of lack of information about HIV/AIDS is risky sexual
behavior. There are two ways to analyze this problem, namely, as (a) deriving
from lack of knowledge about safe sexual practices, or (b) refusal or neglect to
apply already acquired knowledge. Taboos, myths, politics, and misconceptions
surrounding sex and sexual activities militate against appropriate sexual
practices. This is among the principal reasons for the high rate of HIV/AIDS in
Africa, particularly if one considers that the prevalence of condom use by adults
aged 15-49 years during higher risk sex in most countries in the region is the
lowest anywhere in the world. For instance, the prevalence rate of condom use, for
males and females respectively, in Madagascar, Niger, and Ethiopia, between 2000
and 2009 was 9:2 percent,7 8 7:8 percent,7 9 and 9:11 percent.so Regardless of one's
opinion as to the appropriate means of protecting oneself against infection-
abstinence (official policy of the Bush administration and the Catholic Church)8' or
condom use-the key is that unprotected sex among high-risk population, such as
female sex workers, derives from ignorance.
Ignorance, in the form of lack of comprehensive knowledge of HIV/AIDS or
how to protect oneself against infection, implicates the responsibility of policy
makers in this very critical area. This is particularly true in the case of young
people initiating sex very early in life; that is, males and females 15-24 years old
having sex before attaining 15 years. 82 There is no denying that campaigns have
been mounted in various countries, via multiple outlets, to educate the citizenry on
these issues. Nonetheless, the data recited above indicates gaps and
ineffectiveness, either with the message itself or its delivery. Innovative strategies,
designed with the most-at-risk populations in contemplation would go a long way
in turning things around. The introduction of sex education in school curricula of
76. WORLD HEALTH STATISTICS 2011, supra note 69, at 34. See also MDGS REPORT 2012, supra
note 16, at 40.
77. Charbel Ragy, HIV/AIDS: Tackling Taboos in Africa, U.N. WORKS FOR PEOPLE AND THE
PLANET,
http://wayback.archive.org/web/20090206084408/http://www.un.org/works/sub3.asp?lang-en&id=57
(last visited Sept. 20, 2013); see generally Shereen El Feki, Middle-Eastern AIDS Efforts are Starting to
Tackle Taboos, 367 LANCET 975, 976 (2006).
78. WORLD HEALTH STATISTICS 2011, supra note 69, at 108-09.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Elaine Unterhalter et al., Essentialism, Equality, and Empowerment: Concepts of Gender and
Schooling in the HIV and Aids Epidemic, in GENDER EQUALITY, HIV, AND AIDS: A CHALLENGE FOR
THE EDUCATION SECTOR 11, 26 (Shelia Aikman et al. eds., 2008); Cynthia Dailard, Abstinence
Promotion and Teen Family Planning: The Misguided Drive for Equal Funding, GUTTMACHER REP. ON
PUB. POL'Y, Feb. 2002, at 1, 1.
82. UNAIDS REPORT 2012, supra note 13, at 17.
83. MDGs REPORT 2012, supra note 16, at 40.
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many countries is a step in the right direction. 84 But to serve as an effective tool in
the campaign against HIV/AIDS, the curricula should be regularly modified and
revised in tandem with emerging public health threats, amongst which now
includes comprehensive knowledge about HIV/AIDS and preventive measures
against infection. Furthermore, the method of communicating the message should
mirror the communication tendencies of the target population, such that where the
intended recipient of the message is adolescents, movies, drama, and cartoon
characters (featuring people within relatively similar age and experience bracket)
should be part of the project.85  Another strategy worth pursuing is employing
credible voices in the campaign such as religious, civic, and youth leaders as well
as other respectable figures in the community.
Another area where appropriate intervention could yield dramatic dividend in
reducing HIV infection is male circumcision in countries where the procedure is
not routine. This recognition underscored the WHO's endorsement of the
procedure as an "efficacious intervention for HIV prevention in countries and
regions with heterosexual epidemics, high HIV and low male circumcision
prevalence," citing, as evidence, approximately 60 percent reduction in
heterosexual infection resulting from the procedure. 86 Although most countries in
which male circumcision has been recommended have adopted the intervention
and adopted necessary implementation schemes, actual operationalization in
several countries has been lethargic, at best. By the end of 2011, six countries-
Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe-have managed
to circumcise fewer than 5 percent of the target population.8 ' These are also
amongst the countries with the highest proportion of HIV/AIDS population; and,
for these countries to woefully fail to appropriately scale up its intervention
strategy in an area, such as this, requiring minimal deployment of resources is a
source of serious concern:
84. Obiajulu Nnamuchi, The Right to Health in Nigeria 11 (2007) (Draft Report, 'Right to health
in the Middle East' project, Law School, University of Aberdeen), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1622874 (noting, in respect to Nigeria, the
government's approval of the introduction of Family Life and HIV Education (FLHE) curriculum
(formerly National Sexuality Education Curriculum) for implementation at the state and local
government levels and use in teaching reproductive sex education at secondary schools, in addition to a
national campaign promoting the use of contraceptives).
85. See MDGs REPORT 2012, supra note 16, at 40-41 (reporting, against the backdrop of targeted
media campaign on behavior change amongst adolescents, the widely positive impact of dramatizing
the experiences relating to HIV/AIDS in Kenya, Zambia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Ukraine in terms of
not only watching and learning from the program but discussing the issues raised (need to get tested,
avoidance of risky behavior, stigma, safe sex and so forth) with friends, thus spreading the message).
86. Male Circumcision for HIV Prevention, WHO,
http://www.who.int/hiv/topics/malecircumcision/en (last visited Oct. 3 2013). Contra Maria J. Wawer
et al., Circumcision in HIV-Infected Men and its Effect on HIV Transmission to Female Partners in
Rakai, Uganda: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 374 LANCET 229, 229 (2009) (finding, in contrast to
the previous studies, that male circumcision does not reduce vaginal-penile HIV infection and
recommending use of condom, even after circumcision, as a more effective prevention method).
87. UNAIDS REPORT 2012, supra note 13, at 21.
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The unit cost of voluntary medical male circumcision is relatively
low, and unlike most other prevention or treatment efforts, requires only
one-time rather than lifelong expenditure. Nevertheless, countries have
allocated relatively few resources towards scaling up this intervention,
with less than 2 [percent] of total HIV expenditure allocated to
voluntary medical male circumcision in 6 of the 14 priority countries
with data available (Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Namibia, Rwanda and
Swaziland).88
Although some of these countries (Botswana, Kenya, Namibia, and
Swaziland) have infused more resources into their national expenditure for "rolling
out" male circumcision, 9 the question which continues to resurface remains: what
about lives that could have been saved or human suffering that could have been
avoided had the urgency of the situation been a prime consideration? An
appropriate response to this question may never come. In the final analysis,
making headway in regional efforts at meeting the relevant benchmarks of MDG 6
must involve scaling up initiatives aimed at inducing behavior change, access to
condoms, encouraging male circumcision, programs specifically focused on sex
workers and men who sex with men, and access to ART. 90
D. Discrimination Against People Living With HIV/AIDS: An Affront to
Human Rights
The central question this sub-section grapples with is whether the prohibition
of international human rights law on discrimination against PLWHA has any
relevance to meeting the various benchmarks of MDG 6. This question is
necessary because in many cases, the worst aspect of the injury suffered by
PLWHA is not rooted in the physiological consequences of the disease itself but
the way society treats them, the social loss that would follow them everywhere
they go on account of their HIV/AIDS status. Meeting the relevant benchmarks of
MDG 6, particularly universal access to ART, hinges most profoundly on how
society treats its HIV/AIDS population. The heinous nature of discrimination and
the importance the international community attaches to its elimination, particularly
in the realm of health, is underscored by the requirement in the foremost
international instrument on health-the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR") 9 1-for immediate implementation, not
subject to progressive realization. 92
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 16.
91. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
92. United Nations, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (article 12 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 1 30, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000), reprinted in
United Nations, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human
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The major international human rights instruments-Universal Declaration of
Human Rights,93 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR"), 94 and the ICESCR95 --protect individuals, including PLWHA, against
being subjected to discrimination. In addition, virtually all modern constitutions
and major international and regional treaties on human rights contain similar
provision.96 Prohibition against discrimination is a legal as well as an ethical issue.
Two ethical principles are critical here. The first, principle of beneficence, or the
moral obligation to act for the benefit of other, demands that vulnerable
populations, such as PLWHA, should be treated humanely, compassionately, and
with respect. 97 The second ethical principle, nonmaleficence, proscribes actions
that would harm others, captured most eloquently in the maxim primum non
nocere (first do no harm).9 8
What would count as discrimination? Instances abound but discrimination is
typically manifested in verbal abuse, 99 physical assault,' 00 denial'o' or termination
of employment,' 02 denial or revocation of tenancy or other accommodation
rights, 0 3 denial of medical services,104 and so forth. Many of these breaches of
human rights arise out of ignorance; yet, in others, the act was purposeful. The
Rights Treaty Bodies, at 94, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.7 (May 12, 2004) [hereinafter General
Comment No. 14].
93. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (lll) A, art. 2, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(1ll) (Dec. 10, 1948) ("Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.").
94. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 2, 26, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
95. ICESCR, supra note 91, art. 2(2).
96. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, § 9; Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 2, Nov.
20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990); Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women arts. 1, 2, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force
Sept. 3, 1981); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination arts.
1, 2, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969); African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights arts. 18(3), 28, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217; Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa art. 2, July 11, 2003, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/66.6, reprinted in 1 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 40, 53-63 (2001) (entered into force Nov. 25, 2005)
[hereinafter Maputo Protocol]; African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child art. 3, July 11,
1990, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (entered into force Nov. 29, 1990).
97. See ToM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 166
(5th ed. 2001).
98. See id. at 113.
99. UNAIDS REPORT 2012, supra note 13, at 79 tbl.8.1 (reporting that 56 percent, or more than
half of PLWHA in Kenya, have been verbally abused as a result of their HIV status).
100. Id. (reporting that 28 percent of PLWHA in Nigeria have been victims of physical assault on
account of their HIV status).
101. Id. (reporting that 37 percent of PLWHA in Rwanda were denied employment as a result of
their HIV status).
102. Id. (reporting that 65 percent of PLWHA in Rwanda lost their jobs due to their HIV status).
103. See id.
104. Id. (reporting that 21 percent of PLWHA in Nigeria were denied health services as a result of
their HIV status).
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case of Georgina Ahamefule v. Imperial Medical Center & Dr. Alex Molokwu is
quite illustrative. 05 The plaintiff, who lost her job as a nurse on account of her
HIV status, was barred from entering the courtroom in which her lawsuit was
being heard because of fear that her presence would expose others in the
courtroom to risk of infection.' 06 Whether the presiding judge acted purposefully
or out of ignorance is yet to be determined. What is important is the harsh tenor of
the decision handed down by Judge Idowu, to whom the case was subsequently
transferred, "that the purported termination of the Plaintiffs employment is illegal,
unlawful and actuated by malice and extreme bad faith";107 in other words, the
termination was blatantly discriminatory. The ethical implication of discrimination
is critical both for PLWHA and those whose professional lives would involve
dealing with them, individuals upon whom PLWA would rely for therapeutic and
legal protection. There are two prongs to this problem. First, fear of
discrimination, particularly by health professionals, would dampen the motivation
to get tested. Knowing one's HIV/AIDS status is a necessary first step to
therapeutic intervention and this could be defeated by the way individuals perceive
their treatment options. An argument that has been advanced by gay rights
activists is that "fear that test result might be released to people that could
stigmatize or in some other ways negatively treat the individual would hardly
incentivize testing."'0 o This could have a domino-like effect on the health of the
community.
The second problem is related to the first. Upon knowing their status, would
PLWHA be open to receiving treatment if they fear negative consequences on
account of their newly-discovered status? The answer is clearly negative. One
may seek to undermine the critical nature of this second concern by pointing out
the number of PLWHA in various countries who are eager to receive ART but
cannot find any.'0 9 True, the number in some countries is quite staggering, but
what nobody knows for certain is the number of people who, out of fear of possible
105. Ahamefule v. Imperial Med. Centre & Dr. Alex Molokwu, [2012] (unreported) Suit No.
ID/1627/2000 (Nigeria), available at http://www.escr-
net.org/sites/default/files/Mrs%20Georgina%20Ahamefule%20v.%201mperial%20Medical%20Centre
%20%26%20Alex%2OMolukwu.pdf.
106. Id. at 1; see also Ebenezer Durojaye, So Sweet, So Sour: A Commentary on the Nigerian High
Court 's Decision in the Georgina Ahamefule v Imperial Hospital & Another Relating to the Rights of
Persons Living with HIV, 13 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 464,466 (2013).
107. Ahamefule, Suit No. ID/1627/2000, at 22 (Nigeria).
108. Obiajulu Nnamuchi & Remigius N. Nwabueze, Duty to Warn of the Risks of HIV/AIDS
Infection in Africa: An Appropriate Legal Response?, 22 ANNALS HEALTH L. 386, 399 (2013),
referencing Martha Swartz, Is There a Duty to Warn?: Does Safety Ever Warrant Releasing
Confidential Information About HIV-infected People?, HUM. RTs., Spring 1990, at 40, 45.
109. This claim is defensible on the ground that in virtually all the countries in Africa the need for
ART far outstrips supply, and this is true even in countries that are said to have achieved universal
access. See Sydney Rosen et al., Rationing Antiretroviral Therapy for HIV/AIDS in Africa: Choices and
Consequences, 2 PLOS MED. 1098, 1098-99 (2005) (discussing rationing ART because demand
outweighs supply).
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negative repercussions, should their status become known, are dying in silence.' 10
This number is usually not accounted for in official statistics because these people
typically disappear, never, in some cases, to be heard from or seen by anyone in a
position to document their need or attend to it. This, clearly, does not advance the
march toward attaining the target of universal access to ART, a key component of
MDG 6.
An obvious response to discriminatory attitudes toward PLWHA is to
establish prohibitory legal and policy frameworks especially in countries where the
vice is substantial. Because this suggestion is in tune with not only logic but
common sense, one would assume universal existence of such frameworks. Yet, in
2012, only 61 percent of countries report the existence of such laws in their
territories; meaning, as UNAIDS laments, "in the epidemic's fourth decade, nearly
4 in 10 countries worldwide still lack any specific legal provisions to prevent or
address HIV-related discrimination.""' But merely having such laws in national
criminal codes or in some other legislative regime does not automatically ensure
protection for PLWHA. For such result to materialize, two things are necessary.
First is awareness. PLWHA need to be educated about the existence of such laws
and how they protect their interests. A knowledge gap in this area has meant that,
as attested to in surveys conducted in more than forty countries, very few of those
that have been victims of HIV-related discrimination knew where or how to access
legal remedy.' 12 Second, the effectiveness of any legislative regime is measured
by the rate of compliance; and the compliance level itself is a product of
consciousness about the rationales undergirding the framework. Establishing a
punitive legal regime without laying the necessary background for attitudinal
changes in the desired direction would amount to an exercise in futility. Many of
the negative treatments received by PLWHA in sub-Sahara Africa are products of
ignorance or misperception of the state of affairs by the general public. The case
of Ahamefule above is illustrative." 3 Sensitization campaigns aimed at educating
the people about the disease and the true risk posed by sufferers would go a long
110. See, e.g., Bradford McIntyre, Understanding HIV/AIDS, POSITIVELY POSITIVE (Dec. 2001),
http://www.positivelypositive.ca/articles/aids.html (explaining the fear that people have about revealing
their disease and the consequences involved, including the lack of proper treatment).
Il l. UNAIDS REPORT 2012, supra note 13, at 80. But this conclusion should be approached with
caution. Apart from the fact that the numbers were derived from submissions by NGOs, some of which,
presumably, might not represent the most credible sources of that kind of information, absence of HIV-
specific anti-discrimination legal regime does not necessarily translate to non-protection for PLWHA.
See id. at 81. For instance, Nigeria was amongst the countries represented as lacking an HIV-specific
anti-discrimination statute, yet as the case of Ahamefade, discussed previously, shows the country has a
robust framework that adequately protects PLWHA. Id. fig.8.2.
112. Id.
113. See notes 105-08 and accompanying text; see also Nnamuchi, The Right to Health in Nigeria,
supra note 84, at I1, 13-15 (suggesting that increasing the public's awareness and knowledge regarding
reproductive health information and services are crucial to PLWHA).
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way in ensuring optimal protection of the interests of PLWHA in all aspects of
living." 4
III. MALARIA
Behind the statistics and graphs lies a great and needless
tragedy: malaria-an entirely preventable and treatable
disease-still takes the life of an African child every minute. The
most vulnerable communities in the world continue to lack
sufficient access to long-lasting insecticidal nets, indoor residual
spraying, diagnostic testing, and artemisinin-based combination
therapies.
- Margaret Chan, WHO Director-General
A. Impact and Relevant Benchmarks
Target 6C-to have halted and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria by
2015-is of special relevance to Africa." 6 Because Africa shoulders the greatest
burden of the disease, it stands to reap greater benefit than any other region from
reduction in its occurrence. In 2011, an estimated 3.3 billion people were at the
risk of malaria worldwide, with the highest number of cases (80 percent) in sub-
Sahara Africa.'" 7  The region also leads the rest of the world in the number of
malaria-related deaths, accounting for 90 percent of all mortalities reported within
the same period.''1 As high as 25-35 percent of outpatient visits, 20-45 percent of
hospital admissions, and 15-35 percent of hospital deaths are attributable to
114. Dividends inevitable from this type of intervention, resulting from attitudinal changes, are
already evident in countries seriously committed to improving the socioeconomic circumstances of
PLWHA. See UNAIDS REPORT 2012, supra note 13, at 84 (reporting that an overwhelming majority of
people in Lesotho, 80 percent of the population, would accept as teachers people who are HIV positive
and would buy farm produce from an HIV infected vendor, and in Haiti, a community-based, anti-
stigma campaign resulted in significant growth in the number of people submitting to screening for HIV
and TB).
115. Margaret Chan, Foreword to WHO, WORLD MALARIA REPORT 2012, at v, v (2012)
[hereinafter WORLD MALARIA REPORT 2012], available at
http://www.who.int/malaria/publications/world-malaria-report-2012/report/en.
116. More ambitious targets have since been adopted. See, e.g., World Health Assembly Res. 58.2,
Rep. of the World Health Assembly, 58th Sess., May 16-25, 2005, WHA58/2005/REC/l, at 4-5 (May
23, 2005) (setting a new target of reducing malaria cases and mortalities by 75 percent by 2015 from
2000 levels); ROLL BACK MALARIA, REFINED/UPDATED GMAP OBJECTIVES, TARGETS, MILESTONES
AND PRIORITIES BEYOND 2011, at I (stating the retention of the target of achieving a 75 percent
reduction in malaria cases by 2015, like the WHA Resolution, but adding an objective of reducing
malaria mortalities to near zero by the end of 2015). The two new targets were established in 2005 and
2011 respectively. See WORLD MALARIA REPORT2012, supra note 115, at 13.
117. WORLD MALARIA REPORT 2012, supra note 115, at 1.
118. Id.
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malaria in high-burden African countries ("HBCs") (that is, the top twenty two
countries ranked in terms of absolute number of cases).'19
There is also an economic dimension to this problem. Annually, malaria
slows economic growth in the region by 1.3 percent,' 20 resulting in 32 percent
lower regional GDP than would have been the case without the occurrence of the
disease.121 The huge toll exacted by malaria on Africans is such that countries in
the region have made its eradication a centerpiece of regional health strategies. 122
Thus, even before the MDGs, these countries have joined forces to mitigate the
impact of the disease amongst their respective populations. The Abuja Declaration
on Roll Back Malaria in Africa, adopted by African heads of state and government
in April 2000, set a target of halving malaria mortality in Africa by 2010, by
ensuring that by 2005 at least 60 percent of those suffering from, or at the risk of,
malaria have timely access to appropriate preventive or curative measures. 123
B. Special Population Groups
Pregnant women and children are particularly vulnerable to malaria attack.
Due to reduced immunity during pregnancy and low immunity in the case of
children, they are more susceptible to malaria than the general population.124
Although other regions are also affected, the situation is worst in Africa. For
instance, the post-neonatal child death rate attributable to malaria in 2010 was 7
percent globally but 15 percent in Africa.125 The good news is that countries are
increasingly becoming cognizant of the special risk category of these vulnerable
segments of the population, explaining, for instance, the creative ways being
adopted in the distribution of insecticide-treated bed nets ("ITNs"). In Africa,
thirty-three of the forty countries that distribute ITNs free of charge do so through
antenatal clinics whereas twenty-seven countries distribute them through children's
immunization clinics.126 For these two groups, intermittent preventive malaria
("IPT") therapy is recommended.127
119. ROLL BACK MALARIA, WHO & UNICEF, WORLD MALARIA REPORT 2005, at xvii, 21 (2005)
[hereinafter WORLD MALARIA REPORT 2005], available at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2005/9241593199 eng.pdfua=1.
120. ROLL BACK MALARIA & WHO, THE ABUJA DECLARATION AND THE PLAN OF ACTION 1
(2003) [hereinafter THE ABUJA DECLARATION], available at
http://sa.au.int/en/sites/default/files/AbujaDeclaration_2000.pdf.
121. Id.
122. E.g., id.
123. Id. at4-5.
124. Julianna Schantz-Dunn & Nawal M. Nour, Malaria and Pregnancy: A Global Health
Perspective, 2 REVIEWS IN OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 186, 188-90 (2009); Lives at Risk, WHO
(Apr. 25, 2003), http://www.who.int/features/2003/04b/en.
125. WORLD MALARIA REPORT 2012, supra note 115, at 13 (citing Li Liu et at., Global, Regional,
and National Causes of Child Mortality: An Updated Systematic Analysis for 2010 with Time Trends
Since 2000, 379 LANCET 2151, 2156 (2012)).
126. WORLD MALARIA REPORT 2012, supra note 115, at 23.
127. Id. at 6 (defining IPT as the "administration of a full course of an effective antimalarial
treatment at specified time points to a defined population at risk of malaria, regardless of whether they
are parasitaemic, with the objective of reducing the malaria burden in the specific target population").
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C Prevention, Control, and Treatment Challenges
Defeating malaria will require a high level of political
commitment, strengthened regional cooperation, and the
engagement of a number of sectors outside of health, including
finance, education, defence, environment, mining, industry and
tourism. The fight against this disease needs to be integrated
into the overall development agenda in all endemic countries. 128
- Margaret Chan, WHO Director-General
The Abuja Declaration on Rollback Malaria is strikingly similar to the
commitment explicit in Target 6C.129 Both are aimed at arresting the incidence of,
and mortality associated with malaria through a set of preventive, management,
and curative interventions. 130 The availability of these interventions to children
under five is a proxy for the likelihood of attaining the Target since children in this
age group are at the greatest risk of developing and dying from malaria."' MDG 6
specifies two relevant indicators for gauging country progress: (i) the proportion of
children under five sleeping under ITNs; and (ii) those with fever that are treated
with appropriate anti-malarial drugs.132  On these two fronts, African countries
have historically lagged behind-the reason, in part, for the high mortality
associated with the disease in the region. But recent changes in strategy are
beginning to bear fruits. Owing to increased funding, global distribution of
mosquito nets by manufacturers has witnessed an astronomical growth, rising from
6 million in 2004 to 145 million in 2010.133 This has resulted in the delivery of
about 326 million nets by manufacturers from 2009 to 2011-a significant
achievement, although to reach universal coverage, a total of about 450 million are
needed.134
See also id. at 31-34. As of 2011, 34 of the 43 countries in Africa described as "endemic countries/areas
with ongoing transmission of P. falciparn" have adopted policies for IPT for Pregnant Women
(IPTp). Id. at 32. Regarding IPT for infants (IPTi), only Burkina Faso has incorporated the strategy in
its antimalarial policy, although plans are underway in several countries to follow suit. Id.
128. Margaret Chan, Foreword to WORLD MALARIA REPORT 2012, supra note 115, at v.
129. Compare THE ABUJA DECLARATION, supra note 120, at 4 ("Halve the malaria mortality for
Africa's people by 2010. . . ."), with MDG Indicators, supra note 3, Target 6.C ("Have halted by 2015
and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria . . . .").
130. THE ABUJA DECLARATION, supra note 120, at 4-5; MDG Indicators, supra note 3.
131. See WORLD MALARIA REPORT 2012, supra note 115, at 1.
132. MDG Indicators, supra note 3, Indicators 6.7, 6.8.
133. WORLD MALARIA REPORT 2012, supra note 115, at 23-24. There has been a steady annual
upsurge in the level of "[i]nternational disbursements to malaria-endemic countries [that have]
increased . .. from less than US$ 100 million in 2000 to US$ 1.71 billion in 2010 and were estimated to
be US$ 1.66 billion in 2011 and US$ 1.84 billion in 2012." Id. at 15. Most of the funds disbursed to
malaria endemic countries for malaria control came from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis
and Malaria, which accounted for 39 percent and 40 percent of estimated disbursed funds in 2011 and
2012 respectively. Id. Other major sources of funding are "the US President's Malaria Initiative (PMI)
and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID), which accounted for
310% and 11 % respectively of estimated disbursements in 2011-2012." Id.
134. Id. at 23-24.
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Despite this apparent gap, the huge increase in net production and distribution
has boosted the number of children sleeping under ITNs, from 2 percent in 2000 to
22 percent in 2008 in twenty-six African countries for which data is available
(representing 71 percent of children less than five in the region).' 3 5 More recent
data indicates that the proportion of children sleeping under ITNs in Africa has
risen to 39 percent in 2010.136 This is quite an encouraging development but the
proportion of children covered is still far from adequate, especially when viewed in
light of more concrete targets such as 60 percent access to ITNs for children less
than five by 2005 set by the Abuja Declaration.' Parental poverty is to blame for
the low coverage rate as evident in a finding showing that children under five in
wealthier households are more likely than their counterparts in poorer families to
sleep under ITNs.'3 8 While most countries in the region subscribe to the WHO's
policy of providing ITNs free of charge or at subsidized rates,' 3 9 dwindling
resources has constrained full operationalization of the measure.140
The second of the two indicators noted above is the proportion of children
under five with fever who are treated with appropriate anti-malarial drugs. The
standard treatment, as recommended by the WHO, for treating P. falciparum
malaria-the most common in Africa-is artemisinin-based combination therapies
("ACTs").141 This was in response to growing resistance of P. falciparum
parasites to "conventional antimalarial drugs such as chloroquine and sulfadoxine-
pyrimethamine." 4 2  Similar to ITNs, rising levels of funding led to increased
procurement of anti-malarial drugs but the need for ACTs was not met in any
country for which data is available, the most recent derived from a 2008 survey.143
The survey (covering 10 countries) shows that just 32 percent of children with
fever in the two weeks preceding the survey received any anti-malarial
treatment.144 An even lower number (16 percent) of children with fever received
any ACT, although only seven countries submitted data. 145 Again, as with low
135. MDGs REPORT 2010, supra note 23, at 47-48.
136. MDGs REPORT 2012, supra note 16, at 43.
137. THE ABUJA DECLARATION, supra note 120, at 5.
138. MDGs REPORT 2010, supra note 23, at 48; see also WORLD MALARIA REPORT 2012, supra
note 115, at 26 fig.4.1b.
139. WHO, WORLD MALARIA REPORT 2011, at 27 (2011), available at
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/44792/2/9789241564403 engfull.pdf [hereinafter WORLD
MALARIA REPORT 2011].
140. Notwithstanding resource constraints, Africa leads the rest of the world in the number of ITNs
distributed free of charge (thirty-eight of eighty-nine countries) and ITNs sold at subsidized rates
(twenty-one of twenty-four countries). See WORLD MALARIA REPORT 2012, supra note 115, at 23
tbl.4.1.
141. WORLD MALARIA REPORT 2005, supra note 119, at 14.
142. Id.
143. WHO, WORLD HEALTH STATISTICs 2010, at 16 (2010), available at
http://www.who.int/whosis/whostat/ENWHS 10 Full.pdf.
144. WHO, WORLD MALARIA REPORT 2009, at 20 (2009) [hereinafter WORLD MALARIA REPORT
2009], available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2009/9789241563901 eng.pdf.
145. Id.
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ITNs coverage, resource constraints are to blame for limited access to anti-malarial
medicine.
Against the background of low ownership of mosquito nets and inadequate
access to anti-malarial therapy, one might ask whether it is not quite unrealistic to
expect that malaria incidence in Africa will have been halted and in decline by
2015, as required by Target 6C. To be sure, there has been large-scale infusion of
resources, especially from external sources, to national malaria control strategies in
the region. 146 But the investments have been insufficient to make up for the
deficits in national strategies. According to the 2008 Global Malaria Action Plan,
the amount of resources required annually between 2011 and 2015 for global
malaria control will exceed $5.1 billion annuallyl47 and in Africa alone, an
estimated $2.3 billion will be required every year within the same period. 148 Yet,
the total amount of funds (from domestic and international sources) in 2011 was
estimated to be $2.3 billion, leaving a whopping deficit of $2.8 billion in the global
budget.149 And, to make matters worse, current projection indicates no respite any
time soon; in fact, total funding package will stagnate at less than $2.7 billion
annually between 2013 and 2015."0 Considering that many African countries are
dependent on foreign support for major portions of their malaria budgets' (and,
therefore, cannot look inward), the implication of this resource gap is that unless
funds are sourced elsewhere, this shortfall might mean the difference between
progress, or lack thereof, in the fight against malaria in the region.
Indeed, there appears to be a strong correlation between external funding and
incidence of malaria. Evidence is beginning to emerge showing that increased
receipt of external funding leads to a decrease in malaria burden.152 Amongst
countries receiving more than $7 per person at risk, 60 percent reported a decline
in malaria cases since 2000, versus only 26 percent of those receiving $7 or less.1 53
But the exact impact on countries is unclear as other factors such as the capacity of
individual countries to produce funds internally in order to offset decline in
external support cannot be discounted and can affect the overall picture, positively
or otherwise. This might explain why the result is mixed, even amongst endemic
countries, some of which are highly aid-dependent. Uganda's malaria cases
declined by more than 3 million in 2006 from its 2005 level (16 million); Tanzania
reported 11.5 million cases in 2005 but improved to 10.5 million the following
year; and, in Nigeria, there were around 3.5 and 3 million episodes of malaria in
2005 and 2007 respectively, a reduction of one-half million cases in just two
146. Id. at 58 (reporting that funding for malaria control has gone up fivefold from $0.3 billion per
year in 2003 to $1.7 billion in 2009); WORLD MALARIA REPORT 2012, supra note 115, at 17.
147. WORLD MALARIA REPORT 2012, supra note 115, at 17.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. ROLL BACK MALARIA, THE GLOBAL MALARIA ACTION PLAN: FOR A MALARIA-FREE WORLD
36 (2008), available at http://www.rollbackmalaria.org/gmap/gmap.pdf.
152. WORLD MALARIA REPORT 2009, supra note 144, at 65.
153. Id.
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years.154 On the other hand, in Niger, cases skyrocketed from nearly 900,000 in
2006, to 1.3 million the following year, and in Malawi, the number rose from 3.7
million cases in 2005 to 4.2 million in 2007.'ss Is there any lesson to draw from
these disparities?
What the disparities demonstrate quite starkly is that the paramount
determinant of whether Africa would succeed in its fight against malaria is the
capacity of governments in the region to scale up the key elements of national anti-
malaria strategies. And this finds support in recent experiences in some countries.
In Eritrea, the distribution of more than a million mosquito nets between 2000 and
2006 forced a decline in malaria cases and mortality by more than 70 percent.156
The strategy has been replicated in South Africa. Following the introduction of
ACTs and better mosquito control in response to increasing resistance to drugs and
insecticides in the country, its number of cases and mortality plummeted by 80
percent between 2000 and 2006.157
IV. OTHER DISEASES (TUBERCULOSIS)
A. Impact and Relevant Benchmarks
Though the term "other diseases" in MDG 6 is not defined, scholars have
focused on TB as the most critical of the diseases. 1ss TB is considered the most
critical for three reasons: (i) high prevalence in several countries; (ii) high
mortality (second after HIV); and (iii) close association with HIV/AIDS (they
drive and reinforce one another),' 59 the reason the two are sometimes referred to as
"co-epidemics" or "dual epidemics." 60 The Target committed to by countries
regarding TB is to have halted and begun to reverse its incidence by 2015.161 This
obligation is measurable by the incidence ("number of new and relapse cases of
TB arising in a given time period, usually one year or absolute numbers"),1 62
154. WHO, WORLD MALARIA REPORT 2008, at 146 (2008) [hereinafter WORLD MALARIA REPORT
2008], available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241563697_eng.pdf See also
supra note 140.
155. WORLD MALARIA REPORT 2008, supra note 154, at 146.
156. U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT
2008, at 31-32, U.N. Sales No. E.08.I.18 (2008) [hereinafter MDGs REPORT 2008], available at
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2008highlevel/pdf/newsroom/mdg%20reports/MDGReport 2008
ENGLISH.pdf.
157. Id. at 32.
158. See, e.g., David H. Molyneux, Combating the "Other Diseases" of MDG 6: Changing the
Paradigm to Achieve Equity and Poverty Reduction?, 102 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y TROPICAL
MED. & HYGIENE 509, 510 (2008).
159. MDGs REPORT 2010, supra note 23, at 50; WHO, GLOBAL TUBERCULOSIS REPORT 2012, at 3
box.1.1 (2012) [hereinafter GLOBAL TUBERCULOSIS REPORT 2012], available at
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/75938/1/9789241564502 eng.pdf.
160. WHO, WHO POLICY ON COLLABORATIVE TB/HIV ACTIVITIES: GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL
PROGRAMMES AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS 10 (2012), available at
http://whqIibdoc.who.int/publications/2012/9789241503006-eng.pdfua= 1.
161. MDG Indicators, supra note 3.
162. GLOBAL TUBERCULOSIS REPORT 2012, supra note 159, at 8.
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prevalence ("number of cases of TB at a given point in time" or rate of
occurrence), 63 and death rates, as well as proportion of cases detected and cured
under directly observed treatment short course ("DOTS").16 4  In 2006, two
additional targets, linked to the MDGs, were added by the Stop TB Partnership's
Global Plan to Stop TBi 65 -to halve TB prevalence and death rates by 2015, using
1990 as a baseline; and by 2050, eliminate TB as a public health threat.'66 The
original Target, to have halted and begun to reverse the incidence of TB by 2015,
has already been achieved.'67 The TB incidence has been declining globally for
some years and between 2010 and 2011 declined at 2 percent.168  TB-related
mortality rate has also been declining in all regions, 41 percent since 1990
(excluding deaths amongst HIV-positive people).169  Despite this positive
development, however, TB remains a critical public health challenge. In 2011,
there were an estimated 8.7 million incidences of TB (13 percent co-infected with
HIV) and 1.4 million TB-related deaths. 70
Most cases of TB infection (raw number) occur in South-East Asia and
Western Pacific regions (60 percent), and although Africa accounts for 24 percent
of the global burden, the region shoulders the highest rates of cases and mortalities
per capita.171 It also leads the rest of the world in terms of proportion of TB cases
co-infected with HIV, at 39 percent. 172 Of the twenty-two countries classified by
the WHO as HBCs, nine or nearly half are in Africa, with South Africa,
Zimbabwe, and Mozambique listed as the top three countries in total incident cases
(per 100,000) reported in 2011.'
In terms of global prevalence, there were an estimated 12 million cases in
2011 or 170 cases per 100,000 population.' 74  The prevalence rate has been
163. Id.
164. MDG Indicators, supra note 3, Indicators 6.9, 6.10.
165. This is the second Global Plan to Stop TB (effective 2006-2015). STOP TB PARTNERSHIP, THE
GLOBAL PLAN TO STOP TB: 2006-2015, at 24-25 (2006) [hereinafter GLOBAL PLAN TO STOP TB],
available at http://www.stoptb.org/assets/documents/global/plan/GlobalPlanFinal.pdf. The first covered
the period 2001-2005. Id. The Plan (a WHO initiative) is a funding program that was launched at the
World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on January 26, 2006, under the auspices of Stop TB
Partnership. See WORLD ECON. FORUM, ANNUAL REPORT 2005/06, at 27 (2006), available at
http://www.weforum.org/pdf/AnnualReport/2006/annual-report.pdf Designed to bridge funding gaps
in global TB prevention and treatment, the Plan aims to raise and spend $56 billion between 2006 and
2015 on: ensuring that TB-related MDG Target is met, saving 14 million lives, providing universal
access to treatment, and developing new diagnostic tests, new drugs and vaccines. GLOBAL PLAN TO
STOP TB, at 49.
166. STOP TB PARTNERSHIP & WHO, THE STOP TB STRATEGY: BUILDING ON AND ENHANCING
DOTS TO MEET THE TB-RELATED MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 8 (2006) [hereinafter THE STOP
TB STRATEGY], available at http://www.who.int/tb/publications/2006/stop_tb_strategy.pdf.
167. GLOBAL TUBERCULOSIS REPORT 2012, supra note 159, at 8.
168. Id. at 8.
169. Id. at 8, 17.
170. Id. at 8-9.
171. Id. at 2.
172. Id. at 11.
173. Id. at I tbl.2.2.
174. Id. at 16.
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declining since 1990 in all regions, including Africa, although the rate of decline
varies widely around the world.'7 5 This regional variation suggests that the Stop
TB Partnership's target of cutting the TB prevalence by half by 2015 from its 1990
level will not be met worldwide.' 7 6  Whereas in some regions, such as the
Americas, where the target has been attained, and in Europe and South-East Asia,
where the target appears feasible, Africa is off track. 7 7 Globally, an estimated
990,000 deaths (14 per 100,000 population) occurred in 2011 among incident TB
cases who were HIV-negative and an estimated 0.43 million deaths among those
that were HIV-positive.'7 8 The Stop TB Partnership's target of halving TB deaths
by 2015 compared to its 1990 level appears likely to be met in all regions except
two, including Africa.179
B. Special Population Groups
No population group stands at greater risk of TB infection than HIV patients.
This is because decreased immunity resulting from HIV infection renders the
person more susceptible to contracting TB.' 80 This explains why many HIV-
positive individuals are also TB-positive, the reason as indicated above, the two are
sometimes referred to as dual or co-epidemics. In 2011, 23 percent of people
living with TB who were screened for HIV tested positive.'" Mortality amongst
this population, although falling, is still very high. TB-related deaths amongst
people living with HIV have declined by 25 percent globally since 2004, and in
sub-Sahara Africa-home to nearly 80 percent of all people living with both TB
and HIV-by 28 percent.' 82
For this vulnerable population group, a somewhat different intervention
protocol is warranted by their special circumstances. Access to ART for people
living with HIV, especially from the onset of the infection, is needed to prevent
them from subsequently acquiring and dying from TB.183 As a recent study shows,
prompt access to ART resulted in 65 percent reduction in risk of TB illness
amongst people living with HIV.184 In sharp contrast to the general population, for
people living with HIV and TB, it is recommended that ART should be initiated as
early as possible irrespective of their CD4 count,'8 5 the idea being to protect them
against contracting TB. Yet, in 2011, just 46 percent of people living with both
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 17.
179. Id. at 17-19.
180. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, TUBERCULOSIS: THE CONNECTION BETWEEN TB AND HIV
(THE AIDS VIRUS) (2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/tb/publications/pamphlets/TB-
HIVEng.PDF.
181. UNAIDS REPORT 2012, supra note 13, at 58.
182. Id.; GLOBAL TUBERCULOSIS REPORT 2012, supra note 159, at 2.
183. UNAIDS REPORT 2012, supra note 13, at 59.
184. Id. (citing Amitabh B. Suthar et al., Antiretroviral Therapy for Prevention of Tuberculosis in
Adults with HIV: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, PLOS MED., July 2012, at 1, 11).
185. Id.
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HIV and TB in sub-Sahara Africa received ART.186 But aside from early initiation
of treatment, TB testing should also be integrated into national HIV prevention and
management strategies, and vice versa. In that case, a positive test to HIV
automatically triggers TB screening and vice versa. Knowledge of one's status,
TB or HIV, is a necessary first step in initiating treatment and protecting oneself
from preventable morbidity and even death.
A subset of this special population or vulnerable group is pregnant women
living with HIV. Their vulnerability is striking because apart from reduced
immunity to a multitude of pathogenic conditions, including TB, ordinarily
occasioned by pregnancy, for those living with HIV, the risk of developing TB is
more than ten times higher than amongst HIV-negative pregnant women.'" As in
all cases involving maternal health, a prime consideration is the unborn child. In
the case of TB, there has been a number of adverse obstetric and perinatal
outcomes identified, including a very high risk of mother-to-child transmission of
HIV and increased risk of maternal as well as infant mortalities.' To reduce these
risks, it is recommended that (since, as noted above, ART reduces the risk of TB
by 65 percent irrespective of CD4 level) early ART should be combined with
regular TB screening at prenatal clinics to ensure that the women receive isoniazid
preventive therapy 89 or early treatment for active TB. 90
C. Prevention, Control, and Treatment Challenges
To achieve the 2015 global targets, the WHO recommends that every country
adopt the Stop TB Strategy.191 The major components of the Stop TB Strategy are
to: (i) pursue high quality DOTS expansion and enhancement; (ii) address
TB/HIV, multidrug resistant TB (MDR-TB), and the needs of poor and vulnerable
populations; (iii) contribute to health system strengthening based on primary health
care; (iv) engage all care providers; (v) empower people with TB and communities
through partnership; and (vi) enable and promote research.192 Among these six
components, the most critical is the DOTS protocol.193 This is because success in
eradicating TB hinges most crucially on early detection and effective treatment,
both of which are the pillars of DOTS.194 The introduction of DOTS by the WHO
in the mid-1990s led to significant strides in the international effort to control and
manage TB.' 9 5 The DOTS protocol is multipronged, involving scaling up of TB
financing, appropriate diagnosis of TB, standardized treatment, continuous access
186. Id. at 60.
187. Id. at 47.
188. UNAIDS REPORT 2012, supra note 13, at 47 (citing Haileyesus Getahun et al., Prevention,
Diagnosis, and Treatment of Tuberculosis in Children and Mothers: Evidence for Action for Maternal,
Neonatal, and Child Health Services, 205 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASEs S216, S216-27 (2012)).
189. GLOBAL TUBERCULOSIS REPORT 2012, supra note 159, at 3.
190. UNAIDS REPORT 2012, supra note 13, at 47.
191. See GLOBAL PLAN TO STOP TB, supra note 165, at 16.
192. GLOBAL TUBERCULOSIS REPORT 2012, supra note 159, at 4 box. 1.2.
193. THE STOP TB STRATEGY, supra note 166, at 9.
194. Id. at 4.
195. Id.
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to high quality anti-TB drugs, and tracking treatment outcomes.1 96 DOTS has been
adopted by virtually every country as the foundation of national TB control
programs, and the result has been successes on multiple fronts.' 97  The case
detection rate for new smear-positive cases is on the rise globally,198 although the
least improvement was reported in Africa (at around 60 percent).199 Likewise, the
treatment success rate for new smear-positive cases has steadily increased since
1995200 and now stands at 87 percent (based on 2010 data).20' Despite Africa's
failure to attain 85 percent treatment success rate, which was the benchmark set by
the World Health Assembly in 1991, the region fared well compared to other
regions, at 82 percent compared to 77 percent in the region of the Americas and 67
percent in Europe.202
The positive development across the globe can be traced to growing
investment in TB control programs in the 22 HBCs, which began in 2002 and has
consistently gone up each year. 203 Despite increased funding, however, gaps still
remain. The National TB control program ("NTP") budgets in most African
countries have fallen prey to this deficit, resulting in scaling back of a range of
critical interventions. Funding deficit projected for 2013 among HBCs in Africa
ranges from $36 million (NTP budget of $51 million) in Kenya to $5.2 million
($14 million NTP budget) in the Democratic Republic of Congo.204 The huge gap
between NTP budgets in these countries and available funds does not bode well for
scaling up of interventions that are vital to reaching the various global TB targets
enumerated above.
Each component of the Stop TB Strategy, particular DOTS, requires huge
capital outlay, without which progress cannot be assured. Not surprisingly, the
result is mixed. As to incidence of TB (Target 6C), the rate is declining in Africa
(3.1 percent between 2010 and 2011), as in the rest of the regions of the world. 205
The second (and more important) target set by the Stop TB Partnership's Global
196. Id. at 9-ll.
197. Id. at 4.
198. GLOBAL TUBERCULOSIS REPORT 2012, supra note 159, at 35 (reporting that the attainment of
66 percent, a significant improvement from 53-59 percent in 2005 and 38-43 percent in 1995).
199. Id. (meaning that Africa failed to meet the first Global Plan (2000-2005) Target of detecting
by 2005, at least 70 percent of new sputum smear-positive cases-that is, three years past the Target
deadline).
200. Id. at 36 (reporting that regarding the latest year for which data was available (2010) treatment
success rate of 87 percent was achieved, marking the fourth consecutive year that the target of 85
percent, which was set by the World Health Assembly in 1991, was met or exceeded worldwide); see
also WHO, GLOBAL TUBERCULOSIS CONTROL: A SHORT UPDATE TO THE 2009 REPORT II tbl.5 (2009)
[hereinafter GLOBAL TUBERCULOSIS CONTROL], available at
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/34D6472DD50D01 F94925768C00245048-
WHO DecO9.pdf (charting out the treatment success rates among new smear-positive cases between
1994-2007).
201. GLOBAL TUBERCULOSIS REPORT 2012, supra note 159, at 36.
202. Id.
203. GLOBAL TUBERCULOSIS CONTROL, supra note 200, at 20.
204. GLOBAL TUBERCULOSIS REPORT 2012, supra note 159, at 55.
205. Id. at 11-12.
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Plan to Stop TB-halving the 1990 TB prevalence and mortality rates by
2015 206-is more problematic for African countries. Since TB prevalence rate
(including HIV-positive population) in the region was 300 cases per 100,000
population in 1990, achieving the target requires reducing the number of cases to
150 by 2015,207 a herculean task considering that prevalence rate in the region is
going in the opposite direction, rising to 490 cases per 100,000 population in
2008.208 The WHO notes that the target has been achieved in one region and
within reach in others, but not in Africa and one other region. 209 The mortality rate
remains equally grave. The 2010 TB mortality rate of 30 deaths per 100,000
population (excluding HIV-positive people) is just slightly less than the 1990 level
(37 deaths),210 indicating significant progress has not been accomplished. These
troubling statistics led the WHO to conclude, rather trenchantly, that reaching
these targets by 2015 "appears impossible in African countries." 211 So what to do?
V. HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS: MORE THAN ACCESS TO MEDICINE
An apt point to initiate a discussion on a human rights-driven analysis of the
obligation of governments in Africa in respect to the scourge of HIV/AIDS,
malaria, and TB is to emphasize two crucial points that are essential to properly
contextualize the issues. First, is to note that neither MDG 6 nor any of the other
health-MDGs imposes substantially novel obligations on the governments in the
region or, for that matter, anywhere else. Previous global or regional legal and
policy frameworks have sought to address these problems by targeting specific
diseases2 12 or seeking their elimination through a broader umbrella, the health-as-a-
human right approach.2 13  An instance of the former is the Abuja Declaration
which commits African countries to "[h]alve the malaria mortality for Africa's
people by 2010.",214 This commitment is remarkably similar to Target 6C of MDG
6 (to "[h]ave halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria"), the
only difference being a five year interval in the deadlines. 2 15  The Abuja
Declaration was adopted four months earlier than the MDGs. 216
An international policy document that espoused a more cosmopolitan
approach is the WHO's Global Strategy for Health for All by the Year 2000, which
was adopted in 1979, with the goal of attainment by all people of the world by the
206. THE STOP TB STRATEGY, supra note 166, at 8.
207. See MDGs REPORT 2010, supra note 23, at 51.
208. Id.
209. GLOBAL TUBERCULOSIS REPORT 2012, supra note 159, at 16.
210. MDGs REPORT 2012, supra note 16, at 44.
211. GLOBAL TUBERCULOSIS CONTROL, supra note 200, at 26.
212. See MDG Indicators, supra note 3.
213. See WHO, GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR HEALTH FOR ALL BY THE YEAR 2000, at 7, 15 (1981)
[hereinafter GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR HEALTH], available at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/9241800038.pdf.
214. THE ABUJA DECLARATION, supra note 120, at 4.
215. MGD Indicators, supra note 3.
216. THE ABUJA DECLARATION, supra note 120, at 4 (the Abuja Declaration was adopted in April
2000 while the MDGs were adopted in September 2000).
274 VOL. 42:2
2014 MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL 6: A HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS
year 2000 of a level of health that would permit them to lead socially and
economically productive lives.217 The year set aside for achieving the goal of the
strategy has come and gone, and yet the world remains as far off from achieving
health for all as when the thirty-second World Health Assembly adopted the
original resolution establishing the strategy. This important global policy
framework shares several similarities with the MDGs project, particularly in terms
of the end goal and associated programs. Had this previous attempt by the WHO
at radically improving global health succeeded, there would certainly have been no
need for the health MDGs. Moreover, as recognized in the Millennium
Development Project, "human rights (economic, social, and cultural rights) already
encompass many of the Goals, such as those for poverty, hunger, education, health,
and the environment." 218 This means the existence of extant obligations on those
African countries (the vast majority) that have ratified the foremost international
bill on economic, social and cultural rights-the ICESCR. 2 19 Will international
health policy succeed where international human rights legal framework failed?
Only time will tell.
The second point worthy of note (and very critical to positioning human rights
as a key contributor to attaining Goal 6) relates to how to conceptualize health. A
recent explanation was quite on point:
Diseases and illnesses do not just reveal a subpar performance of the
physiological and biochemical functioning of the human system; they
represent something more sinister. Morbidities (and human suffering
that accompanies it) are manifestations of a much deeper socioeconomic
and political pathology: the factors responsible for excess exposure or
susceptibility to circumstances that combine to create the need for
therapeutic intervention in the first place. More than anything else,
including improving access to health services, reversing the status quo
requires sustainable and unwavering action on multiple fronts . . . . This
217. GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR HEALTH, supra note 213, at 7, 15. The Global Strategy was launched
in 1979 at the 32nd World Health Assembly via resolution WHA32.30, although the original idea for
global pursuit of health for all by the year 2000 was conceived at the 30th World Health Assembly in
1977 (WHA 30.43). World Health Assembly Res. 32.30, Rep. of the World Health Assembly, 32nd
Sess., May 7-25, 1979, WHA32/1979/REC/l, at 56 (May 25,1979); see generally DON A. FRANCO,
POVERTY AND THE CONTINUING GLOBAL HEALTH CRISIS 63 (2009) (analyzing the link between the
Global Strategy and the MDGs) (where in the author's opinion, the MDGs constitute a "sequel to one of
the most ambitious commitments of the twentieth century to health through the objectives outlined in
Health for All by the Year 2000").
218. U.N. MILLENNIUM PROJECT, INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: A PRACTICAL PLAN TO ACHIEVE
THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 119 (2005), available at
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/MainReportComplete-lowres.pdf.
219. United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Dec. 16, 1966),
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=IV-3&chapter-4&lang-en
(last visited Apr. 10, 2014) (showing that only three countries in Africa-South Africa, Comoros, and
Sao Tome and Principe-are yet to ratify the treaty).
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is the real antidote to the paralytic performance that has dogged health
systems in Africa for decades. 220
This statement speaks to a broader conceptualization of health, one that is
more intimately aligned with the WHO's definition of health as achieving "a state
of complete physical, mental and social well-being." 22' This is the prism from
which the various obligations undertaken by countries in Africa regarding the
health of the population should be evaluated, despite the seemingly parochial
constriction of the terms of specific legal provisions. By becoming parties to the
treaty, these countries obligate themselves to, inter alia, "recognize the right of
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health."222 An almost identical, although somewhat broader, obligation is
imposed by the Africa Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.223 In addition to
recognizing the right to health, countries in Africa voluntarily took the additional
step of committing themselves to "take . . . necessary measures to protect the
health of their people and to ensure that they receive medical attention when they
are sick." 224 Would the various governments in the region be in compliance with
their treaty obligations were they to successfully scale up access to preventive, life-
saving, or curative health services for individuals suffering HIV/AIDS, malaria, or
TB? Regarding HIV/AIDS, for instance, would countries such as Botswana,
Namibia, and Rwanda, that have achieved universal access to ART, be said to have
fulfilled their obligation regarding the right to health as far as that specific
population is concerned?
Medicine-oriented response to health problems, without more, is not enough.
Access to therapy, while undeniably crucial, is just one of the essential elements
needed to ensure optimal health, or as a U.N. General Assembly resolution puts it,
in the context of HIV/AIDS, "medication . . . is one of the fundamental elements to
achieve progressively the full realization of the right of everyone to . . . health."2 25
The implication, then, is that in order to be in full compliance with the right of the
population to health, more is needed. Of greater importance is the condition under
which people live and work, the socioeconomic and regulatory conditions, or
factors that operate to facilitate or constrain human flourishing. Where people are
born and raised, also taking into consideration their life circumstances, not the
availability of health services per se, are responsible for health outcomes. When
these conditions are positive, population health flourishes and vice versa. These
conditions, known as underlying or social health determinants, are the major
220. Obiajulu Nnamuchi, Health and Millennium Development Goals in Africa: Deconstructing the
Thorny Path to Success, in THE RIGHT TO HEALTH: A MULTI-COUNTRY STUDY OF LAW, POLICY AND
PRACTICE (Obiajulu Nnamuchi et al. eds., forthcoming 2014).
221. WHO, BASIC DOCUMENTS I (47th ed. 2009) (quoting the preamble of WHO's Constitution)
(entered into force Apr. 7, 1948).
222. ICESCR, supra note 91, art. 12(1).
223. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 96, art. 16(1).
224. Id. art. 16(2).
225. Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, G.A. Res. S-26/2,1115, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-26/2
(June 27, 2001).
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drivers of health and consist of, inter alia, "food and nutrition, housing, access to
safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, safe and healthy working
conditions, and a healthy environment." 226  Availability or lack thereof is
responsible for health disparities within and amongst nations. The WHO
Commission for Social Health Determinants helpfully puts it this way, "[a]t all
levels of income, health and illness follow a social gradient: the lower the
socioeconomic position, the worse the health." 227 The Commission continues:
The poor health of poor people, the social gradient in health within
countries, and the substantial health inequities between countries are
caused by the unequal distribution of power, income, goods, and
services, globally and nationally, the consequent unfairness in the
immediate, visible circumstances of people's lives-their access to
health care and education, their conditions of work and leisure, their
homes, communities, towns, or cities-and their chances of leading a
flourishing life. This unequal distribution of health-damaging
experiences is not in any sense a natural phenomenon but is the result of
a combination of poor social policies and programmes, unfair economic
arrangements, and bad politics. Together, the structural determinants
and conditions of daily life constitute the social determinants of health
and cause much of the health inequity between and within countries.228
This can be seen as a restatement or an elucidation of the right to health.229
As to what precisely needs to be done to establish this right in people's lives, this
author has argued, in a related context:
Health policy decisions should be based on the principle that social
determinants of health such as food, housing, et al are, stricto sensu, not
within the mandate of a Ministry of Health but, even so, their
availability and equitable distribution are crucial to . . . improving
overall health and wellbeing. This is the crux of multisectoral
dimension of health and has two critical implications for Africa. First,
health sector reform must be operationalized in tandem with
strengthening other sectors (agriculture, industries, housing and so forth)
connected with providing or creating an enabling environment for
availability of goods or conditions that promote good health. Second,
multisectoral interventions must not only be harnessed, it must also be
harmonized and streamlined to achieve a common goal: improving
health. The leadership role of the Ministry of Health must involve
active cooperation and collaboration with other sectors, including
226. General Comment No. 14, supra note 92, 1| 4.
227. Michael Marmot et al., Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health Equity Through Action on
the Social Determinants ofHealth, 372 LANCET 1661, 1661 (2008).
228. Id. at 1661.
229. General Comment No. 14, supra note 92, 11 4, I1, 12, 36; see also id. 11 12(b) n.6 (providing
that in absence of an explicit contrary provision, references in the General Comment "to health
facilities, goods and services" should be read as including "the underlying determinants of health"
outlined in J|l II and 12(a) of the General Comment).
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bilateral and multilateral partners, to find cost-effective and sustainable
solutions to the numerous health challenges facing the region.230
Short of a multipronged and holistic approach to solving Africa's health woes, all
the investments toward restoring the health of people suffering from any of the
diseases under consideration, particularly in respect to vulnerable populations,
would amount to naught. In fact, deploying resources toward access to the "socio-
economic [goods] that promote conditions in which people can lead a healthy life"
is an important indicator of the commitment of countries to the health of its
citizenry.231 Proof, if there is need for one, is that countries in which these goods
are reasonably (even if not abundantly) available are also those, as a WHO Report
makes quite clear, with better overall health outcomes-and the reverse is equally
232true. Even stronger proof that access to health care does not (alone) translate to
optimal health is provided by health outcomes in the United States. In 2000, the
U.S. led the world in health spending (medical care); 233 still, its overall health
system performance and attainment was ranked 37th globally, worse than even
some third-world countries such as United Arab Emirates. 234 A notable distinction
between the United States and other affluent countries is that the latter invest
heavily in underlying health determinants for its vulnerable populations (in form of
welfare packages).235 Attempts could be made to weaken this point by claiming
that investment in underlying health determinants was not among the indicators
used in the 2000 ranking of global health systems.236 That is true; nonetheless, it is
230. Nnamuchi, Health and Millennium Development Goals in Africa: Deconstructing the Thorny
Path to Success, supra note 220.
231. General Comment No. 14, supra note 92, 1| 4.
232. WHO, THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2000: HEALTH SYSTEMS: IMPROVING PERFORMANCE
152-55 (2000) [hereinafter WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2000], available at
http://www.who.int/whr/2000/en/whr00 en.pdf (showing that poorer nations, as a group, fared worse
than affluent ones, invariably where the basic and super structures of decent lives are more easily
available).
233. David A. Squires, Explaining High Health Care Spending in the United States: An
International Comparison of Supply, Utilization, Prices, and Quality, COMMONWEALTH FUND, May
2012, at 1, 2, 9- 10, available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/Files/Publications/Issue%2OBrief/2012/May/I 595 Squire
s explaining high hit care spending intl brief.pdf (finding that the United States far outspends other
countries in healthcare and yet does not reap commensurate dividend).
234. WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2000, supra note 232, at 155.
235. See, e.g., Social Welfare, UAE INTERACT, http://www.uaeinteract.com/society/welfare.asp
(last visited June 4, 2014) (official government source describes the social welfare system in United
Arab Emirates) ("Despite the UAE's economic success there are, inevitably, individuals who are not in
a position to benefit directly from the country's good fortune. Therefore, a social welfare network has
been put in place to assist these vulnerable members of society. This takes the form of social security
benefits administered by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, in addition to the practical help
offered by the network of Ministry-supported social centres run by the General Women's Union, and
the government-supported social welfare and rehabilitation centres providing assistance to the
disabled.").
236. WHO & COMM'N ON Soc. DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, CLOSING THE GAP IN A GENERATION:
HEALTH EQUITY THROUGH ACTION ON THE SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH 185 (2008), available
at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241563703 eng.pdf ("As part of global and national
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argued that the result would be the same had health determinants been one of the
parameters of measurement. In Glasgow, Scotland, although everyone is entitled
to health care provided by the United Kingdom's National Health Service (NHS),
there is a wide gulf in life expectancies between poor and affluent males in that
city, fifty-four years compared to eighty-two.237 This disparity is inexplicable on
any other ground except greater access to underlying health determinants such as
housing, proper nutrition, education, and so forth by the latter group.
Attending to social health determinants becomes even more critical when
inertia accentuates the vulnerability of an already susceptible population as has
historically been the case. It is in this context that the special circumstances of
those most affected by HIV/AIDS, malaria, and TB become the burden of human
rights. Take HIV/AIDS, as an illustration. More than any other segment of the
population, sex workers stand out, as shown previously, as disproportionately
impacted by the disease. Sex workers deserve to be singled out because no amount
of intervention would be successful in absence of fundamental restructuring of
their life circumstances in terms of provision of, for instance, access to education
and employment. The link is simple and straightforward. At the root of sex trade
is adverse socioeconomic circumstances on the part of its victims, the sex workers.
Securing better remunerating and less risky employment, a possibility best offered
by acquiring education, provides an escape route from poverty and want-a key
element in instilling the kind of attitudinal change needed for exodus from the
hazards of the dark world of sex trade. 238 It is one thing to create awareness of the
hazardous nature of an enterprise but quite a different challenge to equip the
proselytized person with the means with which to escape the hazard. The latter,
more difficult because it involves deployment of resources, is where serious efforts
should be concentrated.
Dehumanizing and debasing one's prized possession via prostitution is hardly
a product of volition; instead, and this is very important, it starkly illustrates an
instance of the consequences of what has been described as "structural
violence." 239 This is not the sort of violence or harm perpetrated with guns or
knives; its reach and tentacles are far more damaging and deadly.2 40 It is quite a
surveillance systems, data on health inequities and determinants should be made publicly available and
accessible and disseminated widely for advocacy purposes and to support coherent policy-making.").
237. Gail R. Wilensky & David Satcher, Don't Forget About the Social Determinants of Health, 28
HEALTH AFFAIRS w194, w195 (2009).
238. See, e.g., G.A. Res 65/277, 25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/277 (June 10, 2011); KIMBERLY A.
MCCABE, THE TRAFFICKING OF PERSONS 35 (2008).
239. Johan Galtung, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, 6 J. PEACE RES. 167, 170-71 (1969).
240. See id. at 171 ("There may not be any person who directly harms another person in the
structure. The violence is built into the structure. . . ."); see also Gemot Kthler & Norman Alcock, An
Empirical Table of Structural Violence, 13 J. PEACE RES. 343 (1976). Structural violence is also a
concern of liberation theology. See LEONARDO BOFF & CLODOVIS BOFF, INTRODUCING LIBERATION
THEOLOGY 24-27 (Paul Burns trans., 1987). In fact the movement against the evil of structural violence
has a lot in common with liberation theology. Both reject vice (laziness, ignorance, or human
wickedness) and backwardness as explanatory of poverty; and see poverty as a manifestation or
consequence of oppression. Id. at 25-27 (defining poverty as oppression; meaning that poverty is the
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different kind of attack on social equilibrium. The violence is termed "structural"
because the circumstances or factors that cause and sustain harm are embedded in
the structure of the society. 241 It manifests itself as "unequal power and
consequently as unequal life chances" for its victims. 2 42 Although he might not
have known it, an informant in Zimbabwe alludes to this kind of violence when he
points out, in a recent interview, that massive poverty in his country leaves parents
with no choice than to "force their children to go out and prostitute themselves" or
force them into "early marriages at the age of 10 and 11.",243 A similar explanation
is given by a sex worker in Swaziland: "Here in Swaziland there are no jobs . . .. I
have no choice to be a sex worker, whether I like it or not, I must do that."244 As to
how this really impacts her life, she continues, "[r]ight now I don't feel that I am a
human being.. .. Right now I am scared to greet my family because if I say that I
,,245
am a prostitute all of the people will just say that I am a prostitute. Despite this
shame, rejection, isolation, and, as would likely be her fate, premature death (likely
from HIV/AIDS), 246  she remains a sex worker-thanks to overwhelming
combination of forces that, over the years, insidiously succeeded in stripping her of
any sense of real freedom. These invisible forces are continually at work, holding
her and others like her in suffocating bondage, all the while wrecking havoc in
their lives and that of the general population (by being a source of infection, with
all that it entails). But sex workers are not alone. A similar argument could be
advanced regarding other diseases, including malaria and TB.247
The Biblical statement, "[t]hey that are whole need not a physician; but they
that are sick" is not only a theological admonition with canonical significance, 248 it
is also a powerful human rights catechism. It is trite that human rights inhere in
human beings equally but in practice, they make more meaning to the
downtrodden, the poor and destitute, those whose daily existence are structured
and constrained by forces outside their control which, in turn, render them
susceptible to "high levels of illness and premature mortality." 249 It is particularly
"product of the economic organization of society itself, which exploits some-the workers-and
excludes others from the production process-the underemployed, unemployed, and all those
marginalized on one way or another").
241. Paul E. Farmer et al., Structural Violence and Clinical Medicine, 3 PLOS MED. 1686, 1686
(2006).
242. Galtung, supra note 239, at 171.
243. Poor People's Testimony: Living on a Dollar a Day in Zimbabwe, VATICAN RADIO (Nov. 29,
2012), http://en.radiovaticana.va/articolo.asp?id=642566.
244. Victoria Eastwood, Sex Worker: I Sleep with Five Men a Day Just to Eat, CNN (Oct. 19,
2012), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/18/world/africa/swaziland-sex-unemployment-
economy/index.html.
245. Id.
246. Swaziland leads the world in the proportion of its population infected with HIV (25.9 percent).
WORLD HEALTH STATISTICS 2011, supra note 69, at 72.
247. Malaria and TB are diseases of the poor, and this fact is unaltered by geography. Id. at 76.
Whether in rural villages in Africa or behind the walls of a Russian prison, Malaria and TB
disproportionately impact those lower on the socioeconomic ladder. See id.
248. Luke 5:31 (King James).
249. Marmot et al., supra note 227, at 1661.
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for the benefit of these people, their welfare and fulfillment, that human rights
really exist. Yet, for the vast majority of them, forces set in motion by others, by
and large, determine their life chances even, in some cases, before birth. "One of
the worst things," laments an unemployed 25-year old man in Zimbabwe, "is
you're not involved in any key decision-making in life."2 50  This type of
disempowerment or disenfranchisement represents the worst abuse of human
rights, a grave infraction on individual autonomy (the cornerstone of human rights)
and it has significant implication for health. As more forcefully argued elsewhere,
the importance of individual empowerment-in the sense of enabling individuals
to take charge of their own affairs, particularly health-cannot be ignored in any
health policy framework.251
The obvious advantage ... is the element of democracy it embodies.
But this sort of democracy has a somewhat different appeal in the sense
that the interest of those on the higher end of socioeconomic ladder is
not, as often is the case in developing countries, taken as representative
of the entire population. 252
It is this sort of democracy that is the task of human rights. Rather than
maintain the status quo, the way things have always been done, it calls for
prioritizing the needs and interest of the poor, including soliciting their views as to
how best to meet their needs. This is human rights pragmatism borne out of
solidarity with the people whose needs and exposure to diseases and illnesses is
greater vis-A-vis the general population. The productivity of human rights is at its
peak, much like liberation theology, when it is "on the side of the poor" and
"struggle[s] alongside them against the poverty that has been unjustly created and
forced on them."253 To suggest that human rights should serve as a liberating or
emancipating force, freeing vulnerable and other marginalized groups from the
cold clutches of poverty, deprivation and other harmful conditions, the
consequence of which has been disproportionate burden of HIV/AIDS, malaria,
TB, and other largely preventable diseases, is not to reconceptualize the doctrine.
Rather, the suggestion merely emphasizes practicalization, the way things ought to
be. It is, in reality, about making human rights work to the advantage of its
primary subjects, the people who need it most.
VI. CONCLUSION
When, in 1962, Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli, better known as Pope John XXIII,
proclaimed what he perceived as the appropriate role of the Church in her dealings
with underdeveloped countries, that the Church not only "present herself as she is,"
but also "as she wants to be-as the Church of all men and especially the Church
250. VATICAN RADIO, supra note 243.
251. Nnamuchi, Health and Millennium Development Goals in Africa: Deconstructing the Thorny
Path to Success, supra note 220.
252. Id.
253. BoFF & BOFF, supra note 240, at 4.
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of the poor," his overarching concern was theological pragmatism. 254 But he might
as well have been speaking about human rights and related obligation of the
international community. The beloved Pontiff was suggesting that although the
mission of the Church is centrally cosmopolitan-in other words, service to the
entire world, a special ministry deserves to be carved out for those on the fringes of
society, individuals whose lives are constrained by daily struggles against misery,
want and deprivation, the "wretched of the earth", as psychiatrist/philosopher
Frantz Fanon aptly describes them. 255 This adjuration, on particularizing the plight
and needs of the poor, is a strong moral imperative whose reach transcends
theology howsoever reconceptualized. It has also a very powerful secular
resonance.
The role of human rights can be summed up as improving the wellbeing of
each and every individual. This is indeed true, and human rights does (at least in
principle) have a special outreach, a kind of special treatment-if you will-for
individuals or groups who are disadvantaged in some material respect vis-A-vis
the general population. 256 Proof is General Comment No. 14, arguably the most
important interpretive document on the right to health, which uses the term
"vulnerable" and/or "marginalized" population at least eleven times to emphasize
countries' obligation to prioritize the needs of the poor.257 But theory often differs
(vastly, in some cases) from practice and this is at the core of the plight of
marginalized and vulnerable populations in the realm of health as well as in other
dimensions of wellbeing.
This dissonance (between theory and practice) is visible in the grotesquely
disproportionate burden of diseases suffered by people in sub-Sahara Africa.
Within this long-suffering population, some distinct groups-identified in the
paper as "special population groups"-are at greater risk than the rest of the
general population. Unjustifiable disproportionality, most especially of adverse
outcomes, represents one of the most brazenly ubiquitous forms of inequity. When
confronted with inequity, the task of human rights is remediation, to expurgate the
inequity as comprehensively and expeditiously as possible. 258 This is the thrust of
254. GUSTAVO GUTIERREZ, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION: HISTORY, POLITICS AND SALVATION
287 n.2 (Sister Caridad Inda & John Eagleson trans., 1973) (citing Radio Message Sept. 11, 1962, 8
POPE SPEAKS 396 (1963)).
255. See generally FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (Richard Philcox trans., 2004).
256. It is no coincidence that MDG 8 was formulated solely for the benefit of the Global South, to
uplift countries in that part of the world. See MDG GAP TASK FORCE, MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT
GOAL 8: THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT: MAKING RHETORIC A REALITY 1 (2012)
[hereinafter MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL 8], available at
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2012_GapReport/MDG_2012GapTaskForce report.pdf. The
idea behind the goal was to cushion the effect of impoverishment on the lives of people in targeted
countries, to bridge the ever-widening gap between the two worlds. See id.
257. General Comment No. 14, supra note 92, if 12(b)(i), 12(b)(ii), 18, 35, 37, 40, 43(a), 43(f), 52,
62, 65.
258. See JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 7-8 (2d ed.
2003) (explaining that human rights are entitlements that allow humans to make certain claims if these
rights are threatened or denied).
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the human rights bent of this paper, in examining the ravages on human lives
brought about by the trifecta of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and TB, particularly on those
most vulnerable to these diseases in the vast majority of countries in Africa.
Strategies, initiatives, and overall efforts in attacking these diseases must go
beyond the general population to attend to the people most at risk of infection (sex
workers, for instance, in the case of HIV/AIDS). Greater attention (in the nature of
deployment of resources) to prevention, treatment, and caring for these individuals
is not only in consonance with the catechism of human rights, it also has practical
benefits. The best health strategy is one that is aimed squarely at the source of the
problem (in this case, most-at-risk population), and that is also the most effective
way to reduce infection and thereby begin to get a firm grip on the problem.
A secondary level solution to the problem involves addressing population-
wide needs as elucidated in the fifth section of this discourse. Meeting the needs
of the sick is, of course, very important; yet, of more importance is preemptive
action, radically rearranging the socioeconomic dynamics in such a way that
exposure to the conditions that result in diseases and illnesses are, to the extent
sustainable by available resources, banished. Attending to underlying health
determinants is the key to rescuing people in Africa from countless and ever-rising
morbidities and mortalities that have come to define life in that part of the world.
Numbers are powerful in that they (where negative) are silent indictments of
affected persons or institutions. That key health indicators in Africa are
overwhelmingly negative is not explicable on the basis of resource constraints.
Otherwise how does one explain strikingly similar health outcomes in Nigeria as in
Somalia, Ethiopia, and elsewhere (countries on different tiers of socioeconomic
development)? In fact, in some cases, resource poor nations have fared better than
wealthier ones. 259 Yet, all these countries solemnly pledged to commit themselves
to protecting and promoting the right to health. 260 Had these commitments been
taken seriously, the health situation in the region would surely have been different.
The latest UNDP Human Development Report is aptly titled Sustainability and
Equity: A Better Future for All. 261 Of the forty-four countries classified as having
"low human development" (worst category) only eight are not African. 262  In
Niger, 64 percent of the population lack access to clean water as does 89 percent
who lack improved sanitation. 263 Other countries in the region are not far behind.
Does the future really hold any better health prospects for people in Africa? Would
259. For example, see supra note 235 and accompanying text.
260. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 96, art. 16. See also supra notes
218-19 and accompanying text.
261. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011: SUSTAINABILITY
AND EQUITY: A BETTER FUTURE FOR ALL (2011) available at
http://www.us.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/2011 %20Global%20HDR/English/H
DR_2011 _ENComplete.pdf [hereinafter HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011]. The Report identifies
"the right of future generations everywhere to live healthy and fulfilling lives" as the "great
development challenge of the 2 1st century." Helen Clark, Foreword to HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
2011, at iv, iv. This challenge is, beyond doubt, greatest in Africa.
262. Id. at 144-145 tbl.5.
263. Id. at 145 tbl.5.
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people in the region be able to claim victory over HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and TB any
time soon? These are critical human rights questions whose unraveling hinges on a
number of issues, some of which were addressed in preceding sections.
In his book, Pathologies of Power, physician/human rights advocate Paul
Farmer explains: "Human rights violations are not accidents; they are not random
in distribution or effect. Rights violations are, rather, symptoms of deeper
pathologies of power and are linked intimately to the social conditions that so often
determine who will suffer abuse and who will be shielded from harm." 264 In other
words, lack of access to basic goods that make life worthwhile and, in most cases,
protect people from unnecessary pain, suffering and death, such as potable water
and improved sanitation (basic essentials of life), is not the result of some
combination of circumstances over which authorities in the region lack control. It
was the 19 1h century English jurist and legal scholar Frederick William Maitland
who wrote, "[t]he forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from their
graves."265 In like manner as archaic rules of common law still rear their ugly
heads in procedural and substantive law, centuries after they have been thought to
have been consigned to oblivion, institutional insensitivity to human rights, which
ought to have been buried with the demise of military dictatorships in Africa,
remains an inescapable part of African polity, even unto this day.
Despite obeisance at the altar of democracy, leaders in the vast majority of
countries in the region retain the mold of their predecessors in military garbs, the
old ways of doing things. Avarice, kleptocracy, and other, no less odious, forms of
malgovernance still hold sway. Opulence has become the reward for
governance-indeed, the two now go hand in hand, sort of bounty for winning
(often rigged) election-even as a large chunk of the governed miserably strives to
survive. Here is an illustration. Although, by their own national count, nearly half
(46 percent) of Kenyans and 55 percent of Nigerians subsist in poverty,266
legislators in the two countries are the best remunerated worldwide, at $175,000
annual compensation package for parliamentarians in Kenya 267 and over $100,000
monthly salary for senators in Nigeria. 268  To put this in proper perspective,
264. PAUL FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER: HEALTH, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE NEW WAR ON
THE POOR 7 (2003).
265. F. W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW: A COURSE OF LECTURES 2 (A.
H. Chaytor & W. J. Whittaker eds., 1936).
266. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011, supra note 261, at 144 tbl.5.
267. Jason Straziuso, Kenya Outraged Over Parliament's $175K Pay Vote, BOSTON.COM (July 2,
2010),
http://www.boston.com/news/world/africa/articles/2010/07/02/kenya outraged over parliaments_175k
payvote (reporting that in mid-2010, legislators in Kenya voted themselves an annual pay package of
$175,000, covering compensation for housing, entertainment, transportation, parliamentary meeting
attendance, constituency allowance, and a miscellaneous allowance).
268. Denrele Animasaun, Nigerian Lawmakers are the Highest Paid in the World, VANGUARD
(Aug. 25, 2013, 12:03 AM), http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/08/nigerian-lawmakers-are-the-
highest-paid-in-the-world ("A senator in Nigeria earns 240 million naira (about 1.7 million US dollars)
in salaries and allowances and a member of the House of Representatives earns 204 million naira (about
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senators in the United States will be paid $174,000 in total annual compensation
package this year269 compared to $1.7 million for their counterparts in Nigeria (in
just salaries, exclusive of other benefits). The latter is notoriously a third-world
country, its health system ranks 187th in the world (amongst 191 countries
surveyed),270 the corruption perception index ("CPI") in the country places it 139th
out of 174 countries,271 and its human development index ("HDI") rank is 156th
(out of 181 countries);272 still, its leaders are compensated multiple times above the
earnings of their peers anywhere in the world. An outrage indeed, but that,
nonetheless, is governance-African style, explaining why Zambian economist
Dambisa Moyo wants to end foreign aid to the region.273
Moyo certainly has a great point, but another worthwhile solution might be
found in the MDGs themselves. Goal 8-which explicitly requires international
cooperation as a means to achieving the MDGs-carves out a special role for
affluent countries, to hold poor countries accountable for the way received aid is
spent.274 And this critical obligation, especially considering that "he who pays the
piper dictates the tune," might be what is needed to force political leadership in
Africa to rethink their insensitivity to massive human suffering in the region. But
even this path would fall short of a sustainable panacea in absence of serious
complementary effort on the part of the citizenry. The complementarity envisaged
here involves the people ridding themselves of docility and demanding good
1.45 million US dollars) per annum. It definitely rubs insult to injury for the average Civil servant who
earns about 46 to 120 US dollars per month.").
269. Senate Salaries Since 1789, U.S. SENATE
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/senate-salaries.htm (last visited Apr. 11,
2014).
270. THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2000, supra note 232, at 152-55 tbl.l. Strikingly, the only
countries that fared worse than Nigeria are countries involved (at the time of the report) in civil war or
other forms of armed conflicts, namely, Democratic Republic of Congo (188th), Central African
Republic (189th), Myanmar (Burma, 190th), and Sierra Leone (191st). Id.
271. TRANSPARENCY INT'L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEx 2012, at 3-5 (2012), available at
http://issuu.com/transparencyintemational/docs/cpi 2012 report/I ?e=2496456/2010281 (defining CPI
as an index which ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived
to be).
272. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011, supra note 261, at 126. The HDI measures
wellbeing in a country using the following three basic dimensions of human
development: health, education, and income. Id. at 23.
273. DAMBISA MoO, DEAD AID: WHY AID Is NOT WORKING AND HOW THERE IS A BETTER WAY
FOR AFRICA 48-68 (2009).
274. Obiajulu Nnamuchi & Simon Ortuanya, The Human Right to Health in Africa and its
Challenges: A Critical Analysis of Millennium Development Goal 8, 12 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 178, 181
(2012) (analyzing the role of MDG 8 as a means to overcoming poverty (on an individual and
institutional level) and corruption in Africa and, consequently, positioning the region on a path to
achieving the MDGs).
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governance as a right275 -the key, ultimately, to real freedom from preventable
diseases-be it HIV/AIDS, malaria, TB, or anything else.
275. Id. at 190-91 (defining "docility" as "acquiescence to misappropriation of public resources"
which "arises when people go about their business as if looting the treasury is somehow an unavoidable
reward for holding a political position" and arguing that it is a "common feature of developing
economies and, lamentably, a powerful factor that sustains treating public resources as res nullius in
many ... countries").
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WILL THE CHILD ABDUCTION TREATY BECOME MORE "ASIAN"?
A FIRST LOOK AT THE EFFORTS OF SINGAPORE AND JAPAN TO
IMPLEMENT THE HAGUE CONVENTION
COLIN P.A. JONES*
I. OVERVIEW
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction' (the "Convention") provides a mechanism for locating and returning
children "wrongfully" removed from or retained outside of their jurisdiction of
habitual residence, a problem that most commonly arises in the breakdown of an
"international" marriage. The Convention seeks to protect the welfare of the
children involved by deterring and remedying unilateral action by one parent. Put
simply, the treaty is based on the assumption that the interests of children should
be evaluated by courts in the jurisdiction where they have been residing, rather
than the one in which they may have just gotten off a plane. As noted in one early
gloss,
the problem with which the Convention deals-together with all the
drama implicit in the fact that it is concerned with the protection of
children in international relations-derives all of its legal importance
from the possibility of individuals establishing legal and jurisdictional
links which are more or less artificial. In fact, resorting to this
expedient, an individual can change the applicable law and obtain a
[favorable] judicial decision .... 2
In order to protect disruptions to the lives of children by preventing this type
of forum shopping, the Convention "places at the head of its objectives the
restoration of the status quo, by means of 'the prompt return of children
wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State.' 3
*Professor, Doshisha Law School; Life Member, Clare Hall, University of Cambridge. This paper is
based on an unpublished Working Paper written as a visiting fellow at the Asian Law Institute at the
National University of Singapore. The author thanks the ALI for the fellowship that made the
underlying research possible, as well as the extremely helpful guidance and feedback of Professors Wai
Kum Leong and Debbie Siew Ling Ong of the NUS Faculty of Law. Gratitude is also extended to the
Singapore Central Authority and the Family Division of the Singapore Courts for their assistance. This
article is for my wonderful little Thalia.
1. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.1.A.S. No.
11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Convention].
2. Elisa Pdrez-Vera, Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention, in
HCCH PUBLICATIONS, ACTS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE FOURTEENTH SESSION (1980), TOME IlI: CHILD
ABDUCTION 426, 429 (1982), available at http://www.hcch.net/uploadlexpl28.pdf
3. Id.
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A country that joins the Convention commits to establishing a central
authority to facilitate the return of abducted children and providing a prompt
judicial process for realizing their return.4 In principle, a return must be ordered if
a child has been removed in violation of "rights of custody" in the child's
jurisdiction of habitual residence if those rights were being exercised at the time of
removal.s Under the Convention, parties must also facilitate the exercise of rights
of access between contracting states. Most academic and professional interest in
the treaty, however, appears focused on rights of custody and the return process, as
will be the case in this article too.
A map of the world showing Convention ratifying nations as of the end of the
first decade of the 2 1s" century would portray a very "Western" treaty regime.' At
the time of writing, virtually every country and territory in Europe, North and
South America as well as Australia and New Zealand had ratified the Convention.8
By contrast only a handful of African nations had done so. Asian countries seem
particularly under-represented, given their importance in terms of population and
economic development. Of the small number of Asian jurisdictions that were
parties to the Convention as of 2009, two (Hong Kong and Macao) achieved their
contracting status due to colonial legacies.' 0  The two other Asian "early
adopters"-Sri Lanka and Thailand (acceding in 2001 and 2002)-are still both
developing nations that have not yet been able to establish treaty relations with all
of the other parties.
4. Convention, supra note 1, arts. 1, 6, 7.
5. Id. art. 12.
6. Id. art. 21.
7. The author is cognizant that terms such as "Western" and "Asian" are problematic both in
terms of generating subjective associations and being geographically imprecise, particularly with
respect to nations such as Turkey or Israel. Nonetheless, a detailed exposition of such semantic issues,
however, is beyond the scope of this article.
8. See Status Table. Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L L.,
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24 (last updated Mar. 10, 2014)
[hereinafter Status Table] (listing current status of countries contracting with the Convention).
9. Id. As of February 2014, the only African jurisdictions that had become contracting states
were: Burkina Faso, Morocco, South Africa, Gabon, Guinea, Lesotho, Mauritius, Seychelles, and
Zimbabwe. Id.
10. Hong Kong and Macao have been parties to the Convention in their capacities as Special
Administrative Regions of China since 1997 and 1999, respectively, pursuant to continuation
arrangements put in place when they ceased being colonies of the United Kingdom and Portugal,
respectively. Id. (scroll down to China in Status Table, follow "D, N" hyperlink in last column of row
for China).
I1. Id. By its terms, the Convention is open to signature between states that were members to the
Hague Conference on Private International Law at the time of its Fourteenth Session in 1980 when the
Convention was adopted. Convention, supra note 1, art. 37. Other states may join, but their accession
must be accepted by other contracting states for treaty relations to arise between those two states. Id.
art. 38. Japan was a member of the Hague Conference in 1980 while Singapore remains a non-member.
See Status Table, supra note 8 (listing Japan as a member and Singapore as a non-member).
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Having acceded in 2010,12 Singapore could be described as the first
"advanced" or "developed" Asian nation to have independently joined the
Convention. It was followed by Korea in 2012 and Japan in 2014.' Japan's
ratification comes after years of high-level lobbying by Western governments and
media condemnation of its status as a "black hole" for parental child abduction
from which no child has ever been returned through the Japanese judicial
14process.
With more countries in Asia joining the Convention the time may be ripe to
consider whether they will cause it to become more "Asian" (whatever that means)
in the way it is implemented and interpreted. This article will briefly compare and
contrast the implementation regimes of Japan and Singapore as well as the relevant
features of the two country's family law systems before suggesting a preliminary,
highly tentative conclusion.
II. JAPAN AND SINGAPORE COMPARED AND CONTRASTED
Japan is one of Asia's largest countries in terms of both GDP (almost $6
trillion) and population (almost 128 million as of 2010).'1 Compared to many
neighboring countries its population is highly heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity,
country of birth, language, educational background, and other elements of cultural
identity.' 6 The Japanese practice a variety of religions including various forms of
Buddhism, Shintoism, and Christianity, all of which coexist peacefully.'" Such
minority populations as do exist in Japan represent a very small percentage of the
population overall.' 8
Of the 700,214 marriages recorded in Japan in 2010, 30,207 (4 percent) were
between Japanese and foreign nationals.' 9 Of the 1.071 million children born in
that year, almost 21,966 (2 percent) were born in households with one non-
12. Id.
13. Id. (listing the ratification date for Japan as Jan. 24, 2014, and Korea as Dec. 13, 2012).
14. See, e.g., Daphne Bramham, Japan is Black Hole for Abducted Children, VANCOUVER SUN,
Aug. 17, 2013,
http://www.vancouversun.com/news/Daphne+Bramham+Japan+black+hole+abducted+children/879958
3/story.html; Mark Willacy, Japan Vows to Close Child Abduction Black Hole, AUSTL. BROADCASTING
CORP. NEWS (May 22, 2012), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-05-22/japan-child-
abductions/4025242.
15. Data: Japan, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/japan (last visited June 2,
2014).
16. The World Factbook: Japan, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html (last updated May 30, 2014).
17. See id.
18. At the end of 2011 there were slightly over 2 million registered foreign residents in Japan.
Press Release, For Number of Foreign Residents in the 2011 Year-End Current (Preliminary), Japan
Ministry of Justice Immigration Bureau (Feb. 22, 2012), available at
http://www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyuukokukanri04 00015.html. Chinese, Filipinos, and
Koreans accounted for over two thirds of this number. Id.
19. Statistic Tables, JAPAN MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LAB. & WELFARE (Dec. 1, 2011),
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/Jinkou/suiil0 (follow hyperlink for 1119 or "Marriage" PDF).
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Japanese parent. 20 In total, 252,617 children in Japan experienced the divorce of
their parents in 2010.21 Of 251,378 divorces in the same year, 18,968 (7.5 percent)
22were "international," with one spouse being non-Japanese. As these statistics
make clear, most instances of divorce or other forms of parental separation in
Japan are strictly "domestic," with those involving a non-Japanese spouse or parent
being a very small minority.
Although economically Japan's peer-the seventh richest country in the
world on a GDP per capita basis-Singapore is quite small in terms of territory
(697 km2) and population (5.46 million in 2013).23 Furthermore for historical
reasons it is demographically more complex than Japan, with an ethnic Chinese
majority (approximately 74.2 percent) as well as significant minorities of Malay
and Indian extraction (13.3 percent and 9.2 percent respectively).24  This
complexity is reflected in the nation's four official languages (English, Mandarin,
Malay, and Tamil).25 Singapore's culture also encompasses a variety of very
different religious traditions and includes a significant Muslim community for
which a formally recognized separate system of family justice exists, as discussed
later.26
As a center of international business and finance, a significant proportion of
Singapore's population consists of transient "expats" and other categories of
temporary workers. 27 Of Singapore's population of almost 5.4 million in 2013,
3.31 million were citizens and a further 0.53 million were permanent residents.28
The remaining 1.55 million-28 per cent of the total-were classified as "non-
residents," a category comprising foreigners working, studying, or living in
Singapore but not having permanent residence (and excluding tourists and short-
term visitors).29
In 2012 Singapore recorded 27,936 marriages and 7,237 divorces and
annulments.3 0 Twenty-one percent of marriages3 ' and 12.9 percent of divorces in
that year were characterized as "inter-ethnic". 32 The same year saw 42,663 live
20. Id. (follow hyperlink for thi4 or "Births" PDF).
21. Id. (follow hyperlink for W or "Divorce" PDF).
22. Id.
23. The World Facibook: Singapore, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sn.html (last updated May 30, 2014).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
27. See DEP'T OF STATISTICS SING., POPULATION TRENDS: 2013, at 1 (2013) [hereinafter SING.
POPULATION TRENDS: 20131, available at
http://www.singstat.gov.sg/publications/publicationsandpapers/population and population-structure/
population2013.pdf.
28. Id. at I tbl.1.1.
29. Id. at 1.
30. DEP'T OF STATISTICS SING., STATISTICS ON MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: REFERENCE YEAR
2013, at xi (2014) [hereinafter SING., STATISTICS ON MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES].
31. Id. at 8.
32. Id. at xi (672 divorces under the Women's Charter and 268 under the Muslim Law Act). Note
that because of Singapore's colonial legacy, it has a complex make-up of ethnic groups-primarily
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births. Of the marriages in 2011, a full 39.4 percent were between a Singaporean
citizen and a non-citizen, with 31.1 percent of children being born to such
couples. 34
Because of the demographic complexity of its population and families,
Singapore courts are well-acquainted with cases involving an international
component. In fact, CX v CY (discussed later), one of the Singapore Court of
Appeal's most important custody cases, involved a dispute between a father, a
Dutch national, and a mother, a Singapore national.35
In connection with the Convention, Singapore may prove to be special in
primarily being a source of outbound cases. As of March 2013, Singapore's
Central Authority had dealt with four outbound cases against one inbound.36 This
ratio is consistent with research by Professor Debbie Ong on pre-Convention
international cases, which identified twenty-two outbound cases to only four
inbound.37 By May of 2013, Singapore's High Court had decided an appeal in the
first litigated instance of a return order, the case of BDUv BDT, which is discussed
in more detail below.38
At the time of writing, Japan had ratified the Convention with the
implementing legislation (discussed below) going into effect April 1, 2014.39 At
least one pre-ratification legislative analysis of the Convention points out that most
outbound cases from Japan would likely involve Asian wives of Japanese men
returning to their home countries (i.e., non-signatory states such as China or the
Philippines), cases in which Japan's status as a party would be of little benefit. 40
III. RIGHTS OF CUSTODY IN JAPAN AND SINGAPORE
Having explored the statistics, let us turn to law. Under the Convention, an
abduction or retention is "wrongful" (and therefore likely subject to return
proceedings) if it is "in breach of rights of custody" in the child's country of
Chinese, Malay, and South Asian-that remain clearly defined. See supra note 25 and accompanying
text. Statistics describing marriages as "inter-ethnic" would thus pick up marriages between members of
these ethnic groups in addition to "international" unions between (for example) a Caucasian husband
and a Singaporean wife of any ethnicity. SING., STATISTICS ON MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES, at 106.
33. SING. POPULATION TRENDS: 2013, supra note 27, at vi.
34. PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, MARRIAGE AND PARENTHOOD TRENDS IN SINGAPORE 5 (2012),
available at
http://www.nptd.gov.sg/content/dam/nptd/Occasional%20Paper/o20on%20MP%2OTrends%20_For/o2
OMedia%2OBriefing%2028%2OJun%202012 w/o20annex.pdf.
35. See infra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
36. These numbers are derived from a presentation given to the author by the Central Authority of
Singapore in March 2013.
37. Debbie S. L. Ong, Parental Child Abduction in Singapore: The Experience of a Non-
Convention Country, 21 INT'L J.L. POL'Y & FAM. 220, 223 (2007).
38. See infra Part IV.A.2.
39. Status Table, supra note 8. For information about the Japanese implementing statute for the
Convention, see infra note 186 and Part IV.B of this paper.
40. Ryota Kaji, "Shinkokuka suru kokusaiteki na ko no tsuresari mondai to h5gu jfyaku" 326
Ripp6 to Ch~sa 51, 60 (2012) (published by the secretariat of the House of Councilors, one of the
houses of the Japanese parliament).
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habitual residence, if such rights were being exercised at the time.41 This section
will focus on trying to develop an understanding of what "rights of custody" might
mean within the context of Japanese and Singaporean family law.
A. Japan: Parental Authority and the Family Register System
1. The Family Register System
Before discussing concepts such as "custody" it is necessary to first
understand a system that forms the basic framework of Japanese family law, the
koseki seido or family (or "household") registration system-a nationwide register
of family units.42 Unlike many countries where an official document certifying a
particular event (e.g., a birth or marriage certificate or court decree) is used as
evidence of a legally-significant family relationship, in Japan this would be
established by submitting an official extract of the family register instead.43 Rather
than merely being a record of a specific event, the family register presents a
snapshot of familial relationships at the time the extract was produced." It thus
shows not only a marriage and the birth of children, but a subsequent divorce as
well. An extract will thus show whether a child has been born out of wedlock.
Through its interaction with the rules of the Civil Code, the locus of parental
authority will also be readily apparent from the register. Since the locus of
parental authority (discussed below) is inexorably linked with marital status, a
family register extract may be important for purposes of proving authority to take
legal acts on a child's behalf (such as when applying for a passport).
Several features of the family registration bear noting. First, it is inherently
nationalistic: only Japanese citizens have family registries.45 A foreign spouse or
parent will be recorded in the register of their Japanese spouse or children, but
non-Japanese residents of Japan do not themselves have a family register.46 Thus,
while procedures have been developed to deal with non-Japanese family members,
41. Convention, supra note 1, art. 3.
42. KOSEKI HO [Family Register Act], Act No. 224 of 1947 (Japan).
43. Japan's Family Registry System, EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES: TOKYO, JAPAN,
http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/acs/tacs-family-registry.html (last visited Feb. I1, 2014).
44. Id.
45. Japanese citizenship is based primarily on parentage rather than place of birth. KOKUSEKI HO
[Nationality Law], Act No. 147 of 1950, art. 2, http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/information/tnl-
01.html (Japan). The family register shows parentage and thus is a source of proof of citizenship,
though this gives rise to a chicken-egg type problem because it is only proof of citizenship if non-
Japanese citizens are excluded. There is no language in the Family Register Act specifically limiting it
to Japanese citizens, yet this becomes apparent from Articles 6 and 16 of the Act which mandate the
preparation of a register for each married couple and their children except in the case of people who
marry foreign nationals, in which case the Japanese spouse is to be registered in the same manner as an
unmarried individual. Family Register Act, arts. 6, 16 (Japan).
46. Id. art. 49, para. 2, no. 3 (mandating special indications when registering a child having a
foreign parent). KOSEKiHO SHIKO KISOKU [Ordinance for the Enforcement of the Family Register Act],
Jud. Order No. 94 of 1947, art. 36(2) (Japan) (requiring the nationality of a foreign spouse to be
indicated in the notations section of a Japanese person's family register).
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they are essentially a "work-around" for an overall system that assumes a family
composed of Japanese citizens.
Second, in its historical context the family register is probably best
understood as existing primarily to facilitate dealings between a family on the one
hand, and government agencies or other third party actors on the other.47 It may
thus be helpful to think of the family register as performing a function analogous to
a real estate title register, which discloses legally pertinent information about a
particular tract of land for the benefit of people who might wish to transact in
connection with it. In fact, a person's family register was once essentially a public
document that could be seen by and accessed without their knowledge or consent,
until access was significantly restricted through a 1976 amendment to the Family
Register Act.48  Official family register extracts remain a basic form of identity
document.
Just as with a title registry, the family register only contains a limited number
of data fields, and since one of the purposes is to clarify the state of family
relationships for the benefit of third parties, ambiguity is kept to a minimum. Just
as a title register reflects the details of a piece of land, and whether it is subject to a
47. As described by Shfhei Ninomiya, one of Japan's leading scholars of family law, the first
national family register system established in 1871 primarily as a means of implementing taxation,
conscription, and peacekeeping rather than a system of identification. Shuhei Ninomiya, Kojildhd no
hogo to koseki kokai gensoku no kentO [The protection of personal information and the public family
register principle], 304 RITSUMEI HOGAKU 238, 240 (2006). In fact, the current system has its roots in
the traditional "ie" (household) system that was formalized in the Meiji-era Civil Code and continued to
define a basic feature of Japanese society until the family law portions of the Civil Code (and
corresponding parts of the Family Register Act) were heavily amended during the post-war American
occupation. See MIKIHIKO WADA, IE SEIDO NO HAISHI [The abolition of the household system] 129
passim (2010) (referencing characterizations of the ie system as a component of the militarist state).
Prior to these reforms, family and society were organized around "households" rather than individuals,
and would typically be more extensive than the nuclear family. See id. Under this system the head of
the household was a legally-recognized status usually accorded only to men and in which was vested a
broad range rights and duties, including control over household property and the ability to veto
marriages by junior members of the household. See id. The register system would thus identify not only
who had the authority to dispose of family property, but also who was responsible for the junior
members and could be the person responsible for implementing government policy (such as the
household) within the household. In this last respect in particular, the ie system has been characterized
as forming the base of the pyramid of the pre-war militaristic state, at the apex of which was the
emperor. See id. See also MINPO [MINPO] [Civ. C.] 1896, arts. 732-65 (Japan), translated in Civil Code
(Part IV and Part V), JAPANESE L. TRANSLATION,
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=2058&vm=04&re=02&new-l (last visited June
10, 2014) (provisions defining the rights and duties of the head of the household that are no longer
present in the current Civil Code). Needless to say, this system of family ordering was inherently
discriminatory, with heads of households having superior legal status over junior family members and
males generally being given precedence over females in various respects. The ie system that was thus
incompatible with the gender equality and other equal protection mandates included in the post-war
Japanese constitution and was essentially deleted from the Civil Code and the Family Register Act. See
MIKiHIKO WADA. Nonetheless, remnants of the system remain in the current system, including the
register system, which remains based on married couples (a smaller "household") rather than
individuals.
48. Shfhei Ninomiya, supra note 47, at 239.
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mortgage or other encumbrances or conditions that are legally significant to
potential buyers or lenders, but does not show whether the house is in good
condition, has a nice view, or is occupied by rent-paying tenants; the family
register would show that a man and woman are legally married and have children
but not the fact that they have not cohabitated for years and may already be in
other relationships.
The most important feature of the family register for purposes of this article,
however, is that the locus of parental authority over a child is readily evident from
the family register, whereas care and control, access rights, maintenance
obligations, and other matters commonly decided in the course of a divorce, are
not. 49 Moreover, the courts may approach disputes of a type that potentially affect
the relationship between the family and the rest of society (divorces and other
changes in personal status that would appear in the family register) differently
from those which only involve the people within a family relationship (who the
children live with and so forth).o
Third, the family register is based primarily on the common consensual
family transactions such as marriage, most divorces, and even adoptions. Marriage
is at the heart of the system; even if celebrated at an elaborate ceremony with many
witnesses, a marriage does not take legal effect unless it has been registered at the
appropriate local government office."' Doing so results in a new family register
being established in the name of one of the newlyweds. 52 Marriage in Japan is thus
quite easy-it simply involves filing paperwork with a local government office.53
49. Family Register Act, arts. 76-85 (Japan) (provisions on registrations relating to divorce,
parental authority, and adoption of minor children).
50. For example, Professor Noriko Mizuno gives a very good description of the high degree of
autonomy traditionally accorded to family units and the minimal degree to which the law has intervened
in internal family affairs, even after postwar reforms and even in order to protect weaker family
members from stronger ones. Noriko Mizuno, Kokenryoku ni yoru kazoku he no kainyu [Intervention
in families by state power], in Shakaihosei, Kazoku hosei ni okeru kokka no kainya [Intervention by
state power in systems of social security law and family law] 159, 164-70 (Noriko Mizuno ed., 2013).
She describes Japan as having a "powerless" family law system. Id. at 169. In other spheres Japan's
Supreme Court has traditionally been reluctant to see the exercise of judicial power being extended to
resolving disputes between members of "social sub-units" (bubun shakai), such as religious
organizations and universities. For example, in considered a leading constitutional case on the subject
of the judicial power, the Supreme Court declined to resolve a financial dispute between a religious
organization and its members that sprang from the provenance of a religious artifact. Saiko Saibansho
[Sup. Ct.] Apr. 7, 1981, 35 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJi HANREISHU [MINSHO] 1369 (Japan), available at
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1981.4.7-1976.-O-.No..749.html. Similarly, the court
refused to become involved in a dispute over a university's decision not to award credits to students for
a class, since the dispute did not have any significant relationship to the "general legal order of civil
society." Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 15, 1977, 31 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHuI
234 (Japan).
51. MINPO [MINPO] [Civ. C.] art. 739 (Japan). For a translation for the familial section of the code
see Book IV Relatives, YALE L. SCH.,
http://www.law.yale.edu/rcw/rcw/jurisdictions/ase/japan/japanciv code.htm (last visited June 5,
2014).
52. MINPO [MINPO] [Civ. C.] art. 750 (Japan). Note that because the family register is tied to
nationality rather than location, it is possible for Japanese persons to get married anywhere in the world
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It is similarly easy to get a consensual divorce. In fact, Japan may be one of
the easiest places in the world to get a divorce if both spouses want it.54 Such a
divorce can be accomplished merely by submitting paperwork in the same manner
as a marriage.55 Approximately 90 percent of divorces in Japan are accomplished
this way.56 Having children does not complicate the process, since all that is
required is for the parties to indicate in the paperwork which one of them will have
parental authority over which children after divorce.57  These arrangements are
reflected in the family register.58 In 2011, amendments to Article 766 of the Civil
Code added a requirement that divorcing parents must make arrangements for
child support and access, but this is only reflected in the divorce paperwork
through the addition of a "check-box" asking whether such arrangements have
been made.59 The authorities accepting such a filing do not look at the substance
of such arrangements and they are outside the scope of the register system in any
case.
Together with Singapore and practically every other country on Earth, Japan
is a party to the U.N. Convention of the Rights of the Child ("CRC"). 60 Under
Article 3(1) of the CRC, the best interests of children must be a primary
consideration in all actions concerning children taken by the governments of
contracting states.61 Whether this mandate is being satisfied in Japan, through a
system by which the great majority of divorces are given effect by the government
(for Japanese law purposes) by filing the necessary paperwork with consular officials in the country
where they reside. The same is true of consensual divorces.
53. In fact, it is so easy that local governments have had to develop an ad hoc method of
preventing fraudulent divorces (particularly easy in a country where most legal documents are executed
with a seal rather than a signature) by allowing spouses to file a notice requesting that divorce filings
not be accepted without the notice being withdrawn by the filing party in person. Mikiko Otani, Fujuri
Todoke: A Valuable Insurance Policy if Your Marriage is on the Rocks, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 23, 2013,
http://www.japantimes.cojp/community/2013/04/23/how-tos/fujuri-todoke-a-valuable-insurance-
policy-if-your-marriage-is-on-the-rocks.
54. Id.
55. MINPO [MINPO] [Civ. C.] art. 763 (Japan).
56. Annual Changes in Divorce, JAPAN MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LAB. & WELFARE,
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/jinkou/tokusyu/rikonl0/01.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2014)
[hereinafter Annual Changes in Divorce].
57. MINPO [MINPO] [Civ. C.] art. 819 (Japan); KOSEKI HO [Family Register Act), Act No. 224 of
1947, art. 76 (Japan).
58. Family Register Act, arts. 76-77 (Japan).
59. See, e.g., Mainichi Shinbun, Kaisei minp6 rikongo no ybikuhi, oyako menkai torikeme
nakutemo todokede juri [New Civil Code: Filings being accepted with no agreement on post-divorce
child support and visitation] (2012). Notwithstanding the introduction of this system, many divorcing
parents have been submitting paperwork without checking the box and local government offices have
been accepting them. Id.
60. United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Convention on the
Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989),
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ShowMTDSGDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsgno=IV-
I l&chapter-4&lang-en#Participants (last visited June 3, 2014) (Somalia, South Sudan, and the United
States being the only states not to ratify the convention).
61. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 3(1), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
CRC].
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without any supervision of the post-divorce arrangements, for the children affected
is debatable.
Only when one of the persons in a marriage does not want to get a divorce, or
the couple is unable to agree upon the terms (the most important of which may
often be who "gets" the children), would proceedings be brought in a family
court.62 However, Japanese family courts operate on a "mediation first" principle
for divorce and child custody proceedings, meaning that the parents may be
required to participate in a number of court-sponsored mediation sessions before
they are allowed to proceed on to seek a judicial divorce.63 The majority of cases
brought to court are resolved through this process, yet the end result is still based
on whatever the parties can be convinced to agree upon, including arrangements
relating to children. 64 Put another way, even in most of the cases in which courts
do get involved, they do so by providing a forum for mediation (or "conciliation"),
meaning their primary objective is to "broker a deal" rather than furthering any
particular policies or clearly-defined rules of law (such as the desirability of
preserving parent-child contact after divorce).
Article 770 of Japan's Civil Code only provides limited grounds for granting
a judicial divorce. 65 Courts have traditionally interpreted them as requiring one
party (and not the party bringing the action) to be culpable, meaning that failure to
agree upon a mediated divorce can mean years of litigation.66 Since most parties
settle before the proceedings reach this point, judicial resolutions in which a judge
makes the final decision regarding divorce and the allocation of parental authority
thus represent a very small percentage, approximately 1 percent of the total. 67
62. See MINPO [MINPOJ [Civ. C.] art. 766 (Japan).
63. KAJi JIKEN TETUZUKIHO [Family Case Procedure Act], Act No. 252 of 2011, art. 277 (Japan)
(mandates that certain types of family disputes be submitted first to family court mediation before more
formal proceedings). This mediation process is also sometimes called "conciliation" since interactions
between the parties are intermediated by the court, with a judge resolving many issues (though not the
divorce and allocation of parental authority) through a decree if the mediation is unsuccessful.
SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, GUIDE TO THE FAMILY COURT OF JAPAN 17 (2013), available at
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/vcms _f/20130807-I.pdf See also Domestic Relations Cases, SUPREME
CT. JAPAN,
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judicialsys/domestic relations/domestic index/index.html#01 (last
visited Feb. 7, 2013).
64. According to Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare statistics (the most recent year for which
official statistics on types of divorce appear to be available), approximately 88 percent of divorce were
cooperative with the remainder resolved through court involvement. Annual Changes in Divorce, supra
note 56. However, of those that were brought to court, the great majority were resolved either through
mediation (conciliation) before the commencement of formal litigation or settlement afterwards (9.7
percent and 1.4 percent respectively). Id.
65. MINPO [MINPO] [Civ..C.] art. 770 (Japan).
66. Until 1987 Japanese courts effectively refused to grant divorces in suits initiated by the party
"at fault" (for example, a spouse leaving the marital home to be with a lover). Since a Supreme Court
ruling in that year signaled a change of direction, courts have moved towards granting divorces if the
marriage has irretrievably broken down. See Taichi Kajimura, Dai 770j5 [Article 770], in KtHONHO
KOMENTARU-SHINZOKU [Basic Law Commentaries-Relatives] 110-113 (lchiro Shimazu & Tadaki
Matsukawa eds., 2008).
67. Annual Changes in Divorce, supra note 56.
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Finally, even if a divorce and determination of parental authority does result
from court involvement, whether through mediation, settlement, or judgment, the
results are ultimately reflected in the family register by filing with the register
authorities. 68 This is a feature of the Japanese system that is easily overlooked yet
potentially important in cross-border custody disputes. Foreign courts may attach
great importance to whether their decrees will be given effect in Japan. However,
because of the family register system, there is unlikely to be any need for a
Japanese parent to ever produce a divorce or custody decree in the course of
raising a child in Japan, since who has parental authority is readily apparent from a
family register extract.
2. Parental Authority and Custody
Under Japan's Civil Code, minor children are subject to the "parental
authority" (shinken) of their parents.69 Parental authority is exercised jointly by
both parents during marriage and solely by one parent after divorce, or in the case
of children born and raised out of wedlock, in which case the mother has parental
authority by default. 70
Parental authority has a number of components that are set forth over several
articles of the Civil Code. These include: the right and duty to care for and educate
the child (Article 820), the authority to determine where the child should reside
(Article 821), the right to reasonably discipline the child (Article 822), and the
right to permit the child to work and manage his or her property (Articles 823 and
824). ' Article 825 makes it clear that the objection of one parent having parental
authority to legal acts on behalf of the child conducted by the other have no effect
on the validity of such acts.72
Under the Civil Code, joint parental authority is only possible during
marriage: only one parent may be vested with it after divorce.73 A corollary of this
requirement is that a husband and wife both nominally retain parental authority
until a divorce takes place, even if they have been separated for many years, during
which time one parent may not even be able to see their child if the other parent
does not allow it.
As noted above, divorcing parents are now also required to make
arrangements for who should have "custody" over the child and other matters
relating to child custody (including access) and to take the best interests of their
children into account when doing so, with a court making such determination if the
parents are unable to agree.74 The term "custody" is taken from the Japanese
government's official translation of the Civil Code but should be treated with
68. KOSEKI HO [Family Register Act], Law No. 224 of 1947, art. 76 (Japan).
69. MINPO [MINPO] [Civ. C.] art. 818 (Japan). The age of majority in Japan is 20. Id. art. 4.
70. Id. arts. 818-19.
71. Id. arts. 820-24.
72. Id. art. 825.
73. Id. art. 819.
74. See CRC, supra note 61, art. 3.
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caution. The Japanese term is kango, which is also rendered as "care" in the
Japanese government's translation of Article 820 of the code.7 5  This article
describes parental authority as including the right and duty to care for and educate
children. Although the Civil Code clearly defines parental authority in terms of
parental rights and duties, academic theory and court practice has moved in the
direction of interpreting these provisions in terms of parental responsibilities rather
than rights.
Possibly because of the length of judicial divorce proceedings, during the
pendency of which parental authority nominally remains with both parents, courts
have developed a practice of making pre-divorce determinations relating to the
custody of the children,77 notwithstanding the fact that title of Article 766 clearly
refers to custody matters after divorce.7 8  Such dispositions might include
designating one parent as sole custodian and ordering child support and access (or,
as is often the case, explaining why no access has been ordered).79 In this way, the
court essentially allocates some of the components of parental authority to one
parent, while leaving both parents jointly vested with the remainder until divorce.80
Although based on the wording of the Civil Code, custody (kango) is but one of a
number of enumerated components of parental authority. A parent who is awarded
sole custody effectively gains almost exclusive decision making authority over all
aspects of the child's life, including where the child will live and go to school and
even whether the other parent will be excluded from their life.' Custody
arrangements are not reflected in the family register. What is meant by "rights of
custody" under Japanese law for purposes of the Hague Convention is not
immediately clear, as is discussed in more detail below.
75. MINPO [MINPO] [Civ. C.] art. 820 (Japan).
76. E.g., COLIN P.A. JONES, KODOMO NO TSURESARI MONDAI [THE CHILD ABDUCTION PROBLEM]
(2011). This is consistent with the trend in many other jurisdictions-including Singapore-which have
moved away from conceptualizing "custody" in terms of parents' rights, as discussed below.
77. Colin P.A. Jones, In the Best Interest of the Court: What American Lawyers Need to Know
About Child Custody and Visitation in Japan, 8 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 166, 215-18 (2007)
[hereinafter Jones, In the Best Interest of the Court].
78. MINPO [MINPO] [Clv. C.] art. 766 (Japan).
79. See Jones, In the Best Interest of the Court, supra note 77, at 216-17, 227-39. Note, however,
that almost everything written about family court procedure-including the preceding works by the
author-predates the new Family Case Proceeding Act which took effect on January 1, 2013. See, e.g.,
Kaji jiken tetuzuki h5 no seko wo mukaete [About the Implementation of the Family Case Proceeding
Act], SUPREME CT. JAPAN, http://www.courts.go.jp/vcms_1f/2412kouhou.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2014)
(undated explanatory memo published on the Japanese court website). While it is too early to evaluate
the effect of this new procedural regime, it is expected to provide greater procedural protections than
existed before.
80. It is possible to "split" parental authority after divorce, with one parent receiving "custody"
and the other having parental authority (such as having the child remain on the family registry and
retaining sole authority to manage property and take legal acts on the child's behalf). Jones, In the Best
Interest of the Court, supra note 77, at 215-18. This is a fairly rare compromise that is occasionally
ordered by courts, but typically only when both parties agree to it. Id.
81. See MINPO [MINPOI [Civ. C.] arts. 820-25 (Japan).
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3. Parental Authority and the Courts
Both the family register system and the Civil Code predate the current
Japanese Constitution, though the family law provisions of the Code were heavily
updated during the American occupation to render them consistent with the new
charter.8 2 Furthermore, the judiciary in modem (post-Meiji) Japan can be said to
have played a much more limited role in family affairs than it has in common-law
systems such as Singapore. For example, Japanese courts do not appear to
exercise broad wardship jurisdiction over children of the type that has long been
inherent to common law courts (see discussion of Singapore below).
Furthermore, as is suggested by the system of consensual divorces described
above, together with a similar consensual system of establishing and terminating
adoptive relationships, the Japanese system has long accorded a broad degree of
autonomy to individual families in managing their internal affairs, treating the
family as a single legal social unit for many legal purposes.83 As a result, for much
of its history the Japanese judiciary has refrained from interfering in internal
family matters. 84  This may be changing, yet is a reflection of the much more
limited understanding of "the judicial power" in Japan, with courts declining to
become involved in disputes taking place within identifiable units of society,
whether religious organizations, academic institutions, or family units. If one
thinks of the courts as simply one part of a governance structure that is charged
with "keeping the peace" and the courts perform their role by resolving disputes
between members of society, it is arguably more efficient to limit coverage to
disputes that effect relationships between components rather than between
individuals.ss
B. Complex Simplicity--Singapore's "Law ofParenthood"
Unlike Japan, which has historically based many of its laws and legal
institutions on continental European models, Singapore has inherited a legal
82. Compare KOSEKI HO [Family Register Act], Act No. 224 of 1947 (Japan), and MINPO
[MINeo] [Civ. C.] (Japan), with NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan), translated in
The Constitution of Japan, PRIME MINISTER & His CABINET,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution and government ofjapan/constitutione.htmI (last
visited Feb. 8, 2014).
83. This can be traced back to the broad powers granted to the head of the household under the old
Civil Code before the ie system was excised from it. See discussion supra note 47.
84. See, e.g., Noriko Mizuno, supra note 50, at 164-69. Mizuno refers to the broad discretion
granted to heads of household under the system and notes that the Supreme Court played an important
role in protecting the weaker party (usually the wife) in post-war families through its policy of refusing
to grant judicial divorces to the party at fault. Id. Note, however, that even this protective role was
performed primarily by judicial inaction rather than assertive intervention.
85. As was recently explained to the author by a veteran Japanese lawyer, the problem for
implementing the Convention in Japan is that its family law is based on the principle that in marriage
1+1=1. By contrast, in Western nations the equation is 1+1=2. By this he meant that the legal systems
in those countries are better equipped for dealing with claims between family members since the law
still treats them as individual legal units compared to Japanese family law, which is set up to deal only
with whole numbers. See discussion supra note 47.
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system deeply rooted in the English system of common law and equity. Long
before Singapore's independence in 1965, it was established that the English law
of guardianship of infants applied in the territory, and that the Singapore courts
were vested with the same equitable powers of the Court of Chancery in
connection with the welfare of children.86 Singapore courts continue to refer to
English and other common law precedents, including certain Acts of Parliament
that remain through the Application of English Law Act.87  The Women's
Charter," one of Singapore's principal family law statutes, has "its origins in
English law, particularly the UK Matrimonial Causes Act 1973."8 As we shall
see, the High Court of Singapore referenced appellate court rulings in the United
Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand in issuing its first decision under the
Convention. 90
This is not to say that Singapore has slavishly followed English practice,
particularly in the field of family law where modifications were required to reflect
local conditions. In the past, common law rules of inheritance rooted in
monogamy and English notions of legitimacy had to be reevaluated in light of the
various forms of polygamy recognized under the customary laws of some of the
territory's principal ethnic communities. 9' While these customary rules have been
mostly eliminated, today, Singapore still retains a separate system of Islamic law
and a Syariah Court (and board of appeals) for its Muslim minority community
under the Administration of Muslim Law Act ("AMLA").92
To consider what "rights of custody" mean in Singapore, it is necessary to
look at the country's laws of custody and guardianship. Unfortunately, this area of
the country's jurisprudence has been described as a "maze" 93 and being in a state
of "confusion." 94 The description of Professor Debbie Ong may be a bit more
accurate: "The law on custody of children is both simple and complex." 95
86. In re Sinyak Rayoon & Anor [1885-18901 04 K.Y. 329 (Sing.), discussed in CASES HEARD
AND DETERMINED IN HER MAJESTY'S SUPREME COURT OF THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS (1808-1890)
726 (James William Norton Kyshe ed., Sing. & Straits Printing Office, 1890); In re the Intended
Marriage between Lee Keng Gin & Catherine Wong Kim Lan [1935] SSLR 7, microfilmed on Christian
Chinese Couple May Now Marry, SING. FREE PRESS, July 19, 1935, at 3.
87. See Application of English Law Act (Cap. 7A, 1994 Rev. Ed. Sing.) §§ 2-3.
88. Women's Charter (Cap. 353, 2009 Rev. Ed. Sing.) § 3.
89. Compare id., with Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, c. 18 (Eng.).
90. See infra Part IV.A.2.
91. See, e.g., LEONG WAi KUM, PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW IN SINGAPORE 87-148 (1997)
[hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW IN SINGAPORE] (discussing Chinese, Hindu, and Christian
customary law in pre-independence Singapore; in particular note the discussion at 87-88 of the famous
Six Widows Case of 1867 in which a Singapore court had to reconcile Chinese polygamy with
monogamy-based common law principles of legitimacy and inheritance).
92. Admin. of Muslim Law Act (Cap. 3, 2009 Rev. Ed. Sing.).
93. 11 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF SINGAPORE 1 130.463 (2006).
94. Leong Wai Kum, Restatement of the Law of Guardianship and Custody in Singapore, 1999
SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 432, 432 (1999).
95. Debbie Ong Siew Ling, The Next Step in Post-Divorce Parenting, 17 SING. ACAD. L.J. 648,
648 (2005).
300 VOL. 42:2
2014 WILL THE CHILD ABDUCTION TREATY BECOME MOR-E "ASIAN"?
First, the complexity: at the time of writing Singapore had not adopted a
comprehensive statute governing children and the parent-child relationship
comparable to the U.K.'s Children Act 1989. The primary source of statutory law
governing the parent-child relationship remains the Guardianship of Infants Act 96
(the "GOIA"), which has its origins in a colonial-era ordinance. 97 Because the
GOIA speaks primarily in terms of "guardianship," it seems common to refer to
guardianship and custody together. To avoid confusion, however, this article will
refer only to "custody".
The GOIA is effectively supplemented by the Women's Charter, and the
AMLA, which provide rules for child custody determinations in connection with
marital actions for non-Muslims and Muslims, respectively." Due to the limits on
the powers of the Syariah Court, however, it is both possible and common for
Muslims to seek orders from the secular family court under the Women's Charter
in parallel with divorce proceedings in the Syariah Court. 99 Unlike these two
statutes, which are concerned primarily with marriage, annulment, and divorce, the
GOIA applies to all children in Singapore regardless of the faith or marital status
of their parents or the pendency of marital proceedings.' 00 Thus, while the
Women's Charter taken in isolation appears to only anticipate courts making
dispositions regarding children ancillary to marital proceedings, other custody
actions come within the ambit of the GOIA.'0
The term "custody" is not defined in any Singapore statute and its meaning in
case law has changed over time, generally moving away from a "rights based"
concept. The Women's Charter is said to have been highly progressive, both in
declaring mothers and fathers to be equal as parents, but also in espousing the
"modern idea of a parent owing responsibility towards his or her child necessarily
[that] rendered obsolete the old common law idea of a parent having rights over the
child." 02 This primacy of parental responsibility rather than parental rights has
been built upon by Singapore's courts and now applies throughout Singapore
law.lo3 As described by Professor Wai Kum Leong, one of Singapore's leading
family law scholars:
From the 1960s, the law in Singapore expects married, unmarried,
separated or divorced parents (a) to view their child as someone towards
whom they owe responsibility, (b) the responsibility should be
96. Guardianship of Infants Act (Cap. 122, 1985 Rev. Ed. Sing.) §§ 3-8.
97. PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW IN SINGAPORE, supra note 91, at 542.
98. Women's Charter (Cap. 353, 2009 Rev. Ed. Sing.) § 125; Admin. of Muslim Law Act (Cap. 3,
2009 Rev. Ed. Sing.) §§ 52(3)(c), 53(2)(b).
99. Admin. of Muslim Law Act § 35A(1)-(2) (Sing.); see also Ahmad Nizam bin Abbas, The
Islamic Legal System in Singapore, 21 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 163, 175 (2012).
100. See Guardianship of Infants Act §§ 3, 8 (Sing.).
101. Id. §§ 7(4), 14.
102. Wai Kum Leong, A Communitarian Effort in Guardianship and Custody of Child After
Parents' Divorce, in THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 375, 378 (Andrew Bainham &
Barthazar A. Rwezaura eds., 2006).
103. Id.
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discharged co-operatively with the other parent and/or guardian and (c)
for the purpose of achieving the welfare of the child.104
Thus, even the statutory provisions of the GOIA, the Women's Charter, and
the AMLA relating to custody should be regarded as being based on a "moral
view" of parenthood. As posited by Professor Leong:
It is not the law that bestows authority on a parent over his or her
child. A parent naturally, from the way society is organized around
family units, possesses and exercises authority over his or her child.
The law accepts that parental authority is unlimited in scope. A parent
must be able to do everything necessary to discharge his or her
responsibility to care for and nurture the child. The law merely
recognizes a parent's authority so that his or her exercise of it is
lawful. os
Accordingly, even the law of guardianship is considered as being limited to
court interventions that do not directly undermine parental authority or, to use the
more modem term, parental responsibility. 06 According to Professor Leong, the
law of custody in Singapore should be viewed as something separate from what
she refers to as the much greater "law of parenthood." "It bears noting that the law
of parenthood that regulates the parent-child relationship contains all the principles
necessary for optimal regulation [of the upbringing of a child by her parents]. It is
this area of law, rather than the law of guardianship and custody . .. that should ...
regulate . . . parents."'
0 7
Thus, although the term "custody" is still used in Singapore, it is in many
ways an outdated notion that is of only secondary importance to a court charged
with advancing the welfare of children. Here we can turn to the simplicity in
Singapore's law of custody: everything that is done by a court or other government
institutions must advance the child's welfare. In other words, "[c]oncem for the
welfare of the child is ubiquitous in the law in Singapore relating to children."'
08
As already noted, the paramountcy of the welfare of children is a basic
principle of the CRC.'09 Both the Women's Charter and the GOIA also contain
provisions regarding the application of this principle in court proceedings.o"0 Most
recently a 2011 amendment to the Children and Young Persons Act added a
general declaration that "the parents or guardian of a child . . . are primarily
104. Leong Wai Kum, Parental Responsibility as the Core Principle in Legal Regulation of the
Parent-Child Relationship, in SAL CONFERENCE 2011: DEVELOPMENTS IN SINGAPORE LAW BETWEEN
2006 & 2010, at 244, 246 (Yeo Tiong Min et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter Leong Wai Kum, Parental
Responsibility].
105. LEONG WA! KUM, ELEMENTS OF FAMILY LAW IN SINGAPORE 259 (2007) [hereinafter
ELEMENTS OF FAMILY LAW IN SINGAPORE].
106. Leong Wai Kum, Parental Responsibility, supra note 104, at 249-50.
107. ELEMENTS OF FAMILY LAW IN SINGAPORE, supra note 105, at 341.
108. Id. at 255.
109. CRC, supra note 61, pmbl., art. 3.
110. Women's Charter (Cap. 353, 2009 Rev. Ed. Sing.) § 124; Guardianship of Infants Act (Cap.
122, 1985 Rev. Ed. Sing.) § 3.
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responsible for the care and welfare of the child . .. and they should discharge their
responsibilities to promote the welfare of the child ....
However, insofar as Singapore's law of guardianship is founded in the
equitable powers of English courts to intervene when doing so is in the best
interests of a child, the paramountcy principle could thus be said to predate any
ordinance, statute, or treaty on the subject."l Moreover, unlike Japan, the
principle supersedes even the agreement of both parents, as noted in a recent article
by two Singapore family court judges:
The paramount concern of the Court in family disputes cases or in cases
involving children directly or indirectly is the welfare and best interests
of the child and this consideration is entrenched in the laws of Singapore
and cannot be circumvented by the desires of the parties under any
situation.'' 3
The judicial focus on children is further reflected by Singapore family court
practices such as requiring non-adversarial mediation and family counseling so that
all divorcing parents can be made aware of the potential impact on their
children.' 14
The shift away from common law "rights-based" notions of custody towards a
welfare-based "law of parenthood" has been reflected in the fact that Singapore
courts no longer treat custody as a form of judicial empowerment of one parent at
the expense of the other. This was illustrated by L v L, a leading case from 1997 in
which the court held that a mother who had been awarded sole custody over her
111. Children and Young Persons Act (Cap. 38, 2001 Rev. Ed. Sing.) § 3A(a). A similar mandate
directed at parents in general was added to Art. 820 of Japan's Civil Code in 2011. Colin P.A. Jones,
Upcoming Legal Reforms: A Plus for Children or plus ca change?, JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 9, 2011),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2011/08/09/issues/upcoming-legal-reforms-a-plus-for-
children-or-plus-ca-change/#.UvQRWSTn IU. In the case of Japan, however, there are no statutory
provisions that can be said to be positively implementing provisions of the CRC relevant to the subject
of custody, including Articles 7, 8, 9, and 11.
112. See ELEMENTS OF FAMILY LAW IN SINGAPORE, supra note 105, at 352. For example, in a 1935
judgment a Singapore court overruled a father who had refused to give his consent to the marriage of
his minor daughter because he did so for reasons related to his own faith rather than his daughter's best
interest. In re the Intended Marriage between Lee Keng Gin & Catherine Wong Kim Lan [1935] SSLR
7, microjilmedon Christian Chinese Couple May Now Marry, SING. FREE PRESS, July 19, 1935, at 3.
113. RICHARD MAGNUS & WONG LI TEIN, THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL PROCESS IN CHILD PROTECTION:
A SINGAPORE PERSPECTIVE 6 (2005), available at
http://app.subcourts.gov.sg/Data/Files/File/eJustice/Archives/ISPCANPaper.pdf.
114. See Children's Issues, STATE CTS. SING.,
https://app.subcourts.gov.sg/family/page.aspx?pageid=6432 (last updated Mar. 8, 2014) (general
disclosure on child custody and related proceedings showing counseling and resolution conferences as
part of the process); The Child Programme, SUBORDINATE CTS. SING.,
https://app.subcourts.gov.sg/family/page.aspx?pageid=45944 (last updated Oct. 15, 2010) (a new, child
focused resolution process with a heavy focus on counseling and non-adversarial proceedings). Among
other things, Article 50(3A) of the Women's Charter requires a court to order mediation and/or
counseling in connection with divorce proceedings. Ellen Lee, The First Meetings and Overview of
Matrimonial Proceedings, in THE ART OF FAMILY LAWYERING 6, 10 (Michelle Woodworth Cordeiro
ed., 2013).
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child was nonetheless not free to unilaterally change the child's surname without
the knowledge or consent of the father.
There is also now a presumption that joint custody will usually be in the best
interests of children in most cases.' 6 This has gone beyond a mere system of
"permissive" joint custody, in which courts allowed it if the parents appear
cooperative, to one where courts have even ordered it notwithstanding
"tremendous bitterness and hatred between" the parents. " Under current practice,
an order of sole custody is only deemed appropriate when it is found to be in the
child's best interests that the non-custodial parent be excluded from his or her
life." 8
That "custody" may have become unimportant is further illustrated by the
comparatively recent practice of courts sometimes not issuing any custody order at
all. In the groundbreaking case of Re Aliya Aziz Tayabali, the High Court declined
to issue any custody order-a so-called "no custody order"-despite competing
petitions from both sides." 9 In the absence of a formal custody decree, both
parents "continue to be regulated by the default law, ie, the law regulating
parenthood." 20 The "no custody order" approach has been both recommended and
praised by academics and would be consistent with the approach adopted by the
U.K.'s Children Act 1989, Section 1(5), which declares that courts should not
make orders unless doing so will be better for the child, rather than not making any
order at all.12 1 As discussed below, however, how a Singapore "no custody order"
115. See L v L [1996] 2 SLR (R) [529], [530] (Sing.).
116. ELEMENTS OF FAMILY LAW IN SINGAPORE, supra note 105, at 354; Michelle Woodworth et
al., Custody, Care and Control and Access, in THE ART OF FAMILY LAWYERING, supra note 114, at 44,
47.
117. See AL v ALK [2010] SGHC [255], 1 28 (Sing.), available at
http://www.commonlii.org/sg/cases/SGHC/2010/255.html (discussed in Leong Wai Kum, Parental
Responsibility, supra note 104, at 237); CX v CY [2005] 3 SLR (R) [690], [2005] SGCA [37], 1 38
(Sing.), available at http://www.singaporelaw.sg/sglaw/laws-of-singapore/case-law/free-law/court-of-
appeal-judgments/12650-cx-v-cy-minor-custody-and-access-2005-3-slr-690-2005-sgca-37 ("We would
emphasise [sic] that recent decisions have been inclined towards making joint or no custody orders due
to the need to ensure that the child becomes attached to both parents. The idea behind joint or no
custody order is to ensure that neither parent has a better right over the child and that both have a
responsibility to bring the child up in the best way possible. Similarly, the child has a right to the
guidance of both his parents.").
118. Woodworth et al., Custody, Care and Control and Access, supra note 116, at 46-47 ("Such an
order [of sole custody] is the exception to the rule (even when the child's parents have an acrimonious
relationship), because it unnecessarily deprives the child of one parent's involvement in the major
aspects of his or her life. Sole custody orders are only made in exceptional circumstances; for instance,
where one parent physically, sexually or emotionally abuses the child, or where the relationship of the
parties is such that co-operation is totally impossible and the lack thereof is harmful to the child."
(citing CXv CY [2005] 3 SLR (R) at [24], [29], [38] (Sing.))).
119. See Re Aliya Aziz Tayabali [1992] 3 SLR (R) [894], [894-95] (Sing.).
120. LEONG WAl KUM, ELEMENTS OF FAMILY LAW IN SINGAPORE 311 (2d ed. 2012).
121. See, e.g., Debbie S. L. Ong, Making No Custody Order: Re G (Guardianship of an Infant),
2003 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 583, 583 (2003) (referring to the issuance of no custody order as "brilliantly
sensible"); ELEMENTS OF FAMILY LAW IN SINGAPORE, supra note 105, at 338 (praising the use of "no
custody orders").
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should be interpreted in connection with "rights of custody" under the Convention
does not yet appear to have been addressed.
In 2005, the Court of Appeal of Singapore issued its decision in the case of
CX v CY,122 which has become one of the most important Singapore cases on the
subject of child custody.123 In it, the court confirmed that the idea of joint parental
responsibility is "deeply rooted in [its] family law jurisprudence." 24  More
importantly, it used the case as an opportunity to announce a new direction: "[Iln
line with the outlook that parental responsibility is for life, the time was right for us
to expressly endorse the concept of joint parenting. We believe that, generally,
joint or no custody orders should be made, with sole custody orders being an
exception to the rule." 25
In expressing a preference for joint parenting while declining to favor joint
custody or no custody, the Court of Appeal noted that "the practical effects of a 'no
custody order' and a 'joint custody order' are similar where a 'care and control
order' has been made." 26 As to when joint custody should be awarded as opposed
to no custody, the Court of Appeal indicated that the latter result would be
preferred "where there is no actual dispute between the parents over any serious
matters relating to the child's upbringing." 27
Shortly after CX v CY was decided, it was also endorsed by the Appeal Board
of the Syariah Court, which declared that
we are of the view that the Muslim law on custody of children as
administered under the [AMLA] is no different from that set out in CX v
CY. We say this because under both Muslim and the civil law the
interest or welfare of the child is the paramount consideration.128
Therefore, Singapore's laws of custody can essentially be considered uniform
regardless of the faith involved.
A slightly cynical interpretation of these developments might be that courts
have merely redefined custody so that it means less. It is generally accepted that in
Singapore today the "battlefield" has moved from custody to care and control and
access.129 "Care and control" refers to which parent the child should live with, and
122. CXv CY[2005] 3 SLR [690] (Sing.).
123. See, e.g., ELEMENTS OF FAMILY LAW IN SINGAPORE, supra note 105, at 359 (describing the
decision as "significant").
124. CXv CY [2005] 3 SLR 126.
125. Id.1124.
126. Id. 1118.
127. Id.
128. LEONG WAi KUM, ELEMENTS OF FAMILY LAW IN SINGAPORE 316 (2d ed. 2012) (citing Zaini
bin Ibrahim v Rafidah binte Abdul Rahman (Appeal Case No. 26/2006)). See also Ahmad Nizam bin
Abbas, supra note 99, at 175 n.93.
129. Debbie Ong, Family Law, 12 SING. ACAD. L. ANN. REV. SING. CASES 298, 301 (2011). "Our
development now mirrors more closely that in England where, although custody or 'parental
responsibility' is no longer an arena for parental disputes, the contests for residential order and contact
orders continue to be tricky." Debbie Ong & Valerie Thean, Family Law, 8 SING. ACAD. L. ANN. REV.
SING. CASES 229, 235 (2007).
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which parent "make[s] the small decisions that are needed for daily living."' 30 In
this sense it is similar to "custody" as used in the Japanese Civil Code.
However, care and control is different from Japanese custody and from
Singaporean notions of custody in that it does not empower a parent to make major
decisions about the child without involving the other parent.' 3 ' Unlike custody,
with respect to which courts can order joint custody or refrain from making a
custody order at all, a care and control order in favor of one parent is generally
required when they divorce or separate.132  Furthermore, joint care and control
orders are still rare, though one scholar has identified a recent trend towards their
increase. 133 At the time of writing it was reportedly common for both parents to
have joint (or "no") custody and thus be expected to participate and cooperate in
all major decisions in the child's life, while only one parent would have care and
control with the other having access.134
In regards to access in Singapore, little needs to be said other than that
"convincing evidence" is required before a court will deny a parent reasonable
access to his or her child.' 35 To the extent cross border access is also considered in
the best interest of the child, courts can generally be expected to allow it also.136
With Singapore having moved away from "custody" as a primary concern in
judicial determinations, particularly in the sense of being a "rights-based" notion,
one might reasonably wonder what "rights of custody" means for purposes of the
Convention. On this point it may actually be useful to look at the country's
criminal law for further guidance.
130. ELEMENTSOF FAMILY LAW IN SINGAPORE, supra note 105, at 354 (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Ong, Family Law (2011), supra note 129, at 301.
134. See Woodworth et al., Custody, Care and Control and Access, supra note 116, at 48.
135. 11 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF SINGAPORE 1 130.515 (2006), citing Tay Ah Hoe (mw) v Kwek Lye
Seng (unreported), Div Pet No 3080 of 1995 (Sing.). "[Within the law of guardianship and custody] a
parent [who] does not live with . . . her child, it has become common to expect that . . . she will get an
order that gives reasonable access to the child." ELEMENTS OF FAMILY LAW IN SINGAPORE, supra note
105, at 355 (emphasis added). See also Debbie Ong Siew Ling & Valerie Thean, Family Law, 2 SING.
ACAD. L. ANN. REV. SING. CASES 224, 236 (2002) ("In Sumathi d/o Boominathan v Kathiravan
(Divorce Petition 6009977/2001, DC, unreported dated 30.4.2002), a father was given overnight access
to his four-year-old daughter despite the mother's fears that the child may be exposed to violence and
fears that being apart from the mother overnight may cause the young child some trauma.").
136. See BG v BF [2007] 3 SLR (R) [2331, [2007] SGCA [32] (Sing.), available at
http://www.singaporelaw.sg/sglaw/laws-of-singapore/case-law/free-law/court-of-appeal-
judgments/I 3189-bg-v-bf-2007-3-slr-233-2007-sgca-32 (concerning a dispute between two non-
Singapore parents). One area for further research would be the question of whether Singapore's
geographical condition has any impact on child custody resolutions. Given its small size, in cases
involving parents who both reside in Singapore, the determination of which parent has care and control
is unlikely to greatly impact the frequency with which the other parent is able to exercise rights of
access. Thus, the type of dispute which might arise in a strictly domestic case in a much larger
jurisdiction (Texas, or Japan, for example) may only arise in Singapore in cases involving a prospective
international relocation by one parent.
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Unlike in some other states that are party to the Hague Convention, such as
the United States or Canada, Singapore does not have provisions in its Penal Code
or other statues making it a crime for a parent to abduct his or her own child
internationally or domestically. As explained by one scholar writing on the subject
in 1999, "[u]nder the Singapore Penal Code, then, a parent cannot kidnap his or
her child."'3 7 Joining the Convention has not changed anything in this respect: as
of March 2013 the home page of Singapore's Central Authority clearly stated that
"[i]n Singapore, parental child abduction is not considered a criminal issue but is
viewed as a civil matter."13 8
There is one exception: a 1996 amendment to Section 126 of the Women's
Charter makes it an offense for any person to remove a child subject to a custody
order from Singapore for more than one month without the consent of both parents
or the leave of the court.' 3 9 The proscription applies even to a parent vested with
sole custody and thus amounts to a prohibition on unilateral relocations abroad
without the consent of the other parent or the leave of the court.
For Hague Convention purposes, therefore, any parent of a child in Singapore
subject to a custody order under the Women's Charter (whether or not the order
gives them custody) appears to have a statutory ne exeat right-essentially the
right of one parent to veto the removal of the child from the jurisdiction of
residence by the other parent, even when the other parent has full (sole) custody
rights. Courts in some states parties to the convention, including the U.S. Supreme
Court, have found ne exeat rights to constitute "rights of custody" under the Hague
Convention, insofar as they necessarily give the parent holding them the "right to
determine the child's place of residence." 40
On its face, the above provision of Section 126 of the Women's Charter does
not apply in cases where a custody ruling has not yet been made (as is often the
case of abductions that take place before any court proceedings have been
commenced).141 Furthermore, it is not clear whether a "no custody order" qualifies
as a "custody order" for purposes of applying this provision. It seems
inconceivable, however, that a parent who has full parenthood under the "law of
parenthood," before any restrictions are applied by courts through the Women's
Charter in the form of a custody order, would not be found to have a right to
participate in decisions regarding his or her child's residence when a parent who
had lost custody would, merely because of the mechanistic operation of Section
126. In addition, insofar as Singapore courts have held that non-custodial parents
should be consulted about important matters such as a change of name, the same
requirement would seem likely to apply to a change of residence.
137. Leong Wai Kum, International Co-operation in Child Abduction Across Borders, II SING.
ACAD. L.J. 409, 418 (1999) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
138. Frequently Asked Questions, MINISTRY Soc. & FAM. DEv.,
http://app.msf.gov.sg/SingaporeCentralAuthority/FAQ.aspx (follow "5. Is parental child abduction a
crime in Singapore?" hyperlink to show answer) (last visited May 31, 2013).
139. Women's Charter (Cap. 353, 2009 Rev. Ed. Sing.) § 126.
140. See e.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 11 (2010).
141. See Women's Charter § 126 (Sing.).
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The author's conclusion is thus that between the Women's Charter and the
"law of parenthood" described above, virtually all parents in Singapore have
"rights of custody" for purposes of the Hague Convention. In most cases
originating from Singapore, therefore, the inquiry would seem likely to focus not
on whether the left-behind parent had rights of custody, but whether they were
actually being exercised at the time.
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE CONVENTION
A. Singapore
1. The International Child Abduction Act of 2010
The International Child Abduction Act ("ICAA"), Singapore's implementing
legislation for the Convention can be seen as a natural extension of the legal
regime described above. Singapore courts have often dealt with international
custody disputes, including in abduction-type situations, before the country joined
the Convention.142 In at least one reported judgment, a Singapore court even
referred specifically to the principles of the Convention in resolving such a case. 143
Doing so can be seen as a natural extension of the principle of the paramountcy of
the welfare of the child, a principle in which the Convention itself is also rooted.
The ICAA is a comparatively short statute, containing just 24 sections that
cover the basic aspects of implementation. 144 First, it establishes Singapore's
Central Authority within the Ministry of Social and Family Development.145
Second, the ICAA establishes the basic procedural framework for court
involvement in ingoing and outgoing cases arising under the Convention.146 More
detailed procedural rules have been left to the rule-making authority of the
Supreme Court, which has used this authority to transfer Convention cases to the
family division. 147
142. For example, the seminal case of CX v CY [2005] 3 SLR (R) [690], [2005] SGCA [37], 1 38
(Sing.), discussed above, involved a Dutch national living in Thailand and a Singapore mother. See also
ELEMENTS OF FAMILY LAW IN SINGAPORE, supra note 105, at 302-304.
143. In AB v AC, a case decided in 2004 and involving a Norwegian man and a Singaporean
woman who had been residing in Norway with their child after their divorce, the Singapore court
awarded custody to the father for purposes of returning the child to Norway after the mother brought the
child to Singapore in violation of the Norwegian court order. AB v AC [2004] SGDC [61 (Sing.). See
also Debbie Ong & Valerie Thean, Family Law, 5 SING. ACAD. L. ANN. REV. SING. CASES 281, 281-83
(2004). Interestingly, the court also based its ruling in part on Section 126(5) of the Women's Charter,
noting that since the provision made it an offense to do what the mother had done leaving Singapore,
permitting similar behavior in the opposite direction would create a double standard. Id.
144. International Child Abduction Act (Cap. 143C, 2011 Rev. Ed. Sing.), available at
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;page=0;query--Docld%3A%2251e460e9-3If7-
4792-ael8-86190cf4b6b%22%2OStatus%3Ainforce%2ODepth%3AO;rec=0.
145. See id. §§ 5-7.
146. See id. §§ 8-20.
147. See Supreme Court of Judicature (Transfer of Matrimonial, Divorce and Guardianship of
Infants Proceedings to District Court) Order 2007 (Cap. 322, 2007 Rev. Ed. Sing.), available at
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;page=0;query--Compld%3Aadb39909-4294-
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The ICAA also addresses legal aid and certain other miscellaneous matters
relating to implementation. Under Section 14(1), an application under Article 15
of the Convention may be made for a court declaration that the removal of a child
from Singapore violated rights of custody in Singapore.' 48
Much of the Convention's implementation is accomplished through Section 3
of the ICAA, which accords most of the treaty (including the Article 5 definition of
"rights of custody") the force of domestic Singaporean law, the relevant articles
being attached as an appendix.14 9 Since the ICAA is readily available online, in
English, 150 and accomplishes implementation through adoption of the Convention
provisions as they are written, the preceding brief summary should suffice for
purposes of this article.
2. The Convention in Singapore Courts: BDUv BDT
Despite the comparatively small number of inbound cases recorded in
Singapore since its accession went into effect in 2011, by the following year a
Singapore court was deciding its first return order case-that of BDU v BDT,
which culminated in a high court opinion issued May 15, 2013.'15
BDU v BDT was what an English court of appeals judge would likely call "a
very standard Hague case."l 52 A German man and a Singaporean woman became
acquainted over the Internet. 5 3 After meeting in person she became pregnant.154
They married and set up a household in Germany where the child at issue was born
in 2010.'15 The marriage went sour and, after returning temporarily to Singapore
in January of 2012 to celebrate the Chinese New Year, the mother, pregnant again,
remained in Singapore, apparently refusing to return to Germany.' 56 The father
had already dealt with a similar situation the previous year at which time he had
procured from a German court an order temporarily vesting in him the sole right to
4bcl-95b8-
ccbla8fbe4e%20 OValidTime%3A20140611000000%20TransactionTime%3A20140611000000;rec=0.
Note that the Syariah Court has no role in proceedings under the ICAA.
148. International Child Abduction Act § 14(1) (Sing.).
149. See id. § 3.
150. See International Child Abduction Act (Sing.), supra note 144 (website at the end of citation)
151. BDU v BDT [2013] SGHC [106] (Sing.), available at http://www.singaporelaw.sg/sglaw/laws-
of-singapore/case-law/free-law/high-court-judgments/1 5217-bdu-v-bdt-2013-sghc-106.
152. E (Children) (FC), [2011] UKSC 27, [2012] 1 AC 144 (S.C.) 11 11 (appeal taken from EWCA)
(U.K.) (quoting the description of the case by U Thorpe of the Court of Appeal) (involving an English
woman who brought her children to England from Norway to escape alleged psychological abuse from
her Norwegian husband and resulted in the return order made by the trial judge being upheld).
153. BDU v BDT [2013] SGHC 116 (Sing.).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See id. 111 8, 11-13 (indicating that the second child was not subject to any court proceedings
in Singapore).
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determine the child's place of abode. 157 The order was vacated after she returned
to Germany. 58
In February of 2012, after the second instance of her refusing to leave
Singapore with the child, the father returned alone to Germany and immediately
commenced proceedings in a court there.159  He promptly obtained an order
transferring parental authority to him and ordering the mother to return the child to
the father in Germany.160 This was followed by a request for return filed with the
Central Authority in Germany and a request for assistance filed with the Singapore
Central Authority.161 The mother commenced proceedings under the GOIA in
April 2012 seeking sole custody and care and control over the child, but these
proceedings were stayed under the ICAA by the father's commencement of an
application for retum.162
The proceedings were prompt. The Singapore district court Judge issued a
decision ordering the return of the child to Germany on August 21, 2012.163 The
mother appealed almost immediately and the Singapore High Court issued a very
thorough judgment affirming the order less than a year later.164 The High Court
was no doubt cognizant of the importance of this-its first decision under the
Convention.
The German father acted well within the one year period mandated by the
Convention16 5 and there was never any dispute about his objections to the child's
retention in Singapore or efforts to exercise his rights of custody. 166 This meant
that the defenses to a return order under Article 13(a) of the Convention were not
available.'6 7 The case was thus essentially about the applicability of Article 13(b),
which states that convention members do not have to return a child if the party
opposing it establishes that "there is a grave risk that his or her return would
expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in
an intolerable situation."' 68
At the district court level, the mother claimed that she had been
psychologically abused by her in-laws and physically abused by the father.' 69 Her
Article 13(b) defense was thus essentially that returning her to Germany would
157. Id. 119.
158. See id. 110.
159. See id. II -12.
160. Id. I 12.
161. Id.
162. Id. I 13.
163. Id. 137.
164. See id. Jil 49-107.
I65. Id. 118.
166. Id.
167. See Convention, supra note 1, art. 13. Hague Convention, Article 13 states, in part, that a
return does not need to be ordered if "a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the
person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or
had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention." Id. (emphasis added).
168. Id.
169. BDU v BDT [2013] SGHC 1J 44-48 (Sing.).
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subject her to further physical and emotional harm and thus expose E, their child,
to grave psychological harm. Upon appeal, this claim was bolstered with affidavits
and a psychological report suggesting that being forced to return to Germany might
render the mother suicidal and that the undertakings and protective measures were
manifestly inadequate and unsatisfactory.170
On appeal, the High Court surveyed how courts in several "peer"
jurisdictions, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, had dealt with the
13(b) defense.' 7' First the court looked at two recent cases of the U.K. Supreme
Court to find the position in the United Kingdom "less than clear cut."' 72 As
interpreted by the Singapore Court of Appeal, in the 2011 case In re E, the U.K.
Supreme Court essentially discounted the subjective, often unsubstantiated claims
of mental harm by abducting mothers and focused on the objects of the Convention
as being to deter parents taking the law into their own hands and restoring children
as soon as possible to their home country.'73 By contrast, however, in a case
decided the following year, In re S, the U.K. Supreme Court seemed to step back
and endorse a highly subjective version of the 13(b) defense:
The critical question is what will happen if, with the mother, the child is
returned. If the court concludes that, on return, the mother will suffer
such anxieties that their effect on her mental health will create a
situation that is intolerable for the child, then the child should not be
returned. It matters not whether the mother's anxieties will be
reasonable or unreasonable.174
The High Court then turned to Australia, where the position set forth in DP
Commonwealth Authority and JLM v Director General NSW Department of
Community Services rendered the position in that country "quite certain."' 75
Essentially the court found this case to stand for that 13(b) defenses were rarely
applied without clear and compelling evidence.
Next the High Court looked to New Zealand, first referencing A v Central
Authority for New Zealand, which it found to stand for the proposition that "the
issue of whether the child will be put in an intolerable situation will not even arise
if the legal system of the country of habitual residence is capable of protecting (the
best interests of) the child."' 6  This would appear to call for an exceptionally
narrow reading of the 13(b) defense.
Yet the court ultimately settled on part of an analytical method developed in a
conflicting New Zealand authority emphasized by the appellant mother, El Sayed v
170. See id. Ji 51, 62.
171. Id. Jllj21-36.
172. Id. Jl 28-30.
173. Id. Jil 26-28 (citing In re E (Children) (FC), [2011] UKSC 27, [2012] 1 AC 144 (appeal taken
from EWCA) (U.K.)).
174. Id. 11 29 (citing In re S (A Child), [2012] UKSC 10, [2012] 2 AC 257 [34] (U.K.) (emphasis
added)).
175. Id. 1 30. (citing DP v Commonwealth Central Authority (2001) 206 CLR 401 (Austl.); JLM v
Director-General NSW Department of Community Services [2001] HCA 39 (Austl.)).
176. Id. J|l| 31-32 (citing A v Central Authority ofNew Zealand [1996] 2 NZLR 517 (CA)).
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Secretary for Justice ("El Sayed").'n In that case the court held, inter alia, that the
13(b) exception required
(a) the identification of [a] specific harm to the child; (b) of a requisite
character; (c) that the harm must be demonstrated to be of a grave
character; (d) by clear and compelling evidence; and (e) if [the] harm of
that kind was established, the trial Court had a wide discretion as to how
the return dilemma is to be addressed. 78
Singapore's High Court found (a) through (d) of the El Sayed test to be useful
guidelines and, noting them to be consistent with the ruling of the U.K. Supreme
Court in In re E, used them to resolve the case at bar.'79 The court discounted
much of the assertions and noted numerous discrepancies in the assertions made by
the mother and her psychiatric expert witness. 80 The court concluded that most of
the mother's assertions about the "intolerable harm" that would result from a return
would spring from the child being separated from her, though she had failed to
articulate any reason why such separation was necessary (the father having offered
various arrangements whereby she could continue to live in Germany).' 8' Since
this harm would only result if the mother refused to return to Germany, and she
had failed to submit adequate evidence that doing so would be intolerable for her
beyond mere assertions and psychological evidence developed primarily after the
proceedings commenced, 8 2 the court concluded that the four elements it had taken
from El Sayed were not present and upheld the return order. 83
BDU v BDT shows that from the outset Singapore's courts have adopted an
approach to interpreting the Convention that looks to what they consider to be its
peer jurisdictions. While there are differences in approach and interpretation
between these jurisdictions, this case shows that the nation's courts can be
expected to interpret the Convention similar to other common law jurisdictions, but
also consistently with Singapore's domestic laws of custody and guardianship.
B. Japan's Implementing Act
Before discussing Japan's implementing legislation, two points should be
noted. First, as in the case of Singapore, when committed by a parent, child
abduction is generally not considered a criminal offense in Japan. However, there
have been occasional arrests and convictions of parents snatching their own
children, though they have typically also involved some element of "disturbing the
peace." 8 4 Nothing about Japan's implementing legislation is expected to change
the criminal aspects of child abduction (or lack thereof).
177. Id. 1133. (citing El Sayed v Secretaryfor Justice [2003] 1 NZLR 349 (N.Z.)).
178. Id.
179. Id. 11189.
180. Id. fIM 100, 104-105.
181. Id.1197.
182. Id.
183. Id. 1107.
184. Possible Criminal Penalties in Japan for Parental Abduction to Japan, JAPAN CHILD. RTS.
NETWORK, http://www.cmjapan.net/TheJapanChildrensRights Network/res-criminalpen.html (last
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Second, with Japan's implementing legislation just coming into effect April 1,
2014, there have been no cases arising under the Convention in Japan.'" It should
be noted, however, that Japanese courts have had an exceptionally bad track record
in returning children removed from another country in violation of a custody order
in that country.'18 It is commonly said that the return of a child to another country
has never been realized through the court system in Japan, a state of affairs that is a
reflection of the Japanese legal system's limited capability to remedy abductions
even in strictly domestic cases.
A great deal of the diplomatic pressure on Japan to join the Convention can
thus be said to have been on the expectation that doing so would result in Japanese
courts acting differently. At the same time, however, it has also resulted in a
portrayal in the Japanese media of the Convention as something Japan "must" sign
visited Feb. 6, 2014). Here again, the Family Registry plays a subtle role. Japanese police are generally
reluctant to become involved in civil disputes. However, after divorce a parent who has lost parental
authority is for family register purposes in the same position as a stranger, making it more likely that
police will regard a post-divorce abduction as potentially criminal. Id.
185. Japan Finally Signs Hague Convention Governing International Child Custody Disputes,
ASAHI SHIMBUN, Jan. 25, 2014, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind-news/AJ201401250061.
186. As already noted, this poor record is one of the factors in the severe criticism and diplomatic
pressure that has been directed at Japan to sign the convention. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 1326, 11Ith Cong.
(2010) (calling on Japan to resolve outstanding cases of abduction of children from the United States
and to promptly join the Hague Convention); Press Release, Joint Statement by the Ambassadors of
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, New Zealand, Spain, the
United Kingdom and the United States, and the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to Japan,
Australian Embassy, Tokyo (Oct. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.australia.or.jp/en/pressreleases/?id=80 (expressing concern over child abduction problem in
Japan and urging the country to join the Hague Convention: "Japan is the only G-7 nation that has not
signed the Convention. Currently the left-behind parents of children abducted to or from Japan have
little hope of having their children returned and encounter great difficulties in obtaining access to their
children and exercising their parental rights and responsibilities."); Lucy Birmingham, How Did Japan
Become a Haven for Child Abductions?, TIME (Mar. 7, 2011),
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2056454,00.html. This author has also written a number
of articles critical of Japan's failure to join the Convention or modify its domestic law and practices to
suitably address the problem of parental child abduction. See, e.g., Colin P.A Jones, Expectations Low
as Hague Signing Approaches, JAPAN TIMES (Feb. 21, 2012),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2012/02/21/issues/expectations-low-as-hague-signing-
approaches/#.UvQSJSTn IU; Colin P.A. Jones, Upcoming Legal Reforms: A Plus for Children or plus
ca change?, JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 9, 2011),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2011/08/09/issues/upcoming-legal-reforms-a-plus-for-
children-or-plus-ca-change/#.UvQRWSTn IU. As an aside, the author believes one of the problems
that likely lurks at the heart of Japan's Hague Convention implementing regime is that the primary
expectation on the part of foreign critics is that joining the treaty will lead to different results from
Japanese courts, while on the other the primary expectation on the part of those Japanese involved in
implementation may be that joining the treaty alone will cause foreign criticism to cease!
187. See Jones, In the Best Interest of the Court, supra note 77, at 258-264 (this work no longer
reflects current Japanese law-including a recent wholesale amendment of the family court procedural
statute-or judicial practice, though the institutional factors described still apply).
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because of foreign pressure rather than for reasons relating to the welfare of
children. 188
Against this background, Japan's law for implementing the Convention, the
"Act in connection with the implementation of the convention on the civil aspects
of international child abduction" ("the Act"), 1 8 9 presents a stark contrast to the
ICAA. Submitted to Japan's Diet in March 2013, which quickly approved it, the
Act was promulgated on June 19 and came into effect April 1, 2014.'90 The Act
contains a total of 153 articles (not including supplementary provisions) and fills
110 A-4 sized pages.' 9 ' Further procedural details will come in the form of rules
to be established by Japan's Supreme Court.
Longtime observers of Japan's international abduction problem might be
tempted to conclude that such a baroque statute evidences a desire to make it
difficult to actually achieve the return of a child from Japan. Much of the Act
(Articles 32-143) is devoted to establishing an entire procedural regime for
handling return requests, including detailed rules governing applications, initial
trials, mediation, appeals, retrials, and enforcement. 192 Each step of the process
established in the Act seems to present an opportunity for a disposition either
preventing or delaying return.
Some cynicism may be justified. For example, going so far as to allow a
losing party to apply for a retrial after appeals have been exhausted (Articles 119-
120)193 seems inconsistent with the Convention mandate that return cases be
handled expeditiously.194 Not to mention the Hague Convention best practices
calling for the minimization of opportunities for further delay once a judgment has
become final.' 95
188. See, e.g., Higuj5yaku, kodomo no tame ni taisei tsukuri isoge [Hague Joyaku-Need to make
a system for children quickly], YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Apr. 30, 2013, at 3. If anything, the welfare of
children has come up in public debate in Japan over joining the Hague Convention primarily in the
context of how to protect Japanese mothers and their children fleeing from abusive foreign fathers. Id.
This has resulted in a spate of vaguely-tautological editorials that support Japan joining the Convention
while calling for it to be implemented in a manner that protects the interests of children. Id.
189. KOKUSAITEKINA KODOMO NO DASSHU NO MINJIJO NO SOKUMEN NIKANSURU JOYAKU NO
JISSHINI KANSURU HORITSU [Act for Implementation of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction], Act No. 48 of 2013 (Japan), available at
http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000l21368.pdf
190. Process Toward Conclusion of the Hague Convention, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF JAPAN
(Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/hr ha/page22e_000251 .html.
191. Act for Implementation the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
(Japan).
192. Id. arts. 32-143.
193. Id. arts. 119-20.
194. See Convention, supra note 1, arts. 1-2.
195. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW [HCCH], GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE
UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
CHILD ABDUCTION: PART II-IMPLEMENTING MEASURES, 36-37 (2003), available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/abdguide2_e.pdf. A motion for a new trial may result in enforcement of a
return order being suspended, and can be requested for any of the reasons set forth in Art. 338 of the
314 VOL. 42:2
2014 WILL THE CHILD ABDUCTION TREATY BECOME MORE "ASIAN"?
Initial cynicism aside, other factors may be at work in the Japanese approach
to implementation. First, for linguistic reasons it is unlikely that Japan could
simply emulate Singapore by adopting convention provisions "as is" into Japanese
law. This would likely involve complex translation issues (including conformity
with domestic legal usages) and has never been Japan's practice with treaties.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, Japan's judicial system is based on
continental models and lacks many of the inherent powers that have come to be
exercised by common law judges.196 Japanese judges can only exercise those
powers given to them by the law and lack the many vaguely defined "inherent
powers" of their common law counterparts (including the broad wardship
jurisdiction that courts in common law systems have long exercised over
children).197  This difference is illustrated by Article 73(2) of the Act which
empowers judges hearing return cases to allow parties to speak, as well as prohibit
them from speaking,' 98 a power most common law judges likely take for granted.
In a similar vein, the Act gives a court hearing a return case the authority to issue
orders prohibiting the removal of an abducted child from Japan (Articles 122 and
123), a power, which to the author's knowledge, has never been used by Japanese
courts in pre-Convention cases.
Thus, insofar as the Convention expects Japanese judges to act in a particular
way (expeditiously and adjudicating only a limited range of issues) in specific
types of cases (requests for return orders), it may not have been possible to
accomplish this by merely modifying existing procedures and expecting judges to
take the lead in implementation. This seems particularly likely when one recalls
that the existing system of child custody litigation is based primarily on mediation
aimed at producing consensual result which, if unsuccessful may require years of
judicial proceedings before a final result is reached. The fact that Japan has chosen
to have cases arising under the Convention handled in just two designated family
courts (in Tokyo and Osaka) further necessitates a procedural regime different
from the existing system rules designed for a nationwide network of family
courts. 200
Another source of skepticism might be the gatekeeper role the Act accords to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs (who under Article 3 of the Act is designated as
Japan's Central Authority) 201 in rejecting defective applications for returns and
Code of Civil Procedure, which include: "There was an omission in a determination with regard to
material matters that should have affected a judgment." MINPO [MINPO] [CIv. C.] art. 338 (Japan).
196. JOHN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX 118(1991).
197. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW IN SINGAPORE, supra note 91, 424-426 (describing
English law background to Singapore law of wardship and judge's inherent powers to make rulings).
198. Act for Implementation of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, art. 73, para. 2 (Japan).
199. Id. arts. 122-123. Note that Art. 22 of the Japanese Constitution guarantees the freedom to
"move to a foreign country." NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 22 (Japan).
200. Act for Implementation of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, art. 32 (Japan).
201. Id. art. 3.
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access assistance.202 While Singapore's ICAA merely empowers its Central
Authority to reject incoming applications which do meet formal requirements,
Japan's Act (Articles 7 and 18) goes into significant detail as to when the Minister
is required to reject applications, including instances when doing so might involve
203performing a quasi-judicial function. For example, under Article 7(l)(6) of the
Act, the Minister must reject a return application if "it is clear" that the applicant
did not have or was not exercising "rights of custody" under the laws of child's
jurisdiction of habitual residence.204 The ability of Japan's Central Authority to
make decisions about law and fact in "clear cases" seems inconsistent with Hague
Convention best practices, which state that: "Central Authorities must exercise
extreme caution before rejecting an application, especially where there is a
difference of opinion between Central Authorities concerning habitual residence or
rights of custody, as these issues will require judicial determination."205
One of the Act's most contentious features may prove to be its
implementation of the Convention exceptions to the return principle. Under
Convention Article 13(b), a child does not have to be returned if "there is a grave
risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm
or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation." 206  This exception is
replicated in Article 28(l)(4) of the Act, but in paragraph 2 of the same article,
judges hearing return cases are authorized to take into account a wide variety of
factors in evaluating whether an exception is applicable, including the risk of
violence (defined as including verbal behavior) to the taking parent or the child.207
Another factor that can be considered is whether there are circumstances that
would make it difficult for the taking parent, or the requesting parent, to care for
the child after a return.208 Such a provision seems to authorize something close to
an evaluation of both parents' custodial capacities, a determination that is
essentially prohibited by Article 19 of the Convention.
A final reason for the Act's baroqueness may be because, rather than building
upon a pre-existing foundation of compatible domestic law and practice as in the
case of Singapore's ICAA, the Act essentially reflects an effort to graft a treaty
onto a system of family law that is arguably inconsistent with it. The Convention
is rooted in widely-accepted notions of what is in the best interests of children (not
being abducted and having their welfare decided in their jurisdiction of habitual
residence),209 while Japanese family law can be understood as based primarily
202. See id. arts. 7-18.
203. Id.
204. Id. art. 7, para. 1, no. 6.
205. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW [HCcH], GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE
UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
CHILD ABDUCTION: PART I-CENTRAL AUTHORITY PRACTICE 47 (2003), available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/abdguide e.pdf.
206. Convention, supra note 1, art. 13(b).
207. Act for Implementation of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, art. 28 (Japan).
208. Id. art. 28, para. 2, no. 3.
209. Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 1-2.
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upon consensual arrangements in which the government performs a largely
administrative function (processing paperwork) without any supervision over the
welfare of the children affected by them.
For example, the Act uses the term "kango no kenri" ("rights of custody") but
does not include a definition, just as with the Convention itself.210 However, the
term "kango" (care, custody) is also used in Articles 766 and 820 of Japan's Civil
Code but there is no attempt to reconcile the two terms, even if only to clarify what
"kango no kenri" means in the context of Japanese law for purposes of
understanding when a child taken from Japan should be returned under the
Conventions.21' As already noted, the "right to determine the child's residence" is
not only part of the Convention definition of "rights of custody" but also identified
as a component of parental authority in the Japanese Civil Code.212 The lack of
concordance between "rights of custody" in the Convention and the Act and
"parental authority" under the Civil Code may result in discrepancies between how
Japanese law treats international cases and domestic cases. This will become more
apparent as cases develop. Under the Convention, a Japanese parent can request
and probably achieve the return of a child taken to a foreign country based on
having joint parental authority over the child during marriage. 213 In the same
scenario taking place domestically, the Japanese parent may not even be able to see
the child, let alone expect a Japanese family court to realize a return to the status
quo ante.214
The discrepancies between the Convention and Japanese domestic law
become most apparent in connection with access rights. Under Article 16 of the
Act, a parent may seek the Minister's assistance in facilitating contact with a child
in Japan based on access rights recognized in another Convention country.2 15 Such
an application must include documents establishing that the applicant is entitled to
access rights under the laws of the child's habitual residence.216 If one were to file
an application from a hypothetical country that had exactly the same laws as Japan,
however, the author has no idea what such documents would be! Japanese law
contains no clear statements regarding access (a term that did not even appear in
the Civil Code until 2011) nor is the author aware of any judicial precedents
declaring access to be assumed because it is in the best interests of children absent
special circumstances. Finally, even in cases where courts get involved in access
disputes, mediation is required first, and access itself may be the subject of
210. See Act for Implementation of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, art. 2 (Japan) (rights of custody is not defined in the definition article).
211. See Minp6 [Minpo] [Civ. C.] art. 766, 820 (Japan).
212. Id. art. 821.
213. Convention, supra note 1, art. 3.
214. Minpo [Minpa] [Civ. C.] art. 819 (Japan).
215. Act for Implementation of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, art. 16 (Japan).
216. Id.
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217
mediation. As a result, it is not uncommon for parents to go for extended
periods with no access despite court involvement through mediation.
The Act appears to have been drafted with full cognizance of the deficiencies
of Japanese law on the subject of access. In Article 21, a provision that to an
extent mirrors Article 16 of the Convention, and by which parents in Japan can
seek assistance in exercising rights of access with respect to children taken to
another contracting state, there is no reference to rights of access "under Japanese
law"-only a generic reference to the "law of habitual residence." 218 Here again,
the author suspects that a clear reference to "rights of access under Japanese law"
would invite unwelcome inquiries about what that means in the context of strictly
domestic cases.
V. SYNTHESIS
With these brief comparisons behind us, we can now return to the question
posited at the beginning of this article: is there anything about the two
implementation regimes presaging the development of an "Asian" version of the
Convention in practice? Accepting that this is a very limited comparison, and one
that can only truly be properly done with a greater range of samples (including the
implementation regimes of "Western" Convention parties), the author would
nonetheless suggest the answer is likely to be "no."
As this article has hopefully made clear, the systems of family law and
manner of implementing the Convention in Japan and Singapore are very
different-even the two countries' motivations for joining the treaty may be quite
different. Moreover, the author believes that many of the differences between
Japan and Singapore described in this article are likely to be attributable primarily
to the differences in the underlying common law and continental systems in which
their respective legal systems are based. Despite having a population comprised of
a variety of Asian ethnic and religious groups, the manner in which Singapore's
courts handle child custody-related matters seems quite familiar to a common law-
trained lawyer such as the author. The Japanese system would likely seem quite
different-and in some respects (the role of the family register, for example)
unique, even.
At the same time, however, many of the features of the Japanese system that
may seem different may be so as much because of their continental European
heritage as because of "Japanese-ness." For example, a widely identified problem
with Japanese family courts in custody and access cases has long been lack of
enforceability. 219 Yet Germany, a country on which many features of the Japanese
217. Domestic Relations Cases, SUPREME CT. JAPAN,
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judicialsys/domestic relations/domestic index/index.html#0I (last
visited June 5, 2014).
218. Compare Act for Implementation of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction, art. 21 (Japan), with Convention, supra note 1, art. 16.
219. Until a few years ago the U.S. State Department website included the following description of
the situation: "compliance with [Japanese] Family Court rulings is essentially voluntary, which renders
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civil justice system is modeled, was identified by the U.S. State Department as a
country showing "patterns of non-compliance" with the Convention as recently as
2008 for essentially the same reason.220 In fact, a review of U.S. State Department
annual reports on compliance with the Convention shows that the countries
identified as having compliance issues, particularly with respect to enforcement,
tend to overwhelmingly be those with civil law, rather than common law
systems. 221
The United States government's view of Convention compliance is not
conclusive of anything, of course. However, it may be the case that, as more Asian
countries do come to join the Convention, the inquiry should be as much on the
differences between the two main sources of Western legal tradition as between
more vaguely-defined "Western-ness" and "Asian-ness."
Finally, if there is one area where more detailed scrutiny as to possible
differences between "Asian" and "Western" modalities of resolving disputes may
be merited, the author would suggest it may be in the area of family mediation.
However, this is a subject that must be lcft to future research.
any ruling unenforceable unless both parents agree." Reproduced in Jones, In the Best Interest of the
Court, supra note 77, at 247 n.317.
220. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE
CIvIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION, 14 (2008).
American parents often obtain favorable court judgments regarding access and visitation, but
the German courts' decisions can remain unenforced for years. Since physical force . . . to
enforce court orders and legal sanctions [is] rare, taking parents can and do avoid allowing
court-ordered access. As a result, a number of U.S. parents still face problems obtaining
access to and maintaining a meaningful parent-child relationship with their children who
remain in Germany.
Id. With the exception of the first sentence, the above would also serve as an accurate description of the
situation in Japanese courts. Jones, In the Best Interest of the Court, supra note 77, at 247 n.317.
221. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORTS ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE HAGUE ABDUCTION CONVENTION
6 (2013), available at http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/childabduction/complianceReports/2013.pdf
(listing Argentina, Australia, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, and Romania as countries with
enforcement concerns). Each of these countries, with the exception of Australia, are based on civil law
systems. See The World Factbook: Legal Systems, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2100.html (last visited June 4,
2014).
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